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THE EMPEROR CHARLES V.

THE EMPEROR CHARLES V

BY

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THE expedition against Algiers was conditional, not only on the peace of Germany, but on the neutrality of France, and this had seemed more than doubtful. At the opening of 1541 it was clear that the eternal friendship of Charles and Francis had not survived its second year. Already in 1540 France had negotiated a peace between Venice and the Turk, which might give her a possible ally in Italy, while it set the Turkish squadrons free to transfer their operations from the Levant, the Morea and the Adriatic, to the coasts of Spain, Sicily and Naples. In this year also Zapolya had died, and, in defiance of the agreement that Ferdinand should succeed to his Hungarian possessions, the widow, with the aid of her minister Martinuzzi, set her son John Sigismund

upon his father's throne, receiving the support alike of French and Turks. There was even some promise of the reversion of Hungary for the Duke of Orleans. France was in this only following her traditional policy of securing a foothold in the East against the Habsburg, whether it were Hungary, Poland or Bohemia. The Duke of Orleans would but have anticipated the *régime* of his nephew, the Duke of Anjou, in Poland. On every side Charles was now harassed by the untiring French diplomatists. They were seeking a foothold in Siena and Piombino, drawing the Neapolitan nobles into treason, tempting the Duke of Savoy to surrender Nice by the offer of a French fief, In the Netherlands open war would have been preferable to veiled hostilities. Democratic and religious disaffection were stimulated in the large cities, while Francis entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Duke of Cleves. If Charles sought a basis of agreement with the Lutherans at Worms and Regensburg, French envoys urged Protestants and Catholics alike to wreck his efforts.

In the summer French intrigues at the Porte nearly provoked immediate war. Antonio Rincon, a Spanish refugee and French agent, had come from Constantinople to complete a treaty between Francis and the Sultan. On his return through Lombardy in company with Cesare Fregoso, who was on a mission to Venice, he was surprised by Spanish soldiers on the Po near Pavia, and in the scuffle the two diplomatists were killed (July 3, 1541). The Milanese viceroy, del Guasto, had doubtless wished to seize the papers, but the more compromising had been left behind, and great was the relief of Francis on finding that his agents had been only killed and not reserved for torture. He blustered loudly about the outrage on his diplomatic servants, and by

way of reprisal arrested at Lyons George of Austria, Maximilian's natural son, who was on his way to his new see of Liège. Charles, perhaps with truth, disavowed all knowledge of the act. Rincon's mission was too dirty to make his murder a comfortable *casus belli*; moreover, both the agents were Imperial subjects under the ban for treason. Francis had to rest content with transferring Rincon's Turkish mission to the enterprising Paulin.

Charles utilised the lull before the storm for his long-cherished scheme against Algiers. Passing over the Brenner into Italy, he received Cosimo de' Medici and Pierluigi Farnese at Genoa, and at Lucca once more pressed upon the Pope his eager desire for the friendship of France, again offering the Netherlands to Orleans and the Infanta. Francis, indeed, did promise the Pope that he would not attack the Emperor until his return from Algiers.

The campaign had been long deferred, owing to the French attack on Savoy and the war which followed. Indeed, Charles's attention had been directed to the east rather than the south. His alliance with Venice and the Pope against the Turk in 1538 might have anticipated the victory of Lepanto but for the disaffection of Ghent, and the outspoken distaste of the Castilian nobility for a distant enterprise which would expose their shores to the attack of the Barbaresques, and their estates in Southern Spain to a rising of the Moors. The fact that the Imperial fleet was commanded by Andrea Doria, and largely consisted of Genoese galleys, made effective concert with Venice, the old rival of Genoa, almost impossible. The jealousy of Venetians and Genoese was said to have caused the escape of the Turkish fleet at Prevesa, even as another Doria was to

be accused of preventing its absolute annihilation at Lepanto. The only result of the naval campaign was the capture and loss of Castelnovo in the Morea. This was but a repetition of the fatal policy of isolated posts, the cause of so many African disasters. The Spanish garrison of 4000 men was surrounded and cut to pieces before relief could reach it. After the truce of Nice Charles had unquestionably intended to take the offensive in person, and to head a Crusade of the three allied powers. He retired from Italy to Spain for the express purpose of organising a campaign for 1539. The events at Ghent and in Guelders caused him to abandon this design, and it is probable that he was influenced by the common sense of his sister Mary, who begged him to let drop these fanciful Crusades, and attend to the preservation and welfare of his hereditary dominions.

The Crusade was not Charles's only method for weakening the power of the Turk. From 1538 to 1541 a strange attempt was made to detach Barbarossa from Turkish service. This apparently had its origin during the campaign in the Adriatic. Captain Alarcon was empowered to offer Barbarossa the possession of Tunis, with Bona, Biserta and Bugia, as a vassal kingdom. The conditions were that the Algerine should serve Charles with some sixty galleys, dismantling the rest of his fleet, and compensating his captains by governorships on land. Barbarossa was required to release Spanish and Genoese captives, to keep the seas clear of piracy, to allow Spanish subjects to engage in the North African pearl fishery, and to refuse refuge to Moors from the Peninsula. It was further suggested that Barbarossa should burn the Turkish fleet, or leave it in such a critical position that it must fall a prey to the Christians. It was represented to him that, although he had recently

been successful in his maritime raids, the peace with France would stop all this, and that it would be prudent to make terms in time.[1]

The negotiations broke down, apparently because Barbarossa insisted on the immediate possession of Tunis and Tripoli, which Charles was not prepared to give, out of regard for Muley Hassan and the Hospitallers. Nevertheless the ransom of the survivors of the garrison of Castelnovo was a convenient pretext for renewing them. Powers were given to Andrea Doria and Ferrante Gonzaga, now governor of Sicily, to conclude a treaty, and Charles even sent orders to the governor of Goletta empowering him to evacuate it at their command. The plenipotentiaries were instructed to cede Tunis, but to reserve Goletta and Tripoli, unless Barbarossa insisted, in which case these latter were to be dismantled: in consideration of the cession of Tunis they should hold firmly to the retention of Bugia. A draft treaty with Ferrante Gonzaga's seal actually exists, in which two clauses relate to a common war against France, if Charles were attacked, and to the conquest of Venice. Whether the Emperor was responsible for the latter condition may well be doubted, as it is quite opposed to his usual policy of caution. It was, however, a favourite scheme of Gonzaga's, and Andrea Doria might have concurred in any plan for humbling the ancient rival of his city. The Cardinal of Ravenna told Charles that he had two open foes, the French and the Turks, and two secret, the Pope and Venice, and advised him to throw all his weight upon the Republic.

Whatever the morality of these negotiations, their interest is undoubted. As Charles had utilised a moment of irritation, and detached Andrea Doria from

[1] For these negotiations see *Documentos Ineditos*, vol. i.

France for ever, so now he would rob the Porte of its admiral, converting him into a naval *condottiere* of the Spanish Crown. Whether or not the Turkish fleet were destroyed, it would be crippled, and all practical danger arising from a Franco-Turkish alliance averted. With the combined squadrons of Genoa and Algiers, Charles could ride the Western Mediterranean undisturbed. The coasts of Spain, Naples and Sicily would be protected by the whilom pirate, now their policeman; the Spanish Moors would be deprived of the resource which alone could make them dangerous. Barbarossa had his enemies and his offences at the Porte: he had only accepted its suzerainty in a moment of extreme peril. His chief captains were Levantines, Italians or Sardinians; his second-in-command the Jew Sinan. They were not adventurers because they were renegades, but they had perforce become renegades in order to be adventurers. Religion sat very lightly on this syndicate of pirates, and none too heavily on some of the Imperial councillors and captains.

Either the Porte had an inkling of Barbarossa's negotiations, or he used them to enhance the value of his services. At all events they proved abortive, and from that moment Charles fixed his attention on the destruction of the corsair state, although before his negotiations with Barbarossa had ceased, and up to the very day of his attack on Algiers, he seems to have conducted an intrigue with Hassan Aga, the commandant, with a view to the surrender of the town. The Turks meanwhile were advancing in force upon Austria, and Charles was twitted with cowardice for turning his back upon them. Scepticism, indeed, as to the genuineness of his designs upon Algiers was general; it was believed that they were a pretext under which he would visit North Italy,

mass his forces there, and anticipate the French attack. In fact, the French, the Venetians and the Pope, all nervously armed in view of possible eventualities. Charles, however, was thoroughly in earnest, nor could he, for German and North Italian interests, any longer shut his eyes to the miseries of Spain and Southern Italy. Whoever was to blame, he was to suffer dearly for the mistake of attacking Algiers so late in the year, but he thought that a fortnight might suffice for its capture, whereas he could not possibly hope even to open a Danubian campaign against Solyman before the winter. The exploit, moreover, would hamper a Franco-Turkish alliance on the sea, which was more directly dangerous than the chance of coincident attack from the two ends of Europe. The Emperor's policy had, probably, the indirect effect of causing the Sultan's withdrawal to Constantinople, at the instance of Barbarossa, after the seizure of Buda-Pesth in the early autumn. It seemed hardly possible to fail. Barbarossa was absent, and Algiers was weakly held. The attacking force was nearly equal in military, if not in naval strength, to that which conquered Tunis, and it was much nearer to its base.[1]

Sailing from Spezia, and touching at Majorca, Charles arrived off the African coast at Cape Metafuz on October 20. Alba and Bernardino Mendoza with the Spanish division were there before him, but to the westward of Algiers. Dirty weather prevented the junction of the

[1] For the Algerian expedition the reader may consult E. Cat, *De Caroli Quinti in Africa rebus gestis*, 1891; *Harleian Miscellany*, vol. iv. p. 532; the memoirs of Cerezeda as above; G. Turba, *Ueber den Zug Kaiser Karls V. gegen Algier* (Arch. für österr. Ges. vol. lxxvi. 1890). R. Basset, *Documents musulmans sur le siège d'Algers*, 1890; L. Galindo, *Historia vicissitudines y politica tradicional de España, respecto de sus posessiones en las costas de Africa* (*Memorias de la real Acad. de la historia*, xi. 1884). See also *Documentos Ineditos* vol. i. Several tracts may be found in Cimber and Danjou.

fleets until October 23. Some 20,000 troops were then landed seven or eight miles to the east of the city, with provisions for two or three days only, with little cavalry and less artillery. On the 24th, the Spaniards and Germans, after a brisk skirmish, occupied the high ground to the south of Algiers, while the Italians guarded the shore to cover the disembarkation from the transport.

The general attack was to take place on the following day, October 25, but during the night a tempest with torrents of cold rain struck the Spanish army. Tents were blown down, the fuses of the arquebuses wetted, the ammunition soaked. The garrison took advantage of the storm to make a sortie. The Spaniards easily drove back the assailants, but great havoc was wrought upon the Italians, who were covering the motley throng upon the shore. The whole of the 25th the storm raged, and ships and galleys were dashed upon the coast under the eyes of the Emperor, who had now marched down his whole force from the higher ground. At length Doria with his shattered fleet bore away for the shelter of Cape Metafuz, and on the 26th, Charles had no alternative but to follow. Surrounded by emboldened Moors the army struggled along the coast, reaching the cape on October 28. Cortes, who accompanied Charles, is said to have urged a countermarch on Algiers with the German and Spanish troops, but there were no provisions save dates and horseflesh, "unsalted and badly roasted," and the troops were demoralised. When Charles could sum up his losses it was found that he had lost the whole of his supplies and most of his artillery; the remaining horses were killed because there was not room for the troops in the ships which had weathered the gale. After embarkation there was a recrudescence of

the storm, and the fleet was scattered in all directions. There was a rumour that Charles was lost, and, indeed, only with great difficulty did he reach the Spanish coast.

Contemporaries very generally attributed the blame for the Algerine disaster to the Emperor's obstinacy in making the attempt so late in the year, in defiance of the advice of experts, especially that of Andrea Doria. The Genoese admiral, it seems, feared a counter-attack on Genoa by the Turkish fleet, and was alarmed by the strengthening of the French garrisons in Piedmont. The case for Charles is that the expedition was postponed by avoidable delay on the part of his subordinates, and that Doria's unreadiness was not entirely unintentional. All Spain was on the tiptoe of expectation. If Charles had deferred the campaign till the following year, the expenses of preparation would have been sacrificed, and could scarcely have been provided a second time. Charles, in writing to Mary from Bugia, immediately after the disaster, not unreasonably attributed it to delay: had the fleet sailed ten days earlier the game would have been won. He already recognised that the blame was laid, somewhat unjustly, on his shoulders.—"There have been so many delays, and on so many sides, that I have got to pay without any fault of mine, which is contrary to the usual rule with me."

Charles would have to resist the new French attack with prestige and material power gravely shaken. There was just this much, that in personal reputation he had greatly gained; to his calm courage and cheerfulness was ascribed the salvation of his force from total annihilation. Catholics and Lutherans could and did recognise that he was sacrificing his treasure and his person in the cause of Christendom, while his rival

lavished both in facile campaigns against the light-armed reputations of French court-ladies.

Charles never again had a year's leisure to resume his darling project. Fighting, indeed, there was in his latter days along the North African coasts, and with varied fortunes. If the Spaniards took the city of Mehedia with its large garrison, the Hospitallers lost Tripoli, and Muley Hassan's expulsion from Tunis by his son implied the revival of Turkish influence. The years of the Emperor's retirement witnessed further losses, which future reigns were never to make good. War differs from football mainly in this, that "tries" count not for, but against the side that makes them. Had Charles won his goal, it is almost certain that Algiers would be Spanish, and not French, at the present day.

When the news arrived of the lamentable fiasco in North Africa, Francis had no scruple in turning the misfortune of Christianity to his personal advantage. The magnitude of Charles's losses was deliberately exaggerated by his enemies. The Kings of Denmark and Sweden, both fearing the claims of Dorothea and the Count Palatine, were drawn into the alliance of France and Cleves; the co-operation of the Porte was no longer disavowed. In July 1542 the rivals were again at war. Reversing his usual policy, Francis stood on the defensive in Italy, and directed his attack against the Emperor's Spanish and Netherlandish frontiers. Charles wrote to Ferdinand that Francis had followed his honourable practice of attacking and taking people by surprise without the preliminary cry of *Guard*. The French, relying upon revolt in Ghent and Antwerp, invaded Artois and Flanders, while the Duke of Orleans conquered Luxemburg, and the capable Gueldrian

condottiere, Martin van Rossem, aided by French, Danish and Swedish auxiliaries, harried Brabant, and reached the walls of Antwerp. In the south, Francis and the Dauphin in person invested Perpignan, the capital of Roussillon. Van Rossem's motley force alone had any real success. The gallant defence of the Duke of Alba and his Spanish garrison forced Francis to an ignominous retreat: Perpignan had proved the French king's Algiers. The year's campaign had squandered the dwindling resources of France to little purpose.

Hitherto the wars of Charles and Francis had been essentially Italian wars. French attacks upon the Netherlands and French intrigues in Germany had been merely episodes or diversions. The war of 1542 seemed likely from the first to be a German war; the combined attack of Francis, Solyman and the Duke of Cleves, must inevitably affect the power of Charles in Germany, and his relations to his Lutheran subjects. He had made large concessions to the Lutherans in order to conquer Algiers: what then would be the result of his disastrous failure? The Emperor's absence, his defeat and reported death, the outbreak of the French war, necessarily exercised reflex action upon Germany. Even before the failure at Algiers, Ferdinand was hard pressed by the Turkish advance along the Danube. He was forced to summon diet after diet, and fall upon his knees for aid. The Lutherans pressed their advantage to the full, refusing supply until they received a guarantee for a long period of security. At home they busied themselves in protestantising the Saxon bishoprics, thus adding largely to the resources and influence of their leading territorial power. The Elector of Cologne formally introduced Lutheranism into his see in defiance of chapter and town-council. Thus three of

the Electors were now Protestants, while upon Mainz and the Elector Palatine the Emperor could place no reliance.

Apart from the wavering and militarily unimportant ecclesiastical princes, Catholicism was now virtually reduced to the rulers of Austria and Bavaria and to Duke Henry of Brunswick. Henry had long been the champion of Catholic interests in Northern Germany. He was eccentric, capricious, violent and tyrannical—more likely to cause trouble to his friends than render aid. He now fell upon evil days. Philip of Hesse and John Frederick of Saxony, under pretext of defending the Lutheran town of Goslar, expelled him from his duchy, forcibly overthrew Catholicism, and established a dual Saxon-Hessian control. This act was contemporaneous with the outbreak of the French war in July 1542. Notwithstanding Henry's misdeeds, it was a breach of public order such as Germany had not witnessed for many decades. If it were part of a definite scheme for the suppression of German Catholicism, if the Lutheran princes were acting in virtual concert with Francis, and if they intended to lend aid to the Duke of Cleves and the Elector of Cologne, the Catholic and Habsburg cause in Germany was irretrievably lost.

It is possible that German Catholicism was now, as was Lutheranism at other times, saved by the successes of the Turk. After Zapolya's death the Turks had, as has been stated, brought Buda under the immediate dominion of the Porte in July 1541, confining Elizabeth and her child to the government of Transylvania. In the following year the Franco-Turkish alliance sent a thrill of genuine patriotism or religious horror throughout Lutheran Germany. The diet voted liberal supplies for the defence of Hungary. The Elector Joachim II.,

however, who led the national forces, was, according to a Venetian envoy, too fat for anything but eating and drinking. He proved so incompetent, and his German troops so unwieldy, mutinous and cowardly, that the attack on Buda was a ridiculous failure. Nevertheless, this Turkish movement had averted a possible or probable alliance of the Lutherans with France. The year 1543 threatened to prove more decisive than its predecessor, for the monstrous coalition bore its fruit. In April Solyman in person marched upon Vienna. He had already, he boasted, touched it with his finger; he would now clutch it with both hands. Barbarossa, with 110 galleys and 14,000 troops, ravaged the Neapolitan and Tuscan coasts, and, joining the Duke of Enghien's French fleet, laid siege to Nice, while Francis I. invaded Hainault. But the Emperor was now ready. The marriage of his son Philip with the Portuguese princess had brought a substantial dowry. From the Mexican fleet Charles had taken as a loan the whole of its precious metals. He left Spain, never to return as ruler, under the charge of Philip, aided by a Council of Regency. Making for Genoa, he hastened, after an inconclusive interview with Paul III. at Busseto, to the seat of war. Thither he brought some 4000 Spanish and as many Italian troops, while his Spanish treasures commanded the *lanzknecht* market. Charles had left Spain only just in time. Had Barbarossa been a little quicker, he could not have sailed, and then, it was thought, the Netherlands must have been lost; the anxiety of Mary of Hungary had been intense. Barbarossa was not the only foe, secret or open, that Charles had left behind him. The Pope, while professing neutrality and desire for peace, strove to utilise the Emperor's difficulties to extort Milan or Siena for his family, and on

refusal sulkily prorogued the Council which he had already summoned. Henceforth Paul III. showed undisguised partiality for France; the very Turks had orders to pay for the supplies which they drew from Papal ports. To keep the Farnesi in check, Charles lavished new favours on their rival, the Duke of Florence: in return for the possession of the fortresses of Florence and Leghorn, Cosimo paid a handsome subsidy for the Emperor's campaign.

If the Pope and the Most Christian King were in alliance with the infidel, the champion of the Faith must dally with the heretic. While making no permanent engagements, Charles reassured the Lutherans for the immediate future, and attracted their younger princes into his service. Philip of Hesse, flattered by the prospect of the command against the Sultan, pledged himself to give no aid to Cleves. The Emperor scarcely seemed to notice the injury inflicted upon his one faithful friend, the Duke of Brunswick, and the insult to the central authority of the Empire. He was ready to give long credit for some of these minor debts; in the most urgent case he would levy distress by force, and then turn his whole attention to settling his score with the king, against whom he had a long account.

Charles's policy of opportunism and detachment was conspicuously displayed in this campaign of 1543. To Ferdinand he sent just sufficient troops to hold Solyman in check. Then, taking full advantage of interior lines, he threw his whole weight upon the Duke of Cleves. A fortnight sufficed to bring the rebel to his knees. His town of Duren, reputed to be impregnable, held only for three hours against the Spaniards' furious assault. The accidental fire which followed on the sack

was the funeral pyre of Gueldrian independence. Save that John Frederick had sent a handful of troops to the duke's assistance, no Lutheran prince moved a finger in aid of the all-important convert. The Germans too had received an object-lesson on the selfishness of French policy and the futility of French alliance: the French King had abandoned the ally of generations to the Emperor's mercies. Charles did, indeed, prove himself as merciful as he was politic and strong. By the treaty of Venloo he invested the defeated duke with his hereditary states, but deprived him of Guelders and Zutphen. Thus the running sore which had weakened four generations of Burgundian rulers was healed at length. The duke engaged not to complete his marriage with his recalcitrant little bride, Jeanne d'Albret; the gift of an Austrian wife later drew him within the Habsburg family circle. He pledged himself to suppress heresy within his states, to abandon his alliance with France and the Scandinavian powers; Van Rossem was suffered to enter Imperial service with his seasoned troops. The effects of Charles's success in Guelders were at once felt beyond its borders. The Elector of Cologne was isolated; the flowing tide of his reform was stayed. The fortnight's war had probably momentous consequences for all time in the religious history of North-western Germany.

In comparison with the Emperor's success it was of small account that the French once more raided Luxemburg, that the gigantic Franco-Turkish fleet laid Nice in ashes. The castle, the Duke of Savoy's last possession, was still bravely held, and when Doria and del Guasto moved to its relief, Enghien and Barbarossa ran for the shelter of Toulon (September 1543). This port was throughout the winter the unhallowed market for the

sale of the population of Nice, whom Barbarossa had carried off as slaves. In the early spring the corsair sailed homewards, stripping the Italian coasts of their inhabitants. Francis had done little but stamp indelible disgrace upon himself and France. Other powers—even Elizabeth of England—have coquetted with the Turk during his immaturity or decadence; but Francis, unattacked and unprovoked, brought him to the northernmost shores of the Mediterranean at the very zenith of his power, when his advance on Germany seemed irresistible. Under the eyes and with the aid of a French admiral of royal blood, the worst of Turkish atrocities were perpetrated upon the defenceless prince who was the French king's kinsman. French Catholicism in vain strove to wash out the black stain of the burnt town with the blood of the neighbouring Provençal heretics.

The late autumn of 1543 saw Charles personally engaged in his last war with Francis. Vendôme had occupied and strongly fortified Landrecy, equally threatening to Hainault and Artois. In spite of all entreaties the Emperor joined the investing army in October. He had been miserably ill, and had lost much flesh; his harness was "a great deal too wide for him, though he had had made a great doublet bombasted with cotton." The operations were resultless. Francis also appeared upon the scene, but, after throwing reinforcements into Landrecy, he retired without an attempt to crush his rival's inferior forces. The interest of the little campaign is this, that here Charles commanded a force of 6000 English, reconnoitred with an escort of their cavalry, inspected their new-fashioned field trenches. "Upon my word," he cried on passing the captains and subalterns of the infantry, "a brave band of gentlemen . . .

if the French king come, as he saith he will, I will live and die with you Englishmen."

In the last as in the first war with Francis Henry VIII. was the Emperor's ally. During the eighteen intervening years they had been strangers to each other's military or naval operations. English ships had fought in Baltic waters in the conflict between Christian III. and Lübeck, but in this Charles had not been actively concerned. Since the victory of Pavia until shortly before the alliance of 1543, Henry VIII. had been ostensibly an anti-Imperialist, although diplomatic relations were never more than momentarily interrupted. This then would seem to be the opportunity to sketch very briefly the causes which led from the first rupture to the final alliance of Charles and Henry.

War had been declared against the Emperor by Henry in January 1528, but it had never passed beyond a suspension of commercial relations, and five months later the inconvenience of this caused a truce between England and the Netherlands. Charles contented himself with putting pressure upon the Curia to declare against the validity of Anne Boleyn's marriage and in favour of that of Catherine. Whatever promises of active intervention he might make, he could not enforce the Papal decrees unless he were at accord with Francis, and the French king more often than not pulled the Pope in the opposite direction. Henry and Charles had this much in common, that the fond desire of each was to be left alone. The avoidance of rupture must in time render possible the renewal of amity.

The death of Queen Catherine in January 1536 undoubtedly brought nearer a reconciliation between Charles and Henry, in spite of officially expressed belief in the agency of poison, and of measures actually con-

ceived for the escape of Mary to the Netherlands. The existence of Anne Boleyn was a safeguard to Charles, because for him she was merely Henry's mistress, and politically a mistress might be preferable to a wife, especially to a French wife. He was therefore not unwilling to make some terms with Anne, while she began to display Imperialist sympathies, talking loudly against the iniquity of Francis I.'s attack on Savoy. The support of Cromwell could now be almost counted on. As early as the summer of 1533 the Emperor's ambassador Chapuys had hopes of winning the English minister, who in 1535 made tentative proposals for the marriage of Philip with Elizabeth. Much more serious was the suggestion made at the opening of the following year for Mary's marriage with Charles's brother-in-law, Luis of Portugal. The negotiations for this continued for some years, even until Philip's successful courtship.

After Catherine's death Charles induced the Pope to suspend the publication of the Bull of deposition, which had been the consequence of the execution of More and Fisher. Both Chapuys and Cromwell expected that Henry would accept the overtures for an alliance against France, and both were chagrined at the snub which Henry administered to the Imperial envoy in April 1536. Paul III., on the other hand, met with equally scant success in his endeavour to coax Henry back to Rome by the cajolery of a French marriage. A month after the rebuff to Chapuys Henry was wedded to Jane Seymour, and this was ill-liked in France, for she passed for a good Imperialist. Then followed the rebellion of the North, which diverted the king's attention from foreign politics.

Throughout 1537 there was growing friendliness between Charles and Henry, of which Diego de Mendoza's

special mission to England was a symptom. On Jane Seymour's death it really seemed that Charles's niece, the pretty young widow, Christina of Milan, might, with the aid of Holbein's portrait, once more bring Henry into the Habsburg circle. Charles and his sister Mary had been induced by Chapuys to abandon their annoying practice of addressing the king as "well-beloved uncle." They could now venture to press for a declaration in favour of Mary Tudor's legitimacy, and though Henry evaded this, he did so in no unfriendly spirit.

The Tudor king's bugbear had always been the possibility of a Franco-Imperial alliance, and the truce of Nice brought this danger home. Henry strove to detach France by proposals for a partition of the Netherlands, while he reopened friendly relations with the Lutheran princes, whose chief concern, however, was not so much the violent restoration of Catholicism as the subtle spread of Anabaptism in England. Charles with needless sensibility complained of the reception of envoys from the enemies of himself and the whole Christian world. The remonstrance was passed on by Henry to the Lutheran princes as a wholesome irritant. Dr. Barnes, a zealous Lutheran, was sent with proposals for a league to Germany, where Mont was already negotiating a double marriage with the house of Cleves. This little state seemed for the moment the key of the diplomatic situation. Neither the young duke nor his sister Anne were nominally Lutherans, although the marriage of their sister with John Frederick connected them with the party. Henry through their medium could form a political alliance with the German princes, without committing himself to a religious union. Charles on his side was anxious not to be compelled to fight for Guelders, which the young Duke of Cleves had

lately occupied. He hoped to find a compromise by uniting him to Christina of Milan, although her ultimate marriage with the heir of Lorraine was already in contemplation. Christina, Anne of Cleves and Mary Tudor form, indeed, a fitting theme for a tragic trilogy of matrimonial destiny.

The first three months of 1539 were remarkable for excursions and alarms. The sacrilegious destruction of the shrine at Canterbury had goaded the Pope into publishing the long pigeon-holed Bull of deposition. This was followed by Pole's visit to Charles V. in Spain, and by rumours of an Imperial-Franco-Scottish alliance and an attack on Ireland. A large fleet was gathering in the Flemish ports. Englishmen were sceptical as to its destination being Algiers or the Porte, especially when all English ships were forbidden to sail from the Netherlands. The simultaneous withdrawal of the Imperial and French ambassadors, although it was somewhat of an accident, seemed a further proof of combined action against the Tudor Court. In England troops and guns were perpetually moving southwards, while Henry in person made a tour of inspection round his new coast defences.

With the dispersal of the Flemish fleet in the spring, the sense of immediate danger passed away. Real danger there had never been, as may be proved by Charles's reception of Pole's mission, against which the English envoy haughtily protested, and in defence of which the Emperor angrily rejoined. The Venetian ambassador Mocenigo was, however, rather than Sir Thomas Wyatt vouchsafed the secret of Charles's real opinions and intentions. The Bull of deposition had been published when the Emperor least desired it—when his whole thoughts were set upon a crusade. He made

no secret of his opinion that it was untimely, and when Francis I. urged him to common action against England, he opened his mind to Mocenigo,—"I have no intention at present of making war on any one except the Turk; nevertheless the king of France would very much like me to make war on England; his reason I do not know, but I, for my own part, do not wish it." The eloquence of Pole left Charles entirely unconvinced. "On the one hand," he told Mocenigo, "it seems that the Cardinal wishes me to forbid trade with this king of England as a sort of warning, on the other he appears to want me to make war on him: my answer is that I know full well what war means—that it is easy to begin and not so easy to end: I am quite aware that at the beginning I should have plenty of companions, but not how long they would stay by me: if His Holiness is counselling such enterprises, it is because he is far distant from the said king; were he as near him as I am, his advice might be very different."

Charles had reminded Pole that at Nice the Pope had impressed upon him that the crusade was so important that all other enterprises must be postponed for this: he could not imagine why His Holiness had changed his mind. Pole, as ever academic, argued that the English evil was intrinsic, the Turkish extrinsic,—that necessity and duty demanded that the intrinsic danger should receive the first attention.—"But," replied the Emperor, "if the Turk came to Italy and right up to Ancona, as come he undoubtedly would, would His Holiness regard that as an intrinsic or an extrinsic evil?" Charles ended by telling Mocenigo that Pole had come to Spain on very slight occasion,—that he had probably himself bothered the Pope to take this course on account of his brother's recent execution.

By the summer of 1539 Charles was convinced that the Pope was moved, not by the wrongs of Pole's family, but by the financial necessities of his own. Paul III. was persuading him to make a truce with the Turk on the honourable pretext of a war with England, offering for the latter purpose a half year's revenue of the Spanish Church. Charles knew that the profit of the house of Farnese was the real aim. He answered roundly that he did not want war especially at that moment, but that he would not hold back if war seemed good to other Christian princes: if, however, the Pope thought of having a share of the half-year's revenue, he would do well to get this fancy out of his head, for he did not mean to give him a *maravedi*.

Meanwhile the German negotiations of Henry VIII. had a chequered course. His reaction towards Catholicism, marked by the issue of the Six Articles, thwarted the success of Dr. Barnes at the Lutheran Courts. Moreover, the clause of the convention of Frankfurt, which confined its concessions to existing members of their party, was believed to be directed against Henry. Charles did not, indeed, ratify the convention in its entirety, and this encouraged Henry to hasten on his marriage with Anne. It was reported that Charles "greatly stomached this," but he gave the lady a safe-conduct through the Netherlands. In this courteous permission there was no *arrière pensée*, but no act so chivalric could have been more politic.

Immediately after Anne of Cleves landed in England, Charles was enthusiastically received at Paris on his way to Brussels. This was a natural source of new alarm in England. Wyatt undoubtedly gave an opening for a rupture by the arrest of a refugee in the Emperor's service. Nor did he temper the bad impression by

demanding redress for the acts of the Inquisition in Spain against English subjects. Charles flamed out into one of his fits of passion, insisting that, extradition treaty or no, his own servant should pass free: as for the Inquisition it depended not on him—he would not meddle with it, no—not for his own grandmother. The angry scene was repeated at Brussels in the following month, and after it Henry VIII. actually took measures to tempt the French king to alliance with himself and the Lutherans. Time, nevertheless, was working for Charles. The increasing heat of his relations with the Pope and the cooling of French friendship caused Anglo-Imperial politics to drift within the temperate zone. The fall of Cromwell and the burning of Dr. Barnes made alliance between Henry and the Lutherans impossible. It became clear that Charles's objective was really Algiers and not England. With France meanwhile there were constant rubs, on the subject of old debts, of Channel piracy, of extradition, of the boundaries of Calais, and finally the quarrel which sprang from the Scottish defeat at Solway Moss. Thus it was that almost without an effort a treaty was concluded with the Emperor in February 1543, and thus it fell about that Charles professed his wish to live and die with the stalwart captains of the schismatic king.

Francis I. was now isolated. By abandoning his niece's claim to the Scandinavian kingdoms Charles had detached the kings of Denmark and Sweden from the hostile combination. In Germany the supposed friendship of the Pope with Francis had set the most uncompromising Lutherans on the Imperial side. Here only the Catholic Louis of Bavaria gave any heed to Paul's entreaties for peaceful mediation. Yet the operations of 1544 opened with a brilliant French

victory, and that in the quarter least expected. In April Enghien, receiving at the last moment permission to risk a battle, outmanœuvred, outfought and crushed del Guasto, who was attempting the relief of Carignano in Piedmont. Ceresole was the most decisive victory which the French had won in Italy since Marignano (1515), and the only occasion on which they had beaten any considerable number of Spanish troops since Ravenna (1512). Pietro Strozzi with a heterogeneous force of exiles and mercenaries moved rapidly from Mirandola, hoping to meet Enghien before the walls of Milan. Papalists and patriots revelled in the defeat of the hated Spaniard. The Pope fortified Rome, and allowed his troops to march in aid of Strozzi. The Cardinals Ferrara and Farnese drafted a treaty with France by which Vittoria, the Pope's grand-daughter, should marry the Duke of Orleans with Parma and Piacenza as her dower. Pressure was put upon Venice and Ercole of Ferrara to abandon their neutrality. Nevertheless the French victory proved sterile. The Spaniards were, as always, admirable in defence; the Lombard fortresses were strongly held. Enghien could not move from lack of funds, for his Swiss troops would not budge without their pay. Strozzi devoted his not inconsiderable talents to escaping from the meshes in which he had imprudently entangled himself. Thus the Pope's courage evaporated, and Venice and Ferrara plumed themselves on their resolute neutrality. Before long the French troops were needed to defend Paris, and an armistice gave some relief to the war-worn peasantry of Piedmont.

The war, in spite of Ceresole, was to be, not a Franco-Italian, but a Franco-German war, and the person of Charles was the centre of operations. Bucer

might scoff at the Emperor's grovelling superstition fit only for old women, at the hours spent on his knees at prayer, at the prone figure with eyes fixed on the Madonna's image, and the fingers busy with the beads. Yet on soldier and citizen the Emperor's martial bearing deepened the impression created by the tales of his personal prowess in the tragedy of Algiers, and by his resistless energy in the campaign of Guelders. When Charles appeared at the diet of Speyer, it was not as a humble suppliant that he claimed German aid against the French.[1] Never before and never again did he draw so near to the Protestants in policy, but he made it felt that it was their common hostility to the Pope and France, rather than his own necessities, which led him towards compromise.

The change in the attitude of the Lutheran princes was marked by the appearance of both the Saxon Elector and the Landgrave at the diet. Contemporaries have recorded the Emperor's reception of his past opponents. In each case he advanced half-way down the hall, cap in hand, to greet them. The Elector had little practice in falling gracefully on one knee; fat and clumsy as he was, he lost his balance and tumbled over. Picking himself up, he burst into a roar of laughter. The Emperor from contempt or courtesy refrained from smiling. Philip, "the cockerel," as Charles's confessor later called him, was more at ease. "Look," he cried, "I have made myself a Spaniard," and he drew the Imperial attention to his Spanish boots. The jest was not without its meaning, for at the moment loyalty and military ambition prevailed over particularism and dissent. Philip, in fact, was tempted by prospects of

[1] See *Carlo V a Spira nel 1544 da documenti contemporanei*, contributed by L. Staffetti to *Arch. Stor. It.* 1892.

high command and glory. John Frederick, brave as he ultimately proved himself to be, had less martial aims. As the Landgrave at Regensburg had entered into a secret treaty with the Emperor, so now the Elector conducted negotiations which were concealed even from his colleague. John Frederick promised to recognise Ferdinand's title to the Imperial succession in return for the Emperor's assent to the Saxon-Clevish matrimonial settlement which secured the reversion of the duchies to the heirs of the Electress. The Saxon crown-prince moreover was to be admitted into the family circle by marriage with one of Ferdinand's invaluable daughters. It is true that these mutual engagements were conditional on a religious agreement not yet concluded, but such agreement was now politically tempting. Imperialism and territorialism might find a compromise in a federation of states, each self-sufficient, but knit together by family alliance with the ruling house. This was the system actually inaugurated by Charles in Italy. He cared nothing for administrative centralisation; his aim was to have the huge military strength of Germany placed at his disposal. In this diet he all but succeeded; the campaign against France was recognised by the Estates as an Imperial, a German war.

At Speyer Charles definitely committed himself to a free and general Council to be held in Germany. As a preparation, and almost as a possible substitute for the Council, he would hold a diet wherein the religious question should be discussed and perhaps arranged. Granvelle privately assured the Lutherans that a measure of comprehension should be concluded, whether the Pope approved or not. Meanwhile all proceedings against the Lutherans were stayed; it was promised that at the next diet the Imperial Chamber should be

reconstituted without regard to religious opinions; the edict of Augsburg and others were suspended until harmony should be restored. This was, indeed, little less than the result arrived at eleven years later in the celebrated religious peace of Augsburg. Unanimity was almost complete. The bishops, wrote the nuncio Morone to the Pope, rushed full-tilt towards comprehension in the hope of peace, at least for their own lives: they cared only for drink and concubines: they had no interest in theology, no respect for the Holy See: their only aim was to free themselves from dependence on the Pope.

It is no wonder that the Pope earnestly protested against this surrender as destructive of the High-priesthood and the ordinances of the Church; no wonder that Charles confessed that he was conceding more than he could well justify to his conscience. But the concessions at last secured him from a Lutheran attack upon his rear, and in his ranks rode the two villains or heroes in the forthcoming Lutheran drama—Maurice of Saxony, and the Franconian Hohenzollern, Albert Alcibiades.

Before Charles left Speyer, the campaign had already opened in his favour. William of Fürstemberg, now in Imperial service, had recovered Luxemburg and then opened the siege of Saint-Dizier. Here Charles joined him on July 13, tired and ill. The siege, misconducted, dragged on until August 17. Charles freely exposed himself to fire, and René, Prince of Orange, who was, perhaps, his chief personal friend, lost his life. After the capitulation of Saint-Dizier Charles marched into the heart of France. On August 31 he was before Chalons, but, avoiding an encounter with the Dauphin's army, moved by his right on Château Thierry and

Soissons (September 12). He was now so near the capital that his light horse scoured the country to its very walls, and caused a hurried exodus of panic-stricken Parisians.

Meanwhile Henry VIII. had crossed in person to Calais. Emperor and King had agreed that the campaign should begin in June, and that they should both march direct on Paris. Charles had delayed too long before Saint-Dizier, while Henry sat heavily down before Boulogne and refused to stir, even when Charles was within striking distance of the capital. This want of co-operation gave the Emperor's friends in the French Court, his sister and the Duchess of Etampes, the opportunity of urging peace, and somewhat to the world's surprise on September 18 the treaty of Crépy was concluded.

The Emperor's desire for peace is proved by the liberality of the conditions which he offered. There was no longer any irritating reference to the treaties of Madrid and Cambray—no compulsion upon Francis to abandon allies or make definite stipulations as to aid against Turk and heretic. The French king agreed in general terms to co-operate in restoring the unity of the Church, and to do his utmost to promote peace with the Porte. Territory taken on either side since the truce of Nice was restored: Francis ceded the suzerainty of Flanders and Artois and his claim to Naples, while Charles waived his rights to the duchy of Burgundy.

The alternative marriage arrangements for the Duke of Orleans were reintroduced, but with modifications which spared his father's susceptibilities. If Orleans received the Netherlands with the Infanta, Charles retained the provinces during life, appointing the duke and his bride as governors. In this event Francis

engaged to abandon his claim to Milan; but if Orleans left no heirs, the King and Emperor would respectively resume their rights to Milan and to Burgundy. If, on the other hand, Charles granted Milan and the Austrian princess, he reserved the fealty of the duchy with the castles of Milan and Cremona until Orleans had an heir, while Francis retained a hold upon Savoyard territory by the occupation of two fortresses. Francis engaged to restore the rest of the Duke of Savoy's territories when either the Netherlands or Milan were conferred on Orleans, and to submit his case to legal arbitration. That Orleans might be a fitting recipient for so well-dowered a bride, he was promised as an appanage Orleans, Angoulême, Bourbon and Châtellerault; yet all these provinces could scarcely compensate for the broken health and premature corruption of the Valois prince.

The policy and motives of Charles in making peace have from the first been the subject of much criticism and discussion. It must be remembered that war with France was always for him a painful necessity, an irksome interruption to his two great aims; he would ever welcome even a temporary suspension of hostilities, though his legal or pedantic view of his own claims made his conditions cumbersome. But, apart from this, he undoubtedly felt himself in danger, although during the campaign he was always for advance and battle. Even in February he had written to his son that success depended upon concert with England, and this upon supplies from Spain; if Spain failed, the whole fabric would fall, and Philip therefore must raise money by every conceivable expedient. Charles added—and this was before the defeat of Ceresole—that the Pope and the Italian powers were watching him, and on any

reverse would declare for France. The slightest defeat in front of Paris, for which the Pope was longing, would doubtless have justified the Emperor's fears, in spite of the caution which Strozzi's failure had impressed upon the Italian states. In May Cobos had written that, when the sums then forwarded were spent, it would be impossible to wring another *real* from Spain.

The concert with England upon which Charles built all prospect of success had failed. The season was wet; the careful plans for provisioning the Imperial army had from the start collapsed; the troops were rotting with disease and dwindling by desertion. The army was a bad one, and its effective numerical strength far below the figures upon the pay lists. The colonies were competing with the Spanish recruiting sergeants, and thus the Spanish contingent was inferior both in quantity and quality, while there were few Italians. Charles would call the Spaniards and the Italians the arms and legs of his army, and the Germans its stomach. The present force was chiefly stomach, consisting of inferior *lanzknechts*, undisciplined and disposed to mutiny. It was very deficient in light cavalry, while the heavy German horse, accustomed to one uniform trot, was valuable only from its weight in shock of battle and useless for skirmishing and scouting. Any trifling cause might have placed Charles and his army at the mercy of the Dauphin's intact and increasing force. Granvelle was probably right in his conclusion that there was no honourable way out of a dangerous position except by the path of peace. But for the capture of Boulogne by Henry VIII. (September 14) the French government might have dragged out the negotiations and extorted better terms. After all it was much to have wiped out the memory of the last unsuccessful war. Charles had

made peace at the head of his army within reach of Paris; the last fall in the long wrestling match was ostensibly in his favour. He now had his right hand free to strike at another foe, whilst Francis was still hampered by an English war.

Henry VIII. complained long and loudly of the Emperor's desertion, although he had been apprised of the negotiations in which Charles professed to wish him to be included. The league had been purely opportunist; there could be no union of hearts between the Catholic Emperor and the schismatic king. In 1544 as in 1522 the English alliance had proved of little practical service. Ferdinand of Aragon had discovered that the English troops were brave enough, but bad people with whom to work in concert. With Charles there had been bickerings from the first. The English required an inordinate amount of draught horses and oxen from the Netherlands; they treated the Flemings roughly; they rigorously suppressed the interchange of French wines and Dutch herrings, which was as essential to the Netherlands as to France. Henry VIII. had insisted that Charles should at once declare war against Scotland, with which he had no quarrel, to the further prejudice of Low Country commerce. Charles felt certain that Henry's presence in France would cause delay; he cautiously, if injudiciously, dwelt on the dangers of the campaign for a monarch of Henry's amiable *embonpoint*, disabled, as he was, by an ulcerated leg. Henry testily replied with rude references to the Emperor's gout. The English king's delay at Boulogne had really disconcerted the plan of the campaign and endangered the person of his ally.

The aims of Charles and Henry had from the first been different. The latter wished to extend his do-

minions in Northern France; Charles desired only to cripple the French king, that he might be free to deal with Germany and the Porte. The Emperor thought it absurd that Henry should insist on the retention of Boulogne, which Francis could never cede, and complained that the continuance of the war prevented France from giving aid against the Turk. Henry stigmatised the Franco-Imperial marriage proposals as disgraceful: Charles could not have yielded more if he had been beaten and a prisoner: the Infanta, bride of Orleans, might well become Queen of Spain, but neither Spaniards, Flemings nor Milanese would bear the rule of the son of their master's greatest enemy. Charles was taunted with paying more regard to a duke of Savoy or Mantua than to the English king: he might at least have obtained for Henry a truce, which would have enabled him to retire with decency: his very *lanzknechts* on their discharge were entering French service against England. It was long before cordial relations between the Imperial and English governments were re-established, and there might well be a risk of English intervention in a German religious quarrel.

Charles could now no longer avoid the selection of a bride and a dowry for the Duke of Orleans. The two alternatives were submitted by Philip to the Spanish Council, and the ensuing debate most clearly illustrates the Emperor's dilemma. One party urged that the disgrace of alienating the ancient Burgundian patrimony would be equalled by its danger, for, even if Charles retained the administration for his life, the French could easily intrigue against him in the Netherlands, and through them act upon the disloyalty of the German princes. France, having by the marriage virtually incorporated the Netherlands, would be so strong that she

could injure Spain in other quarters, while Spain would be deprived of her valuable trade with the North Sea and the Baltic. If the Netherlands were once ceded, it was argued, Spain had no ally who would assist in their recovery, whereas the Italian states, who hated France, would gladly at any time co-operate in her eviction from Lombardy. Milan after all was a new possession, incessantly contested at incalculable cost; it was doubtful if Charles could constitutionally retain it or even invest his children with it; at all events such action would be jealously regarded throughout Italy. Philip was reminded that Charles and Ferdinand the Catholic had both beaten the French in Italy without the possession of Milan: a Spanish king's task as protector of the free states of Italy would be easier than if he were their lord, and withdrawal from Milan would concentrate his means of defence on Naples and Sicily: if Orleans were Duke of Milan, it would be his interest to preserve peace from the merest motives of economy. To abandon Milan, ran the conclusion, would be no disgrace, but an act of generosity in the cause of peace; to cede the Netherlands would darken the glory of the Emperor's reign.

Against these political considerations Alba and Cobos pleaded the importance of Milan in the strategic position of the house of Habsburg. Milan was not only the bulwark of Naples and Sicily, but the highway to Germany and the Netherlands; without it the latter could never be defended, especially if England were allied with France. They reckoned all the blood shed on behalf of Milan as well expended, for it had kept war at arm's length from Naples, Sicily and Spain herself. The possession of Milan had enabled Charles in 1543 to direct his crushing blow against Guelders: with Milan under

French control nothing could stop a French advance through Italy, particularly if supported by the Turk. The Emperor's instructions had suggested that, if Parma, Piacenza and Piedmont were added to the Milanese, Francis would gradually lose his insatiable appetite. To this it was answered that he would never really renounce his claim to Naples, that the only cure for his restlessness was to shut the door of Italy in his face, and keep him within his frontiers. Danger would not cease with the death of Francis, for the Dauphin's Italian ambitions were notorious; he had already published his wife's claim to Florence. Orleans, so argued Alba's party, established in the Netherlands would be an independent prince, his children would be Charles's own descendants, his interests would be distinct from those of his father and brother, he would revive the old Burgundian state, the buffer between France and Germany: there could be little danger that he would succeed to the throne of France or become consort to a queen of Spain, for the Dauphin had a son and Philip's wife gave promise of an heir.

In the course of this illuminative debate it was incidentally urged that Charles would do well to busy himself with adding to his power and prestige rather than with arrangements for the inheritance of his children. With one dissentient voice it was agreed that the suggestion of opening the American trade to French subjects would be fatal to Spanish interests and an inevitable cause of war. Some councillors were of opinion that, though in the abstract Orleans was a fitting husband for the Infanta, he was, unless he mended his ways, totally unworthy, even if it were he that brought the Netherlands into the settlement.

Orleans did not mend his ways; time and the vices

of the Valois were playing on the Emperor's side. Charles, after delaying two months beyond the appointed four, a period of mental agitation which made him ill, decided upon the cession of Milan (March 1545). He was probably influenced by Ferdinand's outspoken antagonism to the surrender of the Netherlands; he knew, perhaps, that the declaration was a mere form, or he was looking around for pretexts to evade it. The world was still wondering as to the upshot, when on September 9 the decease of Orleans released Charles from his perplexity; it was attributed to the plague, but death was already in his blood. Thus it came about that Milan was saved to the Habsburgs for the coming centuries. Alba's argument was, moreover, justified, for the events of Philip's reign would prove that, but for the highway through Lombardy, Spain could not have retained a six months' hold upon the Netherlands.

CHAPTER II

The reign of Charles in Spain—Value of the petitions of the Cortes—Effects of the battle of Villalar on the Cortes—Revenues of the Crown—Parliamentary subsidies—Defeat of the Crown in the Cortes of 1538—Alienation of royal revenues and growth of the debt—Trade with the Indies—Growth of manufacture in Spain—Development of agriculture under Charles—Economic theories in Spain—Scarcity of the precious metals—Differences of opinion between Charles and his subjects on Economics—His encouragement of foreigners—Unpopularity of his foreign policy in Spain—The administration of justice—Petitions of Cortes relating to justice and to social evils—Legislation of the reign—Changes in municipal government—Alleged decline of the Cortes.

FROM the conclusion of the Castilian and Valencian civil wars, until Charles sailed from Barcelona for his last war against Francis I., there was no striking event in internal Spanish history, with the possible exception of the Cortes of 1538. In Spain the years 1529-30, so important for Germany and Italy, form no dividing line. The regency of Philip in 1543 is the chief date of any definite importance, because with this new influences may almost be said to have set in.

Charles has too often been regarded as an absentee ruler, but from his accession to his departure in 1543 he spent practically half his time in Spain. In addition to this he was during the two North African expeditions engaged on a Spanish mission and surrounded by his Spanish nobility. His visit also to Sicily and Naples on his return from Tunis was a duty imposed

upon him by the fact that the former was an old, the latter a more recent possession of the house of Aragon.

It is, nevertheless, difficult to trace with any precision the influence of the reign upon internal Spanish history, for its interest consists less in events than in tendencies, and a better view can be obtained if the somewhat scanty evidence be considered in its entirety rather than in short chronological sections. The problems were constitutional and economical, and they find their expression mainly in the king's relation to his Cortes. The numerous petitions of the frequent sessions are concerned with every department of national life, yet the inferences to be drawn therefrom must be accepted with some caution. It is noticeable that no small proportion of the petitions descends from previous, and is inherited by future reigns. The very frequency of their appearance attracts the historian's attention and leads him to believe that they must have been of peculiar importance. Yet the future student of English history would be mistaken were he to suppose that the Bills for the marriage of a Deceased Wife's Sister and for Female Suffrage were the most vital legislative needs of the present day. Persistency in the production of old programmes may have been partly the result of indolence, for it takes trouble to produce a living scheme or even to bury dead ones.[1]

The Cortes had technically no legislative authority, but their control over supply was so undoubted that they really had enough power to insist upon redress if

[1] For the proceedings of the Cortes see *Cortes de los antiguos reinos de León y de Castilla*, vol. iv. (to 1537 only), 1882, and M. Colmeiro's introduction to the above, two vols., 1883-86. Proceedings of the later Cortes may be found in vol. v. of M. Danvila's *El poder civil en España*, 1885. Volume ii. of this work may be consulted for the general administration of Spain under Charles V., as also M. J. Gounon Loubens, *Essais sur l'administration de la Castille au XVI^e siècle*, 1860.

they were much in earnest. It is the privilege of the representatives of taxpayers to grumble; the so-called petitions of the Castilian Cortes corresponded to the grievances (*doléances*) of the French Estates-General. Such bodies are necessarily pessimists; they dwell perforce on the dwindling resources, the diminishing population of their constituencies. In economic history the evidence of those whose duty it is to reduce or resist taxation is subject to an appreciable discount. It is true that the majority of town representatives were not personally affected by the direct taxation which they voted, but the rising of the Communes proved that they could not safely set public opinion at defiance, and they had moreover an indirect interest in the prosperity of their towns.

Many of the petitions which are most frequently repeated have a judicial or administrative bearing, and it is difficult to believe that these did not become mere *formulæ* copied again and again from previous drafts, in order to swell the tale of grievances to their normal number of a hundred or more. There were, indeed, real difficulties in the path of effective legislation even when the Crown had given its general assent to a petition, especially if it affected the legal and administrative classes. Such petitions were referred to the Council of Castile, and were either pigeon-holed, or altered beyond recognition in the process of conversion into Acts. Lawyers would no more introduce reforms to the disadvantage or discomfort of their class than would the Pope sanction the proposals passed on to him from Cortes by the King, if detrimental to the Curia. Moreover communications were so defective, and the central authority so distant, that, notwithstanding the elaborate devices for remedying these drawbacks, powerful local

interests could often ignore, if not defy, the well-meant legislative efforts of the government.

Whatever their practical efficacy, the petitions are replete with historical interest as throwing light, or shadows, on the institutions, the classes, the everyday life of Spain, upon the Church, the courts, the prisons, the universities, the trades, upon agriculture and forestry, amusements, fashions and clandestine marriages, upon gypsies and apothecaries, old-clothesmen and the *demi-monde.* Foremost, however, in importance is the subject of taxation, because this must really determine the relative power of King and Cortes, and decide the question whether Castile was under Charles a constitutional or an absolutist monarchy, whether parliamentary liberties rose, sank, or kept their level.

Unnecessary sympathy has been expended on the defeat of the Communes at Villalar. They were not fighting to uphold inherited liberties so much as to grasp a monopoly of authority for which they were quite unfitted. Had they won—and but for their own divisions and incompetence they must have won—Castile would have been governed by an unintelligent oligarchy, consisting virtually of the municipal governments of eighteen towns. The victory of the nobles and the Crown made little apparent change in either the economical position of the towns or the constitutional privileges of the Cortes. Within twenty years the towns which had been the very centre of disturbance rose to a degree of commercial prosperity hitherto unknown. Medina del Campo itself had no more reason to bewail its destruction by fire than has had Chicago. It was rebuilt only to become the market of all Spain; it was to the flourishing wool trade what Seville was to the commerce with the colonies.

The Cortes could not of course remain at the high-water mark to which a flood-tide had carried them, but they scarcely sank below their customary level. In the first session after the Emperor's return the Cortes, much to their credit, showed no symptom of subservience, although the party of rebellion must have been almost unrepresented. They fought again and again for redress before supply; they resisted the Chancellor's presence at their deliberations; they denied the king's right to prescribe the form of powers which they should receive from their constituencies.

Charles, on his side, had no wish to press his victory and infringe normal precedent. The legal, conservative habit of mind, which made him cling tenaciously to his own rights, led him to respect his neighbour's boundary. Neither his actions nor his correspondence afford any evidence of the least intention to encroach upon the powers of the Cortes, though directly or indirectly he might exercise some modifying influences upon their composition. Thus he insisted in 1523 that supply was the first function of the session, but, as a compromise, he consented to answer the petitions before dissolution. This concession implied more than the mere satisfaction of impatience, for there was a floating idea that royal ordinances issued during a session could only be repealed in Cortes. The Cortes themselves admitted the justice of the demand that the constituencies should grant full powers, that the proctors should be representatives, not merely delegates bound beforehand by open or secret pledges. Yet even here Charles's practice was generous, for he often allowed the proctors to refer to their constituencies. He tacitly confessed himself to be in the wrong in imposing the presence of his Chancellor on the proctors, for the precedent was not repeated.

One of the signs of monarchical absolutism is the attempt to govern without a Parliament. Ferdinand and Isabella during many years never summoned the Cortes of Castile, and it had seemed possible that they might share the fate of the French Estates-General, especially as they so inadequately represented the nation at large. Charles, however, never neglected his privilege of summons; the complaint early in the reign was rather that he harassed the cities by recurrent Cortes. The attacks of France and the Turks made additional supply essential, and, however objectionable were some of the Emperor's expedients, he was in all his territories so used to parliamentary control that he seldom raised taxation strictly so called without consent. This implied the summons of Cortes at least every three years, for the simple reason that the grant was usually made in the form of three annual instalments. It was, indeed, in Charles's reign that the grant of the subsidy (*servicio*) became almost a regular practice.

The Crown was not wholly dependent on Cortes for its revenues. In Charles and his successors were permanently vested the huge estates and patronage of the three Military Orders of which Ferdinand had held the Grand Mastership for life. Spanish mines and saltworks fell more and more into royal hands. The import and export duties of one-eighth, and the crown royalty of one-fifth on minerals increased rapidly with the growth of the colonial trade, and the discovery of fresh mineral wealth. To these sources must be added the duties at the "dry ports," the frontiers, that is, of the several kingdoms, and the tolls on sheep and cattle moving between summer and winter pasturage. The Church contributed largely. Two-ninths of the tithes were among the permanent revenues of the Crown. In addition to

this the Pope frequently sanctioned the *sussidio*, a tenth of ecclesiastical income, and the *Cruzada*, an indulgence from the more extreme forms of fasting. Thus, if for this reason only, Papal favour was very necessary to the king.

The *alcabala* deserves from its importance a separate mention. It was originally an extraordinary tax granted for a limited period and for a special purpose. It had, however, long formed a regular item of the revenue and no longer required the consent of Cortes. It consisted nominally of one-tenth of the value of all objects sold, but the towns had usually succeeded in securing its commutation for a fixed sum which each city collected as it pleased, and which as a rule amounted to about five instead of ten per cent. The commutation was always granted for a limited period, and since in the sixteenth century prices were rapidly rising there was a conflict of interest between the Crown and the cities. This became the subject of frequent petitions in the Cortes, which were always nervous lest the Crown should refuse to renew the commutation on the old terms now so disadvantageous to itself.

The nett return from these considerable revenues had been very appreciably rèduced long before Charles's accession by the practice of borrowing on a system of perpetual annuities (*juros*). This was a favourite form of investment in Spain, and thus the government was tempted by the ease with which it could raise money, assigning the royal domains or other security for the payment of interest which amounted on the average to ten per cent. This it was in great measure which rendered the revenue inadequate to meet any additional expenditure; hence arose the necessity of a recurring appeal to the Cortes, and hence again the very real control of the Cortes over the policy of the Crown.

Charles by no means always received the supply which he requested. In 1527 both nobles and clergy, disliking perhaps his hostile attitude to the Pope, refused to concur in taxation which was in this case confessedly exceptional. The Cortes made up for this refusal in 1528 by a liberal subsidy, but ten years later Charles submitted to a severe defeat. This was the most remarkable event in internal Spanish history since the rising of the Communes, but its bearing has been much misrepresented or misunderstood. Peace had been made with France, but a debt had accumulated of which Charles could neither repay the capital nor meet the interest. No war had been more unjustifiably forced upon him than that of 1536, and his comparative failure was due to his being crippled by the expenses of his attack on Tunis, which was an essentially Spanish interest. Yet it was natural that Spaniards should feel no direct concern in the fortunes of the duchy of Savoy which had formed the apparent issue.

The Emperor's proposal was sufficiently novel to alarm a class which jealously guarded its hereditary privileges. He begged the Cortes to grant a duty (*sisa*) on meat which should be applicable to all classes. The administration of this, as of the *alcabala*, he proposed to entrust to the Cortes for the purpose of meeting the ordinary expenses of government, while the king would receive the American royalties and the smaller resources of the Crown for the payment of the capital and interest of its debt. The advantage of this duty was that it would rise automatically with wealth and population, which were rapidly increasing. The maximum price of meat, moreover, was modified from time to time in accordance with the change in the purchasing power of the precious metals: thus the nominal increase in the *sisa*

would correspond with the continued fall in the value of metals, whereas the *alcabala* was commuted for a fixed sum, and the *servicio* could not be increased without much heart-burning. This automatic increase, however, of indirect taxation had already at other times and in other countries been regarded as an evil, because it grew unnoticed, and thus imperceptibly exalted the authority of the prince.

The clergy agreed that the *sisa*, if duly controlled, was the best means of meeting the national necessities, and assented to it, subject to the Pope's approval. The nobles answered the Emperor's request by the demand that he should reside in Spain, reduce his household expenses and make universal peace. After three months' discussion they absolutely declined to subject themselves to taxation. They asked leave to confer with the proctors of the towns, but this Charles for obvious reasons refused as being contrary to precedent, although he allowed a deputy from Burgos and from Toledo to confer with them, that they might have the benefit of expert authority.

Finding his nobles obdurate, Charles, with some display of temper, dismissed them to their homes or to wherever they might please to go. The towns also declined the Emperor's proposal, but on his pledge that he would never again mention the *sisa*, and that he would in future abstain from selling domains, offices or titles, they granted an extraordinary subsidy which, as the ordinary, became in the near future part of the nominal revenue. Charles keenly felt this rebuff; the proposal was no mere alternative suggestion of his financial advisers; he had a keen personal interest in the project, and warmly pushed it. Four years later it will be seen that he pressed the rehabilitation of the scheme upon his son.

It is possible that the Cortes were short sighted, that they lost the opportunity of establishing effective control over the appropriation of supply, and that at a moderate sacrifice a check might have been placed on the growth of the debt which ultimately proved Spain's ruin. Nevertheless an exaggerated importance has been given to these Cortes of 1538-39 from the fact that the nobility and clergy never again received a general summons. These estates had not formed an integral part of an ordinary session of the Cortes, which were complete without them. They usually attended on ceremonial occasions, but their summons in 1538, as in 1527, was exceptional, and due to Charles's desire that all classes should voluntarily submit to a national scheme of taxation.

It is difficult to sympathise with the attitude of the Cortes of 1538, though easy to understand it. Charles had been dragged into the French wars, not by the Netherlands nor by Germany, but by Spain. If Naples was an Aragonese rather than a Castilian interest, Castile was directly concerned in the retention of Navarre, and Naples and Navarre were the stakes for which Francis and Charles were playing in Lombardy and Flanders. The universal peace for which the nobles clamoured was as impossible with France, "the Turk of the West," as it was with the Turk of the East: these very nobles grumbled at Charles's toleration of heresy in Germany. The taxation under Charles was probably not excessive; it did not rise as quickly as did prices, and this rise of prices the government was the first to feel. It is true that the interest on its annuities was fixed, and here it gained, but as against this it lost largely from the commutation of the *alcabala*. It seems tolerably certain that the wealth of Spain was at this

time growing faster than its taxation; it is at least significant that the average revenue of the Spanish bishoprics trebled during Charles's reign.

Inadequate taxation entailed the further alienation of Crown revenues, and the rapid rise of the debt, at a ruinous rate of interest, ranging from fourteen to twenty per cent from bankers for permanent loans, and reaching a very much higher rate for temporary accommodation. Charles took as a loan in 1535 the whole of the precious metals which the fleet brought from the Indies, and this was at the close of the reign repeated. He excused himself on the ground of absolute necessity. To the Augsburg firm of Fugger he pledged the revenues of the Military Orders; they farmed also the silver mines of Almaden and the quicksilver of Guadalcanal. So admirable, however, was the management of these great German capitalists with their long experience in mining, that this system was doubtless less wasteful than one of direct Spanish administration.[1] In spite of all expedients the debt on Charles's abdication amounted to nearly £10,000,000, apart from any consideration of the comparative value of money now and then. This was not in reality an impossible sum for Spain with its American wealth to liquidate, but Charles, if he were not wholly responsible for the growth of the debt, was in great part responsible for the birth of Philip.

Taxation was not the only financial subject on which Charles differed with his subjects. Born and bred in a manufacturing country which derived its wealth from an extensive commerce, he had not the exaggerated belief of the Castilian in the value of the precious metals or of colonial monopoly. The American trade had been confined to Castilians, and every ship engaged in it must sail from

[1] See K. Haebler, *Die Geschichte der Fugger'schen Handlung in Spanien*, 1897.

and to the port of Seville. Commerce with Barbary had similarly been restricted to Cadiz, but tradition was not the sole cause of the monopoly. At Seville was the *Casa de Contratacion*, at once a Board of Trade, a commercial court and a clearing-house for the American traffic. This great institution had every facility for collecting the royal dues, and for supervising the character of the ships, the crews and the intending colonists. As the seas were even now alive with pirates, the ships sailed in company, one fleet sailing for Porto Bello to supply the needs of Southern America, the other bound for San Domingo and Vera Cruz, while, when they had received their precious mineral freights, they returned together.

Castilians held strongly to the monopoly of Seville: in the memorial addressed to Charles by the revolted Communes, and later there are petitions in its support. The colonies, however, complained of it, and would even have welcomed free trade with foreigners, which ultimately through the medium of wholesale smuggling came about. Charles himself would gladly have opened the trade to all his subjects, but wisely forebore from pressing so unpopular a measure, although the Augsburg house of Welser obtained a concession in Venezuela, and the Fuggers an abortive charter for the coasts of Chili and the adjoining islands. From a discussion which took place in the Council it would seem that at the time of the peace of Crépy he had admitted as a suggestion the possibility of French trade with the colonies. All that he succeeded in doing was to throw the outward bound trade open to certain other Spanish towns. When he ventured to make Corunna the port for the spice trade of the Moluccas he received angry protests on behalf of Seville.

Spain then must alone trade with her colonies. The colonists would take all that she could make, grow or carry, and pay highly for it. The colonial governments forced Spanish goods upon the natives whether they wanted them or no. This gave a sudden impetus to Spanish manufacturers already encouraged by Ferdinand and Isabella. Spain became for a spell a manufacturing country: the old Moorish silk trade spread from Valencia and Granada to Toledo, the cloth manufacture of the north and centre extended to the Moorish districts. Medina del Campo rose to unexampled prosperity as the Bourse of the wool trade. Manufacture and distribution became more highly specialised; labour flocked into the towns. There was all the feverish agitation of manufacturing prosperity, with all the attendant discomfort resulting from the shifting of population and the displacement of antiquated methods.[1]

The same stimulus was applied to agriculture, for the colonists were idle and would not plant; they were thirsty and must needs drink. Agriculture had hitherto been entirely subordinate to pasturage, and had suffered much from the tyranny of the great sheep-owning corporation named the *mesta*. Now the area under wheat was widely extended, while oil and wine were in brisk demand; the colonists, indeed, were not suffered to plant vines except on the Pacific coasts; Charles

[1] For recent studies on the economic condition of Spain in the sixteenth century, see K. Haebler, *Die wirtshaftliche Blüte Spaniens im 16 Jahrhundert und ihr Verfall.*, 1888; M. J. Bonn, *Spaniens Niedergang während der Preisrevolution des 16 Jahrhunderts*, 1896. Dr. Bernays has criticised K. Haebler's conclusions in *Quidde's Zeitschrift*, i. p. 388. Among older works see M. Colmeiro, *Historia de la economia politica en España*, 2 vols. 1863; and L. von Ranke, *Die Osmanen und die Spanisch- Monarchie im 16 und 17 Jahrhundert* (Sämtliche Werke, vols. xxxv., xxxvi; 1877). There is an English translation of an earlier edition, entitled *The Ottoman and Spanish Empires in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries*, by W. K. Kelly, 1843.

gave direct encouragement to agriculture by constructing the Ebro canal, which irrigated a large district of Aragon, and by raising the maximum price of wheat in accordance with the general rise of prices, which once more made it the farmer's interest to grow it. He also favoured the mobility of traffic, abolishing the tolls between Castile and Aragon. In these measures the Cortes were not quite at one with him. They petitioned that wheat should be reduced to the previous unremunerative price, and for the re-establishment of the frontier tolls. After Charles left Spain in 1543 the Cortes carried the latter measure, and they at length decided, in favour of the *mesta*, the conflict which had raged with varying fortunes throughout the reign between corn-growing and sheep-rearing.

Spain at large, or at least her Cortes, was not entirely satisfied with her seeming prosperity. For this dissatisfaction there was some outward reason and no patent remedy. Prices had even in the previous reign risen all over Europe and especially in Spain. This is generally attributed to the influx of the precious metals from America, but it began long before this was appreciable, and, indeed, this was not a factor of high importance until the discovery of the Potosi mines comparatively late in Charles's reign. Spain has been throughout all time a peculiarly dear country, and the rise of prices was greater there than elsewhere. The Cortes were mainly composed of *hidalgos*, gentlemen of no great wealth, whose livelihood consisted in salaries, rents and government annuities. Salaries are notoriously slow in adapting themselves to a rise in prices, and annuities are necessarily stationary. The *hidalgos* were a large and increasing class, because it was the ambition of all the lower classes to obtain the title, partly from Spanish

pride, and partly from the desire to escape taxation. They could not, however, trade, and therefore reaped no direct benefit from the rapid commercial development. They were not the producers but the consumers, and it was thus the interest of the consumer that was represented in the Cortes, whereas that of the Crown was in production, especially in production the market for which was the colonial Empire.

Spain of the sixteenth century is often called a protective country, but this classification is incorrect. The dearness of Spanish products was attributed by foreigners, perhaps with much truth, to the Spaniard's dislike for labour: his price was fixed, not by the value of his work, but by his reluctance to perform it. Consequently the importation of cheap foreign goods had never been prohibited, except in the momentary interests of Spanish manufacture. At the close of Charles's reign cheap foreign silks and woollens were encouraged by the Cortes, while the Spanish factories were forbidden to make the more expensive cloths for which they were justly celebrated. Native manufacturers vainly petitioned that imported woollens should be subjected to the same severe tests of measurement and quality as their own. The Cortes cared more for the consumer than for the producer, and the interest of the former is rather import than export. This is certainly not the sign of a protective country.

A nation unfortunately cannot buy without paying either in specie or by its exports. If Spain exported her natural products, her iron and breadstuffs, her horses, hides, wine and oil, the consumer found that the home market raised their price for him. If on the other hand she paid with specie there was a general outcry that she was being drained of her true wealth,

her precious metals. This outcry was partly theoretical and partly practical. Spanish economists believed, like many others, that wealth was synonymous with gold and silver, and that the nation which paid in these was necessarily the loser. But apart from this, the lack of currency had long been a practical inconvenience, and continued to be felt when the inpour from the Indies was without precedent in modern Europe. Popular feeling at the beginning of the reign attributed this to the greed of Charles's Flemish suite, but it was felt before and it was felt long after. It was to the honour of Charles that, in spite of temptation, the Spanish coinage maintained a high standard, though its depreciation was suggested in 1538. This did no doubt serve to attract it to foreign countries. But the government service in Italy and Flanders absorbed enormous quantities: the foreign goods brought to Seville to be shipped in Spanish bottoms were mainly paid in specie: the government, in spite of all its laws, sold licenses to export it: much was smuggled away on arrival in Cadiz harbour: almost all the banking and commercial firms at the ports were Genoese: even the French reapers took their annual tale of wages home to France intact. But probably the chief reason of the undoubted want of currency was the extreme backwardness of communications. The precious metals, as the population, of Spain were becoming absorbed by a few of the larger centres, and above all by Seville.

It is unfair to accuse either the Spanish people or the Spanish government of being abnormally stupid in their treatment of a problem which was peculiarly difficult. Spain's fortune had been "sprung upon" her! The accident of colonial expansion had suddenly stimulated manufacture and agriculture in a country which was

neither by capital, population, or natural industry fitted to take full advantage of an opportunity so unforeseen. No nation in the world would have been generous enough to throw its colonies open to European trade, which would have engendered a rivalry in discovery and conquest. There was much to be said, in view of the normal life of the Spanish middle classes, for admitting the cheap wares of foreign nations; but there was also much to be urged in favour of protecting the infant native manufacture against foreign competitors. There was much in favour of encouraging agriculture, which had been artificially depressed: its expansion would stimulate the best energies of the nation, and was essential to the well-being of the colonists. On the other hand wool had long been the most profitable trade in Spain; the *mesta* could reasonably argue that it was impolitic to hamper its operations when the rise in prices alone made wool and woollens more expensive, and at the very moment when there was a phenomenal demand from the colonists, who would only wear woollens because the natives preferred cottons.

The Cortes had strong views on economical questions, and Charles never had a free hand. He did his utmost to promote measures in favour of manufacture, agriculture and commerce; he had a firm belief in the incalculable expansion of his colonial Empire. He did something to check the grosser economical mistakes. Only after he had transferred the internal government of Spain to his son, could the Cortes make their more ruinous experiments in sacrificing agriculture to pasturage, and in ruining manufacture by the prohibition of export. Of this latter heresy the most extreme expression was the proposal to prohibit all export to the colonies, in order to force the colonists to dig and weave,

and so cheapen the price of home products for the clamorous home consumer.

Where Charles was most at issue with his subjects was in the encouragement which he was believed to give to foreigners. Hatred of the Flemings had fired the explosion of the Communes, and Germans and Genoese sat, a little uneasily, over clumsily constructed mines. But the influence of the foreigner had not begun with Charles. There had long been thriving Italian, French, German and Flemish colonies in Spain. Ferdinand had in his last year been petitioned to forbid foreigners to reside or trade in the necessaries of life, or to hold municipal office. He had plainly answered that Spain could not dispense with them. Under Charles the wealth and influence of the firm of Fugger was, as has been seen, a cause of pardonable jealousy, although the Spanish investor was ready enough for a gamble in this gigantic syndicate. In 1518 the Cortes complained that the Genoese had the monopoly of banking, of iron, steel, soap and silk, and all the necessaries of life. Even at Seville the chief export houses were in great measure foreign, though they were forced to trade under native names. It is small blame to Castile that under phenomenal circumstances she should have required much foreign aid, and less that she should have disliked it. This is an eternal law of human nature. The countries which are most generous to Jews are those which do not absolutely need them.

It was not only economical questions that made Castilian dislike for foreigners manifest. The Cortes had insisted that Charles should marry not an English, nor a French, but an Iberian wife, and later that the household of the Empress and her first-born must be Spanish. So also it was demanded in 1555 that the

household of Don Carlos should be of the Castilian and not of the Burgundian type. Charles naturally hesitated to accede to the petitions that not only all officials in Spain, but the viceroys of Naples and Sicily and all ambassadors should be Spanish: he remembered, no doubt, the revolt of Sicily against his first Spanish viceroy. It was too bold a request that no letters of naturalisation should be granted, and that those already conferred should be revoked,—and this too within three years of the defeat of Villalar.

The same peninsularity of ideas appears in the earnest appeal made in 1518, 1523, 1537, 1542 and 1544 that Charles should permanently reside in Spain. Grave indignation was expressed at the summons of Philip to Germany in 1548. It was urged more than once that it was part of the king's duty to supervise the administration of justice in person, but more acute, perhaps, was the economic grievance that his absence withdrew money from Castile. Spaniards deplored the constant foreign wars with Christian princes, although they were unwilling to abandon Naples, and although they blamed Charles for his indulgence to German heretics. They felt with some reason that the defences of Spain were neglected for war in Italy, and this was the origin of petitions for the increase of the coast artillery and the fleet, the inspection of frontier fortresses, the strengthening of the ports of Granada, Andalusia and Africa.

Another cause of constant friction between Charles and his subjects was the right of purveyance. It was admitted that the royal household and councillors, when on progress, had a right to entertainment, if paid on a liberal scale. The claim to purveyance had, however, extended to grandees, bishops, messengers and others who might have the faintest pretence of travelling on

royal service. No country, it was said, Christian or Pagan, was so burdened by this abuse. It was demanded above all that the carts and draught animals of the peasants should be spared from unreasonable demands in time of harvest or vintage. These petitions were nothing new, for they refer back to ordinances of 1428 and 1489, a striking commentary on the efficacy of good intentions. Connected with this is the demand that captains levying troops should be paid, and that they and their recruits should not live at free quarters. This grievance was undoubtedly genuine and was never really remedied: it grew and grew until the Spanish officer in the reign of Charles II. had frequently to live on chance charity. Already the ragged recruits who were drafted to Italy to be drilled into the world's finest infantry were known by the nickname *bisoñosos* (ragamuffins). The king's own household and guards were very irregularly paid, and to a complaint of the Cortes Charles replied that he would gladly pay them if the deputies would find the money.

Throughout Castilian history a very large proportion of the petitions of the Cortes relate to the administration of justice. They leave the impression of a litigious people with a high ideal but a low practical level of judicial reform. On this subject there was little conflict of interest between Crown and Cortes, and the main lines are only indicated to give some idea of the questions which agitated public opinion in Charles's reign. The municipal representatives naturally resented the interference of all bodies outside the hierarchy of royal officialism, such as the ecclesiastical courts, the Inquisition, the wide-spreading and arbitrary authority of the judges of the *mesta*. But even the ordinary courts left much to be desired. The Council of Castile, which was

the supreme administrative authority beneath the king, consisted mainly of lawyers and supervised the judicature, occasionally withdrawing cases from the courts, or acting as a final court of appeal. The high courts were the Chanceries (*Audiencias*) of Valladolid for the north and of Granada for the south, while the *Alcaldes* of the Court administered justice in the immediate neighbourhood of the king, and Seville had its separate *Audiencia*. In the north-western provinces the older system of provincial judicial areas survived. Generally speaking, however, the unit was the municipality under its *corregidor*, embracing a wide area of territory. It is remarkable that while the king now appointed the higher judicial and police authorities in the towns, the towns nominated them in the neighbouring signorial jurisdictions which survived.

The character of justice depended upon care in the appointments bestowed by the Crown, and upon subsequent supervision. Theoretically the Council kept a close watch upon the courts. Officials named *veedores* and *pesquisidores* went on circuits of inquiry into the behaviour of the justices and the condition of the prisons, while magistrates on leaving office were subjected to a strict scrutiny. Many of the petitions of Cortes aimed at making these securities efficient, and at protecting citizens who had the public spirit to inform. It was demanded that a list should be kept of all those qualified for royal appointments, that these should be bestowed according to merit and not favour, that young men fresh from the universities should not receive important posts, that the municipal justices should not be residents, nor buy land, nor connect themselves by marriage with local families. Faction ran so high in Castilian towns that it was felt, as in Italy, that a native official was incapable

of impartial justice. Complaints were made that the *corregidores* themselves were idlers, neglecting the smaller townships in their circuits, absenting themselves from their duties; that the inferior judges refused to execute the sentences of the higher courts; that the costs of execution often exceeded the award.

Delay of justice was one of the evils most persistently denounced by the Cortes. Men charged with slight offences lingered in prison for ten years, and cases would drag on for twenty. The Chanceries were congested by civil suits and neglected the criminal department. It was suggested that the staff of the courts should be increased and functions differentiated, that a Chancery for Central Spain should be established at Toledo. There was an outcry against excessive appeal, against the intervention of the Council, and opinion was in favour of enlarging municipal jurisdiction in minor cases. Among many curious demands was a petition for the abolition of the oath in criminal cases, since it invariably led to perjury. It was proved that whipping was no sufficient deterrent for robbers, and suggested that on the first offence their ears should be slit, and on the second they should be sent to the galleys, where they would cease to annoy the public and would be of service to the king. The collection and publication of existing laws was held to be of urgent necessity to prevent illegality and fraud. Much, indeed, was done in this latter direction in Charles's reign. In the sphere of justice, if he could not always satisfy the nation's impatience, he understood its temper, and no ruler could more earnestly insist in his public and private utterances on the purity of justice and on the responsibility of the Crown in making its appointments.

The petitions throw much light upon the social con-

dition of Castile. Many relate to the curse of idleness and vagabondage to which Spain in this moment of commercial activity became more alive, and Charles was fully in sympathy with the attempts to promote industry. It was proposed to lessen the number of festivals, to force vagabonds to work, and to find them work to do. Distinctions were drawn between voluntary and involuntary poverty, between discreet and indiscriminate charity. There were schemes for encouraging by state aid private enterprise in establishing poorhouses and orphanages, for improving and cheapening the management of workhouses and infirmaries by the fusion of smaller institutions. The idleness of the universities was the subject of legislative proposals. Charles was begged not to appoint professors for life or for long terms, because when once appointed the professors took no more trouble, which was very prejudicial to the students. The expensive life of undergraduates was severely handled. The allowance for necessaries and books was spent on gambling and loose living, the tradesmen encouraging this extravagance by giving credit for the proper objects of the allowance. To check this it was proposed that such debts should not be recoverable from parents or undergraduates, but this Charles granted only in favour of the parent. University degrees were in Spain recognised credentials for the public service and the higher professions. Bogus degrees were thus a source of deception and a common form of fraud. To remedy this the degrees of Valladolid, Salamanca and Bologna, to which were afterwards added those of Alcalá, alone received official recognition.

Gambling was the national vice and most difficult to control. Even at games of ball youths would play for much more money than they possessed, and then be

forced to pay in cloth or silk at far above their market price. Sometimes it was proposed to prohibit all gambling or credit, at others to forbid cards or dice entirely, as in Portugal. Yet when Charles taxed these articles, the Cortes petitioned that they should be free from duty as of yore. Prostitutes were limited as to place of residence and dress, and subjected to medical inspection. Coaches were criticised as knocking people down, frightening horses and mules, and conducing to immorality. Charles himself loved romances of chivalry, but not so his Cortes. They begged that the Amadis and such works should be destroyed, for boys and girls, if they found themselves subjected to the temptations of their heroes, would give themselves a looser rein. Careful mothers, it was urged, left their girls at home, but if they read these books, they were better in their parents' company abroad. On the other hand historical literature received encouragement. It was petitioned that the Chronicles of the kings should be published, and that the historian Ocampo might, contrary to custom, hold his canonry without obligation of residence, that he might devote himself to historical research. Public opinion expressed itself in the Cortes against bull-fights, on one occasion because they were so dangerous to human life, on another because they diminished the stock of bulls. Charles, however, thought it perilous to interfere with the amusements of the masses, and no change was made. The elaborate regulations against finery in dress had at this time, perhaps, rather economic than moral aims.

On certain subjects economical and constitutional Charles and the Cortes were, as has been seen, at issue, but these were not numerous If the ordinances of the reign be compared with the petitions, it will be found that the latter were sooner or later embodied in the

former. It is deceptive to contrast the petitions of any given session with the number of direct affirmative replies then and there given, because much of the legislation was issued during recess, because many petitions entailed reference to the Pope, while many more related to the observance of laws already in existence. The reign of Charles has a creditable record, but, as previously and thereafter, administration lagged far behind the law. The ordinances, in spite of attempts at their collection, were still scattered and confused; justice was still tedious and corrupt. Nevertheless it might be difficult to find another nation at this period, unless it were Venice, which reached a higher standard. The judicial murders of England and France, the anarchical disorder of Germany, the more refined injustice of most of the Italian states, find no counterpart in Castile during the reign of Charles. The execution of the murderous Bishop of Zamora cannot be compared to the execution of Buckingham, More and Lady Salisbury, nor to the persecution of Bourbon and the cruel fate of Semblançay.

It is frequently assumed that the Cortes declined in power and character during the reign of Charles. It is difficult to find satisfactory evidence of this. To the end they are outspoken. Whereas at the beginning of the reign the frequency of sessions was regarded as irksome, it was demanded in 1544 that they should be at least triennial. The deputies never wearied of asking that the petitions of past and present sessions should be answered and executed: in 1555 they required that laws passed during a session should be only repealed in Cortes, that they might hear the reasons of repeal. Their jealousy of foreign governmental influences had not one jot abated. Charles himself recognised this temper, and never deliberately encroached upon the competence of the Cortes.

It is nevertheless possible that the character of the representative body somewhat deteriorated during the reign, as an indirect effect of the change in that of the municipalities. The deputies were conscious of this gradual change, and more than once attempted a reaction against the growing power of the *corregidor*. They petitioned that this official should only be appointed when desired by the town, that his tenure should extend to two years at most, and that he should be subsequently ineligible for a long term. So also there were protests against the continued sale of the office of *regidor*. The motive here was, perhaps, not wholly constitutional. It was to the interest both of towns and proctors that in future the municipal offices should not be sold, and above all not increased in number, for this imposed fresh burdens on the town or diminished the salaries and fees of the existing *regidores*.

To such petitions the Crown paid little or no heed. The royal *corregidor*, becoming more permanent and more powerful, had greater weight with the town governments. The *regidores*, who composed these governments, themselves received their appointments from the Crown, and it was by them and from them that the majority of the proctors in the Cortes were elected. The king in the long run had more influence over an official class which owed its appointment and promotion to himself, than over deputies drawn from a wider area. As the eighteen towns which alone sent members to the Cortes did not adequately represent the kingdom which was growing in population and differentiating in interests, so the proctors less and less represented the real life of their towns, which were becoming active commercial centres, for either, as of old, they belonged to certain families who had the hereditary

privilege of election, or else to the official gentry. The result of Villalar was possibly to make the Cortes more aristocratic. They were, what Mr. Gladstone once said the House of Commons used to be, an assembly of gentlemen. In the petitions the *hidalgo's* point of view constantly finds expression. He begged for a separate prison for himself and his lady relations; he claimed exemption from torture, a privilege which Charles curtly scouted; he wished to protect his poorer brethren from losing caste, owing to the expense of proving hereditary privilege, while he petitioned against the dilution of his order by the flood of those who would purchase gentility for a price. More important was it that the *hidalgos* were striving to gain admittance into municipal governments from which custom had excluded them, and then in turn eliminate the bourgeois element. This latter, occupied in feverish commercial enterprise, was perhaps the less concerned, for the office of a proctor was in itself a burden, and the trading class did not see the less immediate consequences of exclusion from the Cortes.

The decline of the Cortes has been attributed in great measure to the distribution of gratuities which closed the session under the Habsburg dynasty. This was not, however, new, and it was not until later reigns that the schedule of personal favours bestowed upon the deputies became dangerously long. It is possible that bribery was rife in the Cortes of Santiago and Corunna, since the Santa Junta in its memorial protested against the system of gratuities; but the fixed sum usually voted with the subsidy for the payment of proctors cannot be fairly classed with bribery. There was no uniform nor adequate scale of payment by the constituencies, while the expenses of a proctor were very

high, apart from the interruption of his professional work. The Crown did, no doubt, try to win individuals on this occasion or on that; there are hints of such a practice in Charles's instructions to his son. But if the Cortes declined in character from bribery, it was at their own initiative, for at the very beginning of the reign they requested that some offices in the household should be conferred on deputies, and claimed that they should receive favours as in the days of the Catholic Kings.

Charles never showed any dislike to a parliamentary system. If in Germany and in the Netherlands it owed much of its advance to his direct action, it is improbable that he had any deliberate intention of lowering it in Castile. In spite of the rising of the Communes, or rather in consequence of the manner of its suppression, he seems to have been less afraid of his Cortes than of his nobles. The latter were the element which he always regarded as a possible source of danger to the monarchy, and his nervousness on this score was inherited and exaggerated by his son.

CHAPTER III

The Church in Spain—Its national character—Petitions of the Cortes relating to it—Abuse of indulgences—Charles and the Inquisition—The growth of heresy—Its close connection with the Court—The Jesuits—Relations of Charles with the Spanish nobility—Instructions on the government of Spain given by Charles to Philip in 1543—The ministers and their character—Government by Councils—General character of Charles's administration.

THE Church in Spain was at once very national and very royal. From this it would almost necessarily result that the interests of king and people would often harmonise but sometimes clash and clang. Ecclesiastical abuses were the theme of every Cortes, but usually Charles was rather the buffer than the direct object of attack. He met petitions by the stereotyped reply that he would refer them to the Pope. Such friction as there was may generally be traced to jealousy of foreigners. It was complained that in spite of the law aliens obtained canonries, benefices and pensions, and then sold them or retained them under bogus native names: that such foreigners were often spies, or, from knowing only French, threw divine service into confusion. This also was the motive of the insistence upon the residence of bishops, and of the objection to excessive translation, for in this latter case the high fees enriched the Curia. More open were the demands that no Papal Reservations should be conceded, that no

money should be sent to Rome, and that non-resident bishops or canons should lose their stipend. Charles did not repeat his early mistakes in the nomination to bishoprics; he was as eager as his predecessors to keep control over the national Church, and to eliminate Papal influence; but without a free hand in the bestowal of benefices and pensions it was impossible to maintain a Spanish party in the Consistory, and to bribe or reward the ministers of foreign powers, as for example Cardinal Wolsey.

The Cortes saw with alarm the growth of the landed wealth and influence of the Church. They petitioned for stringent acts of mortmain, for powers to sell monastic property and to deprive monasteries of their vassals. They would limit the portions of girls entering convents to cash, and provide for their reversion to the family; they denounced the practice of enticing rich youths of fourteen or sixteen into monasteries. Now and henceforth to the eighteenth century the Cortes thundered against the Bulls of *Cruzada*. These dispensations were hawked about by friars who got a small percentage on the sale. They became a tax virtually compulsory, for labourers were kept in Church all day until they paid, while confession and communion were refused to non-purchasers. It was, indeed, the darkest blot upon the Spanish Church, the most probable ground for a popular rising against its tyranny. The Cortes wisely asked that such Bulls should be entrusted to the parochial clergy only, that sermons upon them should be preached but once a year, and that the receipts should be confined to their original and professed object, the war against the infidel. Such proposals, however, the Crown must actively or passively resist. The *Cruzada* was among the most profitable and cheaply levied

sources of its revenue. It required, indeed, Papal consent, but, as the Popes lost nothing by acquiescence, this was only refused in moments of extreme political tension. In the thick of a French war Charles could not consent to limit the application of the ready money resulting from the Bulls. Nor again was the limitation of Church property in general of palpable advantage to the Crown, because, as was proved in the Cortes of 1538, it was easier to tap the resources of the Church than of the laity. The clergy occasionally protested against the conspiracy of Pope and King against its revenues, but it dared not fight these powers combined, and it needed royal protection against both Pope and laity.

In other proposed ecclesiastical reforms Charles had no such direct pecuniary interest. He was as careful as the Cortes could desire in confining preferment to persons morally and intellectually qualified. The Cortes supported the diocesan authority against the religious Orders which claimed exemption much to the alleged detriment of morals. As Charles had more hold over the bishops than over the friars, he too could have no objection to limiting the agreeable visitations of convents to a week, or to placing the lattice between the nuns and their official interlocutors. So also the laity could hope for his sympathy in abuses connected with tithes and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The demand for tithe was often delayed, in order that a fraudulent charge might pass undetected. The clerical courts were no favourites with the deputies, who belonged largely to the legal classes, and who suggested that each of the royal high courts should contain a department for the trial of ecclesiastical cases. It was complained that the bishops fulminated against the secular courts, that

they haled laymen in profane cases before their own judges to the defendant's infinite vexation and expense, that ecclesiastical lawyers were ill-trained and their fees exorbitant. If such grievances met with no adequate redress, it was because bishops and canonists were powerful in the royal Councils, and because it was impolitic to irritate the Pope, with whom there were subjects of more immediate urgency in dispute.

The Inquisition, of course, stands apart. The subjects of the crown of Aragon hated it, and gave violent expression to their dislike. Castile approved its aims, but criticised its methods. The spying of the familiars into domestic life was much resented. False witness was common; cases which had no connection with heterodoxy were dragged before the Holy Office; for automatic blasphemy over a losing card the player was imprisoned, and, since no one knew the nature of the charge, his whole innocent family was disgraced. Again and again it was demanded that the judges should be men of conscience and character, that they should be paid by the Crown, not by the Inquisition, still less by the confiscation of the defendant's property, a certain means of securing condemnation. But for unorthodoxy there was no sympathy. The Cortes petitioned that the term "Old Christian," which was a qualification for many societies, should be strictly defined, and that sons or grandsons of the Inquisition's victims should be excluded from all municipal employ. This severe proposal the Crown rejected. Apart from the cruel treatment of the Valencian Moors after the social war, the reign of Charles is marked by a lull in the activity of the Holy Office. The number of those condemned was far below that of the preceding and succeeding reigns. The

suspension of the edict relating to the Moors of Granada had proved a turning point. From this moment Moors and Moriscos were treated with generosity. If provisions were issued forbidding the use of their national dress, they were revoked upon appeal to Charles, and finally a small tax was levied for the privilege of wearing it. In 1531 the Emperor applied to Clement VII. for powers to protect the Moriscos from extortion at the hands of the officials of the Inquisition. Twelve years later he ordered that a general pardon should be granted to the Moriscos of Granada without the necessity of a preliminary ceremony of confession and reconciliation, while confiscation orders were suspended for twenty-five or thirty years. In Valencia also there was a marked subsidence of persecution. The term, indeed, granted for instruction and conversion was so long, that many professed Christians took advantage of this leniency to relapse. In spite of a momentary revival of discipline in 1546, the activity of the Holy Office almost ceased until after the accession of Philip II. Save in the trifling cases above mentioned, Charles did not employ the Inquisition for the political and financial advantage of the Crown, as it was used under Isabella or Philip II. In his instructions to his son he did, indeed, beg him to show all favour to the Holy Office, but until his latest years he was no fanatic, while Catholicism sat lightly on most of his chief Councillors.

Charles was never so warm on behalf of the Holy Office as when the Pope attacked it. The friction between Pope and Inquisition dated from its very origin, and was long to outlive Charles and Paul III. When the latter directed that Spanish preachers might say what they thought fit without fear of the Holy Office, Charles angrily sent word that this would let loose a

flood of heresy, and that from Spanish pulpits would issue invectives against the Papacy such as Luther had never uttered. If hard pressed he would declare that he had no power over the Inquisition, and this was admitted by Gasparo Contarini, who, early in the reign, described the Holy Office as "most terrible."

These details will serve to illustrate the peculiar position of the Spanish Church in the age of the Reformation, and the difficult position of the king. It is necessary to enforce the truth that Spanish practice is distinct from Spanish standards, but the Spanish Church almost alone retained a standard, and in its higher branches manfully struggled towards it. The Council of Trent was to illustrate the moral and, perhaps, intellectual superiority of the Spanish episcopate. Italian observers held that Spaniards were by nature indolent, but extremely ingenious when they took the trouble, and this trouble many of their theologians took. Any vulgar man of violence with some command of logic can direct attack, but the Spanish genius was of the conservative character which is most subtle in defence. Doctrinal subtlety is a two-edged weapon. It was, perhaps, this very quality which engendered suspicion of heresy in some of Spain's greatest theologians. But this is a tale of Philip II.'s reign rather than of Charles V.'s. During the latter the Inquisition was still somewhat languidly occupied with cryptic Judaism or Mahommedanism. There was as yet no clearly defined heresy of a Lutheran or Zwinglian type, though much plain speaking against the abuses of the Church. Half-hearted measures were taken to prevent the smuggling by land or sea of literary contraband, and at the ports outspoken sailors and indiscreet commercial travellers fell

foul of the Holy Office to the annoyance of politicians of both persuasions.[1]

It was not until 1558 that the government, and Charles himself, fully awoke to the conviction that the contagion or infection was established in no sporadic form, that the germs of heresy had found a commodious *nidus* in the centres alike of government and commerce, Valladolid and Seville. Nevertheless Spanish orthodoxy had long been threatened both from within and without the country. The very widespread tendencies towards Judaism and Mahommedanism might easily be turned, as they later were, into Protestant channels: many of the influential heretical congregation at Seville were of Jewish or Moorish origin. In every seaport or manufacturing town Spaniards were in contact with foreign colonies and foreign traders. In every campaign Spanish soldiers were cheek by jowl with Lutheran *lanzknechts*, and the common enemy was as often as not the Pope. In court circles Humanist culture, long popular, from the first adopted the Erasmian attitude towards monastic obscurantism, or one of absolute indifference towards dogma of any sort. These latter alternatives were favoured by the cosmopolitan character of the Emperor's court, and by his frequent political antagonism to the Papacy.

It is of interest to notice how many of the pioneers of heresy in Spain, or of those who were first accused of heresy, were in close contact with Charles or with his government. Alonso de Valdés may be described as the Imperial pamphleteer against the Pope; his early death in 1532 alone probably saved him from being as

[1] For the growth of Spanish Protestantism see C. A. Wilkens, *Geschichte des Spanischen Protestantismus im 16 Jahrhundert*, 1888 (trans. by R. Challice, 1897).

definitely included in the heretic ranks as his brother Juan. The Navarrese Servetus was for a time secretary to the Emperor's confessor Quintana, and accompanied the Court to Germany in 1530. Alonso Fonseca, Archbishop of Toledo, was accused before the Holy Office, but the Inquisitor General himself, Alonso Manrique, had Erasmian sympathies. Two of the first apostles of reform at Seville were the learned theologian Juan Gil, Canon of the Cathedral, and Ponce de la Fuente, one of the chief intellectual luminaries of Spain. Both exercised a commanding influence upon the University of Alcalá where the tendencies from early in the reign were at least latitudinarian. Constantin Ponce de la Fuente became chaplain to the Emperor, who wished to make Juan Gil Bishop of Tortosa, and who intervened on his behalf when he was arrested by the Inquisition in 1550. In Valladolid, the northern centre of heterodoxy, the family of Cazalla were among the first victims of the coming persecution, and these included Agostin Cazalla, who as preacher and chaplain had accompanied Charles to Germany and the Netherlands. The total number of heretics of mark in the reign of Charles is so small, that those here mentioned form a very considerable numerical proportion.

We find then in Spain a Church eminently national, laity and clergy uniting in opposition to ultramontane influences. The laity is jealous of the wealth of the clergy and of the judicial power both of the ordinary ecclesiastical courts and of the Inquisition, but it supports the episcopal authority against the exempted Orders. There is hostility more or less overt between the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the friars, and therefore between the former and the Inquisition, which was mainly under the friars' control. Intensifying this feeling there

is a peculiarly lofty conception of the position and duties of the episcopate as being of direct divine origin. The Crown is by tradition determined to maintain its peculiar authority over the Church, which originated in concessions made by the Papacy during the struggle with the infidel and was later increased by the conquest of Granada. On the other hand the Crown must appeal to Rome to obtain a further share of the revenues of the national clergy, while its wide political relations force it to employ a portion of this on objects not immediately Spanish; it is thus brought into conflict at once with clergy and laity. If the hostility which arose between Charles and successive Popes over Italian and German questions be considered, it is not surprising that the relations between Spain and the Papacy were strained almost to breaking point, that there were moments when Charles might have adopted the course of Henry VIII., orthodox but schismatic. This was prevented by the greater self-control of Charles, and by the nation's horror of heresy, which, owing to peculiar circumstances, had no parallel elsewhere. But it may be remembered that at one stormy meeting of the Council of Trent the Papal party dubbed the Spanish Bishops Judaists (*marranos*); that at the close of Charles's life heresy was spreading fast, and that ecclesiastics of the highest standing, closely associated with his memory, the Archbishop of Toledo and Francisco Borja among others, were implicated if not guilty.

To omit all mention of the Jesuits and their founder from a history of the age of Charles V. would be ridiculous, and yet in the biography of the Emperor himself they claim a very lowly place. Charles had really very little interest in Ignatius Loyola and his Order, and for long they failed to find warm welcome in the country of

their origin. Their unfaltering obedience to the Pope was no merit in the eyes of Charles or of the Spanish Church. The very Archbishop of Toledo forbade his clergy to have any relations with the Jesuits; they were even excommunicated by the Vicar-General of Saragossa. The Dominicans, who controlled the Inquisition, showed undisguised suspicion of their orthodoxy, while the great theologian Melchior Cano, who did not mince his words, regarded them as the precursors of Anti-Christ. The universities of Salamanca and Alcalá were foremost in denouncing them. In the latter town Ignatius Loyola was himself imprisoned in 1526 and put upon his trial by the Inquisition on suspicion of mysticism very alien to the Erasmian views which dominated the university. The cross examination of witnesses bore largely on the revivalist meetings to which the future Saint and his companions attracted students and women, and on the swooning of the latter, which is no uncommon feature in such gatherings. Their peculiar dress, their profession of the apostolic life, and above all their alleged interference with the confession of their votaries, all added to the disfavour with which the authorities regarded the young reformers.[1] At Alcalá they escaped with a warning and a suspension from teaching, but at Salamanca Loyola was for a time in chains.

The Jesuits at length found an invaluable recruit and protector in Francisco Borja, Duke of Gandia, a dear personal friend of Charles. To them he confided the care of his own college at Gandia, and before long they obtained admittance to the university of Salamanca. They had already in many places stirred the enthusiasm of the lower classes. It is said that Charles strove to

[1] The interesting documents relating to this trial have been printed by F. Fita in *Boletin de la R. Acad. de la Historia*, vol. xxxiii. parts v., vi., 1898.

persuade his friend to desert the Jesuits, and to join his own favourite Order, the Jeromites. To the end he certainly had no love for the Jesuits, and this not without some reason. Bobadilla, for his denunciation of the Interim, was expelled from Germany. Lainez and Salmeron were Julius III.'s theologians at the Council of Trent, whose privilege it was to speak first on doctrinal questions, and who invariably turned the current of the debate against the Emperor's intentions. Charles quite failed to recognise the part which the new Order was to play in the Catholic revival, but then it is not certain that he sympathised with the form which the revival was to take. Thus at all events it came about that the greatest product of Spain in the sixteenth century occupies little space in the biography of her ruler.

It was during the troublous session of 1538-39 that Charles was for a moment brought into collision with the nobility. The incident illustrates the extreme care with which he preserved their privileges and humoured their pride, although he denied to them any effective share in the actual government of the kingdom. During a procession a too officious police officer pushed aside the Duke of Infantado's horse. The duke slashed with his sword at the offender, whereupon Charles ordered Ronquillo to arrest him and escort him to his home. The Constable on the plea of privilege took the duke from Ronquillo's custody. The whole of the nobility present escorted the Constable and his charge, following the former to his palace with shouts of applause. Charles was left alone to his reflections. On the morrow he ordered the release of the Duke of Infantado, and left the punishment of the offending policeman to his discretion. The duke could now afford to be generous, and, not only begged that the officer might be pardoned,

but gave him a present wherewith to salve his sword-cut.

The despatches of the Venetian ambassador show clearly that the success of the nobles in defeating the financial projects of Charles was a symptom of oligarchical reaction against the monarchy. The gentry at large, the *hidalgos*, did not cease to extol the courage of the grandees in refusing the proposal for an excise, and so liberating Spain and themselves from such a burden; they turned their back upon the court and their eyes upon the natural leaders of their class. There was some suspicion that Charles would attempt to divide the grandees and bring them to repentance one by one, and it was reported that they had formed a private association for mutual defence. There was a very general idea that, if Charles left the kingdom, the nobles, elated by their success, would rise and raise Philip to the throne. The death of the Empress (May 1, 1539) added to Charles's difficulties; in the autumn he was given to understand that, if he went away, he might not be able to return. The ambassador assured the Venetian government that Charles was well aware of this and of the character of the grandees, who in the past were in the habit of rising against the Crown in order to parade their power; he added that, if Charles left for Germany, all Spain would be in arms.

The Emperor, as it proved, could afford to disregard the bravado of the grandees, for, in spite of his no longer having a representative in the Empress, he was able to leave for the Netherlands at the close of the year. The opposition, however, had probably been fatal to his scheme of a triple attack upon the Porte, and had determined him to reduce it to a campaign against Algiers in which the Spaniards were more

directly interested. In the early stages of the dispute the nobles had professed to fear a rising of the 800,000 Moors in Spain, should Charles denude the country of troops for a quixotic attempt on Constantinople.

The next incident of importance in Charles's relations to his Spanish kingdoms, if the expedition to Algiers be excepted, was his departure for the war against France and Guelders in 1543. He never personally exercised his royal power again in the peninsula, and there is some reason to believe that his control over the Council of Regency was not very close. Philip was left as Regent with a strong Council, and in the subsequent legislation there is some trace of reaction against the Emperor's economic principles. On leaving Spain Charles entrusted to his son two papers of advice.[1] Of these one was so secret that not even Philip's wife was to have sight of it. "As we are all mortal," wrote Charles, "in case God should take you to Himself, put the document in such safe keeping that it may be returned under seal to me, or burnt in your presence." Philip fortunately disobeyed his father, and to this we owe by far the most interesting information on the Emperor's methods of government, and on his frame of mind when he was entering on the most difficult stage of his career. As to his general policy in the future, Charles confessed that he could not give his son much counsel, for it was full of confusion and contradiction on the score of diplomacy as of conscience, but amid such doubts let him always lean on that which was most secure, the aid of God, and care for nothing else. "I am so irresolute and confused," Charles continued, "as

[1] These letters are printed by K. Lanz in *Staatspapiere zur Geschichte des Kaisers Karl V*, 1845, but better by W. Maurenbrecher in *Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte*, vol. iii.

to what I have to do, that a man who finds himself in such a case can ill tell another what befits him in the same emergency. I am going on this journey to see if I can clear my way, and since it is my present necessities which so confound me, I have no better remedy than to strive to do my duty and place myself in God's hands, that He may order all things as may be most to His service: whatever He should do or ordain, I shall be content."

Among the subjects which perplexed the Emperor was the future of Milan and the Netherlands. As to this Philip must be guided by time, circumstances, his own inclinations and his own character: he was the heir and must decide as best he could, and might God grant him a good decision: it was that this inheritance might not be diminished that Charles, to his very great regret, was leaving Spain. A few sentences touched upon the coming campaign. If Francis I. anticipated his attack, Charles intended to stake all on a general engagement, for he could not stand the cost of delay. If Francis did not attack, his plan was to invade France from the Netherlands and Germany, to create diversions in Languedoc from Perpignan, and in Dauphiné and Piedmont from Milan, and to direct a naval attack upon Provence. The whole of this scheme was, however, at present impracticable from want of money, and the Turk was keeping his galleys fully occupied.

Everything, therefore, reverted as always to the question of money, and it is highly characteristic of Charles that he returned to his proposal for an excise, which he had ostensibly abandoned but had never ceased to harbour. "I do not like to speak," he wrote, "on the matter of the excise, because I have sworn never to ask for it; I am certain that neither you nor I

have any better means of remedying our necessities, either with a view to the present campaign, or for our support in times of peace and quiet, giving the measure whatever name you please, *so long as the fact be there.*"[1]

Philip was implored to "put his feet against the wall," and to use his influence with the Cortes at large and with individuals to obtain this indispensable measure; he must let it be understood that those who opposed it would not be regarded as the King's good vassals and servants. With the excise, the money from the Indies, and the contributions of the Netherlands, Charles hoped to bring his enemies so low that hereafter they would give Philip and himself the opportunity of restoring their fortunes, and of escaping from the expenses which they daily imposed upon them.

Of yet greater interest is the Emperor's advice on the methods of internal government and his characterisation of his chief counsellors. He warned his son to show his strong disapproval of the quarrels and factions among his ministers, which were the cause of much disturbance to themselves and much disservice to the Crown. For this very reason he placed at the head of the government the Archbishop of Toledo and Cobos, who represented the two chief factions, in order that Philip might not be exclusively in the hands of one or the other, for each would try to monopolise and use him. The Cardinal of Toledo was, indeed, a holy man, who would give the prince good and unprejudiced advice, and aid him faithfully in the choice of fit candidates for office,—"but for the rest," continued Charles, "do not place yourself in his hands alone neither now nor at any time, nor, indeed, in those of any other man; rather discuss

[1] The words in italics were erased by Charles.

business with many counsellors and do not tie or pledge yourself to one, for though it saves trouble, it is not expedient, especially now that you are beginning your career, for men will say at once that you are governed, perhaps even without truth, and the minister who gained the credit for it would so lose his head and puff himself up that he would make a thousand blunders, while finally all the rest would grumble."

This wise advice was followed by hints upon the characters of Philip's future ministers. The prince was warned that the Duke of Alba would strive to utilise the factions for his own advancement, that Charles had recognised during his close connection with him, that he had the loftiest pretensions, that in spite of his sanctimonious, humble and reserved bearing, he would shoot ahead to the very utmost of his powers. Charles, if only on the ground that he was a grandee, had never employed him in the administration, and Alba had shown that he felt aggrieved. He advised Philip to be on his guard against admitting the duke or any other grandees into the inner circle of the government, because they would use every means to gain the mastery of his will, and this would afterwards cost him dear: Alba would not even fail to tempt him with women, against which Charles begged his son to be ever on the watch. Alba's proper place was in the departments of foreign affairs and war; in these Philip should employ him freely, for he was the best soldier that Spain could now boast, and honour and favour were only his due reward.

Cobos was the Emperor's chief financial minister. He believed him to be faithful and honest, and, up till latterly, devoid of party passion, which now, however, seemed not to be entirely wanting. He was not so hard a worker as of yore, for he was suffering from old age

and pain. His wife wearied and excited him, and brought him into ill repute by taking presents, which were, indeed, of small value, and Charles believed that since he had spoken on the subject, Cobos would check the practice. The minister was intimately acquainted with all the Emperor's business, and no one would serve Philip better, if only it pleased God that the causes above mentioned should not taint the mother's milk in his character. The prince was, however, advised not to let Cobos go beyond his instructions, but on the other hand to support him against the opposition which was as undeserved as it was inexpedient. Cobos would of course, as every one else, try to win his master's exclusive favour, and as he had himself in younger days been a squire of dames, he would, if Philip showed any bent in that highly undesirable direction, rather help than hinder. Cobos had been well rewarded, but sometimes would hint at a desire for more; Philip in reply should treat him with all respect and assure him that Charles did not do more for fear of making others grumble. It was with reference to this that Charles speaks, perhaps, most strongly of his belief in the future of the Indies. Cobos had been granted concessions for colonising and a monopoly of salt in the Indies for two lives. Charles advised Philip to compensate the son in other ways, because though these concessions were a small matter at present, they might with time become of high importance; similarly with other regalian rights, the king should keep them for himself and not confer them on his ministers. As a finance minister Cobos received from his master unstinted praise; if he was thought wasteful and extravagant, the fault was neither his nor that of Charles but of the political situation; if only Cobos had the chance he would admirably execute reforms. Philip

was strongly urged, in the event of the Emperor's death, to continue him in the office which had been granted only during his absence, and to associate with him Juan de Zuñiga as the best possible complement to his qualities, in spite of the remonstrances of Alba and others, who would covet the office for themselves, but must not have it.

On Zuñiga Charles bestowed unstinted praise. If this true servant seemed harsh to the young prince, it was only the severity of love and care in contrast to the over indulgence of his other counsellors. "Thank God," continued Charles, "there is nothing especially to blame in you, not but what there is room for improvement if you aim at being perfect, as I beg of you . . . but if Don Juan had been like your other attendants, all would have gone according to your wish, and this is not good for any one, not even for the old, and much less for boys, who cannot possess the knowledge and the self-restraint that experience and age alone can give." Zuñiga had indeed his little failings—some show of temper towards Cobos and Alba, who belonged to the opposite party, and who, as he thought, thwarted his due rewards, some slight avarice due to the pressure of his wife and children. But in spite of shortcomings, Philip was urged to trust implicitly to the truthfulness and honesty of Cobos and Zuñiga, and especially to rely on the latter in all matters relating to personal conduct.

On other members of Philip's *suite* Charles touched more lightly. The Bishop of Cartagena had been too lax in the prince's education, and, it was to be hoped not for personal reasons, too anxious to please him. As the bishop was to be chaplain, it would be well to have a good friar as confessor, for the former might wish to make things as easy in matters of conscience as in study:

up till now no grave harm had been done, but there might be much hereafter: the soul was the principal thing, and it was all important that this should be kept good and pure in youth. The Cardinal of Seville had done of old good service, especially in his recommendations for office, but his health was broken, and if he asked leave to retire to his diocese, he would do better there than at court. The President of the Council of Castile was a worthy man, but not up to his place, and more fitted for a court of Law than the Council. Nevertheless he would do his duty, and therefore Philip should show him favour and give him high reward: it was above all necessary to watch carefully over the administration of justice, and especially over the conduct of the Council of Castile.

To the Count of Osorio, President of the Council of Orders, Charles was less favourable, and Philip was advised to see that his colleagues in this Council had their liberty. Osorio was artful, and not always so clean-handed as he might be; he was very clever, and so short of speech that he was not easily understood; this might be because he did not wish to be understood, or in order to avoid giving dissatisfaction. The Emperor naturally touched but lightly on those ministers who were not at Philip's court. He advised, however, his son, in the event of his own death, to employ Granvelle in all matters relating to Germany, Italy, France and England, and above all to take care that he had a seat in the Council of Flanders. Granvelle was capable and faithful; he had his strong feelings about his native county of Burgundy, and he wished to enrich his sons; on the other hand he had trained the Bishop of Arras very well, and he was likely to succeed his father as a valuable servant.

If in the government of Charles the parliamentary division was marking time or edging towards the rear, the bureaucratic was steadily moving forwards. The influence of the reign was necessarily apparent in the increased differentiation of the administrative councils, which became the prominent feature of Spanish rule, and which, thanks to the enthusiasm of Saint-Simon, supplanted for a moment in France the natural growth of its own bureaucracy. The development of the system during the reign of Charles was determined rather by circumstances than by deliberate policy. As long as the king was resident, the respective limits of the Councils of Castile, State, and War might be indeterminate, but when once he was subject to long absences, the two latter must become more and more distinct from the stationary Council of Castile, whose function it was to supervise the whole internal administration of the state. The same process would apply to the Council of Finance, from the increased bulk and specialisation of its business. To this must be added the evolution of the Chamber, which was mainly concerned with royal grants and patronage, from the Council of Castile. The Councils of the Inquisition and the *Cruzada* were already in existence, but the Council of the Orders had only taken its permanent place in the constitution when Adrian VI. vested them in the Crown for ever. A more important institution of Charles's reign was the Council of the Indies, which perhaps existed in germ before, but which owed to him its modern and very complete form, and became of the highest importance.

All the above Councils are separately mentioned by Charles in his instructions to his son in 1543, and he was ordered to see that all documents were referred to the department to which they belonged. The Council

of Aragon corresponded in some measure with that of Castile, but it was ambulatory, accompanying the person the king, and is stated so to be in the above instruction. In 1544 was created the Council of Works and Woods for the administration of the royal buildings and domains; this would roughly correspond to our department of Woods and Forests and the Chancery of the Duchy of Lancaster. It has been debated whether the Council of Italy was separated from that of Aragon in the last year of Charles or the first of Philip. It was a necessary consequence of the investiture of Philip with Milan, which had not as Naples and Sicily any connection with the crown of Aragon. Thus also the arrangements made for the devolution of the Burgundian inheritance to the king of Spain entailed the creation of the Council of Flanders and Burgundy.

Amid this multiplicity of Councils a certain unity was preserved by the recognised superiority and seniority of that of Castile, and by the admittance of several of its members to the younger boards. Even the Council of State had no such permanent organisation; if the king died, it was to the Council of Castile that the power reverted; it was still emphatically the Royal Council, and much more than a mere department; it exercised influence in all branches of legislation, administration and jurisdiction. This lack of limit to its powers naturally made the Council an object of jealousy to the Cortes, and between the two bodies there was much the same friction which existed in France between the Parliament of Paris and the Estates-General. The Cortes petitioned Charles that the Council's functions should be limited to the supervision of justice and the ordinary administration; they earnestly insisted that it should not be suffered to hear cases which belonged of right to the

Chanceries of Valladolid and Granada. It was, however, no easy matter to limit the Council's power by legislation, for its President, after the lapse of the office of Grand Chancellor on Gattinara's death, presided over the sessions of Cortes, while the Council itself must draft the ordinances which were founded on petition.

Although the routine in Castilian administration was left to the bureaucracy, yet the government of Charles in matters of policy was anything but bureaucratic. All affairs of State passed through the king's own hands and those of Gattinara, and afterwards Granvelle, or, if Spanish, those of Cobos. Granvelle overnight would forward a *précis* of the business of the following day, while Charles sent the minister notes on all audiences granted to ambassadors or Councils. Then followed the private conferences of master and minister, and, although the result of the deliberation might be brought before the corresponding Council, the practical object of this was to "enjoy the benefit of time." Not even the Council of Castile, and still less that of State, was of any great importance in the determination of policy as compared with the chief ministers for the time being. It can readily be imagined that under such a system the new office of the sole Secretary of State for foreign affairs was rising in consideration, although Gonzalo Perez in Charles's reign was never more than a superior clerk.

The only influence which could vie with that of the principal ministers was that of the king's confessor. He had too the privilege of constant personal and most private intercourse. But apart from this, the confessor virtually occupied a high official position in the state, for he could claim admittance into any Council where the subject under discussion might affect the royal conscience. Thus in questions of peace and war with

infidels or heretics, in matters relating to the Inquisition or the Church or the Indies, he was a power with whom to reckon, and Popes and foreign princes knew this well. The confessor's influence, however, is believed to have varied with the health of the Emperor, the sensitiveness of whose conscience was affected by that of his gout-tortured limbs.

There are then in the Castile of Charles three powers, —the parliamentary, the bureaucratic and the personal. Each has its sphere of influence, but the boundaries are seldom absolutely clear. They may roughly be mapped out as economic policy, internal administration and foreign policy. The king was not absolute, for even within his own sphere he was hampered, if not held, by the financial control of the Cortes. This he could only evade by the facilities which the Crown's mineral wealth afforded for raising loans, but this in the long run must bring its retribution. Nevertheless there were signs that the personal power was growing at the expense of the parliamentary, and this in great measure from its natural alliance with the bureaucracy against the common rival.

It is difficult to decide whether the reign of Charles was of positive benefit to Spain herself, except in so far as he did very much to encourage and regulate her colonial enterprise. Negatively also it may be claimed that it was of no slight service in checking, though not with entire success, the seaward advance of the Crescent when it was at the very summit of its power. It must be remembered that with the death of Solyman the worst was over, and that Ferdinand on the Danube and Charles in African waters had had to bear the brunt.

Spaniards have from his own day argued that the Emperor should have abandoned or never accepted his

European position and devoted himself exclusively to the interests of Spain. But would the abandonment of Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, have benefited Spain? In Germany the apparent issue was the success of heresy. In this Spaniards had a genuine concern. Had Charles abandoned Germany thirty years before the Catholic revival, it may be doubted whether Spain herself or any part of Europe would have resisted the movement of reform. Whether for Spain reform would have been a blessing or a bane may be left for the Spanish critics of Charles to decide.

Given the character of Philip II., the personal union of Spain and the Netherlands was an unmixed evil, but it is possible to imagine circumstances under which it might have been a guarantee of European peace, as bridling France, the most aggressive power in Europe. Charles was, however, himself conscious of the dangers and difficulties of the union, and had he been forced to make his final decision when he was ten years younger, he would probably have divided his Spanish from his Burgundian heritage.

Italy was after all the cause of the foreign wars of Charles, and in these, as has been seen, his inheritance of the crown of Aragon involved him. At his accession France was far stronger in Italy than was Spain, and France would not have been content with Milan. Spain, indeed, proved capable, single-handed, of holding Italy against France in later days, in spite of the drain of the Netherland revolt—a fact which is often forgotten in an estimate of the power of Spain, and of the work of Charles and Philip II. Yet this success was due to the blows dealt by the European power of Charles, which sickened France of her Italian cravings. He could scarcely have held Naples without the military resources

of Germany and the wealth of the Netherlands. Had he voluntarily or perforce abandoned Italy, the loss of Navarre and Roussillon would have followed. It has been urged that if European ambitions had been renounced, Spain could have devoted her whole energies to the development of her colonies. If Spain had been allowed to follow what many Spaniards professed to be her natural policy, she would have shrunk into a second-rate European power. In this case is it likely that the states with a fine seaboard, France, England and the Netherlands, would have left her the monopoly of her Indies? France was during the reign of Charles, and in the earlier years of Philip, the dangerous power: the Emperor himself showed anxiety as to the threatened interference of France in America. The European power of Spain warded off the danger from her colonies by striking hard at France at home: in less palmy days it imposed a certain check upon the England of Elizabeth and James I.

Spain after all owes her glory to her matchless military prestige, and this was won, not on Spanish, but on foreign fields. The army long outlived the nation. Trained in Italy, quartered in the Netherlands, almost detached from Spain herself, it was a self-subsistent organism instinct with life down to the battle of Rocroy, even to the battle of the Dunes. Its creation was of course the task of the Catholic Kings and Gonzalo de Cordoba, but its more modern form was due to Charles and his commanders. His were the far-famed *tercios* of Naples, Lombardy, Sicily and Malaga. The Spanish veterans, each private as splendid as a captain, whom Brantôme saw and worshipped as they filed past the French frontier to the Netherlands, were the soldiers whom Charles had trained.

Within Spain the anarchy, which for just a quarter of a century was held under by the joint rule of Ferdinand and Isabella, proved on the queen's death not to be extinct; it blazed up during the regency of Jiménez, and caused a general conflagration in the early years of Charles. In spite of appearances, the permanent centre of disorder lay rather in the nobility than in the towns, and the victory of the nobles gave them a great opportunity. Their leaders happened fortunately to be at this crisis men of unusual wisdom; yet it must be placed to the credit of the thirty and more years of Charles's government that there was never again any serious recrudescence of disorder in Castile. The trouble in Aragon under Philip II. and the revolt of Catalonia under Philip IV. were local rather than class disturbances. In his relations to Aragon Charles behaved with caution, attempting no heroic remedies. A recent monograph would go to prove that he showed peculiar affection towards Catalonia, which was reciprocated by the quick-witted, adventurous, if turbulent, Catalans.[1] The rule of Charles, characterised by sense rather than sensibility, tempering obstinacy with elasticity, and occasional cold-bloodedness with general good temper, tided Spain over a crisis, and left to Philip II. and his successors an easy task. Charles was never popular in Spain; although he avoided irritation, he never bade for popularity. But the most popular master is not necessarily the wisest nor the best.

[1] See F. Bofarull, *Predilección de Carlos V por los Catalanes. Memorias de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona*, vol. v. 1896.

CHAPTER IV

Condition of the Indies at the accession of Charles—The task of the government in the colonies—Favour given to Las Casas—Attitude of the government towards Fernando Cortes—His personal relations with Charles—Difficulties of the government with the house of Pizarro—Organisation of the colonies—The *encomienda* system—Indian slavery—The Emperor's support of the missionaries—His humanity towards the Indians—His instructions of 1548—The extent of conquest and colonisation during the reign—The government and the spice trade—Magellan's expedition—Discovery of the Ladrones and Philippines—Contest with Portugal for the Moluccas and its settlement.

If the internal history of Castile was, since the close of the revolt of the Communes, uneventful, it was far otherwise with her American dependencies. The reign of Ferdinand and Isabella had been the age of discovery; the reign of Charles V. was that of conquest and organisation. Upon his accession the settlements on the mainland were insignificant, while the Antilles were already in a condition of complete decay owing to the rapid extinction of the natives and the consequent deficiency of labour: at the date of his abdication Spanish conquest and settlement had with slight exceptions reached its limits. It could already be foreseen in what colonies the natives would survive and multiply, and in what others the negroes were destined to form the whole or the chief part of the working population. It was in November 1518, during Charles's first visit to Spain, that Cortes set sail for Mexico: the year 1556,

in which the Emperor withdrew to Yuste, has with good reason been chosen by Sir Arthur Helps as the close of his own work upon Spanish America, because the conquests had been virtually completed and the principles of civil and ecclesiastical government determined. Mineral wealth was the main object of colonisation in the Indies, and this is frequently antedated. When Charles succeeded to the throne the output of precious metals was trifling and irregular: by 1555 Mexico and Peru were raining gold and silver upon the unfruitful lap of the Castilian Danae.

The story of the great conquests lies beyond our sphere, for they were the work mainly of adventurers of marked individuality, such as Cortes and Pizarro, starting on their own impulse from the older settlements. The colonisation of the river Plate, however, owes something to the initiative of the home government. In 1516 Juan de Solis had been sent thither direct from Spain. Ten years later Sebastian Cabot, despatched by Charles to the Moluccas, entered the huge river, which Magellan himself had visited. Here Cabot stayed until his return in 1530, but his object was rather to reach the Pacific coast than to effect a settlement in Argentina. The later and more important expeditions of Pedro de Mendoza and Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca, through starting from Spain, were mainly due to private enterprise. Elsewhere usually the task of Charles was, first to encourage the spirit of adventure, and then to exercise control over the adventurers who more than once gave proof of volition for independence. The home government, again, was the mediator between the conquerors of the new and the governors of the older settlements, and it must adjust the relations between the colonists and the natives, which involved in great measure those

between the colonists and the colonial Church. Among its problems were the arrest of depopulation and the supply of the labour market, the regulation of Oceanic trade, the counterpoise of military preponderance by the Law Courts and the Church, and hence the creation of the civil and ecclesiastical system—that enduring framework which even in some degree survived the cataclysm of the Spanish empire.[1]

Almost simultaneous with the accession of Charles was the first great effort of Las Casas to enlist the sympathies of the Crown on behalf of the native population. His chief opponent was the Bishop of Burgos, the head of the old school of American administration. Perhaps for this very reason he found favour with the Burgundian councillors, the Chancellor Sauvage, La Chaux, and afterwards with Gattinara. Their motives may have been pecuniary or they may have been philanthropic, but their favour was of vital importance, because it gave the young king an early interest in the colonial question. The government at once took a new direction from which for generations it never entirely swerved.

The supreme moment was the actual eve of Charles's departure from Corunna for England. The thoughts of the Emperor elect must have been bent upon his coming coronation, upon the prospects of an English alliance against France. He had emerged with difficulty from a prolonged struggle against the flowing tide of popular disfavour as represented in the Cortes; he was already

[1] Bibliographical notes on the American colonies would be far beyond our compass. For the general principles of Charles's administration English readers cannot do better than refer to Sir Arthur Helps, *The Spanish Conquest in America*, 4 vols, 1855-61. Mention may also be made of the monographs recently published by R. Cappa on the government and condition of the Indies, although these extend far beyond the reign of Charles.—*Estudios criticos acerca la dominacion española en America* (various dates, Madrid, Murillo).

endangered by the under-current of actual rebellion which went near to pull down his power if not his person. Yet Charles found time to preside at a Junta in which Las Casas argued his case against the colonial, anti-missionary representative, the Bishop of Darien. With his own hand he signed the grant of the experimental settlement which Las Casas was to found upon the Pearl Coast. Had it succeeded, it would have been as important from a commercial as from a humanitarian and Catholic point of view. Its failure was scarcely due to Las Casas and still less to Charles.

The indirect results of the Emperor's sympathetic action were of high importance. Henceforth the desire of all those interested in the fortunes of the Indies, or their own, was to obtain personal contact with Charles. Such was the case with Fernando Cortes. The Bishop of Burgos did all in his power to prevent or conceal the receipt of the Conqueror's early letters. He supported the enemy of Cortes, Velasquez, governor of Cuba, who had endeavoured to thwart the expedition ; he had even persuaded the regent Adrian to deprive Cortes of his position. But as soon as Charles returned to Spain he nominated a Junta to give a fair hearing to the two parties, and of this the liberal-minded Gattinara was the president. The result was the appointment of Cortes as Captain-General and Governor of New Spain, and an imperative order to Velasquez against interference with the young settlement (October 1522).

Calumny, and occasionally truth, was always busy with the reputation of the Conquerors, to whom independence might bear irresistible temptation. Hence it was that Charles in 1526 despatched Luis Ponce de Leon to take the *residencia* of Cortes, to suspend him, that is, from his administrative functions during an

official inquiry into his conduct. This procedure entailed no disgrace; it was familiar to all the chief royal officials in Spain; it was simply an extension of an everyday corrective, highly popular in the mother country, to the new, vast and unorganised colonies where it was infinitely more needed. The character of the commissioner was a guarantee of the fairness of the government. Charles, however, was not content with the application of mere control to one whose sensitiveness was in proportion to his services. With his own hand he wrote to Cortes, assuring him that he was acting from no feeling of suspicion, but to enable him to refute the accusations of his enemies.

Ponce de Leon unfortunately died, and his tactless successor provoked real peril of a rising of the Conquerors against governmental authority, which Cortes had some difficulty in restraining. The home government in genuine alarm created an *Audiencia*, or High Court, for Mexico, which carried with it orders to send Cortes back to Spain. Even here Charles showed his consideration for his over-mighty subject: his personal letter to the *Audiencia* stated that he wished to consult Cortes on the affairs of the Indies, and bestow on him rewards in accordance with his deserts.

Before the *Audiencia* arrived, Cortes had set out for Spain. During this visit Charles paid him unstinted honour, consulting him on colonial administration, the amelioration of the condition of the natives, the development of agriculture. He visited him when on the sick-bed at his inn; he created him Marquis of the Valley of Oajaca, and endowed him with vast estates, testifying in the patent to the fidelity and obedience with which so good and trusty a vassal had ever served the Crown. When in 1529 Charles left Spain for Italy, Cortes was

among those who formed his escort to the coast. Yet honours were shadowed by precautions. Charles would not entrust these huge, distant provinces to a single hand. Cortes received on his return to Mexico the military command as Captain-General, but the civil authority henceforth remained in the hands of a viceroy who had not the same intimate connection with the Conquerors, and was bound by closer ties to the mother country. The appointment of Antonio de Mendoza proved the high importance which Charles attributed to these new colonial posts.

The final visit of Cortes to Spain was less happy than the first. He was, indeed, honourably received, and joined the Emperor's *suite* at Algiers. But his later enterprises towards the Californian coast had been unfortunate, his financial resources were exhausted, and he was involved in interminable litigation. His last letter to Charles implored the Emperor to order the courts to come to a decision, but to interfere with the leisure of Castilian lawyers was too adventurous a course for Charles, who himself appreciated the benefits of time. The sound of trumpets and the beat of drums still rings in the ears of the conquering hero, when age has dulled the hearing of those he served. Great adventurers make irritable litigants, and Charles may not have given due consideration to the importunity of Cortes: yet it is unfair to ascribe to the Emperor's indifference the Conqueror's fatal fit of indigestion,

As Cortes, so Alvarado and the two Pizarros sought personal contact with Charles. Alvarado at his hands received both pardon and reward. On his first visit in 1527 Charles made him administrator of Guatemala, approved his distribution of the lands and native population, and admitted him to the Order of Santiago. The

Emperor was indignant at Alvarado's insubordination in entering Peru against express orders. He directed the *Audiencia* of Mexico to submit him to *residencia*, and before this had commanded the governor of Panama to make him prisoner. Yet when the offender visited Spain in 1536, Charles could not find it in his heart to dispense with so fine a soldier, and Alvarado returned as governor to Guatemala.

The visit of Francisco Pizarro to Spain was simultaneous with that of Cortes, and he too found a welcome from the Emperor. His brother Fernando returned to the Indies in 1534 laden with honours for himself, Francisco and Almagro. The court did all in its power to encourage the conquerors of Peru, and arrange their disputes by a division of their spheres of influence. But Pizarro and his rivals had little of the statesmanship and self-restraint of Cortes, and Charles soon recognised that the civil war between Pizarrists and Almagrists would lead to independence, although neither faction was professedly fighting against the government. A policy of repression now superseded that of encouragement. Fernando on his second visit in 1539 was imprisoned for twenty-three years and deprived of the Order of Santiago, as the penalty for the judicial murder of Almagro. Peru was in a condition of chronic revolution, and the revolution was devouring its own children. The lawyer Vaca de Castro was despatched from Spain to restore order and emphasise royal authority. Three months after his arrival he heard of the murder of the great Pizarro by the Almagrists (June 1541), and in the autumn of 1542 he captured and executed Diego de Almagro who was in open revolt against the government.

Peru seemed restored to peace and to the Crown; it

was soon to suffer another period of anarchy from the Crown's good intentions in the cause of order. Charles was in Spain in 1542, and here received the memorial of Las Casas on the destruction of the Indians. The result was the appointment of a viceroy and an *Audiencia* for Peru, and the promulgation of a code of laws intended to protect the liberty of the natives. The government had this time erred on the side of severity. So opposed were the new laws to the racial traditions and the material interests of the colonists that they must almost have provoked rebellion, even if the violence and obstinacy of the viceroy, Blasco Nuñez, had not precipitated it. On this occasion it was, indeed, rebellion in form. Gonzalo, the last of the brothers Pizarro, put himself at the head of the movement, and there is little question that he meditated an independent kingdom. The very *Audiencia* and the municipality of Lima recognised his authority, driven to despair by the insane violence of the viceroy. When Blasco Nuñez, after alternations of imprisonment, flight, and partial success, had fallen in battle (January 1546), royal authority seemed really at an end. Pizarro was absolute master of Peru: his fleet at Panama seemed to bar all access to the officers of the Crown.

Charles, undeterred by the failure of Blasco Nuñez, persisted in his attempt to sterilise the seeds of rebellion in Peru. The new President of the *Audiencia*, the lawyer Pedro de la Gasca, was as resourceful and conciliatory as his predecessor had been incompetent and tactless; his government, moreover, had determined to regain touch with colonial opinion. Gasca's first act was to win the commander of Pizarro's fleet at Panama, and wholesale desertion soon placed the rebel general at his mercy (April 1547). The execution of Gonzalo

Pizarro was the tragic close of the fortunes of the soldier family which had won so much for Spain, but which had from the first been following, consciously or unconsciously, the path of independence. The civil conflicts of Peru between Pizarrists and Almagrists seem strangely familiar to modern readers; their history has been plagiarised by many a Central and South American republic. Trouble was not quite over with the notable success of Gasca. The rising of Giron against his successor proved that the spectre of independence had not been comfortably laid; it was only just before the Emperor's abdication that the new governor, Hurtado de Mendoza, reduced Peru to permanent order and obedience.

Notwithstanding many mistakes, the government of Charles dealt wisely with the difficulties of colonial expansion. There was this great distinction between mother country and colonies, that Spain was unmilitary at home, while her colonies in their earlier stage must be military above all. To call Spain unmilitary may seem a paradox, but it is noticeable how few of the petitions in Cortes relate to military topics, except occasional requests for more protection for the frontiers: the far-famed Spanish infantry was trained, not at home, but on the drill grounds of Naples or Milan. Thus, in spite of the military exigencies of the colonies, the thoroughly urban character of Spanish life and the complete judicial organisation of the Spanish municipalities impressed itself upon them from the first, and this gave the government a great advantage. The civil administration in the colonies grew of itself from below. Directly the adventurers were in a position to found a permanent settlement, a complete municipality arose on the Spanish model, with its aldermen, its magistrates and its con-

stables. This was the case, to take two out of many examples, with San Miguel, the earliest town in Peru, and with Santiago in Guatemala. Order was at once established, and the price of provisions fixed. A stretch of territory was reserved for communal uses, while to each horseman and foot soldier was granted a freehold corresponding to his military position. The general character of these townships precisely resembled that of the Spanish settlements on land originally Moorish; they were military colonies, tempered by an elective civil administration. The American conqueror with his *encomienda* of Indians differed little from the Andalucian or Valencian noble with his Moorish vassal peasantry. This made it the easier for the government to introduce the higher branches of the administrative system, the practice of *residencia*, and the supreme court, the *Audiencia*, as well as the elaborate ecclesiastical organisation.

Colonial life, on the other hand, accentuated the crying national faults of the Castilian,—indolence, avarice and arrogance. Charles did his best to remedy the difficulties of the labour question by means of peasant colonies; but it proved impossible to establish a Spanish artisan or agricultural population. The temptation of mineral wealth was the solvent of all such settlements, and in the mines all labour was vicariously performed by men of colour. Exemption from manual labour was the test and the privilege of Spanish blood.

No government has tried harder to do its duty by the native population of its colonies than that of Charles. It was, of course, impossible at once to satisfy the colonists and protect the natives. The original system was that of the *encomienda*. The natives were

settled in villages, which were made over as fiefs to the colonists, who stood to them in the position of the king, and received their tribute. It was plausibly argued that this was for the Indians' physical and moral welfare; that it made the process of their conversion easier, and gave them a protector who had a pecuniary interest in their well-being. This much is true, that in the settlement of Venezuela under grant to the Augsburg banking firm of Welser the natives rapidly died off, because it was to the interest of individual colonists rather to destroy than to preserve them. The necessity, however, of forced labour for the mines and pearl fisheries, and the indolence and brutality of the colonists, rendered nugatory in most cases the supposed advantages of the *encomienda*. Those who took philanthropic interest in the question always advocated freedom as the only remedy, arguing it on the high ground that Christianity and slavery were incompatible.

The Crown listened respectfully to the philanthropists, but it was in this difficulty, that it had no available revenues for pensioning the Conquerors in any other way, while it was essential to the preservation of the new states that they should be tempted to reside. Thus from the first the policy of the Crown wavered, for it was striving to reconcile the desirable with the possible. Spaniards abroad, whether in Europe or America, had an evil reputation for cruelty, but in their own country this was, perhaps, undeserved. There were popular petitions against the cruelty of the *Hermándad*, the police organisation established by Ferdinand and Isabella, and against the loss of life occasioned by bull-fights. So also on the native question the revolted Communes, and afterwards the Cortes, petitioned the Crown in favour of complete freedom for the Indians.

Even the conqueror of Mexico himself was theoretically opposed to the *encomienda*, though forced by the indebtedness and importunity of the colonists to concede it.

It is natural, therefore, that Charles was not quite consistent in his legislation on the native question. In 1523, after full consideration, the *encomienda* was forbidden, but Cortes found insuperable difficulties in enforcing the law in Mexico, and much was left to the discretion of the Visitor, Ponce de Leon. In 1529 an important Junta decided on entire resumption by the Crown, with compensation in the form of pensions for vested interests, and this in spite of the very moderate remonstrances of Cortes who was present at the debate. The ordinance was actually executed to some extent, and in Mexico caused much agitation and the departure of five-hundred colonists, after which the local government found it politic to compromise. This failure was followed by a reaction at the Spanish court, which authorised *encomiendas* for Peru in 1533, and in 1536 even extended the grant to a second life, while the viceroy of Mexico was privately instructed to exercise his discretion.

The Spanish missionary was pitted against the Spanish conqueror and proved a foeman worthy of his steel. The contest, which has since been waged in three continents and for more than three centuries, was now fairly started. Las Casas in 1538 re-opened his campaign, apparently at the Emperor's instigation. The celebrated Junta of 1542, held in Charles's presence, issued the so-called New Laws, providing for the resumption of *encomiendas* on the death of the original colonists, subject to royal provision for widows and children. In addition to this all royal officials and all

those implicated in the civil wars of Pizarro and Almagro were to be immediately deprived of their Indian vassals. As these latter classes included the whole Spanish population of Peru and Chili, it is not surprising that the New Laws caused rebellion, and in their extreme form they were ultimately withdrawn.

Though the government failed in executing its wishes, it was much that it set a high standard of desire. The colonists, now and long after, offered huge sums for the conversion of the *encomiendas* into freehold; the *Audiencia* of Mexico itself backed this request. But Charles in his greatest need would not even grant extension to a third life, and during his retreat at Yuste wrote strongly against the alienation which was then suggested.

It was with the native question as with heresy: he would compromise from sheer necessity, but he would not recognise the permanent existence of beliefs or institutions against which his conscience revolted. Born as he was to the impossible, he had innate experience of its fetters. He was too practical or too uninventive to try and extricate his hands, but, as a stoic, he resolved that they should not bind his soul.

Parallel with the struggle of the Crown against the form of vassalage entailed by the *encomienda* was its resistance to slavery proper and forced personal service. Here at least much was effected. The Conquerors could urge that in the Indies they only succeeded to a slave system, but the *Audiencia* of Mexico rejoined that, whereas the Indians treated their slaves like vassals and relations, the Christians used them as dogs. Slavery, moreover, was the cause of the disgraceful raids made under false pretexts upon harmless native

villages. To have adopted a complete measure of emancipation would have resulted in revolution; but the government did its best to mitigate the evil by precautionary and remedial measures. It reserved to itself the right of branding, and established a presumption in favour of liberty. There was, indeed, an ordinance issued in 1526 that all slaves who wished might return to their homes, but more effective were those of 1528 and 1529 authorising an inquiry into all forays past and present, and enjoining that no native captives should be enslaved, however just the war, and that no fresh Indian slaves should be acquired.

In 1538 was issued the yet more stringent ordinance that no Spaniard might buy or possess slaves, and that no *Cacique* might make or sell them. This was followed by the provisions of the New Laws of 1542 and later, which altogether prohibited forced personal service. The results were the successive revolts of Gonzalo Pizarro and Giron in Peru, while even in more orderly Mexico so drastic a measure could not be enforced. Connected with this legislation was the formal debate between Sepulveda and Las Casas before the Junta of 1550 on the justice of war against the Indians. Although the royal historiographer won a technical victory, the government showed its real inclinations by forbidding the circulation of Sepulveda's pamphlet in the Indies.

In the less settled colonies the regulations against slavery were doubtless often inoperative. The favour shown by the natives to the English adventurers in the Anglo-Spanish wars of the following reign would prove that the treatment of the natives by the colonists was still tyrannical. It is true that the English of all ages have been prone to exaggerate their own philanthropy

towards native races and the affection of the natives for themselves, but many of the reports which illustrate the present subject come, not from English, but from Spanish sources. It is fair to remember that the English captains were chiefly conversant with the Indians on the main lines of the mineral traffic, who were naturally more liable to oppression.

It may, at all events, be ascribed to the Emperor's whole-hearted support of the views of Las Casas that from Northern Mexico to Southern Chili the Indians have been suffered to survive and to form the major part of the population. When the reign began, the extinction of the natives in the Antilles and the settlements of the neighbouring mainland was almost an accomplished fact, and, but for the introduction of a new policy, similar extermination would have been the sequel of Spanish colonisation. This may be proved by the example of Peru, where the home government had least control; for here the presence of a large negro population was due to the loss of native life caused by anarchy resulting from the civil wars. Against the preservation of the Indians may, of course, be set in the scales of good and evil the introduction of negro slavery. Yet as the scheme of peasant colonies proved a failure, this seemed the only alternative to the entire desertion of the islands. Las Casas, as is well known, repented of his mistake, if such it were. Charles at least showed his humanity by the suggestion that, to encourage the negroes to work and marry, they should be allowed a *peculium*, or trifling wage, which would enable them to purchase freedom.

The same feeling of sympathetic interest was shown in the Emperor's kindness to the Indians whom Cortes brought to Spain with him, and in the commands

personally given to Fernando Pizarro to show consideration to the natives. In the instructions sent to Cortes in 1523 the Conquerors were warned to avoid violence and breach of faith; to suppress human sacrifice, but without causing unnecessary irritation; to educate the Indians to Christianity, for a hundred won in this way were worth more than a hundred-thousand converted by force; to impose no heavier burdens than the taxes which had been paid to the *caciques*. Humanity breathes in every line of the instructions of 1526, which speak plainly of the boundless greed and cruelty of the colonists. They enact that in every new settlement clergy should accompany the adventurers, that the natives should be taught that the Spaniards came to free them from their burdens and convert them to a milder faith, that they should be as Charles's other Christian subjects. War, it was added, could only be justified by rebellion and the necessity of self-preservation, and should only be undertaken with the assent of the clergy, whose duty it also was to provide that the Indians who voluntarily worked in mines should be well trained in morality and sound doctrine.

Charles was, it must be admitted, on the side of the missionary against the colonist. At all times colonists, traders, and soldiers have had their reasons for disliking missionary enterprise. They have infected with their dislike the travellers, who are bound to them by hospitality, frequently the civil servants, whose domestic interests and comforts are identical with their own, and not infrequently a section of the colonial clergy. The Spanish colonies were no exception. Many of the reforms suggested by Las Casas were opposed, merely because they bore his name. The earlier bishops, as being themselves great lords, took the colonial point of

view; thus the Bishop of Darien was one of the earliest and fiercest opponents of Las Casas. Cortes, who, more truly than any other Spaniard, held the balance between colonists and natives, inveighed against bishops and entreated Charles to send friars. Even the Jeromite commission despatched during the regency of Jiménez, had thrown their instructions overboard and reported in favour of the colonial opinion on *encomiendas*, whereas the Dominicans settled in San Domingo since 1510 insisted that complete freedom was the only remedy.

The missionaries now found strong support at home. The original Council of the Indies had virtually collapsed, and when Charles reorganised it in 1524, he put at its head his own confessor, Loaysa, who set the tone which it long maintained. Charles sent Franciscans and Dominicans to Mexico, and, as its first bishop, an ecclesiastic well known to himself. The bishop proved a noble protector of the Indians, and worked in harmony with Cortes, but came to blows on the native question with the *Audiencia*. This court, after quarrelling with the official protectors of the Indians and the Franciscans, deprived the bishop of his temporalties, and was in turn declared excommunicate (1530). Yet this very *Audiencia* once declared that, while garrison towns were dens of thieves, monasteries were as good as walls and castles for keeping Indians in subjection.

Charles took the deepest personal interest in the mission settlement founded by Las Casas in the Land of War. He wrote to thank the *caciques* who had favoured the Dominicans; he ordered the governor of Guatemala to give them every assistance; he forbade lazy Spaniards to enter the district, himself begged the Franciscans of Mexico to send trained Indian choristers to the mission, and himself gave the name of Vera Paz

to a district in the Land of War. It is true that this distinctively missionary view of the Catholicism of the Indies was an obstacle to the possibility of labour colonies. From the south of Spain only could these be expected, and the provision that no Moor, Jew or person punished by the Inquisition should be allowed to sail was a grievous practical drawback to success. That Charles paid all the debts of the second Bishop of Mexico upon his death in 1548 is one of many minor proofs of his constant interest in the evangelisation of the colonies. It may well be doubted if in this respect any ruler has attained a higher standard of duty. To Charles the Catholicism of the vast Spanish-American territories owes very much. European Catholicism shrank before the Lutheran and was smitten by the Moslem, but the Emperor in the sphere of religion might well have anticipated another's boast, "that he called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

Charles did not forget the Indies on leaving Spain. The instructions sent to Philip from Germany in 1548 prove how much he had their welfare at heart. The prince was warned to show the greatest care in acquiring full knowledge of the condition of the colonies. He must secure them for the service of God: he must compel the obedience of the colonists in order that the Indies might be governed with justice, which was the only means of repeopling them and reviving their prosperity: he must keep a check upon the oppressive acts which the Conquerors and the magistrates had inflicted, and were still inflicting, on the natives. Charles urged his son to support the Indians in their just claims, in order that their good-will and fidelity might be won, and to insist that the Council of the Indies

kept a strict watch over this matter as being one of extreme importance. There had been, he added, much debate and difference of opinion on the subject of *encomiendas*, and he had written to Antonio de Mendoza, governor of Mexico, for further information and advice: on a subject of such vital importance for the present and the future Philip must form a resolution with the greatest care, discussing it with men of good judgment, possessed of expert knowledge, but free from personal interest: the aim must be the maintenance of royal authority and the common welfare of the Indies: the system adopted must be moderate, and of as little prejudice to the natives as might be possible. It is well to remember that these instructions, so full of humane solicitude for his suffering native subjects, were written by Charles at the very summit of his power, and when he had just undertaken the most arduous task of his life—the re-establishment of Catholicism and of Imperial authority in Germany.

Before the abdication of Charles, Mexico and Central America, Venezuela and New Granada, Peru, Bolivia and Northern Chili, were established and organised possessions of the Castilian Crown. Argentina and Paraguay were still in the early stage of settlement, California and Florida in that of discovery. For a single reign this was an enormous exploit. For the actual conquest Charles, as has been seen, can claim little credit, but for the civil and ecclesiastical framework of the new territories very much. Imperialism on a scale so gigantic must add wrinkles to the brow which wears its laurels. Anxiety for novel and thorny questions resulting from the relations between colonists and Indians was added to the multifarious pre-occupations of the honest, hard-working ruler whose task was already beyond his brain.

Spain was being drained of her more adventurous spirits at the time when her ruler had sore need of such in Africa and Europe. If the treasures of the Indies facilitated loans from Augsburg bankers, they complicated the problems which were the *crux* of Spanish administration. It is surprising that one who never learnt mathematics till he was over thirty, and then at second hand through the medium of a future Saint, should have possessed a clearer and more modern view of the monetary conditions of colonial trade than the expert representatives of Spanish commerce. If the whole trade of Spanish America were forced to converge upon a single Spanish port; if the indolence of the colonists were artificially fostered, to preserve the agricultural and manufacturing monopolies of the mother country; if the cupidity of all maritime powers were attracted to ill-defended ports and galleons lumbering along familiar Ocean roads; if wholesale smuggling was to prove the only vent to save colonial disaffection from explosion,—all this was at least no fault of Charles. Had he been the absolute monarch that he is often represented, America would have been thrown open at least to his Empire, if not to Europe.

If in America Charles and his government played but an indirect part in discovery and conquest, they can claim their share of credit for Magellan's wonderful voyage. This needs some mention here, because, apart from the intrinsic importance of the discoveries, it is the best example of a governmental expedition in the reign of Charles. Magellan, indeed, rather than Cortes or Pizarro, is the Columbus of the reign. The Portuguese, as the Genoese, owed his fortunes to the appreciation of the Crown of Spain when he had been flouted by the Court of Lisbon.

Magellan, on leaving Portuguese service, laid his scheme for the discovery of a western route to the Spice Islands before the *Casa de Contratacion* at Seville. Here he found no support except with one of its members, Juan de Aranda, by whom he was taken to the newly crowned king at Valladolid. The Chancellor Sauvage warmly favoured Magellan's cause, which was aided also by Adrian of Utrecht, and even by the Bishop of Burgos, who generally threw every obstacle in the way of the discoverers. The Portuguese minister, Da Costa, strongly opposed Magellan's venture, and Charles, now in Aragon, personally listened to his remonstrances as well as to the arguments in favour of the voyage. It may be true enough that, as Da Costa explained to his master, Charles had as yet no liberty to do anything of himself, and that therefore there was no need to take too serious a view of his course of action. Nevertheless it was of high importance that at this early stage he was taught by his Flemish favourites to take a keen interest in the expansion of his Colonial Empire, and it is fair to remember that Sauvage himself was dead before the king's final instructions were sent to Magellan from Barcelona.

This new expedition was eminently royal. By the king's authority the opposition of the *casa de Contratacion* was overruled, and it was forced to find the necessary supplies. It is an interesting hint of the dislike of the present government to the monopoly of Seville that the king informed the Board that he had purchased some of the stores in Biscay, as being cheaper there and of better quality. The number of five ships and 234 men was fixed by the Crown. Magellan and his partner Faleiro were given royal commissions as Captains-General of the fleet, and as hereditary governors of the

territories which might be discovered; they received governmental pay, and the Cross of Santiago was formally conferred upon them in the royal Council. When disturbances arose at Seville before the expedition sailed, Charles sent stringent orders that Magellan should be obeyed, and it was by his authority that Faleiro was dismissed. The schedule of instructions, divided into seventy-two heads is an admirable example of the care with which the regulations for governmental enterprise were drafted. It contains provisions as to the loading and the course to be sailed, as to precautions on landing, the disposal of prizes, the conduct of barter, the sanitary surroundings of settlements. The religion, the morals, the rations, the surgical attendance of the crews, all received careful consideration. The very date of departure was not left to Magellan, but was peremptorily fixed by Charles. It is remarkable, however, that the capital for equipping and lading the ships was in great measure supplied by private merchants, a proof, if any were needed, that the Crown was already short of ready money at this early stage of Charles's reign.

Magellan sailed in 1519, and, after entering the River Plate and then finding a passage by the straits which bear his name, discovered the Ladrones and the Philippines, where he met his death in battle. The survivors of the squadron made their way to the Moluccas, and ultimately two ships straggled back to Spain. When the first of these, the *Victoria*, arrived in September 1522, Charles had just returned to Spain. He at once showed his interest in the feat of circumnavigation by sending for the crew, and by liberally rewarding Sebastian del Canc who brought the *Victoria* home.

For Spain the brilliant voyage of discovery had little

immediate result. Spanish interference in the Moluccas produced a quarrel with Portugal, which not only urged the claim of prior occupation, but asserted that the islands lay within the sphere assigned to her by the line of demarcation drawn by Alexander VI. and subsequently amended. Charles had strictly ordered Magellan not to touch at nor explore any land belonging to his Most Serene uncle the King of Portugal, but the Moluccas were, of course, from the first the object of the expedition. At the conference of Badajoz in 1524 an attempt was made in vain to settle the vexed question of possession. Charles seemed determined to make his claim effective. He despatched Garcia Jofré de Loaysa for the Philippines and Moluccas, while Cortes in 1527 sent Alvaro de Saavedra thither from the Pacific coast. A further proof of the importance attributed to this line of discovery is the fact that Charles sent Sebastian Cabot, whom he had created Pilot Major in 1519, in the wake of Loaysa. Cabot's disgrace on his return was, perhaps, partly due to disappointment at his non-arrival at the Spice Islands, at that time far more attractive than Argentina. Meanwhile in the Moluccas there was brisk fighting between Spaniards and Portuguese, until in 1529 Charles, then in desperate straits for money, mortgaged his interest for a huge sum which left Portugal with the monopoly of the spice trade. The Emperor was probably glad enough to get handsome compensation for the surrender of a non-existent right, and no doubt regarded the mortgage as a cession. With the Spaniards it was otherwise: they resented the alienation of this source of wealth, and as late as 1548 petitioned for its resumption. With the abandonment of the Moluccas the Philippines almost dropped out of sight, and no permanent settlement was made there

until the following reign. This lame conclusion well illustrates the interaction of the Emperor's interests and difficulties. But for the French attack on Naples and the Turkish march upon Vienna, the settlement of the Philippines and the conquest of the Moluccas would probably have been reckoned among the many colonial triumphs of his reign.

CHAPTER V

Reasons for the peace of Crépy—Negotiations with Paul III.—The diet of Worms in 1545—The last Lutheran gains—Foreign relations of Charles—Difficulty of Alliance with the Pope—Charles at Regensburg in 1546—His hesitation in beginning war against the Lutherans—His final resolution—He wins Bavaria to benevolent neutrality—His allies among the Lutherans—Policy of Maurice of Saxony—Weakness of the League of Schmalkalde and its causes—Was the war of 1546 a war of religion?

THE peace of Crépy had not been made with the deliberate purpose of substituting a religious for a national war. The Emperor's motives were military. Had the campaign offered prospects of success, he would not have abandoned it for a war of which the very possibilities were infinitely obscure. Nevertheless peace with France did by a logical sequence of events lead to war with Lutherans. The Pope could no longer lean on Francis; he must therefore seek support in Charles, and this entailed the summoning of a Council to a German city. The meeting of this Council would imply that the period of suspension was near its close, and war could be the only alternative to submission. The Turk was the Lutherans' last shelter; were this withdrawn they would be face to face with the Catholic champion.

The alternative of force had never been absent from Charles's view. He states in his Commentaries that his easy victory over the Duke of Cleves first proved to him

the possibility of success, as revealing the want of coherence in the Lutheran party. In the treaty of Crépy there was a very secret clause which pledged Francis to aid the Emperor against heresy. Charles knew the king too well to place much faith in his assurances, but his correspondence with Mary shows that he did not this time regard them as mere verbiage. Francis was still at war with England, and even unfriendly neutrality on the part of Charles would close the frontier to German mercenaries and to Antwerp or Augsburg bankers. With broken health and shattered credit he was now convinced that he could not beat the Emperor, and was really eager for a settlement by a Franco-Imperial marriage. Thus Francis honestly pressed upon Paul III. the necessity of summoning a Council to Trent. In November 1544 the Pope gave way, fixing the following March as the date of meeting.[1]

Paul III. had little time to lose. Had he delayed, Charles, in accordance with the promise made at Speyer, would have submitted the religious question to a German assembly. Relations between Emperor and Pope ostensibly improved. Juan de Vega returned as ambassador to Rome. Granvelle assured the nuncio that if the Pope would honestly and without afterthought take the hand held out, friendship might be even closer than of yore. But Charles's own ideas ranged beyond a Council. A long and remarkable letter of December 2, to Juan de Vega, contains perhaps the first definite project for the coming war. The nuncio had in general

[1] The relations of Charles and Paul III. at this period are fully discussed by A. von Druffel in *Kaiser V und die Römische Kurie 1544-46* (*Vier Abhandlungen der Münchner Akademie* 1877-90); also in *Ueber den Vertrag zwischen Kaiser und Papst von Juni 1541* (*Deutsche Zeitsch. für Ges.* vol. iii. 1889).

terms expressed belief that if Charles would let bygones be bygones and extend his favour to the Farnese family, the Pope would contribute liberal aid against Turk or Lutheran. Charles snatched at the opportunity, and instructed his envoy to force Paul's hand. The Pope, he wrote, had plenty of money, professedly amassed for a Crusade: if war against the Turks proved unnecessary, all would approve the application of this fund against the heretics: there must be no generalities; the Pope must come to details—to a resolute, determinate and specific proposal as to either war or both, although if war must be declared against the Turk, it would be necessary to dissemble with the Lutherans: no sum less than 500,000 ducats would serve: Charles had made peace with France solely to aid Christendom against Turk and Lutheran, but he could not move without Papal aid: the Council by itself was of little use, for the Lutherans obstinately declined attendance. They utilised, he continued, every demand for aid against the Turk, to extort fresh concessions; but if Charles possessed in Germany a large sum under colour of the Crusade, they would offer less resistance both to the Turkish war and the Council, and, perhaps, before the latter closed they would give in, either of their own free will—or otherwise!

This letter was studded with precautions: the French must not be suffered to imagine that Charles was acting in the religious question behind their backs: the Pope must be most dexterously handled, lest he should do the Emperor an injury with the Protestants: the secret must be inscrutable, for there was not a prelate nor an individual in Germany, however zealous for the faith, who could hold his tongue. If, concluded Charles with a touch of humour, the Pope was inclined to send

Cardinal Farnese, and Vega thought that more money and greater efforts for both objects would be extracted from him, he was to make no objection,—"his youth after all will be a drawback to His Holiness rather than to us."

The importance of this letter, only recently printed, is obvious. Charles definitely states the two alternatives,—a Turkish or a Lutheran war, and shows his preference for the latter. A General Council unfortified by arms he believes to be of no avail. He insists upon an enormous Papal subsidy as a *sine quâ non*, and the young Cardinal Farnese is to be the instrument. From this letter the War of Schmalkalde may really be said to take its immediate origin. Nevertheless Charles did not yet trust the Pope, upon whom all depended; he wrote to Ferdinand that Paul was only trying to avoid the religious conference at Worms—that he was playing the old game against themselves and their dominions. In a gust of passion he told Pierluigi Farnese's agent that his master was a scoundrel, and that he would make him the sorriest man in all the world.

The Imperial address which opened the diet of Worms (March 1545) contained matter sufficient to alarm the Pope.[1] Charles promised that if by the date of the recess the Council of Trent had failed to complete the work of reform, he would summon another diet for a full treatment of the subject. On the other hand this promise did little to allay the growing irritation of religious parties in Germany. The Lutherans would grant no aid against the Turks unless Charles guaranteed a perpetual peace irrespective of the Council. When they clamoured against persecution, the Catholics retorted

[1] For this diet see P. Kannengiesser, *Der Reichstag zu Worms, 1544-45*, 1891; J. Springer, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Wormser Reichstages, 1544-45*, 1882.

that the boot was on the other foot, that not a hair of a Lutheran head had been touched or was likely to be touched, whereas Catholicism was pillaged and persecuted wherever Lutherans had control. Veiling the delinquencies of the old Church, they could with some show of reason ascribe the disorders of the Empire to the contempt of authority inculcated by the preachers, to the decay of schools and charities, to the raving abuse which had taken the place of homilies, to the pamphlets against Jews and usurers, which were open incitements to plunder and bloodshed.

Such was the state of feeling when Charles, hitherto delayed by gout, reached Worms in May. He had implored the Elector of Saxony to attend, but he had absolutely refused unless a free, Christian Council replaced that of Trent. The Lutherans repeated their refusal of a subsidy; it mattered little, they said, whether their wives and children were carried off by Catholics or Turks. In vain Charles promised that, if the Council failed in its duty, he would take other measures,—that at all events there should be another religious conference and diet before its ultimate decision. In vain he vowed that he would not suffer the Council to diminish by a hair's-breadth the rights of any Estate or his own, but he could not now forbid the meeting of the Council, on which, with the consent of the Estates, he had so frequently insisted, and to which other European powers had at length assented; he begged that the Lutherans would not insist on the impossible. The breach was widened by the intemperance of preachers and publicists. Luther, writing in the agony of his last illness, surpassed himself in denunciations of the Pope, the Church, and all believers in the old religion. He called upon Charles to head a religious war against Pope

and Cardinals and all the Sodom of Rome, until the Germans could wash their hands in their blood. Sleidan, the authorised historian of the League, formally called upon the Estates and Emperor to shake off Papal tyranny and destroy the temporal power.

It is not surprising that the Emperor's hitherto crude idea of force began to ripen to a resolution. The Pope had sent Cardinal Pole to Trent to counteract his colleagues, whose policy Charles rightly regarded as pure obstruction, and now Cardinal Farnese came to Worms under the pretext of bringing a subsidy for the Turkish war. If, as is said, the Cardinal was startled at the proposal for an offensive war against the heretics, his surprise must have been histrionic. But, although prepared for the proposal, he apparently did not think it genuine, believing that Charles's object was to extract money from his grandfather, which he would employ against France. When he realised that Charles was in earnest, he left Worms at once for Rome, and very soon the first Papal proposals for a substantial subsidy reached Worms (June 17, 1545). Charles had already sounded the King of Poland; he fully intended to open the campaign without delay, and the Pope was for once equally zealous with the Emperor. Yet within three weeks Charles sorrowfully realised that his scheme must be postponed. He could not hurry the diet to its close, and reach his natural base at Regensburg, without exciting Lutheran suspicions; he was not yet sure of Bavarian neutrality or support; his own counsellors were almost to a man against the project. The diet dragged on its weary course till August, and closed with the promise of a conference and diet. All irritating reference to the Council was avoided.

The feverish moment was over, and the cold fit

succeeded. Charles had retired to the Netherlands, and was under his sister's pacifying influence. The dangerous year passed away in outward peace. Yet neither side was idle. Lutheranism received its last accessions. The Elector of Cologne was admitted to the League, and his suffragan of Münster followed suit. Frederick, now Elector Palatine, declared for the Gospel, partly to please his subjects, and partly to induce the League to support his claims on Denmark. Albert of Mainz had died at last: while Charles's candidate received not a single vote, the new Elector, Sebastian von Heusenstamm, was a nominal Catholic of easy views and much under Philip of Hesse's influence. Henry of Brunswick, in attempting to recover his duchy, was captured, and his territories virtually annexed by the Lutheran chiefs. These were no mere details, but essential political and geographical factors in Charles's ultimate decision. The Palatinate, added to Württemberg and the Imperial cities, gave the Lutherans a decided superiority in South-western Germany, endangering the Habsburg possessions in Tyrol and Alsace. Protestantism in Cologne and Münster would necessarily determine the religion of the Netherlands, and the edicts of Charles and Mary became increasingly but uselessly severe. If the votes of the Electoral College were now given on religious grounds, the Lutherans commanded a majority. Abroad, moreover, the League was equally active, thrusting its mediation upon France and England, appealing to each country for support, holding out to Francis I. prospects of Milan and the Empire.

Charles, meanwhile, though he was now hesitating as to the feasibility of a war, success in which depended upon so many favourable incidents, did not for a moment neglect the diplomatic foundations of his scheme, while

carefully abstaining from overt military preparations. The death of the Duke of Orleans in September 1545 relieved him of the painful embarrassment of deciding which state he should bestow upon him. He amused Francis I. with proposals for a marriage between Philip, who had recently lost his Portuguese wife, and the Dauphin's sister Margaret. It was suggested that the reversion to Milan should pass to the children of this second marriage. Relations with England materially improved, and there was once more talk of a Habsburg-Tudor marriage. The Bishop of Augsburg busied himself with negotiating a betrothal between the Bavarian heir and Ferdinand's eldest daughter. In December arrived the welcome news that a truce had been concluded with the Porte; the infidel would no longer stand between Catholic and heretic.

Notwithstanding his precautions, it seems certain that Charles was hesitating at the opening of 1546, and would gladly have avoided war. Time had served to show how wide were the divergences between his ideas and those of his indispensable Papal ally. He had promised to hold a diet and religious conference at Regensburg, and yet these to the Curia and to the Curial party in Germany were anathema. No sooner had the Council opened in December 1545 than the Pope advised its transference from Trent to an Italian town. Paul had only summoned it under extreme pressure; his one anxiety was that it should damage as little as possible his own autocracy, and the means to this was a rigid definition of doctrine which should render the Council inoperative for conciliation. How widely different were the views of Charles! Not only was he personally convinced of the crying need for disciplinary reform, but he felt that its postponement would render peace or war

with the Lutherans alike impossible. If the Council were removed to Italy, or if it exhausted its energies on dogma, the Lutherans would arm and cut him off from his Spanish and Italian resources. The prospect of reform might win the less uncompromising Protestants, while its rejection by the extremists would put them in the wrong, and give him a *casus belli* which would appeal to his Spanish subjects and to Catholic European powers. The Council was the justification of the Emperor's aims, the instrument of his diplomacy.

There were other points at issue. Charles had pledged himself to advance Farnese interests, but Paul went farther and faster than he approved. In time the Emperor might have consented to the investiture of his own son-in-law Ottavio Farnese with Parma and Piacenza, in spite of the claims of the duchy of Milan to these territories. Paul, however, confident that Charles could not afford to oppose him, conferred them upon his son Pierluigi, whom the Emperor abhorred.

The terms of the Papal alliance had virtually been settled at Worms, and the future variations were matters of mere detail; why then should not the Emperor sign? Charles's correspondence proves that he wished to be able to assure the princes on his way to Regensburg that he had signed no such document, but the Pope not unnaturally believed that he meant to use it to extract conditions from the Lutherans. Charles, perhaps, early in 1546 really for a moment hesitated whether he should not once more turn to England and the Lutherans as a counterpoise to the Pope and France. He knew that France was intriguing against him at the Porte where she could be most dangerous. "Charles," said Jovius, "has an English dog in leash for France, and Francis has a Turkish dog in leash for Austria."

War was impossible unless Charles could reach Regensburg, and this was impossible unless he could lull Lutheran suspicion. He went calmly on his eastward way from Maestricht. He pointed to the smallness of his escort as proof that he had no intention of reducing the Elector of Cologne by force. He begged Philip of Hesse to meet him at Speyer, and here he earnestly entreated him to attend the diet. Philip thrice, and not without insolence, refused. It has been believed that Charles meant to lay a trap for him at Regensburg, but it is more probable that this was a last throw for peace, that he hoped to win Philip in 1546 as he had won him in 1541, and then all chance of a religious war was over. The failure was hardly a disappointment, for he had already confessed to his son and his sister Mary that he had little or no hope of peace (February 1546). When he reached Regensburg, the religious conference had already broken up owing to the withdrawal of the Saxon divines. None of the Lutheran leaders were present at the diet, and this could now but be the screen behind which Charles prepared for war. There was no other alternative; comprehension by national agreement had failed, comprehension by Council was impossible, for the Lutherans could never pledge themselves to such decrees as the fathers at Trent might formulate. The very existence of the Council proved that the period of suspension must shortly end, for Charles was obliged by his position to enforce its recognition.

Yet still Charles hesitated. Even as late as May he turned back to the alternative of comprehension, to a scheme of reform to be drafted by the moderate Gropper, which should include both Catholics and Lutherans. His constitutional irresolution was increased by the division of opinion among the counsellors in whom he chiefly

trusted. Granvelle and his son almost to the last day of peace were opposed to war; in April the older minister said that those who urged war wanted the ruin of Emperor and Empire and the loss of Charles's life. Most of the Spaniards, and especially the financial minister Erasso, wished Charles to turn his back on Germany and reside in Spain; even Alba was but a late convert to the alternative of force. Mary was always for peace; Ferdinand in April at earliest was convinced of the painful necessity of war. But Charles was ill, and when his conscience was stirred by gout the confessor outweighed all the ministers. At such a crisis a man who focussed considerable abilities upon a near and narrow view was a greater power than those whose glasses strove to penetrate the mists upon the wide horizon. Pedro de Soto enforced the arguments expressed in an admirable state paper by threats of retiring to his convent if Charles would not fight. He dwelt upon the poverty and divisions of the Lutheran princes and the exhaustion of their subjects, upon the religious dissensions in the towns, and on the commercial distress which would result from the exclusion of their merchants from Spain and the Netherlands. He implored the Emperor to have more confidence in the Pope, and calmed his scruples as to the clause which pledged him to make no concessions to the Lutherans without the Pope's consent. The Emperor's hands, he urged, would not really be tied by this provision, for all engagements between man and man were only binding if they did not prevent a greater good, or were not the cause of evil; if the Pope proved unreasonable, Charles might lawfully grant such concessions as seemed well.

Ferdinand, and perhaps even Granvelle, had now yielded, and on June 6 Charles summarised his last

attempts at reconciliation in a letter to his sister Mary. "My dear sister—You know what I told you when I left Maestricht, that I should do all in my power to establish some order in the affairs of Germany, and to make some advance towards its pacification, avoiding to the uttermost the path of force. Accordingly on my journey I did all that I could towards this end, especially in connection with our cousin the Elector Palatine, the Landgrave and others. Even since my arrival here I have never ceased to make all conceivable efforts to induce the Lutherans and other sectarians to concur in some method of pacification, but, do what I would and could, there have been no results whatever." The princes, he continued, had refused to attend the diet with the object of leaving Germany in its disorder; they were intriguing with France, and intending to enervate the Imperial authority by forcing the rest of Germany to join their league; they threatened to destroy those who refused, to ruin the clergy, and above all to do their worst against Ferdinand and himself: he had then, after discussion with his brother and the Duke of Bavaria, come to the conclusion that there was no alternative but force or the irretrievable loss of all. On the following day Charles signed his treaty with the Pope, and the lot was cast; to the very end the Curia believed that he was not in earnest.

In spite of his irresolution, Charles had sedulously prepared. He could not fight without Catholic allies, and without dividing the Lutheran power. Paul III. engaged to pay a subsidy, to contribute 12,000 foot and 500 light horse, to grant half the revenue of the Church in Spain for a year, and to allow Spanish monastic property to the extent of 500,000 ducats to be sold, the Emperor mortgaging crown lands of equal

value to recoup the loss of revenue to the religious bodies. In return Charles pledged himself to enter into no treaty or peace disadvantageous to the Church without the Pope's consent, and to bring back the German heretics to the true faith and to obedience to the Holy See.

No complete reliance could be placed on the German Catholics. The nuncio had reported that false Catholic friends had dissuaded war on the ground that the presence of Spanish and Italian troops would unite all Germany against the Emperor. The final decision depended upon the attitude of Bavaria. The importance of detaching Bavaria from the enemy was at once military and political. The right of passage over Bavarian territory would give either party the power of the offensive; the Emperor could advance on Ulm and Augsburg, or the League could move on Regensburg or Innsbrück. If Bavaria stood on the Imperial side, it would be proof palpable that Charles had no design of overthrowing the constitution. In Bavaria the numerous ecclesiastical members of the College of Princes had long recognised their leader; Bavarian alliance would ensure the united support of the Catholic party.

It was not so long since the all-powerful Eck had advocated a political alliance between Bavaria, Saxony and Hesse, urging that it were better that Catholics should declare themselves Lutherans and all stand together, for, if the Lutherans should be crushed, the turn of the Catholics would come next. Eck, however, and his master were at length won.[1] A common religion was not sufficient to bind the two traditional rivals.

[1] For Bavarian policy during the coming war see S. Riezler, *Die baierische Politik im Schmalkaldischen Kriege* (*Historiche Abhandl. der baier. Akad.* vol. xxi. 1894).

The duke promised in the end only benevolent neutrality, with some supply of money and artillery, but even for this his price was very high. The elder line of Wittelsbach had for some two centuries grudged the younger its possession of the Electoral dignity. This Charles promised to transfer, if the Elector Palatine engaged in active hostilities against him. There was talk, moreover, of the little cadet state of Neuburg in the Upper Palatinate, held by the zealously Protestant, if bankrupt, Otto Henry, and the duke would gladly have added the Imperial town of Regensburg, long the ambition of his house. His heir, Albert, was now married to Ferdinand's daughter, and in default of Habsburg heirs-male had the prospect of the Bohemian Crown. This was not the only marriage, for the Duke of Cleves now received the Austrian bride promised to him on his submission. The Habsburg matrimonial net which had been cast, now upon Europe at large, now upon Italy, enmeshed at length the German territorial princes :—*Tu felix Austria nube.*

To win Bavaria, the traditional rival of Austria and the close friend of Philip of Hesse, was to prove that Charles had no designs against German liberty ; if he could gain some Protestant princes, he could show that this was no religious war—that its aim was the restoration of order and due obedience. Charles strove to isolate John Frederick and Philip, even as in 1543 he had isolated the Duke of Cleves. He could rely upon the friendly neutrality of the Elector of Brandenburg, who was satisfied with the religious concessions of 1541. Joachim's brother Hans of the Neumark, and Albert Alcibiades of the Culmbach line, rode to the diet and, in spite of their strong Protestantism, entered Imperial service. The Protestant princes of Brunswick, resenting

the spoliation of their house, were likely to arm for Charles. The knights and lesser nobility, dreading the perpetual encroachments of the princes and large towns, and longing to avenge the fall of Sickingen and his fellows, were ready to flock to the Imperial standard. In Suabia and Franconia, along the Main and Rhine, throughout the states of Northern Germany, this military class was successfully canvassed in Charles's favour. Sickingen's own son was among the most eager to recruit gentlemen for the Emperor's service. Meanwhile Philip of Hesse's brutal treatment of the Teutonic Knights within his territories roused the members of this Order, whose Commanderies were scattered throughout Germany. The knightly class was usually Lutheran, but its political interests lay on the Emperor's side. With the mercenary soldiers the religious question rarely affected their enlistment; pay was equally good from whichever camp it came, and only a few returned their earnest money on finding that they were expected to fight against the Gospel.

The Emperor's greatest gain was the engagement of Maurice of Saxony to remain neutral.[1] We cannot here decide the question whether the young Albertine's policy was from the first a masterpiece of treachery, or whether he was cajoled by the greater experience of Granvelle. It is fair to remember that he was surrounded by his uncle's counsellors, who were mainly Catholics, and that he had inherited the strong loyalist traditions of the Albertine line, and also the long-standing jealousy against the Ernestine branch of his family. He had left the League of Schmalkalde in 1542, from dislike of

[1] Maurice of Saxony is the subject of many studies; see especially G. Voigt, *Moritz von Sachsen, 1541-47*, 1876; E. Brandenburg, *Moritz von Sachsen*, vol. i. 1898.

its organisation and distrust of its competence, but he promised aid if religion were endangered. During the late French war he had served Charles, and took more interest than other German princes in resistance to the Turk. Recently he had proposed an alliance of the two lines of Saxony and Hesse, which should give the Emperor their aid in return for the secularisation of Church property. In his attempt to absorb the Saxon sees, and in his ambition to secure the protectorate of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, he had come into collision with his Ernestine cousin, and Philip of Hesse vainly strove to produce a better understanding. In May Maurice came to Regensburg, and on June 19, after his departure, he signed a treaty of neutrality in consideration of the promised protectorate. He was not indifferent to the religious question, but was persuaded by Granvelle that Charles would summon a free Christian Council, which would take the word of God as its basis. He pledged himself only to submit to the Council on the same lines as other German princes, and was assured that if three or four questions remained undecided, he should be unmolested until a further settlement, that there would be no compulsion in respect of the marriage of the clergy and the grant of the cup to the laity, and no objection to the application of Church property to reasonable uses.

These important defections from the Lutheran ranks enabled Charles to profess, and not entirely without truth, that he was aiming not at the suppression of dissent but of disobedience. He used this plea in his attempt to dissociate Ulrich of Württemberg and the Elector Palatine from their co-religionists. He pressed it upon the South German towns. Nuremberg, indeed, remained neutral, promising to supply the Emperor with ammunition. Ulm, Augsburg and Strassburg were for

some time divided. Charles did his utmost to retain their obedience, and the aristocratic element was on his side; but the democracy, which had less to lose, carried the day for religion against commerce.

Ranke is responsible for the statement that the Lutherans in the war of 1546 were taken by surprise. All the evidence is against this view. From the peace of Crépy, Philip of Hesse, who had once more rallied to his co-religionists, recommenced his intrigues with all powers and parties. If John Frederick, who in 1546 had lost the stimulating influence of Luther, professed to the end to disbelieve in war, it was from indolence rather than from conviction. Schärtlin was long busy in raising troops for the South German towns. Perhaps, however, the cry of *Wolf* had been raised too often, and Charles's own irresolution puzzled the Lutherans and proved contagious. Irresolute men usually make sudden resolutions. It is somewhat of an accident whether the moment chosen is the right one or the wrong, but at least they have given full consideration to the facts. Charles had, with or without design, made a happy choice. The Lutheran party had lost the sense of danger and of intimacy which contributes to the existence of *esprit de corps*. Religion had almost ceased to be the determining factor, and of this he took full advantage. The weakening of the religious tie enabled him to revert to the policy of his grandfather Maximilian. Charles played the house of Brandenburg against the house of Saxony, he pitted the ducal line of Bavaria against the Electoral, the younger Albertine line of Saxony against the Ernestine, and to this he had added his favourite method of matrimonial federation. He was even prepared to use his sister Eleanor, obviously on the verge of widowhood, as a decoy.

Apart from constitutional irresolution it was difficult that Charles should be convinced that he had at length chosen the right alternative. He must have recognised that on the scene of the campaign the Protestants were the stronger. He was divided by the length of Germany from his Netherland resources, and might at any moment be cut off from Italy. The slightest reverse might be made the occasion for religious revolt throughout the Netherlands and Ferdinand's Austrian and Bohemian possessions. Charles might well doubt the permanence of the Lutheran divisions upon which he had relied, and fear that the enemy might forestall him in attack. Had the news of the Franco-English peace arrived a fortnight sooner, it might have postponed or prevented war. Although his diplomacy had been long active, he only gave his orders for mobilisation three days before the signature of his treaties with the Pope and Bavaria. Even then those who watched him carefully believed that he was keeping a door open for negotiations. Some date the real beginning of the war from the scornful laugh with which he greeted Lutheran proposals on June 13, others from the reply to the demand for an explanation of his armaments on June 16. But it was not until the League took the offensive in July that the nuncio and Alba noticed that he shook off his sluggish hesitation, and at length seemed in earnest for the struggle. "His Majesty is waking up a little," wrote the nuncio on July 8, "and abandoning his usual phlegmatic mode of proceeding."

War had now opened. The question arises, Was it a religious war? The definite engagements to the Pope, the demand that the expenses, as those of a Crusade, should be mainly borne by the Church, at once point to the affirmative. Paul III., much indeed to the Emperor's

annoyance, formally treated the enterprise as a Catholic Crusade, giving the cross to the legate Alessandro Farnese, and the consecrated sword to his brother Ottavio, and granting indulgences to those who prayed for its success. If the Duke of Bavaria were not merely influenced by bribes, his only common ground with the hated Habsburgs was their common religion. The Lutherans declared that religion alone was the cause of the Emperor's attack; religion alone could justify their treatment of unoffending, neutral ecclesiastics. Had the Lutherans won, the ecclesiastical states and Catholicism itself would have been extinct in Germany; the last meeting of the League of Schmalkalde passed a resolution for the secularisation of Church territories; war was not to cease, said Philip of Hesse, until every priest had been expelled. On religious grounds alone would the great trading towns have joined the princes against the Emperor.

More urgent still are the arguments derived from the Emperor's most confidential utterances. To Mary he confessed that the extreme danger of religion and the inevitable perversion of the rest of Germany had forced him to his resolution; that his accusation against the Elector and Landgrave, as disturbers of public peace and justice in the Brunswick feud, was but a cover and a pretext to disguise the real causes from the less violent dissidents, and to isolate the two leaders. So also to his son he wrote (August 10, 1546): "Although our end and intention has been and is, as you know, to make war in aid of religion, yet it was publicly stated that its object was the punishment of the disobedient, especially of the Landgrave and the Duke of Saxony, as this course seemed more expedient at the outset." Ten days later he assured Cardinal Farnese that the only object of this

enterprise, the hardest that he had ever undertaken, was the cause of religion; that he had given another pretext on the advice of Ferdinand, that he might not have all Germany against him.

Nevertheless the war was not exclusively religious, and it is doubtful if Charles fought for doctrine only. He received little aid of value from German Catholics, but much from Lutherans. There was no war against Protestant states as such; no neutral Lutheran was injured. The treaties with Charles's Protestant allies left their religious position virtually untouched; the terms imposed upon conquered towns and princes made little or no mention of religion. Even John Frederick, when a captive, could refuse submission to the Council of Trent, though forced to surrender his temporal authority. The secession of Cologne, which more than any other event had actually provoked the war, was as much political as religious, for it endangered Charles's position as Emperor and threatened the Habsburg succession.

It is impossible to disentangle the religious from the political threads of this, even as of the Thirty Years' War. For more than a century politics were the woof and religion the warp of the texture. Protestantism and particularism were so closely intertwined that neither Charles nor his opponents could unravel them. The quasi-religious character of the Empire assumed more prominence when the idea of a General Council was in the air, and complicated constitutional resistance to the central authority. To this was added the fact of Charles's rule over other countries, and especially Spain, whose orthodoxy was still untainted; this constituted a national ground for German opposition. Religious revolt against the Church to which the Emperor belonged

was the form which territorialism was now taking, but had there been no religious quarrel there would have been opportunities for conflict. Religion, however, is more likely to bring opposing parties to the fighting point than diplomatic or political difficulties, which may simmer on until they evaporate. In the very lawlessness which Charles made his political pretext there was a religious element. Zeal for religion gave to the Lutherans, being the stronger, an excuse to revert to the "fist-law" of old German life. The secularisation of Church property within the territory added to the prince's authority and wealth; the appropriation of neighbouring sees under the guise of a protectorate extended the borders of his state.

Charles even less than most men acted from a single motive and in a single direction. The very letters to which reference has been made prove that the political grounds of action were more than pretexts. He told Mary that heresy, if unchecked, would infallibly infect the Netherlands, which would not only be alienated from the faith, but from the fidelity and obedience due to their prince, "a thing which I would not for anything in the world witness or tolerate." Ferdinand's subjects, he added, were losing their fear and respect, and the German heretics were openly aspiring to withdraw obedience from Emperor and king. Philip was assured that the exemplary chastisement of the princes would not only be of service to God, but would add to the Emperor's reputation and the security of his dominions, especially the Netherlands: were order restored in the sphere of religion, the intrigues, current in Germany, would be cut short, to the great benefit of public business and the Emperor's own peace and quiet.

It need not be assumed that all Charles's allies

were actuated by purely selfish motives. Thoughtful Lutherans might well regard Philip of Hesse as the foe of German peace and the friend of his country's enemies. Maurice, self-seeking and ambitious as he was, might honestly believe that Charles would grant the essential minimum of religious liberty. Albert of Culmbach, reprobate as he became, could put his finger on the blemishes of his co-religionists. In a private letter to his strong Protestant uncle, the Duke of Prussia, he proved that the Elector of Cologne, in forcing the reformation upon his see in defiance of his chapter, was violating the territorial constitution. Such people, he wrote, were bringing the Empire into danger and the Emperor into contempt: every diet of late had ended as the League wished, and yet it was not satisfied: the Emperor, thank God, had borne himself towards the German nation as a father, a Christian and a man of peace, yet in Saxony his name was omitted from the public prayer: if the Emperor and other princes washed their hands of the League, what a marvellous government there would be! Germans would soon be holding out their hands to the Turk!

Honest public opinion in many cases turned towards the Emperor. He was neglecting his hereditary estates, endangering his relations with the Pope, sacrificing health and comfort to attend diets with the sole aim of pacifying Germany. Yet the Elector and the Landgrave ostentatiously spurned the constitutional machinery for ventilating their grievances. The latter told the Emperor to his face that he could not bear the expenses of attendance—that diets were more frequent than they had ever been. As if the frequency of diets were not the surest guarantee for the preservation of national liberties!

With whomever lay the fault, war was inevitable. It was only natural that Emperor and princes, Catholics and Lutherans, should not accept each other's point of view. It was impossible that Germany should again bow the head to the yoke of Rome, as Rome then was; it was equally impossible that Charles should sacrifice the hope of unity on which his power depended, and as to which his personal convictions were at least as sincere as those of the Lutherans. He had at all events been very patient. At every diet he had endured the vulgar insults to himself and his faith, from the citizens of Imperial towns, from foul-mouthed preachers and from drunken princes. The Lutheran press had poured forth a muddy stream of pamphlets in which the pictures were as coarsely insolent as the text. Luther and his associates had lost all reverence for authority except that of the lord from whom they drew their stipends. Luther justified his change of front by the pretext that the Emperor was no true Emperor, but a tyrant and a devil. Every authority in the Empire had been set at naught: religion had become a cloak for shameless territorial greed. The guardian of public order could not for ever turn a deaf ear to his aggrieved Catholic subjects, however little their courage and their conduct justified support. The abortive diets of Worms and Regensburg drove Charles to a war which he did not wish, and for which, in spite of his alliances, he was not prepared.[1]

[1] See W. Friedensburg, *Am Vorabend des Schmalkaldischen Krieges. Denkschrift aus der Umgebung Kaiser Karls V* (*Quellung und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, 1897).

CHAPTER VI

The opening of war—Schärtlin's march on Tyrol—Bombardment of Ingolstadt — Courage of Charles — Buren's junction with the Emperor—Exhaustion of the combatants—Attack of Maurice on Electoral Saxony—End of the Danube Campaign—Reduction of Southern Germany—March of Charles to the Elbe—Battle of Mühlberg—Treaty of Wittenberg—Popularity of John Frederick and hatred for Maurice—Capitulation of Philip of Hesse—Dispute as to his imprisonment—Conduct of Charles during the war—Ideas of foreign intervention—Death of Francis I.

WAR[1] was actually opened neither by Emperor nor princes, but by the Protestant towns. The capable *condottiere* Sebastian Schärtlin von Burtenbach led the forces of Augsburg and Ulm briskly southwards, seized Füssen in the Bishop of Augsburg's territory on July 9, and then surprised the small force guarding the pass of Ehrenberg, which gave access to the Inn valley. The religious character of the war was emphasised by plunder of churches and ill usage of monks and clergy. Two obvious courses were now open to the insurgent princes. Either they could march direct on Regensburg, where a

[1] For this war may be consulted Luis de Avila, *Comentario de la guerra de Alamania hecha por Carlós V.* (*Biblioteca de Autores españoles*, vol. xxi. 1858). For an elaborate criticism of this work, attributed to Schärtlin, together with a description of Schärtlin's own campaigns, see J. B. Mencke, *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum*, vol. iii. 1730. Another contemporary account is printed by A. von Druffel, *Des Viglius von Zwichem Tagebuch des Schmalkaldischen Donaukriegs*, 1879. Among modern monographs are H. Baumgarten, *Zur Geschichte des Schmalkaldischen Krieges* (von Sybel's *Hist. Zeitschr.* 1876); M. Lenz, *Die Kriegfuhrung der Schmalkaldener gegen Kaiser Karl an der Donau.* (von Sybel's *Hist. Zeitschr.* 1883).

mere handful of troops protected Charles from a strongly Protestant population, or in support of Schärtlin they could clear Tyrol of Imperialists, close the passes to Spanish and Italian reinforcements, and even pay a domiciliary visit to the Council of Trent. This latter was Schärtlin's programme; the Tyrolese had Protestant sympathies, and dreaded the advent of the foreign troops; Charles averred that even their government was ill-affected. Schärtlin would even have persuaded the Venetians and the Grisons to forbid passage to the Emperor's troops, and have enlisted the services of Ercole of Ferrara, the enemy of the Pope. But either of the two strategic movements was too bold for the Schmalkaldic Council of War. The first would have violated the neutrality of Bavaria in which the League still believed, while it had no quarrel with Ferdinand, who was ostensibly conciliatory. The towns, moreover, wished to keep their captain within hail, for they feared the possibility of attack either from Regensburg or from Ferdinand's paltry forces in the Vorarlberg.

Schärtlin retired on Augsburg, but on July 20, reinforced by a Württemberg contingent, occupied Donauwörth and was here joined on August 4 by the Elector and Landgrave. The insurgent army now numbered 50,000 foot and 7000 horse. The very size of this force, by far the largest that Germany could remember, is a disproof of the not uncommon assertion that Charles took the Lutherans by surprise.

On a rumour that the enemy were crossing the Danube to separate him from the troops on the march from Italy, Charles moved on Landshut with some 6000 men, not much more than a tenth of the opposing force. He was determined, he wrote, to remain in Germany alive or dead, rejecting as idle vanity the notion that it

was beneath his dignity to lead so small a force. At Landshut he met the Papal auxiliaries under Ottavio Farnese and Alessandro Vitelli, with detachments of light horse sent by the Dukes of Florence and Ferrara. When the Spanish foot and Neapolitan cavalry had joined, he could muster at Regensburg 28,000 men, over whom he placed Alba in command. The Elector and Landgrave in renunciation of their fealty had sent in a herald with a broken staff addressed to Charles self-styled the Fifth and Roman Emperor. To him was delivered the ban of the Empire against his masters, condemning them not for heresy but for acts of violence and rebellion, for the Pack plot, the attack on Württemberg, the seizure of Brunswick.

The campaign now began in earnest. While the Lutherans timidly wasted their opportunities, Charles with his greatly inferior force made a hazardous night march on Ingolstadt. The movement was executed with much disorder, resembling a flight rather than an advance. The League neglected the chance of making a flank attack on the hurrying, straggling line as it followed the right bank of the Danube until it was conveyed across the river at Neustadt. To add to the Emperor's danger, his German troops were mostly Lutherans, hating the priests and the Spanish and Italian regiments. Many had early deserted from their general, the Marquis of Marignano; all cherished ill-feeling against Charles's confessor as being the cause of civil war. Even the population of Bavaria, professedly a friendly territory, was in great part Lutheran.

At Ingolstadt Charles could draw supplies from Bavaria, whose neutrality the League had foolishly respected, and hither the Count of Buren with the Netherland army might find his way. He was by no

means out of danger, encamped as he was with but feeble artillery outside the city walls. But the Lutheran princes with all their bluster had little stomach for a stand-up fight. From August 31 to September 3 they bombarded the camp with 110 guns to which Charles's 32 pieces could make scant reply. They did not dare attack the improvised trenches. "I would have done it," wrote the Landgrave, "had I been alone." On the other hand it was reported that the Lutherans laid the blame on Philip, that he had refused to move, "for every fox must save his own skin." The "Cockerel," as the confessor, de Soto, had contemptuously prophesied, had crowed better than he fought. Charles, on the other hand, was at his best. He rode round the trenches, exhorting his soldiers to stand firm, with the assurance that artillery made more noise than mischief. In vain Granvelle sent the Confessor to persuade him that Christianity needed an Emperor less gallant and more sensible. He answered that no king nor emperor had ever been killed by a cannon-ball, and if he were so unfortunate as to make a start, it would be better so to die than live. When Ferdinand afterwards expostulated with his brother, Charles assured him that his self-exposure had been exaggerated, but that they were short of hands, and it was not a time to set a bad example.

The division of Lutheran command was already giving Charles the expected opportunities. The princes withdrew westwards, a palpable confession of weakness. They had been the aggressors, and yet they now surrendered the initiative to Charles. Their retirement enabled the Count of Buren to march in with his Netherland division, and with him the troops of Albert and Hans of Hohenzollern. This march of Buren was the strategic feat of the war. He had led the hostile

forces which were watching him a dance up and down the Rhine, and slipped across it unopposed. He had brought his troops three hundred miles mainly through the heart of Protestant Germany, with no certain knowledge where he should find the Emperor, for communications could only be maintained by means of long detours. Finally he had marched boldly past the vastly superior army of the League, which had professedly retired from Ingolstadt to bar his passage.[1]

Charles now took the offensive, pushing the enemy slowly up the Danube, and steadily forcing his way towards Ulm. The strongly Protestant Count Palatine of Neuburg, Otto Henry, was the first prince to lose his territory, which, indeed, his debts had already forced him to desert. The Lutherans now showed more fight, and during the last fortnight of October the advance came almost to a standstill. Charles was ill, money and supplies were falling short, Spaniards and Italians were suffering from the cold rains of the Danube valley. The Papal contingent was demoralised from want of pay; three-thousand men deserted in a day, whereas the Lutherans were being reinforced. Yet Charles, in spite of professional advice, refused to go into winter quarters. He counted on divisions in the League, on the selfish interests of the towns, on the penury of the princes, and reckoned aright. The fighting was never more than skirmishing; not arms but ducats were deciding the issue; the fate of war was literally hanging on a fortnight's pay.

The Emperor had said that a league between towns and princes could never last. The financial burden pressed mainly on the cities, and they refused to raise

[1] See P. Kannengiesser, *Karl V und Maximilian Egmont, Graf von Buren*, 1895.

further subsidies. The richer classes had always disliked the war; the great merchants were often, as the Fuggers of Augsburg, zealous Catholics. Trade was at a standstill, and they could protest that all their capital was at the Emperor's mercy, at Antwerp, at Seville, in the Indies, or else in Portugal. It was convenient to forget the brisk traffic which still continued with friendly Lyons. Zeal for the Lutheran cause seemed limited to a Catholic, Piero Strozzi the Florentine exile, who in his hatred for the Habsburgs was vainly spending his fortune on revenge, striving for aid from Venice, negotiating loans from France. There was, moreover, no real solidarity between Northern and Southern Germany. Neither the Protestant princes nor the wealthy cities of the Baltic had as yet stirred a finger for the cause. Under any circumstances the Lutheran army must have broken up. The leaders had resolved to retire to the Rhineland for the winter, live at free-quarters on the ecclesiastical princes, and renew the struggle in the spring.

At this critical moment Maurice of Saxony came into action. Hitherto his conduct had been ambiguous. This was probably due less to deliberate deceit than to genuine hesitation. The incompetence of the Lutheran leaders and Ferdinand's expressed intention of invading Ernestine Saxony determined him. Persuading his Estates with difficulty that it was necessary to save the Electorate for the house of Wettin, he undertook to execute the ban in his cousin's state. His reward was the title of Elector and the Ernestine territories. The correspondence of Charles and his brother on the subject was characteristic of both. Ferdinand, always greedy of territory, had bargained for partition, but Charles persuaded him to be content with John Frederick's

Bohemian fiefs. Charles, cautious and suspicious, was unwilling to grant the title until Maurice had proved his loyalty; Ferdinand, more impetuous, induced him to pay the bribe and give credit for the service. The Albertine and Austrian troops soon overran the defenceless land. This determined the manner of the ending of the Danubian campaign, and the Saxon phase of the war began. John Frederick must withdraw his troops to defend their homes, and he plundered *en route* the neutral ecclesiastical territories through which he passed. "In a Papal country," he told the burgomaster of Aschaffenburg, "there is nothing neutral." The campaign on the Danube was suddenly over. Philip of Hesse retired sullenly to his two wives, as Schärtlin put it. As he passed through Frankfurt he hoisted banners with the crucifix, flails, and mattocks, to incite the lower classes to revolt; he had failed to bend the powers above him, he would fain stir Acheron.

Charles could now complete the subjection of Southern Germany. Granvelle, the last to be convinced of the necessity of war, was the first convert to the policy of peace, which the Landgrave and the towns desired. Peace would relieve the financial strain and prevent the Germans from becoming desperate: peace would enable Charles to turn his arms against the Turks. Charles thought it undignified to negotiate with an army in the field: peace entailed the abandonment of Maurice, and henceforth no other prince would dare serve him: Augsburg and Ulm, if they were persuaded that he had no wish to establish a tyranny in Germany, were likely to capitulate, and after a victory his generosity in leaving Germany her liberty would appear the greater. Charles did not at this moment fear the Turk, and it was in his power at any moment to propitiate the

French. Pedro de Soto urged the continuance of the war, to avert the danger of a Papal-French combination, which would be the natural result of Paul's indignation at a compromise with heretics.

The deserted princes and towns of South Germany now one by one made submission. Very pathetic was the Emperor's meeting with the Elector Palatine, the friend of his youth, the whilom lover of his sister, the husband of his niece. Charles did not extend his hand: the Elector made three low bows, after which Charles drew out a paper which he read, and then spoke to him in French. "It has grieved me most of all that you in your old age should have been my enemies' companion, when we had been brought up together in our youth." The Elector answered almost in a whisper, and left "like a skinned cat," the Emperor, half-raising his cap, but no one else. He was ordered to go to Granvelle, and the minister played the doctor and healed the wound. He returned with tears in his eyes, and then Charles forgave him. "My cousin, I am content that your past deserts towards me should cancel the errors which you have recently committed." Henceforth the old friendship was renewed.

Ulrich of Württemberg escaped less lightly. He paid a large indemnity, received Spanish garrisons in his fortresses and engaged to serve against his late allies. He had no resource, for his subjects hated him; from the windows of the cottages fluttered the red and white Burgundian colours as a token of what was in the peasants' hearts. Ferdinand pressed warmly for the restoration of the duchy to Austria, but Charles replied that the aim of the war was the service of God and the revival of Imperial authority: to seek their private advantage would only quicken the envy with which

neighbouring powers regarded the house of Habsburg. Farther north the octogenarian Elector of Cologne resigned his see, and the evangelisation of the middle Rhine was at an end. Ulm gave in with a good grace, but Augsburg long delayed. Charles's original intention was, apparently, to garrison these towns, as Milan and Naples, with reliable Spanish troops, and perhaps to destroy their walls, and dominate them by fortresses. But he treated the cities leniently. He left here and there companies of Imperial troops, levied moderate contributions, replaced at Ulm and Augsburg the democratic constitution of the trades by the old wealthy aristocracies, but promised to respect the existing religion. Strassburg, which, in spite of French entreaties, capitulated in February 1547, was almost exempt from punishment; it was feared that the distant, wealthy and headstrong city might hold out a hand to the Swiss and become a Canton.

In Southern and Western Germany there was no longer an enemy in the field, but in the North Maurice's treachery had brought its penalty. John Frederick, acting with unusual vigour, recovered his dominions, received homage from the feudatories of Halberstadt and Magdeburg, and overran Maurice's territories, until he was checked before the walls of Leipsic. When Ferdinand prepared to aid Maurice, the German Protestants of Lusatia and Silesia refused their contingents, and the Bohemian Utraquists made common cause with the Lutherans. The Utraquist nobility and towns formed a league in defence of national and religious liberties; they convoked a diet and raised an army. Ferdinand was faced by a general Bohemian revolt. His position was weakened by his wife's death in February, for it was pretended that he was merely consort. Only the

Catholic nobles were for the Habsburg king, the roads were barricaded to prevent the passage of his artillery, and John Frederick, entering Bohemia, received a hearty welcome. The North German maritime and inland cities were now in arms, and the Lutheran princes of Oldenburg and Mansfield were threatening the Netherlands. Charles sent his best troops to Ferdinand's aid, and despatched Hans and Albert of Hohenzollern in support of Maurice. But Germans could still beat Germans. Albert was surprised and taken at Rochlitz. Ferdinand eagerly pressed Charles to march north in person. The Emperor was unwilling, and Granvelle strongly dissuaded it. The despatch of Alba was the alternative, but Charles did not quite trust his generalship. He was delayed, partly by gout, and partly by fear of a fresh rising in the Suabian towns. Here he had left 7000 men, but he could not himself safely stay in Nuremberg without a garrison of 3000, and could not afford to lock these up. His sole presence in the north, wrote Pirro Colonna, was worth 25,000 foot, and Charles, ill as he was, must march.

The unexpected turn which the war had taken in Saxony was not Charles's only trouble. Paul III. had been alarmed at the Emperor's progress, which had been more rapid and complete than he expected, and at the end of the six months for which he had promised his contingent he withdrew it. The material loss was slight, but the whole aspect of the war was altered. Charles could scarcely now profess to be fighting for submission to Pope and Council, for the Council in March transferred itself, after violent altercations with the Spanish bishops and Imperial envoys, to Bologna. Rome rejoiced at the successes of John Frederick. In the late French war the Turks had figured as the Pope's

friends and had spared his shores; it now seemed possible that the Lutherans might be the Pope's allies. It was certain that, if time were given, the Pope's defection would stimulate the active hostility of France. Charles must have done with the rebellion, and that quickly.

Tortured by gout and fearing that his forces would prove inferior to the Saxons, Charles moved painfully from Nordlingen to Regensburg, and thence to Eger, where he was joined by Ferdinand, Maurice and the electoral prince of Brandenburg. Spending Easter at Eger, he crossed the Saxon frontier on April 13, 1547 with 18,000 foot and 8000 horse. Ten days of incessant marching brought him within touch of the Elector, who was guarding the bridge of Meissen. John Frederick had foolishly frittered away his forces in Saxon and Bohemian garrisons. He now burnt the bridge and retired down the Elbe to Mühlberg, hoping to concentrate his scattered forces under the walls of Wittenberg, while his bridge of boats would keep open communications with the left bank.

Charles was too quick for the ponderous Elector. He marched at midnight on April 23-24, and at 9 A.M. reached the Elbe nearly opposite Mühlberg. As the mist cleared, Alba's light horse descried the bridge of boats swinging from the farther bank, and a dozen Spaniards, covered by a heavy harquebus fire, swam the river with swords between their teeth, routed the guard, and brought the boats across. Meanwhile Alba and Maurice found a ford by which the light horse crossed with harquebusiers *en croupe*. Charles and Ferdinand followed, with the water up to the girths, the Emperor pale as death and thin as a skeleton. The Elector, after attending his Sunday sermon, was enjoying his breakfast; he made no attempt to defend his strong position

on the higher bank, but withdrew his guns and infantry, covering the retreat in person with his cavalry. The bulk of the Imperial forces had crossed by the bridge of boats, and the day was passed in a running rearguard action. It was a long-drawn sunset, and not till between six and seven did Alba, as ever making sure, deliver his decisive attack. The Saxon horse had turned fiercely on the pursuing light cavalry some nine miles from Mühlberg, and then the Imperialists, striking home, converted the retreat into a headlong flight. More than a third of the Saxon forces were left upon the field, the whole of their artillery and baggage train was taken. John Frederick redeemed his timid generalship by his personal bravery. Left almost single-handed in the wood through which his troops retired, he slashed at the Neapolitan light horsemen and Hungarian hussars who surrounded him, but at length surrendered to Ippolito da Porto of Vicenza, who led him, his forehead streaming with blood, to Charles.[1]

Of the interview between the Emperor and his enemy there are several versions, but none inconsistent. "Most powerful and gracious Emperor," said the Elector, vainly endeavouring to dismount, "I am your prisoner." —"You recognise me as Emperor now?" rejoined Charles.—"I am to-day a poor prisoner; may it please your Majesty to treat me as a born prince."—"I will treat you as you deserve," said Charles. Then broke in Ferdinand: "You have tried to drive me and my children from our lands."

The evidence as to the angry scene seems conclusive. Charles had been twenty-one hours in the saddle; he

[1] See M. Lenz, *Die Schlacht von Mühlberg*, 1879. An excellent contemporary letter may be found in *Documentos ineditos para la historia de España*, vol. 85. Another account is given in Weiss, *Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Granvelle*, vol. iii. p. 62.

had been exasperated by the insolence of the princes who had addressed him as "Charles of Ghent, self-styled Emperor." Yet his harsh reception of a wounded prisoner contrasts unpleasantly with the words which his biographers have ascribed to him—*Veni, vidi, vicit deus.*

When Charles returned to his camp he cried in high spirits, "Get my supper ready, for I have been hunting all day long and have caught the pig, and very fat he is." With rest and supper the Emperor's anger passed away. The Bishop of Arras was sent to see how the prisoner bore himself, and found him playing chess with Ernest of Brunswick. Not a word escaped him that was not dignified, brave and princely. Only when the Confessor and some chaplains visited him, "he snorted like the buffalo he is," and begged that he might not be pestered with friars. Charles treated him honourably, giving him two pages, a valet, a doctor and a barber. Spaniards were betting ten to one that John Frederick would lose his head, but when the Confessor and other zealous Catholics urged this course, Charles answered drily. The politicians and soldiers, especially Arras and Alba, were opposed to the death penalty, although Alba had lately told Charles, almost in the words which he afterwards used to Catherine de' Medici, that he must rid himself of the tallest heads. Sentence of death was, indeed, passed, but merely with a view to obtaining the capitulation of Wittenberg, which the Spanish troops were in no mood for storming, for it was strongly held by the Elector's wife with some 2000 men.[1]

The terms of the treaty were sufficiently severe. The Electorate and its lands were bestowed upon Maurice

[1] See S. Issleib, *Die Wittenberger Kapitulation vom Jahre 1547* (*N. Arch. für Sächs. Ges.* xii. 1891).

and his line, to which Wittenberg, the profits of the Saxon mines, and a considerable portion of the remaining Ernestine territories were shortly added. All fortresses must be surrendered, all leagues abandoned, all claims on Magdeburg and Halle renounced, all property confiscated from the Teutonic Order disgorged. The late Elector was pledged to accompany the Emperor or his son for ever, to obey the Imperial Chamber and all recesses of the diet. Nothing, however, would induce him to submit to decrees which the Council of Trent might pass or Charles ordain; he would yield only to a free General Council held in Germany.

If John Frederick was severely mulcted, Maurice was not wholly satisfied. He had wished the Ernestine line to be deprived of its princely rank and reduced to the position of mere landholders. To this Charles did not assent. Gotha still formed the centre of a moderate principality for John Frederick's sons, while his brother retained Coburg. No direct settlement was made in Maurice's favour with respect to the sees of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, though a little later he obtained the protectorate under an arrangement with the house of Brandenburg. Charles refused to make the possible release of John Frederick dependent upon Maurice's permission. The new Elector would fain have retained united and intact the whole of the Wettin territories, but Charles detached and bestowed upon Ferdinand the numerous fiefs held by the Bohemian crown. Ferdinand utilised his victory by stamping on the constitutional pretensions of his Bohemian subjects. Charles advised him to cure the wounds of Bohemia with the knife, promising to be at hand to aid in the operation. Czech Utraquists paid dearly for their momentary sympathy with the Teutonic Lutherans.

The town of Wittenberg stipulated that it should receive a German and not a Spanish garrison. This was conceded, and on May 23 the Imperialists marched into the Lutheran Vatican. Here in the great Church lay the body of Luther himself, since whose death but a year ago so much had happened. A tale which has more currency than authority is told that the Bishop of Arras suggested that the grave should be desecrated and the heretic's bones cast from it, but that Charles replied, "I war not with the dead but with the living." To the Emperor's camp came Sibylla of Cleves to beg mercy for her husband; she was not pretty, wrote a Ferrarese gentleman to his master, but looked clever. She knelt before the Emperor, and twelve princes went on their knees in support of her petition. Charles was all courtesy, for he raised the ex-Electress and even kissed her: but women did not influence his policy.

John Frederick remained a prisoner until circumstances totally different brought him liberty. His captor's severity is not surprising, if it be remembered that Mühlberg was the climax of thirty years of hostility, now open, now concealed, between the Wettins and the Habsburgs. John Frederick's uncle had opposed Charles's election to the Empire; he had hidden Luther from the sentence which the diet had imposed; from his university of Wittenberg had issued the incendiary preachers who had carried fire and sword through Germany, and had lamed all Italian enterprise. His father was responsible for the Protest, for the formation of the model territorial Lutheran Church, for the creation of the League of Schmalkalde. John Frederick himself had long opposed Ferdinand's election as King of the Romans; he had wrecked the scheme of comprehension on which Charles built his hopes of peace

in Germany and success abroad; he had aided the Duke of Cleves in his usurpation of Guelders, had solicited, if not consistently, French and English support, had denied Charles the title of Emperor, had raised revolt in Ferdinand's Bohemian kingdom. This was surely a long list of crimes for an unrelenting character to forgive. Nevertheless the Lutheran leader's gallantry at Mühlberg and his immovable fortitude in captivity had won the heart of every Spaniard, Italian, or Hungarian in the Imperial army. Spanish officers of high birth delighted to do him honour. The hatred and contempt for his betrayer Maurice contributed much to the victim's popularity. Maurice's troopers and Charles's foreign soldiers had to be separated by their officers. John Frederick's people saw their late ruler pass with poignant grief, while they cursed the Judas who had sold him. "The universal opinion is," wrote the Ferrarese agent, "that Maurice, directly the Emperor has gone, will have a fall, and if his cousin should ever return, though only with cloak and sword, he will quickly recover his own, and take Maurice's state and life, for the latter is grievously hated, and John Frederick most cordially beloved." Mocenigo, the Venetian envoy, remarked to Maximilian and the Bishop of Arras that Maurice would now be too strong. They replied that matters were so arranged that neither Saxon line would get a crown from their respective states for three or four years to come. While giving rein to his resentment Charles had curbed his gratitude, and Maurice was very ill content.

Mühlberg was little more than a skirmish, and yet it was decisive. In a far more murderous battle the Imperialists were beaten. The forces of the maritime towns had compelled Eric of Brunswick to raise the

siege of Bremen, and on his retreat had defeated him near Drakenberg with heavy loss. But victories belated or premature do not turn the scale against an opportune success. The sole result of the battle was to delay the Landgrave's surrender a little longer. Philip had sworn to die like a mad dog before he would surrender his fortresses, but he yielded ultimately without a blow. He found discontent rife among his nobles; he was threatened alike from the Netherlands and by the Count of Buren; for months he wavered between capitulation and resistance. Arras assured the nuncio that he was a scoundrel and a coward, that he had implored Maurice to intercede, first for all Lutheran Germany, then for John Frederick and himself, and finally for himself alone. "See what men these are," added the bishop later; "Philip has even offered to march against the Duke of Saxony; he is a sorry fellow and of evil nature . . . he is such a scoundrel that His Majesty cannot trust him in any promise that he may make, for he has never kept one yet."

The Imperial minister's judgment upon the Landgrave was too severe. He long struggled for honour against fear, and but for his son-in-law Maurice's influence might have made a better fight. Maurice had from the first striven to detach Philip from John Frederick, while he in turn was expected by the Landgrave to strike in for a free Germany and a free gospel against the Hungarian hussars and the black Spanish devils. When the two Lutheran leaders parted in November 1546 on no good terms, Philip warned his son-in-law that the Elector was on the march against him, but begged him to intercede with Charles for a general peace. Maurice would have no peace with his Ernestine cousins, but offered to use all his influence on behalf of Philip, who

must hasten to decide, for Buren was "on his legs," and the Emperor was an obstinate man. From this moment the Landgrave's irresolution was piteous; the negotiations crippled all enterprise, and yet he could not persuade himself to abandon his ally, although the natural expiry of the League of Schmalkalde on February 27, 1547 gave him a tolerable pretext. Maurice waxed impatient at the recurring hesitation, at the perpetual amendment of all suggested terms: Philip could not bargain with Charles as though he were a tradesman: he need have no fear for religion, but he must make it clear to the Emperor and Ferdinand that he was against John Frederick. Then came the defeat of Mühlberg, which at least relieved Philip from obligations to his late ally. It was now the surrender of his fortresses and his artillery that he could not stomach, and the victory of Drakenberg raised his once martial ardour to a final flicker.

The flicker died away, and at length Philip yielded to the pressure of Maurice and Joachim of Brandenburg. Charles insisted on unconditional surrender, but promised the mediators that punishment should not extend to personal injury or perpetual imprisonment,—this only, however, on their pledge that Philip should not be informed of these limitations. It was agreed that he should dismantle his fortresses with one exception, surrender his artillery, and pay an indemnity, but that his territory should remain intact and its religion undisturbed.

Even Imperialists thought the terms too harsh, and John Frederick had advised Charles to grant favourable conditions rather than drive Philip to despair. Charles answered that he must be thoroughly humbled if he wished for peace. The punishment cannot be regarded

as severe, if account be taken of the Landgrave's treasonable intrigues with every enemy of Charles and Ferdinand, of his restless hostility varied by false or fleeting expressions of devotion. Philip, almost alone, had made the Emperor's task in Germany impossible, and enabled French and Turks to fight him with advantage. Yet his captivity has cast a shadow on Charles's honour which not even the full light of evidence seems able to dispel. The terms of the capitulation granted by the Emperor were absolutely unvarying and clear; they had been the subject of long discussion. Nevertheless the two Electors took it upon themselves to promise Philip that his detention should last but a few days; they gave him a safe-conduct to and from the Imperial Camp; they engaged to place themselves in the hands of his sons, to be dealt with as Charles dealt with Philip. Christopher of Ebenleben, who carried the safe-conduct, warned them of their responsibility. "You are pledging yourselves too much; see that you are certain of the facts!"[1]

On June 19 the Landgrave was admitted to the Emperor's presence in an audience of much ceremony. Charles told the kneeling prince that he should be punished neither by perpetual imprisonment, nor by confiscation of territory, but to the general surprise he refused his hand, in spite of the Elector of Brandenburg's request. Alba invited Philip and the two Electors to supper, and afterwards told the former that he was his prisoner. The Electors broke out into furious reproaches, and maintained a heated argument until 2 A.M. This in the later morning was renewed in

[1] See G. Turba, *Verhaftung und Gefangenschaft des Landgrafen Philipp von Hessen, 1547-1550* (*Arch. für Oesterr. Ges.* vol. xxxiii. 1896); S. Issleib, *Die Gefangenschaft des Landgrafen Philipp von Hessen* (*N. Arch. Sächs. Ges.* xiv., 1893).

Charles's presence. The terms of the agreement were, however, as they were forced to admit, indisputable. They could only beg him to be gracious; he replied that grace should depend on Philip's conduct.

Misunderstandings grow like mushrooms. The behaviour of the Electors appears inexplicable. There is little doubt that they were genuinely surprised and aggrieved, and until 1552 persistently maintained that they had been deceived. They had, perhaps, in their over-anxiety to induce Philip to surrender, persuaded themselves of the Emperor's intended leniency. It is possible that the Bishop of Arras, equally bent on peace, had by silence or by ambiguity of phrase contributed to their self-deception. It is just conceivable that there may have been a genuine mistake. The plenipotentiaries who had arranged the final terms were four. Of these the two Electors knew neither French nor Latin, Granvelle knew no German, and Seld no French. In such confusion of tongues two opposite ideas might themselves become confounded. The French draft of the capitulation alone of the three survives, and this is entirely in favour of the Emperor's contention. The old tale that in stating the length of Philip's imprisonment the term *ewige* (perpetual) was substituted for *einige* (any) must at all events be a punning afterthought. Charles had not determined on the terms of the Landgrave's confinement, but his inclination was not to make it nominal. His private letters to Ferdinand and Mary prove that he was stung to the quick by the imputation on his honour. He would have done wisely had he, as Ferdinand advised, released Philip as a favour to the two Electors. But righteous irritation overbore sound judgment, and for this Charles had later to pay the penalty.

With Philip's surrender the war seemed virtually at an end. Magdeburg, indeed, still held out for fear of falling again under its Catholic Hohenzollern archbishop. There was no reason to believe that the city would prove more courageous than its fellows. Charles did not dare spend his 4000 Spaniards in the assault, but in this case extravagance would have proved to be economy. When he knew his subject, his opinion was usually well-founded; he had little knowledge, however, of North Germany, and confused Magdeburg with Ulm or Augsburg. It were better for Charles had his Spaniards been decimated on its parapet than that they should lord it in security over the churches and taverns of Southern Germany.

Apart from his two last mistakes, in the campaign against the League Charles, whether as soldier or statesman, is seen at his very best. When once the drums beat to arms there was an end to irresolution. He had that reserve of energy, upon which an indolent, lethargic nature can sometimes at a crisis draw. The Netherlands seemed threatened from east and west; yet in perfect calm he ordered his agitated sister Mary to watch her frontiers, but to send every man and gun that could be spared under Buren to the front. Taking advantage of his enemies' delays, he made with greatly inferior forces the forward move on Ingolstadt, and was there seen under heavy fire "steady as a rock and smiling." Racked by gout he now sought sleep in his litter behind a bastion, now warmed his aching limbs in a little movable wooden room heated by a stove. In the cold wet November, when generals and ministers fell sick, and soldiers of every nationality deserted, he resolutely rejected expert advice to withdraw into winter quarters. He would not give his enemies, he said, the least chance

of outstaying him. All success, wrote the Marquis of Marignano, was due to the Emperor's resolution to keep the field. Charles vexed the fiery Buren by shrinking from a general engagement, because he knew that his combinations would break up the League without the risk of battle. But when once danger really pressed, ill as he was, he marched across Germany, and followed fast upon the Elector's heels until he tripped and took him.

From first to last there were gloomy forebodings that French and Swiss, if not English also, would join the League. Nevertheless Charles knew that the Zwinglian Swiss would never throw in their lot with the losing side, especially if ample funds were not forthcoming. He drew closer the relations with England, spurning the Pope's request for a campaign in favour of Mary's succession, and warmly returning the friendship which Henry VIII. on his deathbed had enjoined upon his son. The young king, said an English envoy, must have a foreign father, and who could this be but Charles? In France a strong party, headed by the Dauphin, was eager to aid the Lutherans by attacking Charles in Lombardy. Aubespine was sent to enlist the Pope's sympathies, to implore him not to renew his treaty with the Emperor. With the Protestants a league was drafted for the deposition of Charles and the investiture of Francis I. with the French-speaking provinces of the Empire and with Milan. The Lutherans were distracted and delayed by promises of help that never came. Charles went his way unmoved, handling the military and diplomatic reins, as though soldiery and statesmanship were a well-trained pair. The possibility of French intervention for 1547 doubtless made him the more determined to press the campaign throughout the winter

months, but he was never flurried. Against the Dauphin he could count on the Constable Montmorency and Cardinal Tournon; the queen, his sister Eleanor, acted now as a spy, now as a diplomatic agent. Above all his staunchest ally was the character of his rival, consistent only in its vacillation. At each fresh success of Charles, Francis I. would sulk or storm for a day and then form a project, but projects were all that he could make; he had lost the power of resolution. He still wandered from hunt to hunt, from one woman to another. By his death alone could he injure Charles, and this he delayed until Charles was within reach of victory. The high pretensions, the dashing onslaughts of the Valois king had dwindled to a policy of pin-pricks. While Charles was on his way to his victory of Mühlberg, the victor of Marignano on March 31 capitulated to death. The Tudor king soon followed the Valois to the grave; the cessation of the inveterate hostility of the one and the intermittent alliance of the other gave Charles at least a breathing-space for the objects which were always in his heart.

CHAPTER VII

The Papal-Imperial quarrel—Withdrawal of Papal troops from Germany—Angry scenes between Charles and the nuncio Verallo—Disputes at the Council of Trent—Its withdrawal to Bologna—Administration of Charles in Italy—Pedro de Toledo, Viceroy of Naples, and his reforms—Ferrante Gonzaga, governor of Milan—Diego de Mendoza—Hostility of Pierluigi Farnese to Charles—The Fieschi conspiracy at Genoa—Revolt against the Inquisition at Naples—Troubles at Florence and Siena—Murder of Pierluigi Farnese—Imperial occupation of Piacenza—The last quarrel with Paul III.—The Pope's death.

To the imperturbable calm of Charles throughout the war against the League there was one notable exception. The legate Farnese and the nuncio Verallo were from week to week a vent for his pent-up sufferings and anxieties. Nowhere else is so vivid a picture of the Emperor's short temper to be gained as in the nuncio's despatches.[1] The grievances were not all on one side. The pledges relating to religion given to Maurice and the Hohenzollerns were contrary to the spirit of Charles's engagement to the Pope, as were also the terms which he granted to the towns and princes who surrendered. As against the Pope's reproaches Charles complained that, in order to render a peaceable settlement impossible, he had divulged the conditions of their secret treaty to

[1] W. Friedensburg, *Nuntiatur des Verallo, 1546-47* (*Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland*, Abt. i. Bd. 9, 1897). This may be followed by A. von Druffel, *Die Sendung des Cardinals Sfondrato an den Hof Karls, 1547-48* (*Abhandl. der hist. Classe der k. bayer. Akad. Wiss.* xx., 1893).

the Swiss, who had straightway communicated them to the Landgrave, who in turn made capital out of them for his manifesto.

From the very opening of the campaign the delay of the Papal subsidies caused embarrassment. Charles was so angry, wrote Verallo, that he could scarcely speak: he declared that he should be forced to kiss the feet of Philip of Hesse and crave for peace: he would have moved a stone to tears, so clearly did he prove that ruin or salvation depended on this money. The conduct of the Papal auxiliaries was a constant subject of complaint. It is probable that the Imperial commissaries neglected them, giving them the worst of the quarters and of the food. The Italians supplied deficiencies by robbery, and by violating the friendly neutrality of Bavaria. Charles in high dudgeon threatened to make a personal visitation of their tents, and wherever he found booty to hang the occupants. He vowed that these Italians taught his Germans and Spaniards to burn and pillage, although the nuncio reminded him that the soldiers of neither of these nations were Observantist friars in character.

During October 1546 the Italians slipped away in large numbers, taking advantage of Cardinal Farnese's departure. In January 1547 the six months, for which Paul III. had granted his auxiliaries, had expired, and, in spite of Charles's critical position, he sent to recall their miserable remnants. This was the occasion for a violent outburst. The Emperor professed to be delighted at their recall, for they were a weight upon his shoulders, but he declared that the Pope's alleged reasons were mere nonsense, and that his action was really due to the persuasions of the French. In this there was much truth; Aubespine as early as July 1546 had urged upon the

Pope that Charles's motive was not religion but universal empire, that his aim was to annex Cologne even as he had absorbed the sees of Utrecht, Cambray and Liège. Paul had replied that he would have so much work in Germany that he would be forced to concede the French demands, and that if he had to fight the united Protestants, the fire would be so big as to burn rather than warm the man who lit it. Charles in a fury now kept repeating to the nuncio an ugly jest on this French contagion with which the Pope, old as he was, had become afflicted. Paul, he declared, had embarked him in this war to ruin him, and would never have been his ally if he had expected a successful issue; his behaviour was not that of an honest man nor a good shepherd; but God had not willed to second the Pope's evil thoughts, for the war had gone well and would go better, and Charles had managed his own business right well and would still improve upon it, having more regard to God's service than His Holiness, who only cared for temporal pleasures and his family's advancement.

To Verallo's expostulations on the long refusal of an audience Charles rejoined that he had so acted because he knew what he was going to say, mere trivialities, vague peace proposals from the French: he knew better than the Pope how to do his duty and serve religion, and would go and tell him so to his face, if Paul lived long enough. "He spoke with such exaggeration," concluded the nuncio, "that all present saw that he was in a passion; he kept on saying that His Holiness was French, and that he knew his duty better than the Pope; he then hurried from the room and went to mass. I begged him to let me say ten words, but he would not stop and said, 'Another time, another time,' and that was the end of my fine audience."

The financial demands of the Emperor were a further subject of disagreement. At the close of 1546 the Pope refused his request for the appropriation of half the Church plate through his dominions and half the annual repair fund of the churches and monasteries. Even the Confessor admitted that Charles might lawfully lay hands on these resources in God's service, while the Imperial envoy at Rome told the Pope plainly that his master would take them. To aggravate matters yet further, Paul III. proposed that he should join with Francis I. in making war upon Edward VI. Charles angrily told the nuncio that he would not make war on the most paltry rapscallion for the Pope; as to the Church revenues he should take them with a good conscience: Ferdinand the Catholic was as saintly a man as any, and had done so: did the Pope say that the war was virtually over? then he would take legate and nuncio next Monday, and put them in the front to see if there was still war, and whether they could exorcise it with the cross. The nuncio begged him not to act against his conscience. "You know your conscience," was the reply; "the Pope knows his and I mine. It is enough for me if I can get a good sum out of Church revenues, I shall not fail to take them,"—"and so he went off to his room, for in truth he was troubled by gout, and that morning had been bled." The Tuscan envoy fully confirms Verallo's account of the Emperor's ill temper. "The Emperor said, 'I won't speak of Peter nor of the Church, but of Pope Paul, an intriguing, malicious man.' The nuncio was quite dumbfounded, and though these outbursts have often occurred, I have never heard Cæsar use such stinging language."

The Council of Trent, which Charles had so long and so earnestly desired, proved from the first a source of

nothing but danger and annoyance. It is strange that any one should have believed in the efficacy of such a Council. The Protestants necessarily refused to recognise it. It is true that Trent was politically a German town, and was, indeed, in those days ethnologically more German than it is now. Yet a Council could not be called general when it was attended by only a handful of Spanish and Italian bishops, nor was it in the Protestant sense free, because the Pope soon proved that he was master. It might have been foreseen that the Council was the surest means of provoking the rupture between Pope and Emperor, whose relations had long been strained to the uttermost. The Pope from the first would gladly have transferred the Council to Rome or some dependent Italian town, and this Charles obstinately resisted. Yet the control after all remained with Rome, for the three presiding legates could determine nothing without reference to Rome, and it had, perhaps, been purposely arranged that they should be at a certain variance with each other. Again, as the voting was not by nations but by heads, the Pope could always manufacture a majority of Italian bishops.

The Spanish prelates and the Emperor's envoys, Juan de Mendoza and Francisco de Toledo, were soon at daggers drawn with the Italian party. Their views of the functions of the Council were totally distinct. The Imperialists wished to conciliate the Protestants by disciplinary reform; the Papalists desired to formulate Catholic belief in the most absolute and precise shape, so that there should be no question as to the doctrines which the Lutherans were to be forced to accept. Some of those doctrines, indeed, especially that of Justification, had been the subject of much debate among the higher Italian clergy, and the action of the ultra-Catholic

majority was doubtless partly directed against their weak-kneed colleagues. The Spaniards had less interest in this definition of doctrine, because they had never had their doubts; as Charles's envoy said, the dogmas were already contained in books. They clamoured, on the other hand, for a restoration of discipline, a thorough reform of the undoubted abuses, which, rather than doctrinal differences, had driven the Lutherans beyond the pale of the Church: such a reform would prove that the Church was sincerely desirous of welcoming them back to the fold.

Charles's own orthodoxy was unquestioned, but he was strongly opposed to a discussion on Original Sin and Justification at a moment when he was professing to be fighting, not for religious doctrine, but for political obedience. He insisted that at least the publication of the decrees should be postponed until the Protestants had been subdued, and, as the war went on, he dwelt strongly and more strongly on the necessity of prudence. As a compromise Paul III. had with much reluctance agreed that the reform of discipline should proceed *pari passu* with the definition of doctrine, but this for Charles's purpose was of little practical avail. When therefore the decree on Justification was published in January 1547, the Imperial envoys, the ministers and Charles himself angrily protested, threatening to supersede the Council by a national synod and a "tiresome diet," which, as Verallo complained, would be the ruin of Christianity. The Cardinal Farnese, himself favourably disposed towards Charles, plaintively wished that he were both blind and deaf that he might not hear nor see the violent scenes at Rome, but he blamed Charles for his want of consideration towards the sensitive Pope, who needed to be caressed.

Equally vexatious to Charles was the Pope's alleged wish to remove or suspend the Council. As early as July 1546 there were rumours in the Imperialist camp of an intention to withdraw to Lucca or Ferrara. Charles complained that the legate Cervini was intending to leave Trent, and when Verallo mildly suggested that it was the usual time to take a holiday, he received the retort that it was no time for holidays when war was being made solely to support the Council. He pressed the nuncio to request the Pope to punish the mutinous members of the Council by deprivation of their benefices, and Verallo added, the warning that suspension or removal would result in a disastrous agreement with the Protestants. The Pope was anxious to hurry the Council to an end, Charles to keep it sitting until his complete victory over the Protestants would induce them to submit to it.

Paul III. had in August 1546 given the legates secret powers to remove the Council from Trent, and in March 1547 they made the plague the pretext for its transference to Bologna. The Pope professed, perhaps with truth, to be surprised at the intelligence, but this did little to allay the Emperor's indignation. The Spanish bishops remained at Trent; Charles absolutely declined to recognise the session at Bologna, and authoritatively ordered its immediate return to Trent. A schism between the ecclesiastical and temporal heads of the Church, between the two swords, between the sun and moon, seemed imminent.

At this moment Charles was on the march to Mühlberg, and Verallo had to endure another painful scene. The Pope, cried Charles, was an obstinate old man, bent on the ruin of Christendom. Every time the nuncio pressed him hard, the Emperor interrupted—"Go

away, go away, for I won't believe what the Pope or you say any longer. Go away, go away; I won't argue the subject; talk about it to Arras." When Verallo hinted that the Council was in security at Bologna, but that if not it was the Emperor's duty to protect it, Charles burst into a passion. "Yes, I will indeed protect it, and without their asking me; that is part of my authority which I do not mean to lose, but shall maintain by all manner of means; yes, yes, I will protect the Council within the very walls of Rome; you shall see that I will protect it in Rome; yes, yes, I will protect it in Rome." "And yet," concluded the nuncio "in this interview he was rather like a lover with his girl, and his face did not always correspond with the fierceness of his words." These scenes are worth relating, not only because they illustrate the Emperor's relations to the Pope, but because they throw light upon a side of his character which is rarely revealed to us, and prove the self-restraint which so hot a temperament must at other times have exercised in maintaining the usual calm and passionless reserve in good or evil fortune.

The ecclesiastical and financial disputes between Pope and Emperor were partly the cause, but mainly the result of differences on Italian politics. Given the character of Paul III., his son, and grand-children, such differences must necessarily have arisen, yet they were aggravated by the shape which Imperial domination in Italy was now assuming. Over and over again it had been impressed upon Charles by diplomatists, generals and ecclesiastics that his presence was essential to the security and prosperity of his Italian possessions. But he could not be everywhere at once. Since the truce of Nice, Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany had so fully occupied his attention, that Italy had fallen into the

background of his personal survey. Everything would therefore depend upon the nature of his appointments to Naples and Milan, and on the relations of his governors and envoys towards the nominally autonomous Italian princes and republics, towards the Pope, and above all towards each other.

The Emperor's ideal for the administration of Italy had been a federation of viceroys and princes. In this federal harmony there was of course always an occasional jarring note, but after 1546 a keen ear might have detected perpetual discord. Two parties were in fact forming themselves, one of which found its chiefs in Pedro de Toledo and Duke Cosimo, the other in Ferrante Gonzaga and Diego de Mendoza. In the choice of the two former Charles had been singularly fortunate. It would be difficult to overrate the services of Cosimo in Central Italy, whereas the maintenance of Charles's power and of order at Naples was solely due to the Cosimo's father-in-law, the greatest of Spanish viceroys.

After the defeat of the French in 1528 Naples successively obeyed, or rather disobeyed, the short-lived authority of the Prince of Orange and Cardinal Pompeo Colonna. Then in 1532 Charles appointed Don Pedro, a cadet of the house of Alba, his personal friend and constant comrade. Under the new viceroy Naples became its modern self. Until lately the one great artery, into which and through which the life of the city flows, has borne his name, the Via di Toledo. He doubled the arsenal, remodelled the fortifications, built churches and hospitals, introduced some rudimentary form of drainage, widened the great grotto-thoroughfare of Pozzuoli, which the magician Virgil was popularly believed to have first pierced. Naples had grievously

suffered from the fall of its once brilliant court, though even this had denizened a palace in a pig-sty. The viceroy once more made the city a capital worthy of the kingdom. Nor were the walls of the capital the confines of his services. The huge coast-line from the mouth of the Garigliano to that of the Tronto was efficiently fortified; neither in the war of 1537, of 1543, nor of 1553, could the Turkish or Algerine fleets make any serious impression upon its defences.

Don Pedro brought to Naples the high Spanish ideal of justice and police; he was determined to make royal authority effective. Hitherto there had been no punishment for nobles, nor for the gangs of ruffians who made life a daily peril. The viceroy's personal supervision of justice soon improved the character of the judges. The courts, criminal, civil and ecclesiastical, and the cruel prison system, all felt the benefit of his reforming hand. He made examples in high places; he cleared away the dingy porticoes and the labyrinth of stalls that harboured ill-living men and women; he made it punishable with death to carry a ladder by night, for it had been the practice to abduct nuns and noble girls by escalade. The civic guard was reformed, and a strong police established in the country. Duels were prohibited, together with the bearing of arms other than swords; the right of asylum claimed by noble houses was abolished. The viceroy at least tempered the orgies customary at funerals and weddings, and during vintage; he brought, however, a compensating amusement in the bull-fight, for he was himself an expert *toreador*.

When Charles reached Sicily from Tunis, the Neapolitan nobles urged him to visit Naples and depose Don Pedro. He listened patiently to their grievances, but then came the representatives of the people, who proved

that he was their protector against tyranny. The viceroy was left at his post with fuller powers than ever. Don Pedro, unlike too many of his successors, did not batten upon his office to return to Spain, in Alberoni's phrase, as "a fatted pig." He was to die in harness while undertaking an expedition against the French troops in Siena. The proud old Spaniard boasted that from long residence he could claim to be a Neapolitan.

Very different from the Neapolitan viceroy was Ferrante Gonzaga, whom in 1546 Charles appointed to the governorship of Milan. Since Sforza's death Milan had been ruled by soldiers as a temporary expedient, their main function being to check the French advance through Piedmont. When de Leyva died, del Guasto was perhaps the best successor that could be found, though he had little of his uncle Pescara's talent, and, indeed, at the defeat of Ceresole he lost his head and, perhaps, his courage. Meanwhile an important change had taken place in the political relations of the duchy. Charles, despairing of an immediate compromise with France, had invested Philip with Milan in 1540, but this was quietly and unceremoniously done; it looked as if Charles had not abandoned his project of a buffer Valois-Habsburg state. Nevertheless Philip was now duke, and a statesman of the first order was required to conciliate the capital and duchy to the foreign rule which was to be its fate, and also to allay the natural fears of the neighbouring Italian states.

Charles long wavered between Alba and Gonzaga. By choosing the latter he made a capital error. In view of Alba's later career it may seem paradoxical to suggest that the Spaniard would have proved a more conciliatory ruler. But Philip II. sent Alba to the

Netherlands to execute a policy which had been deliberately settled; Charles was by no means absolutely decided as to the ultimate fate of Milan. Alba in his relations towards the German Protestants was usually cautious and temporising. In Italy he would probably have adopted a conservative, defensive policy, and would have worked in harmony with his relation the viceroy of Naples, who never went out of his way to disturb his neighbours. Charles regarded with some suspicion the duke's ambition; he perhaps feared to give too great influence in Italy to the house of Toledo; he may have felt that the services of the reliable Spanish general were indispensable to him in Germany. Ferrante Gonzaga therefore was appointed, and this act may be said to open a new and far from fortunate phase of the Emperor's rule in Italy.

Gonzaga was not so good a soldier as Alba. His enterprises were political rather than military; his bold schemes for his master's aggrandisement had no counterpart in his strategy or tactics. When it came to war, he showed at distinct disadvantage in comparison with his enterprising antagonist Brissac. Unlike Alba, Gonzaga was no disciplinarian. Cruel and unscrupulous himself, his character affected his soldiery; they were seldom under control. Thus the sympathies of the Piedmontese, even of the Milanese, began to turn towards the more genial French commander. Charles, however, was personally devoted to Gonzaga, and the Mantuan was a servant of indubitable fidelity, striving always for his master's advancement. No ambitious man can be unselfish, but Gonzaga at least had no such definite aims of personal territorial advantage as had Cosimo I.

It might seem an advantage that the ruler of Milan

should be an Italian, but in reality there could be no worse qualification. The government of Trivulzio, himself a Milanese, had for a time lost Milan to Louis XII.; the great duchy could never have welcomed a cadet from the petty neighbouring state of Mantua. Yet it was Gonzaga's foreign policy rather than his internal administration which brought his master into troubled waters. Such a policy was very simple, very definite, very uncompromising. This in itself had an attraction for a nature irresolute and temporising, even though it were in complete contradiction to the natural inclinations. Charles had hitherto been generous to Italy; he had sought little or no territorial aggrandisement; the duchy of Milan had been forced into his hands almost against his will. His generosity had not won affection or security; an opposite method might well commend itself if stoutly and logically pushed. For this end at least Gonzaga was admirably suited. He was a revival of the older Italian despot, or of the more recent Cæsar Borgia, even though his ambitions were vicarious. He would shrink from no violence which might compass his immediate aim. The whole of independent Italy was soon in a turmoil; even Cosimo I. himself for a moment made advances to the French.

Diego de Mendoza, ambassador first at Venice and then at Rome, was fully qualified to run in harness with Gonzaga, even though his methods were those of diplomacy rather than of force. His diplomacy, however, consisted as much in threats as in persuasion; he knew precisely how to deal with a weak power or a weak character. Highly cultured and intellectually gifted, he could give a semblance of legality and sweet reasonableness to the Emperor's extremest pretensions. His success was great as long as he had to deal with other

cultivated diplomatists who likewise acted on rational principles, but he failed when brought into contact with the hot-headed, unreasoning democracy of Siena. The diplomat here overreached himself. Such was the pair of prancing proconsuls to whom Charles had harnessed his interests in Northern Italy.

The Farnesi, meanwhile, were alternating grievances and ambitions. In January 1546 the commission appointed to inquire into the suzerainty of Parma and Piacenza decided that Pierluigi must not bear the ducal title without the Emperor's investiture. In March Paul III. eagerly coveted the governorship of Milan for Pierluigi or Ottavio; it would be a stepping-stone towards the possession of the duchy. When Charles appointed Ferrante Gonzaga, a personal enemy of the Farnesi, Paul realised that such hopes were at an end. France was in the summer released from the embarrassments of the English war, and into the arms of France Pierluigi threw himself. Thus while the Pope was the professed ally of Charles in Germany, his son was, throughout Italy and beyond, compassing the overthrow of Imperial power, intriguing with the Swiss and with Venice, with Genoese democrats and Florentine exiles. There was already a talk of his son Orazio's marriage with the Dauphin's bastard. Everywhere French agents were parading their promises, and behind them, half-concealed, was the evil face of Pierluigi.

In January 1547 one of the long-laid trains was fired, and this at Genoa, the most dangerous and combustible point in the Emperor's communications. Family faction was the curse of every Italian city with the honourable exception of Venice. If the great houses were on level terms, they fought; if one were by some accident uplifted, the other of necessity conspired. The

Fieschi were equally noble with the Doria but not equally fortunate. As Filippo Strozzi was to Duke Cosimo of Florence, so was Gianluigi Fieschi to Andrea Doria, or rather to his overbearing son. The Genoese as the Florentine aristocrat posed as the champion of popular liberty. The conspirators' secret was well kept; the Doria galleys were surprised in port; the obnoxious son was killed; the veteran admiral fled for his life. But at the very moment when the government had disappeared, the leader of the opposition was nowhere to be found. To a greasy gangway and a slipping step has traditionally been ascribed the survival of Dorian and Spanish power at Genoa.

It seemed proved beyond doubt that the French were concerned in this conspiracy, and that Pierluigi had lent galleys to its chief. In the self-same month Paul III. withdrew the contingent serving under Charles in Germany, while in March the Council was transferred from Trent to Bologna. The action of some of the Curial party was prompted by the desire to uphold the spiritual against the temporal power, to resist the autocracy of Charles and the importunity of the clique of Spanish ambassadors and bishops. The Pope's protestations were not without dignity, nor necessarily without genuine feeling for his true position. But, in the confusion of ecclesiastical and temporal aims, every good motive had its distorted shadow, every fair pretext its seamy side. It was miserable that the bare chance of Christian unity should be sacrificed for a petty Italian principality, and Charles felt this. A less proud and honest man, a mere cool-blooded politician, might have given the Pope and his rascally son their price.

Papal intrigue was next traced in revolt at Naples.

Here the rapid spread of heresy, due to teachers of such influence as Bernardino Ochino, Peter Martyr and Juan de Valdés, rendered more stringent measures necessary, and Paul III. took advantage of this to issue a brief which was interpreted as introducing the Inquisition. No measure was so certain to provoke a rising. The viceroy had been from the first nervous as to the publication of the brief. He avowed that it was the work, not of the government, but of the Pope; he gave ample assurances to the deputies of the people. This availed little. When the hated word was read in the brief posted on the gate of the Archiepiscopal palace, the document was torn down. All classes were soon at war with the inadequate Spanish garrison of 3000 men. The rising was peculiarly serious, because, on this occasion only, nobles and people made common cause. There were rumours of intrigues with France, of intentions to offer the kingdom to its suzerain the Pope. Cosimo prepared to bring Tuscan troops to his father-in-law's aid, but Don Pedro single-handed quelled rebellion. The Emperor disclaimed any intention of introducing the Inquisition; his action affords a good example of his moderation and opportunism, when brought face to face with facts which thwarted the execution of his principles. The viceroy, as a preliminary, made the people lay down their arms, professing to be satisfied with the very imperfect fulfilment of his order. He then cancelled the obnoxious inquisitorial measures, fined the city, and published an amnesty from which few were excepted, and even those were pardoned, save rebels who took refuge in France.

Tuscany also was troubled in these years by the acts or the intrigues of the Pope. These were directed at first against the authority of Cosimo in Florence, and

then immediately against Imperial power in Siena. At Rome there was a strong Florentine anti-Medicean colony, while at Florence Cosimo believed that the Dominicans of San Marco were still a focus of democratic agitation and French sympathy. The friars were removed from their convent at the close of 1545, and although they were afterwards restored, his refusal to give them the customary alms almost led to actual rupture with Rome, the Pope threatening to punish Cosimo as a heretic, and brutally ill-using his secretary of legation.

Although Pope and Emperor at the beginning of 1546 were gradually concerting common action against the German heretics, they were by no means at one in their Italian aims. Siena was among the alternative appanages which Paul coveted for his family. Among the four factions which professedly ruled in common it was easy to stir discord. The more popular elements rose against the aristocratic party, which took refuge with the Spanish governor and his little garrison of 200 men. Cosimo intervened to save the aristocrats and Spaniards from massacre. Siena consented to submit its case to Charles, and, pending a decision, was left to its own devices. When the result of the arbitration was made known, it was rejected, and the Sienese utilised the breathing-space accorded by the German war to prepare armed resistance. After the withdrawal of the Papal troops from Germany, and during the troubles at Naples, affairs at Siena went from bad to worse. Both Cosimo and Ferrante Gonzaga were warning Charles not to neglect this danger. They had hitherto acted in concert, but now they differed as to the means of reducing the city to obedience. Gonzaga was all for force; had he not himself once easily installed

a Spanish governor? Cosimo better realised the defensive possibilities of the town. He was himself endangered by the renewed activity of the Strozzi, who were in high favour with his cousin Catherine de' Medici, now Queen of France. He pressed his mediation upon Siena, and this, combined with Charles's success in Germany, produced a voluntary offer of surrender. The exiles and the garrison returned; the peril was averted, if only for the moment.

Charles had been within an ace of losing both his great Italian seaports in 1547, while still occupied by the German war. The finger of the Farnesi was rightly or wrongly traced in the revolt of Naples as in the *coup de main* on Genoa. The Emperor's patience was not inexhaustible, and patience was a quality which his most stirring agent in Italy entirely lacked; no Spaniard has so recklessly and ruthlessly compassed the subjugation of Italy as Gonzaga. Pierluigi played into his enemy's hands, for his perpetual intrigues induced Charles to consent to an act of violence which was to usher in the more drastic Italian policy of his later years. Gonzaga met these intrigues by countermining against Farnese's power in his own two cities of Parma and Piacenza. Pierluigi was brutal and passionate, craving for rule, yet unfit to be a ruler, a petty Italian despot of the lowest type. He aped the Emperor's love of fortresses, of which more hereafter; he would bridle the nobles of Piacenza with his bastions. His private vices and his public tyranny were the fuel amid which Gonzaga fanned the flame of hatred.

Ever since January Gonzaga had urged an attack upon Pierluigi. Meanwhile, however, relations had improved between Pope and Emperor, and at the moment when the blow fell, Cardinal Farnese had almost led

them back to friendship. Two policies were clashing. Reconciliation with the Papacy was essential to Charles's interests in Germany, while his interests in Italy demanded the fall of the Farnesi. Thus it was that he at length assented to Gonzaga's proposals, insisting only that Pierluigi should not be personally injured.

In September 1547 the nobles of Piacenza rose against their tyrant; they would not be bound by the Emperor's limitations, and they murdered him. Cannon thundered a signal to the garrisons of Lodi and Cremona, and Gonzaga, who had not so far openly appeared, occupied Piacenza in the Emperor's name. Paul's ambition and affection were wounded to the quick; he peremptorily demanded that the murdered man's son Ottavio should be at once established in Piacenza. Gonzaga replied that he could not act without the Emperor's express command. Charles with burning face assured the nuncio that Gonzaga had been completely ignorant of the conspiracy, but added that, had he been in his lieutenant's place, he should have secured Piacenza for the safety of Milan.

It is a shabby, sordid tale in all its aspects. Charles seldom stooped so low, for, dangerous as Pierluigi had been and was, there was not now the excuse of absolute necessity. The error and the crime must be imputed to the malign and masterful influence of Gonzaga, and to Charles's worst characteristic,—his vindictive, unforgiving nature. The Italian, consistently unscrupulous, wished to make a similar attack on Parma, but Charles, unwilling to drive the Pope to desperation, bade him hold his hand. Paul, indeed, vowed that he would suffer martyrdom rather than miss revenge: his wrongs as a father he could forgive, the insult to the Church he could never pardon.

Had not Henry II. of France been involved by his

Scottish alliance in broils with England, the fate of Pierluigi must have led to war in Italy. The king did personally visit Piedmont, and this was suspiciously synchronous with a conspiracy against Gonzaga's life. He was recalled by the rising of Guyenne against the *gabelle* on salt, but he had utilised his opportunity to imprison the Marquis of Saluzzo on the ground of Imperialist sympathies, and to annex the little marquisate snuggling in the southern angle of the Western Alps.

Meanwhile the Cardinals of Guise and Ferrara successively urged the Pope to action. The French should attack Genoa and Naples: Orazio should at once marry the king's bastard, and receive Parma and Piacenza, or exchange them with the French, for Ottavio, being the Emperor's son-in-law, could not be trusted with positions so vital to Franco-Papal interests. Paul even recommended alliance with the Sultan and the Barbaresques. On the other side Alba delivered a formal decision that the Church had no right to either of the two towns, adding that the Emperor in his generosity would find elsewhere a fief for Ottavio Farnese. Gonzaga, trusting to force rather than to law, stirred the Colonna against the Pope, and planned a Florentine attack on the Papal city of Perugia. The very legate of Bologna, Carlo Morone, who was Charles's devoted friend, was implicated in a conspiracy with Gonzaga, which was, perhaps, only rendered abortive by French insistence on his recall to Rome. Gonzaga forestalled the possible hostility of Venice by intriguing with the malcontent mainland nobility in Crema, Bergamo and Brescia. He parried the danger of a Franco-Turkish landing, by occupying, with Cosimo's aid, Elba and Piombino. He would avert the constant danger of a rising at Genoa by utilising the visit of the Infant Philip to build a fortress, or,

better, to unite Genoa with Milan, Savoy and Piedmont in a North Italian kingdom for the Spanish prince. Charles, however, would not follow his proconsul blindfold. He forbade that Philip should be received with any royal honours; though persuaded of the necessity of a fortress, he would not compromise the liberty of Genoa during his old Admiral's lifetime; he refused to give Gonzaga a blank cheque upon his honour.

However questionable the means, the tables had been turned upon the Pope; the Imperialists everywhere were taking the offensive. Charles, moreover, had this advantage, that he could divide the Farnese family. The favour which the French lavished on Orazio drove Ottavio back to the Emperor's side. Paul on this deprived him of Parma, and declared the duchy re-annexed to the Papal States. Ottavio, equally violent with his father, strove to re-enter the town by force. Paul III., who had sacrificed personal honour and spiritual influence to family affection, died on November 10, 1549, virtually at war with his own grandson.

CHAPTER VIII

The power of Charles in Germany—His success abroad—The Armed Diet of Augsburg—The Emperor's conservatism and constitutionalism—His proposal for a league of Germany—Its failure—Treaty between the Netherlands and the Empire—The military chest—Reorganisation of the Imperial Chamber—The diet, the Emperor and the Pope—The Interim of Augsburg—Reform of the Catholic clergy—Moderation of the Emperor—His roughness towards the towns—Absence of the idea of world-empire—The instructions to Philip of 1548—Diet of 1550—Failure of the Interim—The diet refractory—Quarrel with Ferdinand on the succession to the Empire.

At the close of the previous chapter the chronological order of events has been outrun. It seemed desirable to consider in its entirety the dispute between Pope and Emperor on Italian territorial interests, for it will thus be the easier to understand the peculiar difficulties of the Catholic reaction which would naturally follow the defeat of the Lutheran leaders. For these difficulties Charles was not wholly blameless. Great as was the provocation he had done better to avoid a rupture, and await the chances of a not distant Conclave. He had shown in Italian matters a want of patience, but Popes possessed an *ex officio* faculty for annoying him.

In Germany at all events Charles deserved the success which he had won. His patient policy had been completely justified. He had awaited the supreme moment, and then struck hard. The hostile section of the Lutherans had been humbled; the friendly section had

been tempted to disgrace itself; Maurice, in spite of future services to his religion, never shook off the soubriquet of Judas. The two rebel leaders were in the Emperor's hands, and Germany was apparently at his feet. Ulrich of Württemberg and Frederick, Elector Palatine, owed their continued existence to his generosity. German or Spanish garrisons domineered over Frankfurt, for a moment over Wittenberg, over the Suabian Imperial cities and the fortresses of Württemberg. Two Electors, those of Cologne and Saxony, were the Emperor's creations; but for him the ecclesiastical princes would have been evicted by the revolution. Catholic Bavaria in chasing the Will o' the Wisp of an Electorate had strayed far from her political Protestant allies.

The sunshine of Imperial power was spreading from Germany to France and Italy; the black Moslem clouds were rolling away from the Danube valley and the Mediterranean basin towards the Persian frontier. Revolution at Naples, Genoa and Siena had flashed in the pan. Before the diet of Augsburg had sat a fortnight, the Pope had been taught his lesson; his son had been murdered with the connivance of the Imperial viceroy, and an Imperial garrison ruled Piacenza. In France the new king was influenced by advisers who advocated imperial alliance, while Scotland rather than Western Germany was becoming the coveted sphere of influence.

"What will he do with it?" was the question asked after Mühlberg, as it had been asked after Pavia and Rome. Now, if ever, was the opportunity for a creative mind which could mould into new forms the apparently plastic material of German politics and religion. But Charles was not a great creator, he was rather a man of expedients than a master of original design. He was

better fitted to tide over difficulties than to capture fortune. As a faithful servant of time he received his guerdon; he was never his master, never seized him by the forelock and dragged him to the work in hand. Charles had taken prisoner every one of his chief enemies, but he never learned how to utilise success. His latest victory had been, perhaps, too easy; a more stubborn conflict might have better served his purpose. The power of Germany was really great, and had not been seriously impaired. Military requisitions seldom ruin the payer, while the receiver rarely puts them to good use. Even Granvelle's son, the sanguine Bishop of Arras, in a rose-coloured letter to Mary of Hungary, hinted at rocks ahead,—"It is true that I suspect that, when we come to press the negotiations for putting everything in order, there will be more difficulty than is now imagined, but after all we must do the best in our power."

Outwardly the diet which met at Augsburg on September 1, 1547 differed somewhat from its predecessors. Charles was still accompanied by a few of his troops, and this has left to it the name of the Armed Diet. Even in Court etiquette he seemed to show that he was no longer merely *primus inter pares*, but head and shoulders above the German princes. He would not now advance to meet them when they came to audience, nor accompany them to the door. To the Emperor all the current territorial disputes were submissively referred. He even hanged a colonel and two captains who had served France against himself, an object lesson on the existence of high treason new to German eyes.

Nevertheless at no period is the conservatism, the want of imagination of Charles so clearly seen as in the

years which followed his great success. A less conservative, less legally-minded ruler might have inaugurated a new age for Germany. Formerly the Catholics had been as obstructive as the Lutherans, but they had awoken to their danger, they might welcome an absolutism which alone could restore their material fortunes. The towns would have benefited by a strong government, which could re-establish order, encourage trade, and crush once for all the pretences of constitutionalism and the realities of princely particularism. The obvious fact that Charles's relations to the Papacy were strained to the breaking point would have conciliated German feeling. At Augsburg the princes appeared in unusual numbers. The diet was no congress of clerks from the provincial chanceries; it was an assembly really representative of the nation.

In spite of outward appearances all was as though it had never been. The princes had come to play rather than to work. Whatever the misery of their subjects, the rulers' clothes were so magnificent, their tables so sumptuous, that "it seemed as if heaven had rained down gold and silver." If heaven rained precious metals, the earth flowed with generous drinks. Charles had to beseech the princes, in honour of God and of himself as Emperor, to abstain, at least while the diet lasted, from being drunk or half-seas-over, an abstinence which would serve to the saving of their souls, their bodies and their purses. Nor was drink the only pastime. Albert of Culmbach and Maurice of Saxony illustrated the long-standing jealousy of the houses of Hohenzollern and Wettin by their rivalry for the favours of an Augsburg beauty. The diet was in its display pompous beyond precedent, but it marked no inauguration of a new policy in the grand manner. Charles must listen

as usual to the clamours of the more pushing Protestants and the shrieks of disappointed Catholics. How different it would have been, observers asked themselves, if the fortunes of war had favoured the princes, and they had stood over against a conquered Emperor!

Charles had formed a diagnosis of the maladies of German life, and he was ready with his remedies—such as they might prove. These latter are prescribed in his correspondence with Ferdinand as early as January 1547. They comprised religious peace, the reorganisation of justice, and the formation of a league of all Germany on the model of the Suabian League or the less satisfactory Nine Years' League which had succeeded it. Maurice of Saxony might say to Alba that the coming diet would be short, and the recess in the nature of a command: the Cardinal of Augsburg might testily reply to an inquisitive secretary of embassy,—"Diet! what diet? do you want His Majesty to call a diet? he will do well not to call one till he can say *Ego dominus sic Volo*": but this was not the view of Charles. The Emperor agreed with Ferdinand that the diet was the proper constitutional means of effecting the needed reforms, although the ground might be carefully prepared beforehand for the reception of the general league.

This league was Charles's dominant idea. As soon as he heard of John Frederick's capture, he exclaimed, —"Now my league will go ahead." It was conceived as a voluntary association uniting all Germans, but lying outside the constitution of the Empire, although its courts would bear a certain relation to the Imperial Chamber, while its geographical divisions apparently coincided with the Ten Circles. Of its two parallel

executive bodies the one was intended for the ordinary maintenance of peace and justice, the other for military emergencies. In each case the Emperor would appoint the supreme commander, but in the former the four captains and the Council, and in the latter the Councillors of war were to be nominees of the larger Estates or of groups of the smaller. The project had this great merit, that the officials were permanent, devoting their whole time to their new duties; they were not, as were the representatives of princes and towns at the diet, mere envoys without professional knowledge or sufficient authority to conclude. Each Estate was bound by the association to maintain a military quota of all arms, and Charles expected in addition a considerable annual subsidy for the support of the standing army for which his own resources had proved wholly insufficient.

A real need was undoubtedly met by such a league. It would be far more speedy and less cumbersome than the diet. Judicial decrees could be at once executed by a standing force, while an intelligence department would go far to prevent the actual outbreak of disorder. For this reason the weaker powers, many of the towns, the lesser nobility, the ecclesiastical princes, were in its favour; it would afford protection from the encroachments of the princes or the raids of knightly bandits. But this was not Charles's only aim. He expressly told Ferdinand that the league would be of incalculable service in uniting Germany against France or the Turk. It would strengthen moreover both the Imperial and the Habsburg power. The executive officials were likely to fall under Imperial influence: though representatives of the Estates, their permanent position would interest them rather in central than in territorial government. Some such network of officials had in

older days been the ambition of the stronger Emperors; its lack was, perhaps, the chief cause of Imperial powerlessness. The Habsburgs again would be much stronger in the league than in the diet. In the latter they had no place in two of the three curias, while in the College of Princes their votes formed an insignificant proportion. In the league they would monopolise two of the ten divisions, Austria and Burgundy; if the greater princes controlled Upper Saxony, the Lower Rhine and Bavaria, the smaller Estates, which composed Suabia, Franconia and the Upper Rhine, would rally to the Habsburgs, while Lower Saxony and Westphalia were so composite that it was difficult to forecast their policy.

This project, notwithstanding its merits on paper, was at once unoriginal and yet too ideal. It was a mere adaptation of Maximilian's clever expedient to circumstances totally different. The success of the Suabian and other German leagues had been due to their limitation to a certain area or a certain class. To place a league of the whole Empire side by side with the constitution of the Empire was a needless multiplication of entities. If the latter had proved inadequate, a really creative mind would have proposed its radical reform. In such an attempt it is not certain that Charles at this moment would have failed; the task of Bismarck was scarcely less difficult.

The very fact that the league would strengthen Imperial and Habsburg power was sufficient to ensure the princes' opposition; for such objects they had no desire to surrender a jot of territorial independence. Long before the Emperor's proposal to the diet Bavaria had been working against the league. Some Estates were loath to dissolve or weaken smaller associations more closely fitted to their needs; all, or almost all,

shrank from fresh contributions, however desirable the objects of expenditure. The Emperor's foreign troops inspired Germans alike with hate and terror; the nation feared liability for the Austrian and Burgundian frontiers. Above all, religious discord made the scheme unworkable; it had already split the Suabian League in pieces. The Bavarian duke thought that the league would free the Emperor from dependence on the Catholic estates; he avowed that he wanted no league with heretics. The Lutherans feared the preponderance of the numerous ecclesiastical princes, and the probability that the league's action would extend to religious objects, especially to the recovery of secularised property. Moderate as Charles might be, any increase of the central authority would in his hands constitute a danger to Lutheran states.

Thus, in spite of the support which Charles had laboriously accumulated, it was at Augsburg at once clear that the league had no prospect of success. When the diet rejected as unconstitutional the proposal that the subject should be referred to a mixed committee of the several orders, its doom was sealed. Both Electors and princes declared against it. How could it be otherwise? How could a league which deprived the diet of all vitality be approved by the very body that it sapped? It is a proof of Charles's constitutional behaviour in the hour of victory that he made no attempt to force his bantling on the nation, and showed no resentment at his failure. He quietly let his project drop, or rather pigeon-holed it for possible use hereafter.

Some flotsam and jetsam Charles contrived to save. With much difficulty he secured an everlasting treaty between the Empire and the Netherlands, purchasing this by the promise of Netherland contributions to

Imperial taxation and military service. It was a gain moreover that the Empire recognised the acquisition of Utrecht and Guelders, which were transferred from the Westphalian to the Burgundian group.[1] Charles obtained also the vote of a so-called "Roman Month," a sum nominally representing the expense of 20,000 foot and 4000 horse for six months. But this military chest could not be utilised without the consent of the diet, and this was but another term for his territorial rivals. When rebellion and foreign war broke out again, Charles had no power to raise a ducat or a trooper outside the Habsburg lands.

A more important gain was the reorganisation of the Imperial Chamber in the direction demanded by the Emperor. This court, representing the Catholic majority in the diet, had been the most plausible of Lutheran grievances. Powerless to protect a Catholic state from a strong aggressor, it had been able to inflict annoyance and expense on the weaker Lutheran states, especially the smaller towns. Every case before the court was apt to take a religious colouring, and it was therefore inequitable that the judges should represent a majority of nominators but a minority of population. The same trouble was to occur in France, where the law courts, with a long past, a splendid reputation, and no pecuniary difficulties, lost all respect in times of religious partisanship: it was the more acute with the starveling court of Germany which had no traditions and no character. The representative system of judicature had broken down, and Charles therefore, with the diet's consent, himself nominated the members of the reconstituted court, though with the proviso that hereafter the nomi-

[1] For this treaty see F. Rachfall, *Die Trennung der Niederlände vom deutscher Reiche* (*West.-deutsche Zeitschrift*, xix. part 2, 1900).

nation should revert to the Estates. This temporary measure was essential to the peace of Germany. The Emperor alone had an interest in preventing friction in the supreme court; it was not to his advantage to drive his Protestant subjects to despair, nor could he sympathise with the petty persecution of the towns. Not only was Charles most careful in appointing judges of character and moderation, but he actually carried through there and then a codification of the principles on which the court should act, while he secured its permanency by insisting, in face of much opposition, that the Estates should pledge themselves to contributions for its support. He even succeeded in reserving for his own decision cases bearing on ecclesiastical property and jurisdiction. Once more after the lapse of centuries the Emperor reappeared as the fount of German justice.

The debates on the Imperial Chamber already touched the fringe of the religious question, in which all deliberation must ultimately centre. It might have been expected that Charles, who had tried suspension and comprehension before he applied force, should now turn his back upon his former methods and impose his will and his religion upon the conquered, that he should forbid the exercise of Protestant worship, restore to the Church her plundered property, and enforce obedience to Rome. To win back Germany to the Church by arms, and hold it there by the influence of a reformed Catholic clergy, was no unworthy task for the champion of the Church to set himself. Catholics cherished such an ideal, but Charles knew it to be impracticable. He had not the means for a religious war, nor indeed the inclination, for in a few weeks he was himself under the Pope's dire displeasure.

Thus Charles fell back upon his old expedient, a medley of comprehension and suspension. His address to the diet stated that religious schism was the origin of all disturbance; that unless the breach were healed there could be no peace; that first and foremost the Estates must deliberate how religious agreement could be ultimately attained, and what should be the position of the two religious parties in the interval. To satisfy the Catholics, Charles must first prove that a conciliar settlement was as yet impossible. He wished the diet to put pressure upon the Pope by demanding the recall of the Council from Bologna to Trent, and a more zealous treatment of ecclesiastical reform. If Paul III. refused—and his refusal was a foregone conclusion—the slight inflicted on the diet would render the plan for a temporary national settlement far more feasible. Charles's success was not complete. The diet would not withhold assent to his intervention with the Pope, but it threw all the responsibility on his shoulders, so that a refusal would be a slight to himself rather than to the nation. This responsibility Charles could not decline: he pledged himself to secure fair treatment for the Lutherans, the reform of the clergy, and the definition of doctrine according to Holy Writ and the teaching of the Fathers. The Lutherans grudgingly consented to submit to a free and General Council held in Germany. Charles then informed the Pope that what he had so laboriously and devotedly striven to compass had come to pass: electors, princes and cities had submitted to the Council of Trent.

To appeal to the Pope was to court rebuff. The runaway Fathers of the Council could not stultify themselves by meekly rejoining their dissident Spanish brethren who had faced plague and Protestants at Trent.

Paul, who had recently said with some dignity that at his age he could wish for nothing better than martyrdom for the freedom of the Church, could not at the Emperor's behest abandon the liberty of the Council and his own. The despatch of twelve French cardinals to Bologna encouraged him in resistance. Charles, as official protector of Councils, delivered a protest that the transference to Bologna without his assent was needless and unlawful, and that he would regard all its proceedings as invalid until it returned to Trent.

Nothing remained but to settle the German religious difficulty at home. Charles in his conciliatory, constitutional spirit wished the Estates to nominate a committee. But again the diet shrank from responsibility. Charles therefore himself formed a committee of the most prominent statesmen and some Catholic theologians. The introduction of the laity was a new feature; it was hoped that the princes would give a wide berth to the theological rocks on which former compromises had split, and make rather for the reform of practical abuses in which Charles himself was chiefly interested. The lay section of the committee was thoroughly representative, for the Emperor's object was throughout not an ideal scheme, but one which had the most chance of carrying popular opinion with it. Least of all did he wish to impose a religious system upon an unwilling Germany by his absolute authority.

The result of this committee might have proved to Charles that compromise was impossible. The Catholic majority insisted that doctrine should be left to the Council, but that the first measure essential to the restoration of peace was the restitution of Church property to its rightful owners: this done, they professed

to have no wish to force their belief upon unwilling persons. The Lutheran minority rejected a General Council, which would certainly have an Ultramontane colouring: Germany must settle her own disputes in a National Council or a diet: it was wrong to restore property to those who had so long misused it: it was moreover impossible, for the Church institutions had long been broken up, and others had acquired a vested interest in the revenues. The Lutheran Electors had ere now declared that restitution was against their consciences, and the younger Granvelle had told the Legate that, much as Charles wished it, to enforce it was beyond his power. As the leading Lutherans at this moment gave a general support to the Emperor, the weak ecclesiastical princes would hardly have resisted his wishes, had their religious scruples not found political support in the Bavarian representative Eck, whose one object was, not to close, but to widen the religious breach. Eck had no wish that the Habsburg should stand firmly on solid German soil; from the first he had introduced irritating topics and exaggerated demands, claiming restitution of Church property with interest for past years, and the restoration of Catholic worship at whatever cost.

As no further progress on constitutional lines seemed possible, Charles, closing the committee, instructed three theologians to draft a scheme of comprehension. Of these Julius Pflug, Bishop of Naumburg, had long been the Catholic champion of compromise; Michael Helding, Suffragon Bishop of Mainz, was one of the Emperor's Councillors; Agricola was a conservative Lutheran and Court preacher to Joachim of Brandenburg. The latter unfortunately had little weight among Lutherans at large; it would have been wiser to have

risked a stouter Protestant. The result of the labours of this trio was the celebrated Interim.

This attempt at compromise proved, as is well known, a lamentable failure; of all Charles's mistakes it was the most fateful. This is why it has been necessary to tack to the measure so long a preamble. The Interim was not the original device of Charles; he had done everything in his power to associate the nation with himself in the search for some tolerable remedy. But neither Catholics nor Protestants would accept any responsibility, neither party would stir a finger to promote the peace for which both clamoured, nor was either prepared for mutual toleration. It may be frankly granted that the Imperial scheme for German unity failed, and must have failed, but at least it must be credited to the foreign Emperor that he was the only power that worked for conciliation.

The Interim was, as it was intended to be, a masterpiece of ambiguity; doctrines widely differing might be read into and between its lines. Its general tendency was Catholic, but the committee had leaned towards the Lutheran view of Justification, and modified the doctrines relating to the sacrificial nature of the Mass. The Pope was recognised as the head of the Church, for otherwise the main object, reunion, would be abandoned; but the divine authority of bishops was fully recognised, and to them, in conjunction with the Pope, was ascribed the interpretation of Scripture and the definition of doctrine. In what Cromwell would have called circumstantials two important concessions were granted: the clergy were, under certain reservations, allowed to marry, and the use of the cup was granted to the laity.

Charles had carefully prepared his way with the

Lutheran estates, and they accepted the Interim without much demur—Maurice of Saxony, indeed, protesting that he could not pledge his people. The Catholics, however, who regarded themselves as victors, although they had contributed nothing to the victory, offered violent opposition. Some wished, with Bavaria, to weaken the Emperor, but the majority may have honestly felt unable to accept a change which had not the Pope's approval; they represented that only a Pope and Council could allow the marriage of the clergy and the grant of the cup to the laity. Charles recognised the hand which pulled the wires, and, probably with deliberation, lost his patience. Through the lips of Vice-Chancellor Seld he told the ecclesiastical princes that he knew their desire to make him hateful to the Pope, as though he wished to usurp his authority and change the old religion. He ridiculed their demand that he should force the Lutherans to abandon their confession; he exposed their one desire to delay or prevent reunion. The fault, he added, was less theirs than that of certain folk whom he knew well, who had only their own gain at heart, whose minds were poisoned against the work of peace, and who strove to cross its path.

Then Charles, interrupting Seld, broke out in Italian against Eck, the traitor Judas—he cared not whether he hanged himself or was hung by others—nay worse than Judas, for not content with thirty pieces of silver he had taken infinitely more, and, to get it, would sell Christ, his country, the Empire and the world. "Among you," concluded Charles, "are many servants of the Pope, and to give him pleasure you have insinuated that I favour the Protestants, which was never in my thoughts. I cannot like them, because they believe neither in God, in Luther, nor the Saints. Make provision then for your

own interests, and accept this useful measure for the public peace. It is for you only that I have toiled; try to realise the fruits that you will be able to gather from the victory which God has given me. Be at one with each other, and do not let yourselves be deceived by any. I wish to aid you, as I have hitherto done, and with you to endure all for our holy religion. Let those of you who understand Italian interpret to the others what I have said." This address proves how genuine was Charles's interest in conciliation, and how true his devotion to his own faith. On no occasion had he so roughly handled his Bavarian enemy, though provocation had been frequent.

The Catholics were at length convinced that they must bow to the inevitable. In the diet itself there was no debate. On May 15 the Elector of Mainz rose to express the general assent to the Emperor's proposal, and the Interim was carried. On June 30, 1548, it was published simultaneously with the recess of the diet. Charles had tried to gain the Pope's consent for his measure, but knowing that the nuncio was bringing a refusal he delayed his audience until the Interim was accepted. He had thus contrived to avoid formal and open disobedience to Paul's expressed wishes.

After the close of the diet Charles issued his scheme of reform for the clergy. This contained regulations for the examination into the fitness of candidates for Holy Orders, the avoidance of pluralism, the duty of preaching, the morals of the priesthood. Much stress was laid on regular episcopal visitation and the revival of diocesan synods. The bishops professed to give a warm welcome to the measure, but they significantly added that there could be no reform of the clergy without the restitution of Church revenues.

The Interim and the Reform must be considered together as two sides of the religious revival and reunion which Charles had so much at heart. The former was designed to check the evolution of fresh heresies within the Lutheran body, and to lead back the dissidents towards the Church. The latter would remove excuse for fresh lapses from the faith; it would cleanse the fabric of the Church, and throw its doors open, offering a welcome to those who had left it in disgust at its filthiness and neglect. It was not quite unreasonable that Charles should believe in his remedial measures. Both parties had condemned the Papal subterfuges which had first delayed the General Council, then rendered it ridiculous, and finally split it into two. It seemed generous in the hour of victory to make concessions to the Lutherans for which they had long cried, and which in earlier days many would have gladly accepted. If ever a General Council should be held in Germany, the Emperor's attitude towards Rome was a guarantee that the old abuses of the Curia would not be left unpruned. The Catholics were secured from further encroachments, and were granted a respite from Lutheran violence. Charles truly told the restive Catholic princes that he had gained more for them than had ever been gained in the past, and that there was every hope of yet greater success in the future.

The gain or the loss to the Catholics and to Charles depended upon the width of the area to which the Interim could in practice be applied. It was questioned at the time, and it has been debated ever since, whether the compromise was intended to apply to Catholic states as well as Lutheran. It is possible that this delicate matter was at first intentionally left indeterminate, though very soon Charles was forced to limit the applica-

tion to Lutherans. Nevertheless he had almost certainly meant it to be a measure of comprehension in the true sense, not indeed compulsory but permissive. According to this view, all those who availed themselves of the concessions of the Interim would be regarded as being within the pale of the Church, and thus the success of the measure would entail the reunion of religious parties, even though considerable latitude was left for differences of practice and opinion. The hostility of the Catholics drove Charles from this position, and really wrecked the scheme before it was fairly launched. They held that the Interim was for Lutheran states only, that for Catholics it was unnecessary and, in the absence of Papal consent, impossible. They utilised against the compromise the territorial autonomy which the Lutherans had previously plied with such deadly effect against the Church. The exclusive application of the Interim to themselves entirely altered its aspect in the eyes of the Protestants. It was now no longer a measure of healing, but one of compulsion, an instalment of the governmental pressure which was intended to thrust them back, sooner or later, into their old prison. It seemed to be, as it was called, a strait-waistcoat for the Lutherans. Nothing had been farther from Charles's original view than this. He had striven to eliminate the religious discord which had for a generation wasted the power of Germany. But the two parties still stood over against each other, and even during the Armed Diet each had regarded the Emperor's interference with some rancour. The consciousness that they had rendered the Interim inoperative had induced the Catholics to assent to it, while Maurice of Saxony had already expressed his dissatisfaction at its limitation.

It was a startling result of a generation of religious

strife that the most orthodox ruler in Europe should of his own authority formulate a complete code of discipline for his Catholic clergy, and determine some of the most essential doctrines of the Church; that he should thus act in defiance of the wishes of the Pope, known if not publicly expressed; that he should ignore the existence of a General Council summoned for the self-same purposes. This might, not unnaturally, be regarded as the very climax of Imperial absolutism. But the policy was none of the Emperor's own contriving. It had been pressed upon him by German Catholics and Protestants for a quarter of a century, and had at first been indignantly rejected by him as schismatic. Charles had, as in so many other cases, slowly assimilated the views of others, forcing himself to a repugnant line of action from his conviction of the incurable dishonesty of the Papacy.

Throughout this diet, held at the moment when Charles was at the summit of his power, there is no trace of the autocratic spirit of the *hoc volo sic jubeo*. For each of his proposals he had patiently courted the support of public opinion; he had wished the national representatives to take the initiative. Whenever he was assured that popular feeling was against him, he bowed to it, and withdrew or modified his most cherished schemes. His enemies, Lutheran, French, or Bavarian, had ceaselessly urged that his motive was not religion, but the desire to be absolute lord of Germany. "There are many ill-disposed people," said Granvelle to a Venetian envoy, "whose perpetual talk is that Cæsar is bent on absolutism and the subjugation of Germany; but now all the world will realise that he does not covet the property of others, and that he will not take for himself a morsel of Germany, but will be content with

regulating her disorders." Granvelle was right. In suffering Ulrich to retain Württemberg Charles risked the indignation of his brother, who claimed that the duke's treason was a breach of the treaty of Cadan and had forfeited the duchy to Austria. Ferdinand had, indeed, annexed the Bohemian fiefs held by John Frederick, but then the Elector had deliberately provoked revolt among the king's subjects: the survival of a foreign feudalism had been a perpetual danger to the order and autonomy of the Bohemian kingdom. In Southern Germany Constance had during the recent war alone refused to capitulate. She now in 1548, to save herself from Spanish troops, voluntarily surrendered her old Imperial liberty to the neighbouring Austrian government. Charles, with great reluctance and only under strict limitations, suffered his brother to accept the offer: he would not for the world have it thought that he had made war for the private benefit of the house of Habsburg.

Constance was not the only Imperial city which suffered for its share in the rebellion. As after the diet of Augsburg in 1530, Charles was rough towards the larger cities. They had been virtually excluded from consideration in the reorganisation of the Imperial Chamber, while they had to bear the larger proportion alike of the war indemnity and of the subsequent grant. Granvelle threatened to the representatives of Augsburg that he would hang or drown their preachers who would not accept the Interim. Another minister told the deputies of Frankfurt that they would have to take lessons in the old religion, or they would be forced to learn Spanish also. More practical was the constitutional change which Charles effected in Ulm and Augsburg. He replaced the democracies resting on the trades

by smaller Councils drawn mainly from the wealthy and aristocratic families. Many of those latter were Catholic, and at all events their financial welfare depended upon the Netherland and Spanish markets. Henceforth these turbulent cities would be ruled by those who must look to Charles for political and commercial support. He had well noticed that Nuremberg, which almost alone of large German cities had retained its old aristocratic constitution, had also preserved its loyalty and prosperity.

After the victory of Mühlberg the Spaniards had cried that no nation could now resist their king, and prophesied a world empire. This had been another commonplace of Charles's enemies, and even of his friends. In later years Charles laughingly denied that such dreams were his. From first to last his action was defensive, forced upon him by the movements of his enemies. Weakened as France now was, he had no notion of attacking her. His very proposal for a league of Germany was a purely defensive measure. The phrase that Charles had world ideas is only true so far as this, that he was the actual ruler of several states, and thus his policy in respect of any one of them was necessarily conditioned by the circumstances of the others. He never clutched at what was not his own; he frequently withdrew from positions that a less practical ruler would have defended. At one moment he advised Ferdinand to surrender Hungary; he abandoned any idea of active intervention in England on his aunt's behalf; he made peace with the Lutheran ruler of Denmark in spite of his own niece's reasonable claims; he never, indeed, surrendered his own right to the duchy of Burgundy, but he warned his son that it was not worth a war.

There is no better proof of the Emperor's purely

defensive policy than the instructions which he sent to Philip on January 18, 1548, when to all appearance he was at the summit of his power and had Europe at his feet.[1] He had been so ill as to believe himself in danger of death, and therefore, in view of the uncertainty of his life, resolved to trace for his son the path which he should pursue as king. Thus the instructions are no ordinary state paper, but a solemn testamentary record of Charles's wishes and opinions, which deserves a full consideration.

The opening clauses of this document impress upon the Infant the duty of taking all possible measures for the repression of heresy, and of continuing with his uncle's aid the efforts of Charles for a General Council, which he believed to be the sole remedy for the German schism. Nor was the reform of the Catholic Church forgotten, for Philip was enjoined to exercise consummate care in the nomination to bishoprics throughout his dominions. The main burden of the instructions is, however, peace—not peace at any price, but peace preserved by a firm grip upon actual possessions, by the avoidance of provocation, by a dignified reserve as to dormant, if undoubted, rights. Philip must have regard to the condition of his territories exhausted by the wars which Francis had ceaselessly forced upon the Emperor; he must therefore avoid war by all means in his power, and only fight under compulsion. With this end in view, it was all important to adhere honourably to the truce with the Sultan, and to maintain the existing friendship with England, without, however, making the least agreement to the prejudice, direct or indirect, of the Holy Faith and the authority of the Pope. A close

[1] This instruction is printed in Weiss, *Papiers d'état du Cardinal de Granvelle*, vol. iii. p. 267.

alliance with Portugal was valuable for the protection of the Indies. The treaty with the actual king of Denmark should be maintained, and no claim raised on behalf of Christian II. and his daughters, save that for liberal treatment: the imprisoned king should not be allowed sufficient liberty to enable him to renew the contest, and so endanger as before the Netherland provinces. The Pope had given the Emperor every cause for displeasure; yet Philip was advised to render him due respect, and to befriend Ottavio Farnese for the love of Margaret, who had proved herself to be a most faithful daughter: Paul after all was well laden with years, and the essential was to neglect no precaution for the choice of such a successor as the urgent claims of Christianity demanded.

Peace must really depend upon the attitude of France. Charles stated that he had gone all lengths to remain on good terms with Francis, but the latter had never observed peace nor truce. Henry II. had inherited his father's unhappy hatred, and seemed bent on treading in his footsteps. The service of God, the welfare of Christendom, the good of the state, all cried for peace: but with the French the worst way to win peace was to make concessions. If Philip once allowed the permanence of the stipulations relating to Naples, Sicily, Milan, Flanders, Artois and Tournai to be questioned in any one respect, the French would revive their claims to all. Francis and his ancestors had never lost an opportunity of usurping their neighbours' territories: they had made a principle of never respecting any treaty, under pretence that a king could not prejudice the rights of the Crown. This being so, Philip would do better to retain a firm hold of the whole of his present possessions than to be forced hereafter to fight for the remainder, and run the greater risk of even losing these. It would

be wrong to sign any treaty with France which might deprive Philip of the least of his provinces: he must be incessantly on his guard against attack, and never trust to negotiations for peace or to words of friendship, lest the French should follow their usual custom of stealing something while making professions of affection.

Careful as Charles was to make no fresh concessions, he was willing enough, for the sake of peace, to recognise the *status quo*. He advised that the claim of his house to the duchy of Burgundy, its true patrimony, should be left in suspense, and that war should not be renewed on this account, though Philip must never abandon nor disguise his rightful title to the province. Nor would it be well to fight for the recovery of Hesdin, important as this was to the defence of the Low Countries. Most clearly, however, was the Emperor's defensive attitude displayed in his recommendations with regard to Savoy, upon the restitution of which to its lawful prince he had never failed to insist. Charles admitted that the retention of the duchy gave the French the entry to Italy and the power to trouble it at will: every step they took pointed to their intention of attacking Milan and Genoa from Piedmont, and of then passing on to Florence, and thence to Naples and Sicily. Such a power of offence the Emperor could not suffer; he could not advise Philip to withdraw his opposition, even if the house of Savoy were willing to accept an equivalent elsewhere. Yet what was the outcome of his argument? Merely the advice that the matter should be left as it stood, but without concealment of the wrong inflicted upon the duke; merely the hope that God would some day furnish the means to chastise the impious and cruel conduct of Francis and Henry towards the duke and his son, their near relatives! To defend the duke's

remaining possessions Charles thought imperative, but Philip was urged to refuse him his aid in any attempt to recover his state, unless the whole-hearted support of the Empire or an Anglo-French war offered a high probability of success. The renewal of war, for some years at all events, Charles believed to be impossible; and if, after all, the duke accepted a compromise with France, he advised the Prince not to make this a cause for violent intervention, but to cover his own Italian provinces as best he could.

In his review of the condition of his territories Charles everywhere dwelt on the condition of defence rather than on the opportunities of attack. For Flanders he had little fear, since the loyalty of the nobles and the new fortresses of Ghent and Cambrai would deprive the French of all hope of successful invasion. Roussillon and Navarre were well guarded. The county of Burgundy was, in spite of the Swiss guarantee of neutrality, dangerously isolated; but, as neither French nor Swiss could be trusted, he was strongly fortifying Dôle, and recommended further fortifications at Gray and other points. For the defence of the Indies he showed much anxiety, recommending that the governors should be on their guard against the first shock of a French attack, after which their fleets in American waters were usually found to lose their sting. The real danger lay in Italy. Here the Emperor might have been expected to favour a policy of annexation, if only for defensive reasons. On the contrary, he advised his son to do everything to avoid a rupture with the Pope or Venice. The two defensive points were Milan and Piacenza, and of these the former was well fortified and recently armed with the guns taken in the German war: Naples, Palermo and Messina were also strongly guarded. Philip was

urged to consider not only the condition of his fortresses, but the temper of the inhabitants: he must maintain the close friendship with Cosimo de' Medici, favour the house of Mantua, which had greatly suffered in the Imperial cause, and watch with suspicion the French leanings of Ercole of Ferrara. Charles expressed the hope that Ferdinand, as Emperor, would take Siena and Lucca under his protection, for both were devoted to himself and to the Empire, of which they were members: their very liberty depended on the maintenance of the *status quo*, and therefore they could be relied upon to oppose any movement in Italy. Upon the friendship of Genoa depended the security, not only of Milan, Naples and Sicily, but of Sardinia and the Balearic Isles. It was of the highest moment, therefore, to keep the Genoese in good temper and in their present feeling of loyalty towards the Empire. Charles was, he confessed, meditating the means of making yet more safe of Genoa, which he probably intended to be the erection of a fortress. He owned that the people of Naples had latterly been troublesome, but there was nothing on which the Pope or French could really build; the majority was quite loyal, and the Neapolitans, as the Milanese, knew the French too well to like them. In conclusion, Charles implored Philip to lighten the burdens of these Italian peoples, and to rule them with justice, which would make them good and faithful subjects. He knew well enough the hatred inspired by his Spanish troops: Philip could not, indeed, be able for some time to dispense with a Spanish force in Italy, but they should be quartered in the fortresses and on the frontiers, where they would cause least annoyance, and be restrained from mutiny and disorder. In the event of his death the Emperor had ordered all the

Spanish troops with him to march for Lombardy, which is an answer in advance to the accusation that he was even now intending to establish an hereditary Spanish despotism in Germany.

It is noticeable that throughout the instructions there is no hint of any scheme for Philip's succession to the Empire. The Prince was advised to seek for his chief and most unfailing friendship in Ferdinand and his son, to advance their interests and uphold his uncle's Imperial authority, to be willing on all occasions to ask and proffer advice on their mutual interests; for the power of one would give reputation to the other, and community of action would intimidate the common enemy. Yet, far from advocating a universal empire of which each part should be uniform with every other, Charles insisted that Philip's future possessions, with the exception of the Netherlands, must be free from all liability of service or taxation for the defence of Germany against the Turk. The system recommended was one of friendship but not of union: Philip would be unwise to accept the advice, which would certainly be tendered, that he should turn his back upon the Empire, for he would be in a better position for gaining early information of intended attacks upon his scattered territories, if he maintained a close friendship with the electors and princes: this need not, and, indeed, must not be expensive, for if a German once received a pension, he expected to be paid in addition for every trifling service that he rendered.

Charles was the last man to contemplate death without due forethought for marriages and births. Nothing, he wrote, so greatly contributed to loyalty and obedience as the sight of a goodly array of princes around the throne, from among whom the distant

provinces, and above all the Netherlands, might hope to find a governor. He longed that Philip should have several sons, and therefore the young widower must re-marry. Among all possible wives Charles gave the preference to the French princess, if only this marriage would add new force to existing treaties—if it would bring to pass the restoration of the Duke of Savoy, and offer any guarantee for future peace. This advice would seem to prove that the Emperor was not so insincere as has usually been thought in the negotiations for Philip's marriage, which followed the death of the Duke of Orleans. As a second string was mentioned the heiress of the house of Albret, if only she could be removed from France and induced to renounce her claims to Navarre. Failing these problematical brides, Charles could think of none better than one of Ferdinand's daughters, or Eleanor's child by her first husband, the King of Portugal, but he evidently thought this unimaginative union a marriage opportunity wasted. Of his own daughters he recommended that the elder should be married to her first cousin Maximilian, and the younger to the Infant of Portugal. Three of these marriages actually took place, for the two princesses married the husbands thus selected, while Philip, after Mary Tudor's death, wedded Elizabeth of France, and, moreover, replaced her, not indeed by Ferdinand's daughter, but by his grandchild.

Charles apparently had already fears of the ambition of his nephew Maximilian. He dissuaded his son from entrusting the regency of the Netherlands to his sister and her future husband, for, as Philip would necessarily be an absentee, they would doubtless be urged to establish their own authority in the provinces; unquestionable as might be their sense of duty towards the King of

Spain, so high a prospect might in time tempt them to be persuaded. This was a curiously sound forecast. Even in the last years of Charles many Netherlanders looked eagerly to Maximilian as his successor, and an English envoy reported that if his father "put up his shutters," Philip would have little chance of reigning in the provinces. At the height of the future troubles it was Maximilian's son that the malcontent nobles imported as their governor, and the Belgic provinces were ultimately ruled as a quasi-independent state by Philip's daughter and an Austrian archduke, the very combination which Charles had dreaded as a source of disruption of the territorial aggregate of the elder Habsburg line.

The remaining clauses of these instructions relate to the administration of the Indies, which has been already discussed, and to the absolute necessity of maintaining the Spanish, Neapolitan and Sicilian squadrons of galleys at their full strength, as a check upon Turks, Barbaresques and French. This, added Charles, was a reason for keeping the Genoese in good humour, for Philip could not dispense with Doria's fleet, which, if he did not employ it, might take service, as of yore, with France: great as was the expense, it was a safeguard against yet greater loss, and the only justification for economy would be a permanent peace with France and the cessation of danger from the Turk, of neither of which was there probability or hope.

The importance of this document lies in its occasion, in the Emperor's solemn sense of responsibility, in the momentary greatness of his power, in the corresponding weakness of France and England, and in the Eastern embarrassments of the Porte. If the house of Habsburg could not strike for universal Empire at the opening of 1548, at what other date in Charles's life could such an

ambition have been within the range of practical politics? In spite of the jingle of the names, the days of the Cæsars and of Charles the Great were for ever past, and their nominal successor was too sensible and too unimaginative not to know it. Whatever may have been his self-sacrifice in pushing aside the idea of World Empire thrust upon him by friend and foe, that of his biographer in rejecting it is beyond dispute. For the latter it means nothing less than the elimination of many a sonorous phrase, and the abandonment of the one showy general principle which might give apparent unity to his scattered studies.

The diet of Augsburg (1550-51) may be regarded as almost a continuation of the Armed Diet, for here Charles reported the results of the previous recess. These were, it must be confessed, extremely small. Though foreign ambassadors might prate of the danger of universal Empire, the Emperor must have been conscious that the bloom had already been knocked from the fruit of his victory. In some respects, indeed, the situation had improved. Paul III. had been at length persuaded in 1549 to a limited acquiescence in the Interim, and Catholics therefore could not absolutely refuse its recognition. Since then the old Pope had died. His successor Julius III. had, as the Cardinal del Monte, presided over the recalcitrant Fathers much to the Emperor's annoyance. As Pope, however, he showed unexpected friendliness, promising to restore the Council to Trent, whither it in fact returned in 1551. Just before the diet met, both Eck and his master, William of Bavaria, died (March 1550). The new duke, Albert, was Ferdinand's son-in-law and more friendly to the Habsburgs; the new court was less interested in political intrigue than in play and drink.

Here the Emperor's good fortune ended. He had been absent in the Netherlands with his back to Germany. The new system was not sufficiently automatic to work smoothly without its engineer. Already the business of the Imperial Chamber was hopelessly congested; the salaries of its members were in arrear, for the Estates were haggling over their contributions. The interpretation of the treaty of the Netherlands with the Empire was in dispute, and was alienating the Burgundian government from its neighbours. The Catholic reformation was a confessed failure: it was opposed by all who had vested interests, paralysed by want of means and lack of candidates for ordination. Some said that it was the business, not of the Emperor, but of the Pope: others would refer it to the Council. Catholics disliked the Reform as much as Lutherans disliked the Interim. The bishops, it was reported, descanted on the means of setting their neighbours' houses in order, only to divert attention from the disorder in their own. Their only taste, wrote Vice-Chancellor Seld, was for riotous living and benefice-hunting, and the Emperor could not drag them all by the hair of the head into a virtuous life.

With the Interim the case was worse. Throughout the greater part of North Germany it was openly defied in principalities and towns. Even the absolutism of Joachim, "fat old Interim" as he was called, could not force it upon Brandenburg. Philip of Hesse, reckoning no price too dear for liberty, pressed his party to accept the Emperor's compromise: but in doctrinal questions Saxony had usually led, and now John Frederick's steadfast resistance gave the keynote to the chorus of Lutheran opposition. For his own dominions Maurice had obtained substantial concessions, and on the other

side Melanchthon, in his anxiety for peace and pardon, had gone very far to meet the Emperor's wishes, writing with some rancour of his own past servitude to Luther and of his late master's spirit of contention. There was, indeed, this much advantage, that the Lutheran party was rent in twain by the invectives of Flacius, who headed the stalwart Lutherans at Magdeburg, against Melanchthon and the temporising school of Wittenberg. The unity of Lutheranism was not to be quite restored, but the gain was rather for the Catholic revival of the immediate future than for Charles. Meanwhile even in its more liberal form known as that of Leipzig the Interim was not observed.[1]

In Southern Germany there had been many promises but little performance. At Augsburg there was a riot in the church of St. Ulrich; at Strassburg the clergy were stoned. The more zealous Lutheran or Zwinglian preachers had fled, and there was not sufficient ministers who accepted the Interim to take their place. Public preaching against the "devilish Interim" was not uncommon, while the populace was carried away by floods of anti-Interim songs and pamphlets. The authorities were careless or hopeless; they represented that a religion which had existed for thirty years, and in which a second generation had grown up, could not suddenly be suppressed. The purely outward observance of the Interim was in Seld's words mere child's play.

Not only Lutherans but Catholics hampered the Emperor's religious system. The ecclesiastical princes put every obstacle in its way. The concessions made by Paul III. had been too tardy and too conditional to

[1] S. Issleib, *Das Interim in Sächsen 1548-52* (*N. Arch. Sächs. Ges.* xv. 1894).

be of service. He was known not to be in earnest. It was the interest of Catholics and Protestants, of the King of France and the Pope, to make the Interim impossible. In August 1549 a French envoy advised Paul to refuse all aid to Charles in this matter, for the Emperor would only turn it to his own advantage: the Interim was being observed in no town of Germany, and yet Charles did not seem to care! The Pope, well pleased, replied that this method properly conducted would be a means of bleeding Charles to death without his seeing blood. How, indeed, was Charles's religious reformation to succeed, for he was fighting for religion, wrote his minister Veltwyck, against its head the Pope, and against two members of the Church in Germany, the Catholic ecclesiastics and the Protestants?

Charles himself must have been convinced that his threats were a *brutum fulmen*. He seldom used actual force. The one exception was in the immediate neighbourhood of Augsburg during and after the diet of 1550-51. Even here the punitive measures seem to have sprung directly rather from the town government than from the Court. Ten preachers who had spoken against the Interim were expelled from Germany, though the sentence was modified in the case of four. They were, said Granvelle, ignorant men, some of whom had tried Anabaptism out of curiosity, while no two agreed in doctrine. Such harsh measures were not general, for the minister assured Mary that his master would not attempt severity where the town governments were not favourable, but that he hoped to have a little orthodox corner in and around Augsburg. He minimised the importance of the preachers' expulsion, saying that the women who ran after them made a few wry faces, but that within a week there was no more talk of them than if

they had never been born (September 1551). This was not the view of the English envoys, Dr. Wotton and Morosyne. They wrote to their Protestant government that men and women at Augsburg were in a marvellous dump, that few shops were without men in tears, few streets without citizens in plumps discussing how their people could now get baptized or married: that a hundred women gathered round the Emperor's gate, asking where they should christen their children, or whether, if not christened, they would be taken as heathen dogs.

As the Emperor's failure to enforce the general observation of his Interim and Reform was manifest, it was unlikely that the diet would prove subservient. Not even the affair of Magdeburg was decided as he would have wished. The proud Lutheran city, "the Chancery of Christ," had for two years defied the ban. Charles, anxious as ever to have public opinion on his side, desired that the Estates should undertake the reduction of the town, and make a special grant for siege expenses. They on the other hand wished Charles in person to subdue Magdeburg, and that with his own resources, which were totally inadequate for a new campaign. At length it was agreed that the military chest, which the Emperor intended for very different purposes, should be drawn upon, and that the execution of the ban should be entrusted to Maurice, whom the Imperial ministers already regarded with dislike if not suspicion. Although the disastrous consequences could scarcely have been foreseen, it was a political defeat.

More grievous to Charles than all his rebuffs was the quarrel which arose with his brother on the order of Imperial succession. The subject was not new; for two or three years past it had been mooted on one side or

the other. Charles now brought it to an issue, and at a moment when Ferdinand and his son had other causes of complaint. In favouring his brother's election as king of the Romans, Charles had departed from his principle that the whole power of the Habsburgs should be primarily in one hand. To this principle he had now returned. Philip's development was reported to be promising; Charles had already resolved to leave to him both the Netherlands and the Italian conquests. That the head of the house should combine the Empire with the hereditary possessions seemed the best guarantee for the reunion of Christendom, and for the defence of Germany and the house of Habsburg on east and west. The scheme therefore was that the Electors should be induced to nominate Philip as Ferdinand's successor. In this there was nothing unnatural, or necessarily unwise. If the Empire was in any sense to be hereditary, and upon this both brothers were agreed, it would properly devolve upon the elder line. Charles rightly foresaw that if it descended in the junior branch it would lose its European significance, and become an Empire merely titular, while the two lines of Habsburg would inevitably drift apart, and leave France at liberty to strike at either.

Nevertheless the Emperor's scheme was quite unpractical. He did not take into his reckoning the hatred which his Spanish troops had inspired in Germany. There were only some three thousand in all, scattered in various garrisons; the bulk of Germany had never seen a Spaniard. Yet wherever they appeared their fanaticism, licentiousness and greed were insupportable; all Germany seemed at the mercy of a handful of contemptuous barbarians. Philip's arrival only increased the prejudice against his nation. The slow and solitary,

ungracious, ungenial Infant was a sorry contrast to his cousin Maximilian, sensitive and sympathetic, jovial and demonstrative, delightfully unreserved in the imprudence of his confidences. Ferdinand's German advisers had long chafed at their subordination to the foreign ministers of Charles, the two Granvelles and de Praet, Cobos, Alba and Erasso; they now feared that the predominance of the European over the German element in Imperial councils would be perpetuated. Ferdinand had grievances of his own. Charles had indeed grudgingly suffered him to annex Constance, but he still refused to decide the claim to Württemberg in his favour, and showed little sympathy with his passionate desire to recover Transylvania for the Hungarian Crown. Ferdinand had even been persuaded by mischief-makers that Charles intended to set aside his own undoubted claim, and settle the immediate succession upon Philip. Maximilian was fuming and fretting in his regency of Spain. With the Emperor's daughter Mary he had expected to receive the Netherlands as an appanage, but the dowry consisted of mere cash, and even this delayed. His appointment to the regency during his cousin's absence seemed but a pretext to leave a clear field for Philip in Germany.

Charles and Ferdinand had been brought up apart; they had enjoyed no common childhood; during manhood their meetings had been few and far between; their earliest intercourse had been marred by suspicions of treason and by consequent severity. It is creditable to both that since then, in spite of occasional jarring interests, their relations had been so harmonious. This harmony was now no more. Violent scenes were succeeded by sullen silences. The Emperor's enemies were already beginning to make the family quarrel a factor

in their intrigues. Mary alone seemed able to compose the family strife which was troubling the entire range of politics, and Charles begged her to come to Augsburg. His whole correspondence contains few letters which are so natural and heartfelt as this to Mary. He complained that his brother and son-in-law had been secretly working upon the diet, raising bogus rumours about danger in Hungary, perhaps even purposely creating it: Charles had implored him to remember the importance of Magdeburg and of pacifying Germany, adding that the diet would be scandalised at being asked for so large a subsidy for Hungary. Ferdinand had replied that conscience and honour forced him to bring forward the proposal. At this Charles confessed that he was a little stung: everything that a man wanted to do, he told his brother, he always put upon his conscience and his honour: he implored him for the love of God to let his proposals drop, reproaching him with having become cold and indifferent to public interest: every one crossed his own good intentions and Ferdinand more than all. "I told him," continued Charles, "that he wanted everything for himself, but in the long run either he or I must be Emperor, and weak and crippled by illness as I was, I should manage to be present when there was most need: Ferdinand might do what he liked, but I should do all in my power to hinder him, and tell the diet plainly what was happening."

At the close of the interview thus described Ferdinand, seeing his brother so angry, had somewhat softened, promising to postpone his proposals about Hungary, and do all in his power for Magdeburg. But just before Charles had despatched his letter to Mary, Ferdinand had written him an irritating note, repeating that he owed more to his soul and his conscience than to his

brother, and accusing the Emperor of causing the Hungarian troubles by his unprovoked attacks on Monastir and Mehedia. Annoyance extracted from Charles a postscript painfully penned by his own tortured hand: "My dear sister—I would gladly have written this letter in my own hand. Although I might plead in excuse that much writing is dangerous for my gout, I will confess that this has not been so much the cause as the strain on my feelings and my reason that I should have suffered, for I assure you that I can bear no more, unless I am to burst. Be convinced of this, that I have never in the past or present felt so keenly anything that the dead King of France did against me, nor that the present King would like to do, nor all the insolence of the Constable at this moment, as I have felt and am feeling my brother's behaviour towards me. What touches me most is that in spite of all his talk after our interview, and all his general professions, I cannot recognise in his face, when we are together, any sign of repentance or shame. It has come to this that I have no other refuge but to turn to God, praying Him to grant Ferdinand good-will and knowledge, and myself strength and patience, that we may some day be at one, and that if your arrival does not serve to convert my brother, it may at least serve to counsel and console me at such a pass. I must not omit to tell you that I fear that with your arrival he will not give way in his pretensions for the subsidy, and perhaps he will not even await it. God grant that I may be a worse prophet in this than I have been on his behaviour hitherto. As it seems that I have written more than I intended, I will finish this.—Your dear brother, CHARLES."

Only half concealed by the thorny thicket of Hungary, North Africa and Magdeburg was the ever-widening

fissure of the Imperial succession. Mary hurried from the Netherlands to restore fraternal unity, and not in vain. She was convinced of the strength of Charles's arguments, but she and Ferdinand were devoted to each other, and none knew so well as she the difficulties of the Hungarian Crown. A compromise was arranged by which Maximilian should succeed Philip, while their election should be simultaneously negotiated. Philip was debarred from unsolicited interference in Germany during his uncle's lifetime. To Maximilian was accorded during Philip's reign the position which Ferdinand had occupied under Charles. Ferdinand engaged to canvass Saxony and Brandenburg: Charles had little doubt of winning the Rhenish Electors. Nevertheless the brothers might have spared themselves their quarrel, for the refusal of both groups of Electors to entertain a project so unprecedented and so prejudicial to their own liberties was absolute and unconditional.

CHAPTER IX

Unpopularity of Charles in Germany—His weakness and the revival of France—Early symptoms of resistance among Protestant princes—Conspiracy of Maurice of Saxony with France—Programme of the confederates—Ill-health and depression of Charles—He goes to Innsbruck—Forewarnings of Maurice's rebellion—The Emperor's incredulity—Unsettled condition of foreign politics—Prospect of war with England—Operations in North Africa—Capture of Mehedia and loss of Tripoli—Events in Transylvania—The war of Parma—The Council of Trent—Its divisions, difficulties and dissolution.

THERE is a painful contrast between the Emperor of the Armed Diet, who sat upon his throne dispensing laws human and divine, and the fugitive of 1552, crippled by gout, broken by shame, hurried in his litter over the mountains in driving rain, barely escaping the third-rate army of a second-rate princeling of his own creation. Yet in the four years' interval nothing very striking had occurred, and it may be questioned which of the two situations was the more unnatural. Protestant historians have sometimes drawn highly-coloured pictures of Charles's power at Augsburg in order to emphasise the glories of the so-called war of liberation. Nor are they without the support of contemporary evidence. The envoys of an impecunious Elector of Brandenburg might in their despatches truthfully dwell on the total loss of their master's consideration. Even the wary statesmen of the Papal Court and so experienced a diplomat as the

French envoy Marillac feared the possibility of a paramount power in Europe.

Charles beyond all doubt had become unpopular in these years. The Germans were sensitive and sore. They felt keenly that their nation had been disgraced. The buckram league which for fifteen years had imposed upon friend and foe had been divided by the Emperor's alien ministers, and beaten without a serious fight by a few thousand Spaniards and Italians. The nation's nervous system had been shaken; fear multiplied the Spanish soldiers and magnified the bailiffs of the Imperial Chamber. If Charles himself had been studiously moderate, his ministers had spoken sharply. The impudent self-confidence of Spanish officers had a terrorising effect. They would talk of leading the German buffalo by the nose, and as the buffalo did not employ its weapon of offence, this seemed no idle boast. Spaniards were everywhere obnoxious; has not Cortes himself described his countrymen as "somewhat uncomfortable and troublesome?" It is true that the Spanish garrisons in no way affected the princes who ultimately rebelled, but they were on the nerves of all. It might, again, seem really formidable that the Imperial Chamber should consist of Catholic persons of the Emperor's choosing. The bare idea of an Imperial tax opened a prospect of infinite possibilities to the ruler and endless inconvenience to his subjects. The Interim, though it seldom could be enforced, had excited Lutheran opinion; the revival of the Council of Trent gave a fresh fright to those who had not fully realised that Interims and Councils were but bogeys. That an Elector and a Prince should be dragged about in the Emperor's train or imprisoned in his hereditary possessions painfully struck the public imagination. Philip of Hesse's alleged ill-usage by his

Spanish guards went far to canonise him as a saint and martyr; even Catholics believed the legend that he had been fraudulently entrapped. The rumours of the proposed settlement of the succession were intentionally exaggerated to rouse the national susceptibility, for all Germans, not without reason, loathed the prospect of a Spanish ruler.

Charles then was unpopular, but this would have mattered little had he been strong. If the confidential utterances of Charles, his brother, his sister, and their ministers be followed, it will be seen how small was the Emperor's actual power, how completely successful was even the passive resistance which German princes and people were offering. It needed no rebellion, no war of liberation, to convince the Habsburgs that Germany was no fit subject for an absolute monarchy. Charles was in reality extremely weak, and the cleverest of his enemies knew it. They rebelled, not because he was strong, but because he was weak, and their movement was directed, not only against the Emperor, but against the more defenceless elements of German life, the ecclesiastical princes and the towns, whom the Emperor was now powerless to protect. So weak was Charles that he was forced to retire under the shadow of his brother's government at Innsbruck; so weak that, to defend Sicily against the Turks, he must withdraw his Spanish garrisons from Württemberg, and invest young Duke Christopher with his father's duchy unimpaired, in spite of Ferdinand's remonstrances.

The real difference that had taken place between 1547 and 1552, the real cause of the outbreak of rebellion, was not, as German princes reiterated to credulous ears, the growing tyranny of Charles, but the recuperative power of France. Charles was

losing his hold on Germany, because his resources were being strained to the uttermost to retain his hold on Italy. France was now strong enough to attack him at once on the Po and the Rhine. The threats of the Turk against Hungary and the Italo-Sicilian coasts were the reverberation of the armament of France.

In Germany there had been early symptoms of resistance to Imperial authority. Hans of Cüstrin had ridden away from the Armed Diet in dismay and disgust, and was prepared to resist the introduction of the Interim. His cousin, the Duke of Prussia, feared that the Emperor would signalise his victory by executing the long outstanding ban, the penalty for the secularisation of the Teutonic Order. The sons of John Frederick were prepared to head the militant forces, such as they were, of extreme Lutheranism against Emperor, bishops and "pepper-bags," as they termed the city merchants. Apart, however, from these Saxon princes, the programme was at first one of mere resistance. The Northern princes and towns meant only to stand with their backs to the Baltic, and await the attack which Charles had not the slightest intention of delivering. Then the muffled figures of Maurice of Saxony and Albert Alcibiades of Culmbach, the Emperor's late allies, began to frequent the *coulisses* of conspiracy, and the transformation scene of the tragic pantomime was soon to open.

Albert's main object was to fish in troubled waters for rich Church endowments, but the motives of Maurice were more complex. With a little more energy at first he might perhaps have secured the Landgrave's release: his minister Carlowitz attributed the failure to Maurice's dalliance with Bavarian court-ladies in place

of keeping his appointment with Imperial ministers. Nevertheless, his feelings were probably really hurt at his father-in-law's continued imprisonment, which lessened his own consideration. He had not come into actual possession of the promised protectorate of Magdeburg and Halberstadt; he had received only part of the territories of Ernestine Saxony, and the Emperor was reserving his final decision between the claims of Maurice and his cousins. The Emperor seemed to have turned his back upon him in spite of his signal services. If Charles were to divert his favour to John Frederick,—if, even, he were to die,—the position of Maurice would be most precarious, involved as he was in wrangles with his estates, and dubbed Judas by his more zealous Lutheran neighbours. He could only regain consideration by championing some national cause against the Emperor. The commission to execute the ban against Magdeburg gave him the opportunity for which he looked. He could now gather round him such mercenary forces as were still on foot; he intrigued with France and with the North German princes; he prepared a collusive capitulation which would add the garrison of Magdeburg to his troops.

Before the close of 1550 Maurice had formed a little family association with his brother Augustus and his brother-in-law William of Hesse. In May 1551 this group combined at Torgau with Hans of Cüstrin and John Albert of Mecklenburg; the young Ernestine princes were still hesitating between hatred and suspicion of their cousin and desire for plunder and true religion. The late autumn brought the French diplomat de Fresse in the disguise of a trader, and on October 5 the intrigues with the French Crown which Maurice had conducted since June 1550 culminated in the agreement

of Lochau.[1] The entrance of Henry II. into the league profoundly altered both its character and composition. To be of any value to France it must be offensive, while the Most Christian King could not openly declare war on his own religion. On these grounds Hans quarrelled with Maurice, and so, with the Duke of Prussia, withdrew from an association which they had intended to be defensive and religious. The Ernestine princes were sternly forbidden by their father to have any dealings with Judas and his crew. Albert of Culmbach, on the other hand, personally acted as the go-between with France, and by his efforts the formal treaty of Chambord was signed by the French king on January 15, 1552, and completed at Friedewald on February 19 by Maurice, William of Hesse and John Albert of Mecklenburg. Albert of Culmbach was not himself a signatory, although a close ally. For him the war must be indeed offensive to the uttermost, but above all religious—a war less upon the Emperor than upon the Church; he published a separate manifesto, and held a separate command.

As Henry II. could not don the armour of the Gospel, he posed as the champion of German liberties, promising an immediate attack upon Lorraine and a monthly subsidy. To him were conceded in return, as an Imperial vicariate, the three Imperial bishoprics, Metz, Toul and Verdun, which were geographically the military keys of Lorraine. He should win Franche Comté, and recover Cambrai and the lost suzerainty of Artois and Flanders. The princes engaged to elect no

[1] See E. Schlomka, *Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Kurfurst Moritz und Heinrich II. von Frankreich von* 1550 *bis zum Vertrag von Chambord*, 15 *Januar 1552*, 1884; S. Issleib, *Moritz von Sachsen gegen Karl V. bis zum Kriegzuge 1552* (*N. Arch. Sächs. Ges.* vi. 1885). The subject may be continued in J. Trefftz, *Kursachsen und Frankreich 1552-56*, 1891.

one as king of the Romans without his consent, and to promote his own election if he so desired it: they would fight Charles whenever and wherever Henry wished. Maurice did indeed cleverly evade the demand that the French king should be appointed protector of the ecclesiastical states, which would have made him master of all Western Germany.

Thus the programme of the confederates was not religious but political, not defensive but offensive, not national but international and anti-national. While they expatiated on the tyranny of some three thousand Spaniards, now withdrawn, they betrayed the frontier of the Empire to the hereditary foe. Those who were not with the princes were against them: neutrality was a crime punishable by plunder and blackmail. Religious persecution found, indeed, no place in the official programme, but for all this Maurice's associates declared against the temporal power of ecclesiastical princes, and prepared to overrun their unarmed states. The rebellion was the outcome, not of patriotism, but of self-interest. Maurice fought to secure and extend his ill-gotten principality, Albert of Culmbach to win a Franconian duchy, the dream of his forefathers, at the expense of the Church and the Imperial cities. The Mecklenburg prince was closely related to Philip of Hesse, but he struck in mainly because he was a restless adventurer by heredity. William of Hesse alone had a creditable motive in the desire for his father's release. In no sense was the rebellion a general national movement. John Albert was at variance with his relations. The Estates both of Saxony and Hesse were opposed to war. The solid Lutheran North of Germany severely stood aloof. The rising was little more than a military mutiny of the princes who in the recent war had been the

Emperor's generals. The danger consisted in the mobility which the exclusively military character gave to the rebellion, and above all in its support by France.

Enough has been said to prove that Maurice's rebellion was no bolt from the blue. The barometer had been steadily falling and the thunderous clouds gathering. Nevertheless Charles sat, almost with hands in lap, awaiting the inevitable storm in the futile hope that it might disperse. This impassivity has been ascribed to the vanishing of ideals, and it is true that to characters at once indolent and conscientious activity is the variable handmaid of ideals. Mainly, however, it was the purely physical effect of that form of gout which manifests itself in lassitude, discouragement, irresolution, irritation. He was overcome with unconquerable languor and disgust; he clutched at every deceptive straw which might save him from the responsibility of effort, from the mental agony of decision, from the physical pain of movement.

It is in these days of broken health and failing illusions or ideals that it is possible to approach nearest to the personality of Charles. His letters are not often subjectively luminous; they throw their light far afield on outer facts; it does not search the chinks and crannies of the writer's character. But the correspondence of these later years is different; it reflects his states of mind and body, his irritability and indecision, his depression and suspicion. Men, it is true, write to their nearest relations in their fits of gloom; their letters register, not the average, but the minimum temperature of their spirits; when hope and health thaw the paths of life, they drop the pen and go a-hunting. But Charles's own letters are not the only index of his

pitiable condition. The Bishop of Arras was in close correspondence with Mary, and implored her not to let her brother know that he was writing. In November 1551 he described Charles as slow and irresolute, despairing of success from the deficiency of funds, disgusted at the indiscipline of his troops in Italy, hopeless of any remedy, sickened by the counsel that, if he could not find a satisfactory issue, he might at all events make for the least undesirable. When the minister begged his master to gain the goodwill of the English, the Venetians, the German princes, he took no heed. When envoys pressed for audience, he would not postpone his ride; he knew, he would declare, all they had to say, and they did nothing for him. He did at last give way when the bishop assured him that he had many enemies and few friends; that even those who could do little good might do much harm; that as Charles was powerless to confer substantial benefits, he might at least be less chary of fair words.

The Emperor's depression is well illustrated by his letter to Mary of January 28, 1551, a full year before the hostile combination was complete. "I do my best," he wrote, "to make a brave show of upholding my reputation, and not to let people understand that they can force me by fear to do what I do not wish. . . . I must take the least bad alternative, for things are in such a pass that I can adopt no policy which I should myself choose. . . . As to your suggestion that I might undertake a war in Germany, I see so many difficulties as to find it almost impossible, and I implore you to believe that it is sheer necessity and not lack of will that would prevent me. I find myself at such a pass that if the Germans, out of pure rascality, should choose to attack me, I should not know what else to do but to

throw the handle after the hatchet, and, even so, God only grant that I may have the strength to do it." Charles was too much maimed by gout to write the above lines, but in his own hand he adds a postscript: "This war of Parma, the devil take it, is causing my ruin, for all the money that has come from the Indies is almost at an end, and I do not see wherewith I am to hide my nakedness. I am sure that you will be sorry to see things in such condition. I know that I am. But one must take matters as one finds them."

If the difficulties were obvious, the remedies were obscure. First and foremost came the question as to the Emperor's presence. Even within Germany he could not be everywhere. Where then had he better be? He had lingered on at Augsburg after the diet, and from there himself stated the problem. He had dismissed the Spaniards, who had been hard by in Württemberg, and had no means to raise 3000 Germans to replace them. The wretched war over Parma and Mirandola was running its course in Italy; relations with England might at any moment produce a rupture. At Trent the Council dragged its weary length along, or rather tied itself into indissoluble knots. If Henry II. visited Italy in person, Charles felt that he ought to be there to fight him. The Netherlands, that "tail-end of the world," as Mary called them, would be too far from Italy: navigation to Spain in the present attitude of Edward VI.'s government would be dangerous. Brussels was too distant from the Council of Trent, which, unless under the Emperor's eye, would end in smoke. And so Charles formed the fatal resolution of repairing to Innsbruck, where he would be near to Italy, whence he could easily reach Spain, whence he could watch the Council.

To this plan Arras had been opposed: if Charles went to Spain, there would be revolt in Germany, failure of the Council, descents of the Turks: if he engaged Henry II. in Italy, Germany would rise in his rear, and, even if he beat his rival, there was no prospect of his successfully invading France: let him then repair to the Netherlands, where the people were loyal and the Antwerp Bourse would give him credit. Most sensible, as usual, was the advice of Mary. Innsbruck, she urged, was as far from Germany as the Netherlands, and would give the appearance of undue influence upon Trent: the fit place for the Emperor was the Rhineland, the threatened frontier, where he would be in touch with the Rhenish Electors, and could protect either Lorraine or Luxemburg: here he could keep the Western cities in obedience, and prevent the princes from slipping into France: hence also an expedition against England, should it be necessary to the safety of Mary Tudor, could be more easily undertaken. Had Charles followed his sister's advice, his reign might have drifted to its end without notable disaster.

Charles in his present humour disliked suggestions. He told Mary that Speyer was dangerous, for the Palatinate was not yet settled, and the Duke of Württemberg was annoyed with Ferdinand: disaffected Hesse was near, and rebel Magdeburg not far: on the Rhine he would hear nothing but complaints which he could not remedy: he could not afford an adequate guard, for in the winter he must save all his money for the summer: the Lutherans would like his presence at Innsbruck, where he could guarantee their interests at Trent: here he could re-establish friendly relations with Maximilian, speak frankly to his daughter, and cover Ferdinand's frontiers against France: here he could

encourage the revival of Catholicism in Suabia, where, under his warming influence, it was already bearing fruit. "Innsbruck is healthy," he concluded, "bad, indeed, for my chest, but I need not go out when it is cold." This letter was written on October 4, the day before the convention between the princes and the French at Lochau.

To Innsbruck Charles went, and the conspirators were left to pursue their machinations unmolested. As these took shape, Charles recognised his error. He confessed that Mary had been right, but he could not now move to Speyer with dignity and safety: he should only cause expense to his friends, and thus play into the hands of France, whose object was to bring him to bankruptcy by procrastination. He decided to remain at Innsbruck and see what Maurice intended, for without Maurice Albert of Culmbach could do nothing. Arras assured Mary that he sang to his master the old song that he must make for the Netherlands,—and that at once, for otherwise he could not get there,—but all in vain. A fortnight later the rebel princes were in the field.

The Emperor was not forearmed, but he was sufficiently forewarned. As early as November 1550 Lazarus Schwendi wrote that, if Maurice were not satisfied, he would come to terms with Magdeburg, for his people, his nobles, his brother, were all setting him against the Emperor, and the French were included in the intrigue. He begged Charles for God's sake not to neglect the danger: religion was the chief cause of discontent, and in the second line the fears for German liberty and the dislike of foreign ministers. On November 30 he emphasised his warning, showing that the Duke of Prussia and Hans of Cüstrin were in the

plot, and that the sole remedy was to avoid all mention of the Interim in the recess of the diet.

Mary's first note of warning against Maurice is probably to be found in her letter of May 15, 1551. On October 5, the very date of the arrangement of Lochau, she sent definite information of his intrigues with France, Hesse, and the North German powers. A month later Ferdinand confirmed this, advising Charles to buy the services of Maurice and Albert. On December 12 he implored Charles to release Philip of Hesse, for otherwise he might expect a more general and dangerous war than any which he had yet experienced: if the troops at Magdeburg were not paid their arrears, they would move on Bamberg and Würzburg, draw with them all who had reason to dislike peace, and excite the common people to drive Charles from Germany, break up the Council of Trent, deprive him of the obedience of the Imperial cities, and all this with the aid of France. Ten days later Mary entreated Arras not to listen to Maurice's excuses, which were all false and invented to lull Charles into security.

Throughout the first two months of 1552 detailed news as to the enemies' plans, absolutely correct, reached Charles from Mary, from Ferdinand and from Schwendi. Mary expressed her certainty that Maurice meant mischief; that there was no hope of diverting him from his schemes; that, if Charles did not act immediately, Germany would be lost for himself and his successors, and not only Germany but the Netherlands, "which would be no slight loss, for they are not the ugliest feather in His Majesty's hat." On March 5 she almost savagely fired her parting shot,—"This incredulity, this refusal to place faith in our warnings, may cost you very dear." A few days before this letter reached Charles,

intercepted letters from the rebels had at last convinced him and his ministers of the reality of his danger.

Charles, Arras and Vargas had all been equally sceptical. As late as January 24, 1552, Arras confessed that he was blamed for his incredulity, but that it would be folly to incur the expense of raising troops to protect the Rhenish cities, for Maurice had no resources, while the towns, which were not, moreover, so wealthy as in the recent war, were against him: France could not possibly finance the movement, and all that Charles spent now, he would regret hereafter.

Three days later he wrote to Mary that, though still sceptical, he was uneasy, and was endeavouring to counteract by diplomacy the princes' attempt to win the people by intertwining the cause of religion with that of Philip of Hesse. He believed the danger to lie in the restless brain, the insanity of Maurice, who could not see his coming ruin, and also in the necessities of Albert driven to despair by debt; but neither of the princes had the wits or the credit to execute such an enterprise, for their own horsemen would refuse to follow, while the French king most certainly would not pay the piper.

Charles himself on February 26 was still clinging to the possibilities to which an interview with Maurice might give birth. He could not bring himself to believe in the Elector's substantial power, or be induced to take active steps against him. "If Maurice," he wrote, "keeps his troops scattered over his territory, it will be his ruin, for his subjects will hate him: if he concentrates we could demand an explanation, before which we could hardly decently take action against him. It would be better to temporise and wear him out than to drive him to attack us from despair."

In all these arguments there was something that was true. Maurice and Albert found very little sympathy even among their own subjects, but then the Emperor possessed none at all. The resources of the rebels proved not to be very great, but Charles forgot that a rapid offensive war pays itself, and, if Maurice were not strong, he himself had not a regiment at his disposal. He relied too much on his power of releasing John Frederick, and of thus carrying the war into Maurice's country. He had, he said, a big dog in leash that he could set at Maurice's tail. He attributed too much value to the possession of Philip of Hesse as a hostage: Arras wrote, that if Maurice invaded the Netherlands to set Philip free, Mary would cut her prisoner in two, and give him up so dead that his friends could make pies of him. It was not after all unnatural that Charles and his keen-eyed Burgundian minister should disbelieve that Maurice could outwit or outgeneral them. He had shown much absence of scruple and some presence of mind, but no power of winning affection and no military competence. They had so often deceived the stolid Germans, so often broken up hostile combinations by separate negotiations, so often avoided a crisis by promises and postponement, so often enjoyed the benefits of time—time which spelled salvation to the Emperor and ruin to the rebels. At the worst, if absolutely necessary, concessions could be made to the pride of Maurice or the pocket of Albert. Maurice had promised to come to Innsbruck, and there he could be talked into peace or postponement. To Innsbruck Maurice came indeed, but not now, and on no conversational mission.

The condition of Germany had been enough to disquiet the Emperor, but Germany was by no means his sole nor his most irksome care. His extreme weakness

and anxiety were directly caused rather by Italian and European than by German complications. The first war against the Lutheran princes had been rendered possible by his entire freedom from foreign danger, by the peace with France, the truce with the Turk, the friendship of England, the submissiveness of Italy. Before the outbreak of the second civil war Charles was beset and hampered upon every side, by the untoward turn of events in England, by the danger of Hungary and naval operations off North Africa, by the disturbance of Italy through his own son-in-law, by an exhausting if undeclared war with France. In one respect only was there a resemblance between 1546 and 1552: in each of these years he enjoyed the rare favour of a Pope, and in each at his own pressing instance a General Council was in session at Trent. Yet in the latter case it may be doubted whether the Council were not of all his anxieties the chief: it was, at all events, closely linked to the present Italian and the future German war.

In the critical autumn of 1551 the attitude of the English government towards the princess Mary and towards France added not a little to the Emperor's anxiety and annoyance. Until this date his relations with England since the accession of Edward VI. had been unimportant. The reign had opened with friendly professions on both sides, but Charles had given no aid in the indirect war which had been waged with France in Scotland, nor in the direct French attack which had led to the cession of Boulogne. The Inquisition at Naples and the Interim in Germany had sent flights of heretical preachers scudding to the English shores, and the shelter which Bucer, Peter Martyr and others found in the highest quarters was not calculated to propitiate the Emperor. Since Somerset's fall the weak English

government seemed almost resolved to pick a quarrel. Northumberland's friendliness towards France culminated in a treaty for Edward's marriage with the French princess Elizabeth. "This court," wrote Wotton and Morosyne from Augsburg on August 4, 1551, "so frowneth at the forwardness of this affiancing that we do not think they mean to dance at the day of the wedding." The persecution of Mary was even more exasperating to Charles than her brother's engagement. In an interview at the close of August Dr. Wotton was threatened with war in no uncertain tones. Charles angrily complained that his cousin had been evil handled, her servants plucked from her, and she still cried upon to forsake her religion in which the Emperor's house had lived and died. When Wotton urged the authority of Parliament, he was answered that Parliament was no place for the discussion of such subjects, a reply in curious contradiction to the Emperor's later utterances in Mary's reign. The envoy did not make his own path smoother by protesting that the use of Communion as in England was an ancient use, and Mass a modern thing. Charles answered that he did not wonder they thought so in England, for they had called to them daily all the greatest heretics of the time, such as Bucer and Bernardino, who were able to seduce any man. On Wotton's rejoinder that not a hundred such, with all their wisdom, could cause England to alter unless the truth itself had very clearly appeared to them, Charles broke out against the insular conceit. "What truth," he cried, "can appear to the English that does not appear to the number of learned men of other nations, who are as learned as they; or what truth can appear to them that the Church of Christ could not see all this while?"

Had Charles not been entangled in his Italian toils,

the ill treatment of Mary must almost have led to war in the autumn of 1551. The regent of the Netherlands had urged this as one of the reasons why Charles should come to Lower Germany from Augsburg. She confessed to Arras in a letter of October 5 that one of her *Chasteaulx en Espaigne* was the seizure of an English port for the protection of Netherland commerce, and with a view to an invasion. She believed that its extreme division and poverty would render England an easy conquest—that Edward, if still alive, could be released from the hands of his evil councillors, and Mary married in the Imperial house. The Spaniards, so she thought, would zealously aid, and so too the Germans, if Charles would only drop or dissemble his schemes for Philip's succession to the Empire. The invasion would of course entail a war with France, in which if Charles proved victorious, he could do as he pleased with regard to General Council or Imperial succession: if he lost, the Empire was lost also, and such schemes became of no importance. All in fact, she concluded, would depend on the issue of the war, which must be sharp and short, for, with so many enemies, a long one could not be borne. It is strange to find the cautious ruler of the Netherlands recommending an Armada in advance. For her it was mainly a means of averting the French danger from her provinces: she would anticipate the French attack upon the Emperor's western frontiers by crushing the weak ally of France: she would countermine against Henry II.'s intrigues with the German Protestants by delving into the disaffection of English Catholics.

The great Sultan Solyman had taken advantage of his truce with Charles to turn his arms against the Persian Sophy. Nevertheless once again Tunis and

Transylvania fell within the range of the Emperor's operations or anxieties. It must be confessed that he and his brother were to some extent respectively the aggressors in these two directions: in their angry moments each would throw the blame upon the other for the embarrassment which his unconsidered haste had caused. The Sultan's pirate vassal Dragut had established himself on the Tunisian coast at Mehedia, and thence had furrowed the Western Mediterranean backwards and forwards with his corsair keels. Piracy had come to be an inseparable accident of Mediterranean life, and the normal depredations of the Barbary syndicate or of the Knights of St. John were no more regarded as acts of war entailing the rupture of a peace than were cattle-lifting raids on the Anglo-Scottish frontier. Dragut, however, was too powerful and too purpose-like to be overlooked, so Doria's fleet, reinforced by Papal, Florentine and Hospitaller galleys took Monastir and Mehedia in September 1550, and fondly thought to have trapped the pirate in the shallows behind Gelves, while in reality he was ravaging the Sicilian coasts.[1]

On Solyman's return Charles represented that action had been forced upon him by Dragut's inveterate piracy, and that it was no breach of the truce with the Sultan's self. The latter could not dissociate from his own cause that of his vassal whom he had created *Sanjak* of the Barbary coast. A Turkish fleet made a sharp attack on Malta, carried off the population of Gozo, then, heading for Africa, appeared off the Hospitallers' settlement at Tripoli, and on August 14, 1551, compelled it to capitulate. The Hospitallers were to Charles what Barbarossa and Dragut were to Solyman; they were the untiring, unscrupulous naval scouts of Christendom.

[1] P. Rachel has written on this subject in his Leipsic Dissertation of 1879.

In losing Tripoli the Christian sea-power lost one of its two eyes, and Malta, the other, must sooner or later be sympathetically affected. The tragedy had its point of contact with the quarrel in the Imperial house, for Andrea Doria's fleet, which could easily have saved Tripoli, had been diverted from the Southern to the Northern Mediterranean to escort Philip back to Spain and Maximilian home to Germany. The smaller squadron of Antonio Doria lost eight galleys in a storm. "This unlucky loss," wrote Dr. Wotton from Augsburg, "has had as great dump among the Imperialists, as stirred up talk and courage to the French." The French ambassador Aramon had, indeed, urged the despatch of the Turkish fleet to western waters, and was personally present at the capture of Tripoli.

Meanwhile Ferdinand had brought upon himself the exhausting conflict in Transylvania which outlasted Charles's reign. For Hungary the possession of this province was of high importance, for it was the strategic key to the kingdom, while its salt and minerals, its fine breed of horses and its valiant population, would add largely to Ferdinand's financial and military resources. The rule of Zapolya's widow Queen Isabella had been so incompetent that her minister Martinuzzi, known as Brother George, determined to transfer the sovereignty of Transylvania to Ferdinand. The king for some years refused the offer for fear of creating trouble with the Porte, but at length in the summer of 1551 he finally accepted the proposal, in which Isabella and her subjects concurred. The annexation of the province was at once followed by a Turkish invasion, and, to make Ferdinand's difficulties the greater, his Neapolitan general Castaldo allowed himself to be persuaded that Brother George was intriguing for the possession of Transylvania under

Turkish suzerainty. Ferdinand had given his consent that, if the minister's guilt seemed proved, his treachery might be forestalled, and acting on this Castaldo had him murdered in December 1551. From this moment the Austrian arms were almost uniformly unsuccessful, and when war broke out in Germany, Szegedin had just fallen to the Pasha of Buda, whilst the Second Vizier was marching to the siege of Temesvar. On July 21, 1551, Wotton and Morosyne had written to the English Council, "A Turkish shower marreth all this fine weather." Nine months more, and the local disturbance had become absorbed in the European storm which was now to develop dangerous energy.

If the Hungarian and African troubles were contributory to the Emperor's perplexed condition, its immediate cause was the war of Parma which, as has already been seen, had affected his movements and strained his resources. In spite of the nominal peace, Charles had for some time past been unofficially at war with France in Italy; it is scarcely too much to say that this war had already really determined the fortunes of the open conflict which was to follow.

The death of Paul III. and the accession of Julius III. in February 1550 were of good omen for the settlement of Italy in accordance with the Emperor's desires. Julius had few of the territorial ambitions of his predecessors; his leaning was towards literature and pleasure; he would fain, as Leo X., enjoy the Papacy which God had given him. The Pope's nephew Giambattista del Monte was an active soldier rather than a would-be princeling; he was eager to win glory under the Imperial banners.[1]

[1] For the relations of Julius III. and Charles, see A. Pieper, *Die päpstlichen Legaten und Nuntien in Deutschland, Frankreich und Spanien seit der Mitte des XVI Jahrhunderts*, 1897.

There was in the Curia a general desire for compromise and peace, and, as an earnest of this good fellowship, Parma was restored to Ottavio Farnese. Unfortunately, however, there could be no peace between the Farnese and Ferrante Gonzaga, especially when the latter, by occupying a cordon of posts on Parmesan territory, threatened the little capital with starvation. Julius made every conceivable suggestion for a compromise, but the still disputed suzerainty of Emperor and Pope proved a genuine difficulty. Ottavio, despairing of Imperial favour, turned to the king of France, who undertook the protection of Parma. The Pope, partly in anger at his vassal's disobedience, partly in the desire to smother a spark which might kindle a general conflagration, declared Ottavio's fief forfeited, and appealed to Charles for aid.

The last war of the Emperor with France, though it was to be decided in Germany, began once again in and for Italy. Nominally the peace of Crépy was not broken; Charles was acting merely as the Pope's auxiliary, the king of France as protector of Ottavio Farnese. But the pretence could not be long preserved. Parma must have fallen, had it not been reinforced from Mirandola by French troops, and thus the Papal-Imperial forces must invest, not only Parma, but the recognised French protectorate, which served as a reservoir of supply. Hence the war necessarily spread to Piedmont, where the French general Brissac attacked the remaining territories belonging in name to the Duke of Savoy, but occupied by Spanish garrisons. The government of Henry II. was more subtle than that of his father. In Italy as in Germany it professed to be, not the conqueror, but the protector, the liberator of the oppressed, the disinterested champion of the claims of others. To

Charles this attitude was the more dangerous in view of the increasing restlessness of his Lombard subjects. "The Emperor snuffeth," wrote Mason to the English Council, "at this alteration of Parma," and snuff he reasonably might.

The policy of securing the peace of Italy by the agency of a friendly family ring had failed. Gonzaga's rough hand had snapped the ring, of which the Farnese link had never been too strong. This was the more disastrous because the most intimate connections of the Habsburg house had latterly been strained almost to breaking. If in Italy Charles was actually at war with his own son-in-law, in Germany he had imperilled the friendship of his brother and his nephew. It is, after all, more easy to quarrel with relations than with strangers; the blood of kinship may be thick, but its skin is singularly thin.

The Papal-Imperial forces proved unequal to the task of taking either Parma or Mirandola. Gonzaga was called off to Piedmont where sciatica aggravated his anxieties. Giambattista del Monte, most honourable of Papal *nipoti*, fell in action. Before his nephew's death the Pope had come to terms with France. On April 15, the day of Giambattista's fall, he informed the consistory of the conclusion of a truce which would enable Ottavio Farnese to hold Parma for two years. The inner meaning was that the Pope had turned his chasuble. Charles had no option but to concur. It was on January 28 that he had expressed the wish that the devil would take the war of Parma. Since that date the French had entered Lorraine and the rebel princes were in the field. On May 10 he ratified the truce relating to Parma: in nine days more he was flying over the Brenner. The rebellious son-in-law had carried off the honours of war,

and Charles had received his first very serious check in Italy. The paltry Italian quarrel had been the cause of his absolute defencelessness against the insurgent German princes.

The General Council and the war of Parma were two aspects of the self-same Papal-Imperial alliance. The latter opened while the members of the former were still gathering, and, as far as the Pope's action was concerned, they both were brought to their conclusion on one and the same day. When the French king was ready to aid Ottavio Farnese, his ambassador protested in the secret consistory against the Council. The first session had been fixed for May 1, 1551, but as the numbers were very scanty, the meeting was prorogued until September 1, and though some resolutions were then taken, the serious work of the Council scarcely began until October 11. From the end of February 1552 discussion was virtually at a deadlock, and on April 28 the Council voted its suspension for two years. Charles had arrived at Innsbruck on November 2, 1551; he was therefore within easy reach of the Council during the greater part of its session. His ambassador was Francisco de Toledo, whose diplomatic experience was aided by the greater theological knowledge of Vargas. Spanish bishops had joined their long-sitting and long-suffering brethren of the earlier session in considerable numbers. From Germany came the three ecclesiastical Electors, together with the suffragan Bishop of Würzburg, the Bishop of Meissen, and the Emperor's moderate adviser Pflug, now Bishop of Naumburg. Ferdinand sent as his representatives Nausea, Bishop of Vienna, and the Bishop of Agram, while a strong contingent of theologians was despatched by the university of Louvain. On the Protestant side were present the envoys of

Brandenburg, Württemberg, and finally those of Maurice of Saxony. The confessions of Württemberg, Strassburg and Saxony were laid before the meeting, but the theologians were delayed by disputes as to the form of safe-conduct, and the rapid termination of the Council anticipated their arrival. The Papal legate Crescenzio passed for an Imperialist in mundane politics, but he was a stout champion of Papal supremacy: his assistant presidents, Lippomano and Pighino, were both favourably known to Charles. Italian bishops could of course be collected *ad libitum*, to support the wishes of the Curia on which they were dependent. From French-speaking Lorraine came the Bishop of Verdun, but the French Church was wholly unrepresented. On September 1, letters were brought from the king of France explaining his abstention. The very address to the Most Holy and Reverend Fathers in Christ of the Convention of Trent was taken as a proof that he denied the authority of the meeting as a General Council. No Council could in fact be really œcumenical from which the French nation stood aloof, but the French king's disclaimer of a Council held in a German city, and in the cause of German peace, must of a certainty have been foreseen.

Regarded as a meeting of theologians and envoys from the countries more immediately under the Emperor's and the Pope's control, the Council was neither unrepresentative nor undistinguished. Nevertheless it is marvellous that Charles should have expected from it any satisfactory result. He had already failed to influence alike the Catholics and Protestants of Germany, whose interests were, after all, in a measure coincident with his own. In the Council the Curia must inevitably play a leading part, and the aims of the Curial party and the Pope, however friendly he might be, must be at total

variance with those of the Emperor and Germany. To state the dualism in general terms, it was the aim of the Pope that doctrines should be peremptorily determined, and Protestants forced to accept them, whereas the Emperor's desire was to introduce reforms which would propitiate the Lutherans and prepare them for voluntary reconciliation.

The Council itself was scored by deep dividing lines. The Spanish bishops, remarkable for their zeal, their learning and their loyalty, must still remain at war with the Italian ecclesiastics, dependent for their very livelihood on the continuance of old abuses. The Spaniards were, as in the previous session, less interested in doctrinal definition than in disciplinary reform. The centre of their position now was the residence of bishops. This duty, if once recognised as obligatory, would go far to purify the clergy, especially if to this were added the right of nomination to benefices in the diocese, and a jurisdiction unhampered by continual appeals to Rome. If the king nominated the bishops, and the bishops the parochial clergy, the result would be a national church under a strong national discipline. This was very much the Emperor's own ideal; it was the system which from the beginning to the end of his reign he was striving to introduce into the Netherlands. On this subject he was deeply imbued with the Spanish spirit; in his recent instructions to his son in 1548 he had insisted on nothing more earnestly than on the choice of fit candidates for the episcopate. But if all churches were national and all bishops resident, how could the huge Papal Court continue to exist? Its survival implied a practice of non-residence, for it subsisted on foreign benefices, on foreign pensions and appeals, since the small Italian bishoprics were too poor to provide a living wage.

Nor was it merely a matter of finance: the power of the Papacy must shrink, as the principle of national decentralisation was extended: the chair of St. Peter would become little more than an Italian primacy.

In the conflict with the Curial party the Spaniards would find general support from the bishops, who hailed from the Emperor's possessions in Italy and Sicily, and from the theologians of Louvain. The German Catholics had little in common with the Spanish bishops, except that both gave some measure of support to the Emperor's wishes. Their immediate aim was of a much less general character: it was to secure such concessions for the Protestants as had already been provisionally granted by the diet. The presence of the ambassadors and the prospect of the theologians of Protestant Germany made confusion worse confounded. The representatives of Joachim of Brandenburg, indeed, in order to obtain confirmation of his young son's uncanonical election to the sees of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, were all sweetness to the Curial party. But the remaining Protestants would not budge an inch from the demands, which could scarcely have been higher had they been victorious in arms. They claimed power to sit, to debate, to vote: the Council must apply the sponge to all the doctrinal decisions at which it had previously arrived: the Pope must appear as party not as judge, and every member of the Council must be formally released from his oath of obedience to him.

The Spaniards on many questions of disciplinary reforms might have a certain sympathy with the Lutheran demands: some of them actually applauded the freedom with which the envoys in the session of January 24 inveighed against the sins of the Curia: their ideal of a national Church was not so very different. On the other

hand a wide gulf separated their doctrinal beliefs, and this must have become the more apparent, if only the Lutheran theologians had arrived. The German Catholics were fighting for concessions comparatively trifling, which they hoped would satisfy the Protestant leaders, and secure their own unarmed states from Lutheran excursions and alarums. But the history of the Interim had proved that the Lutherans would never be content with the grant of the cup to the laity and the marriage of the clergy; nor could the Catholics welcome the predominance which the acceptance of the Protestant demands must have given to their ancient enemies.

Under such favourable circumstances it is small wonder if the Curial party, headed by the legate, the two presidents and the two Papal Jesuit theologians, with whom lay the initiative both in organisation and debate, resolved from the first to make the Council a sham, and in this resolve succeeded. They could not of course always resist the pressure of the Imperial ambassador, Francisco de Toledo, and of the Imperial section of the Council. They were compelled to postpone the publication of decrees against the grant of the cup and the marriage of the clergy. They were forced to concede, after long tergiversation, a satisfactory safe-conduct for the Lutheran theologians whose arrival they so greatly dreaded. By this time, however, they were well aware that the Council had already failed, and that the Emperor dared not push his resentment to extremities for fear that the Pope should fling himself into the arms of France, and make the political position in Italy more hopeless than it was already.

Charles was by both parties very hardly used His professed ally the Pope was hurrying the Council to a premature conclusion which must necessitate a most

untimely rupture with the Protestants. The Lutherans were grumbling that the Council was not such as the Emperor had promised them: at the moment when his support had enabled the Saxon envoys to make their outspoken address of January 24, their master was already in league with France to drive Charles from Germany. Yet the Emperor had risked much to keep faith with the Protestants; he was earnest in his purpose to secure them a full and patient hearing; his envoys at the Council had assured their representatives that his cause was identical with their own.

Since the close of 1551 Francisco de Toledo had become convinced of the futility of the Council, but Vargas still had hopes, and Charles was reluctant to abandon his long-cherished scheme. Illusion was no longer possible, and by February 1552 it had come to this, that the Papal and Imperial parties each wished for the relief afforded by suspension, while each was fencing to make its adversary incur the responsibility of proposing it. The German Electors left Trent on the rumours of coming disturbance at home; the Italians began to slip away from the hated city. On March 5 the Emperor gave his permission to his Ambassador for suspension. The Pope in the consistory of April 15 declared the Council suspended: it was the very day on which he had announced the truce with Ottavio Farnese. The presidents thought it wiser that the Council should itself be induced to vote its own dispersal, and after some final debates of even unusual warmth the decree of suspension for two years was carried on April 28 in the face of a collective protest from the minority of twelve Spanish bishops.

CHAPTER X

Henry II. and Maurice of Saxony open the campaign—The Emperor's suspicions of Ferdinand—Conference of Linz—Charles attempts to escape to the Netherlands—Maurice's advance on Innsbruck and the Emperor's flight—The treaty of Passau—Maurice's demands and the Emperor's amendments—Improved position of Charles after the treaty—His march against the French—The siege of Metz and its abandonment—The Emperor's illness—His last campaign for the protection of the Netherlands.

THE French opened the campaign in Germany on March 13, 1552. They drove the Emperor's niece, the regent Christina, from the government of Lorraine, and deprived her of her son, whom they sent to Paris for his schooling. Toul was occupied, and Metz taken under fraudulent pretences, with the connivance of the bishop. Not content with Lorraine, the king prepared to march on Strassburg. Simultaneously Maurice, protesting his intention of visiting Charles at Innsbruck, where his agent had actually engaged rooms, moved rapidly southwards.[1] The rendezvous of the confederates was at Rothenburg on the Tauber, and here they issued their manifestos. That of Maurice and his immediate associates dwelt mainly upon the Emperor's oppression, financial, political, and religious, upon his resolve to reduce the free German nation to a bovine servitude.

[1] See S. Issleib, *Moritz von Sachsen gegen Karl V.* 1552 (*N. Arch. Sächs. Ges.* vii. 1886). A biography of *Markgraf Albrecht Alcibiades von Brandenburg-Kulmbach* has been written by G. Voigt, 1852, and that of *Johann Albrecht I. Herzog von Mecklenburg*, by F. W. Schirrmacher, 1885.

Albert Alcibiades, unfettered by engagements to Catholic France, was more outspoken. He also set out the proofs of Charles's absolutism and of the foreign character of his rule, while professing no desire to attack his dignity and office. In very truth he declared war less against the Emperor than against the overgrown power of the ecclesiastical states, which he expressed his intention of protestantising for the benefit of the German princes. On April 1 the allies appeared before Augsburg, where the recently dispossessed democracy gave them welcome, while they in turn restored the constitution founded on the trades. Here Maurice was within striking distance of the unprotected Emperor. A mere handful of troops in the pass of Ehrenberg lay between Charles and his enemies. This pass once stormed, they could march unmolested into and down the valley of the Inn.

At the last moment Charles woke up. He wrote to his sister that, if she would send a few squadrons of horse from Luxemburg, he would make his way thither from Ulm. But his presence now could only embarrass the careful regent. She replied that she had no horse to spare: if he could not resist Maurice in Germany, let him retire on Austria, and thence create a diversion by throwing himself on the French in Savoy. But neither did Ferdinand want his brother. He told him that his presence in Austria would only draw the enemy thither, and cause the irremediable ruin of both. So Charles testily wrote to Mary that he must remain at Innsbruck, and, if need be, defend himself in the mountains with the peasants.

Charles was acutely miserable. Every man's hand seemed against him. He privately instructed his agents to watch Ferdinand, who had been so general in his state-

ments, so cold and unsympathetic, that he suspected him of having secret assurances from the enemy. His very daughter, Maximilian's wife, was at this most inopportune of moments pressing him for payment of her dowry. Charles's suspicion of his brother's loyalty is echoed to the present day. The accusation is almost certainly unjust. Nothing in all this miserable time was more noble and straightforward than Ferdinand's letter of appeal to the honour and patriotism of Maurice. He even recalled for his brother's protection the much needed troops who were on their march for Hungary. Yet undoubtedly his interests were not those of his brother, whose cherished schemes he had tried to thwart, and of whose foreign ministers he disapproved. Peace was to Ferdinand essential in view of the danger in the East, and the ruler of Austria could have no more useful ally than the Saxon Elector, to whom he was bound by personal and hereditary ties. A war of religion might set the whole of the Austrian territories ablaze, from the Black Forest to the Hungarian cornlands. Thus Ferdinand, equally orthodox with Charles, was prepared for greater religious sacrifices. Nor had he his brother's personal resentments; in concert with Mary he had pressed Charles to release Philip of Hesse and John Frederick, the former as a concession, the latter as a threat to Maurice.[1]

Notwithstanding Charles's suspicions he was compelled to seek Ferdinand's mediation, and Ferdinand induced Maurice to meet himself and a few other princes

[1] Opposite views on the subject of Charles's relation to Ferdinand are taken by G. Fischer, *Die persönliche stellung und politische Lage König. Ferdinands von und nach den Passauer Verhandlungen*, 1891, and by J. Witter, *Die Beziehung und der Verkehr des Kurf. Moritz von Sächsen mit dem röm. König Ferdinand seit dem Abschlusse der Wittenberger Kapitulation bis zum Passauer Vertrage*, 1886. See also H. Barga, *Die Verhandlungen zu Linz und zu Passau im Jahre 1552*, 1897.

at Linz. Except that arrangements were made for a future congress at Passau, this conference had but slight results. Neither Charles nor Maurice wished for peace. Charles meant to gain time, which would ruin his enemies already in the field, and enable him to complete his armaments: he might separate the rebel princes, and appear as the protector of Germany against foreign invasion and domestic anarchy. Maurice thwarted these aims by refusing an immediate armistice, but he too had his disappointments. He had hoped at Linz to gain the support of some of the neutral princes, but had found them totally averse to his devastating war, and began to be conscious of the unpopularity of his move. Albert Alcibiades had by this time separated from his allies, and was conducting an independent campaign of devastation against the feeble bishops of Franconia. Maurice returned to his other confederates, and prepared for his advance on Innsbruck. The armistice was postponed until May 26; he had nearly a month wherein to work his will.

During this interval occurred one of the few personal adventures in Charles's life. He suddenly made up his mind to escape to the Netherlands, and on May 6, after leaving letters with the Bishop of Arras for Ferdinand and Mary, set off in the strictest secrecy with six attendants. Two other confidants only had any idea that the little party had ever left or returned again. It is probably a fable that the Groom of the Chamber was laid in the Imperial bed to personate his master, and heard, undetected, the usual early mass. The true story is known from the letter addressed to Ferdinand, which gives the motives of the adventure, and from a later letter to Mary describing its failure. In the former Charles showed that there was little

chance of defending himself in Tyrol, and that he might easily be caught in bed. There were only three routes open for escape. He did not like to accept Ferdinand's offer of a refuge, because the enemy might press them both. Italy was not so safe as it looked, for, going without forces or reputation, he might be in danger as he crossed Venetian territory, and even then he should find himself in a land as disaffected as Germany, although Italians had a greater gift of dissimulation: the soldiers, moreover, were mutinous and discontented from irregularity of pay, the people driven to despair by ill-usage: during his flight in his feeble state of health the enemy might beat up his quarters. If he deserted Germany, no German would declare for him: if he tried to reach Spain, the French and Turkish fleets might capture him; then Italy would certainly revolt, and the Netherlands fall a prey to France,—truly a fine end to his later days! "My health," he continued, "is not equal to the journeys which I used to take. The road to the Netherlands is closed for an army, or even for my household. Whatever I do, if it turn out well, people will ascribe it to good luck; if ill, to my own fault. Thus, after fully considering all alternatives and my present straits, commending myself to God, and putting myself entirely in His hands, my conclusion is that I would rather people should take me for an old madman, than ruin myself in my old age without doing all that is in me, and perhaps more than my failing strength would warrant. As I must either submit to a great disgrace or place myself in great danger, I have decided to choose the latter, since it is in God's hands to find the remedy. Thus I have resolved to start to-night for the Netherlands, for I have more means of resistance there than elsewhere, and I should be so near Germany

that, if any feel indignation at all this villainy, I could concert action. I would sooner die or suffer captivity in doing my utmost, than live any longer in dishonour. I have ordered that this should not be given to you until news of my absence has got abroad. Spread the rumour that I have gone to you, and play your part right well."

Nothing shows better than this letter the Emperor's powerlessness and discouragement, and yet the very act of resolution had restored a portion of his manhood. He left Innsbruck at midnight, meaning to reach the defile of Ehrenberg, and then, turning to the left, to make for Constance by byroads. Charles's adventure will give an added interest to any who travel from the Inn valley to Füssen by this beautiful route. He had intended to cover only three leagues for the first stage, but, finding himself quite fresh at dawn, he pushed on to Parwies. Unfortunately, two troops of horse, retiring from Kempten on the news of Maurice's occupation of Augsburg, had quartered themselves on the villages in defiance of strict orders. Men-at-arms were found at Parwies, so Charles was forced to take a mountain road to the right, and marched till nearly 8 A.M., when he rested at a poor farm near Nazareit till 2 P.M. His intention was to travel another four leagues and reach the defile at dawn. The little party met horse and foot, who told them that Maurice had left Augsburg for Füssen. On reaching Lermoos Charles was very tired, but had to push on to Büschelbach, only a league from Ehrenberg, where he spent the night much exhausted. Here he met Christopher Taxis, master of the posts, who told him that Maurice was still at Augsburg, but that his troops would reach Füssen on the morrow. Then a servant brought in word that the Kempten road

was infested by Maurice's troopers in quest of food and grass. Van der Fe went on to Ehrenberg to explore, and found that the enemy were already close ahead. Charles then felt so tired that it would be impossible to get through, and so without further adventure returned to Innsbruck, reaching his room in perfect secrecy. Charles now must await Maurice's advance. The Elector did not leave Füssen until May 18. He drove the Imperialists from Reutte back upon the defences of Ehrenberg. In the night George of Mecklenburg scrambled with his men like so many chamois, as Maurice expressed it, to the rocks commanding the blockhouses, and so rendered the position untenable. But for the mutiny of a regiment next morning, Charles might have been caught at Innsbruck "like an old fox in his earth." On that same evening, the 19th, Charles, accompanied by Ferdinand, fled from Innsbruck. His last act was to restore freedom to the ex-Elector John Frederick, whom he begged to accompany him voluntarily for a fortnight, his intention being to employ him against Maurice. The passage of the Brenner was rendered the more difficult by driving rain; the torches were frequently extinguished by the wind; two of the baggage mules were lost. There was little rest until Charles reached Bruneck, and finding there but one day's food he hurried on to Villach in Carinthia. Maurice had subjected the Emperor to deep humiliation, but he had missed his aim, which was to capture him, in spite of his alleged saying that he had no cage for so fine a bird. It was believed that he meant to press on to Italy, and join the French and the Duke of Ferrara. With the latter he had been long intriguing with a view to co-operation from the south of the Brenner Pass. This is a fact not without interest, although it had no practical results,

because it shows a certain community of feeling between the territorial princes of Italy and Germany, both jealous of the growth of Imperial authority. Maurice, however, never went beyond Innsbruck: he could not have ventured sufficiently far from his base either to pursue Charles, or to descend on Italy. After plundering the Emperor's private property, he led his troops back from Tyrol, and made his way to Passau, whither Ferdinand also was repairing. The chief result of the spirited raid had been rather ecclesiastical than military. Maurice had frightened the Fathers at Trent into breaking up the Council—at least such was their pretence. They were naturally unwilling, it was said, to argue with armed soldiers on questions of the Faith.

At Passau the German princes or their representatives met in great numbers. The middle party, Ferdinand and the neutral powers, were bent on peace: Ferdinand that he might gain Maurice's aid against the Turks, the princes that they might exorcise the spectre which was alarming them. Maurice and Albert Alcibiades with an armed force were in their midst; even so powerful a prince as the Duke of Bavaria trembled at their presence; they all, in the favourite phrase of Albert, had a hare in their breasts.[1] The alleged tyranny of Charles had never approached that of the rebel princes. He had treated the revolted cities with humanity, but never until the Thirty Years' War were such horrors inflicted upon Germans as by Albert. He was said to have boasted that he had chosen not God but the devil for his master, and men might well believe it. The track of the wild warrior with the floating fair hair and the freckled face was a wide path of fire. For miles round Ulm and

[1] For Bavarian policy in these years see W. Goetz, *Die bayerische Politik im ersten Jahrzehnt der Regierung Herzog Albrechts V von Baiern* (1550-60), 1896.

Nuremberg the country-side smoked with burning villages, while the bishops and their territories were yet more rudely handled. Charles grimly told his brother that, if the Bishops of Bamberg and Würzburg and the town of Nuremberg had paid as much to their natural protector as had been extorted in blackmail by their lawless persecutor, they would have escaped these horrors.

It might seem impossible that the Emperor and the rebels should come to terms, unless, indeed, Charles made an abject submission. Maurice, however, proved unexpectedly moderate. He had found himself weaker than he thought to be, and this placed him at the mercy of France. The French invasion had caused much ill feeling in Germany, especially among the towns. If Augsburg had admitted Maurice, Ulm had beaten the confederates off, and Strassburg showed her teeth to the advancing foreigners. The very fact of negotiation had brought upon Maurice scoldings from his French ally. Early in June the king, after watering his horses in the Rhine, turned his back upon Alsace, and retired homewards, snapping up Verdun, the last of the Three Bishoprics, on his way. Maurice was after all an Elector; his immediate ends once gained, his interests were those of order; the wild works of Albert were a danger to every settled state. Maurice had for a moment more or less adopted the anti-ecclesiastical platform of Albert and his Mecklenburg ally, but he now abandoned it. He remembered the big dog in leash. The collar had just been slipped; the dog was still within his master's call, and was eagerly watching his master's eye. John Frederick at the Emperor's first word could soon have raised a tumult in Saxony which would have called Maurice away from Passau. He was warning the

Lutheran leaders in Augsburg and Strassburg against the Judas of Meissen; he was prepared to tamper with Maurice's captains and even with his brother Augustus. Hans of Cüstrin was ready to enter Imperial service for the bribe of slices of Saxon territory. Ferdinand and Maximilian, if pressed too hard, might easily invade the Electorate from Bohemia. Maurice, in fact, dared not alienate the middle party; he could only present such grievances, religious or constitutional, as would command their sympathy; it would be enough if he could obtain a permanent guarantee for the position won in the recent campaign.

The demands of Maurice were grouped under three heads. Of these the first was merely of temporary interest. The release of Philip of Hesse was practically conceded, the only question being the precise moment at which the insurgents should lay down their arms and Philip be set free. Then followed the all-important discussion on religion. Maurice rightly assumed that a Council under Papal supremacy was doomed to failure. He rejected a settlement by the diet, because in the College of Princes the Catholics had voting power out of all proportion to material strength. The only alternative therefore was a national congress in which both creeds should be fairly represented. Neither party would openly surrender the hope of ultimate unity, yet in their heart of hearts the Catholics felt that peace was even more desirable than uniformity. Even the bishops and the house of Bavaria were at last convinced that the Pope and France would thwart any Imperial attempt to combat heresy. Protestant aggressors and Catholic mediators were therefore alike agreed that peace must be independent of religious concord. The raids of Albert Alcibiades had done this much service, that they

had converted the uttermost obstructives to the merits of some form of toleration. The peace, however, that Maurice demanded was limitless in time but not in space. He, like Luther, would not insist on the extension of toleration to states not yet Lutheran, for such insistence would have sacrificed the sympathy of the existing Catholic states.

The constitutional demands were ushered in by protests against the presence of foreign soldiery and the employment of foreign ministers, to whom even the seal of the Empire was entrusted. Charles, it was said, had summoned diets too frequently, and had kept them too long in session. It was complained that the Electors had not received due consideration in the conferment of fiefs and offices; their special meetings had been neglected, and when the opinion of their College had differed from that of the Princes, Charles had listened rather to the latter; he had preferred a general committee of the diet to the constitutional usage of separate committees of each College: he had even threatened the electoral rights by the introduction of hereditary monarchy. A more general grievance was the prohibition of foreign service, for the princes claimed the right of serving a foreign power even against the Emperor and his hereditary estates. The Imperial Chamber had been unconstitutionally composed, and its jurisdiction improperly extended to electoral and princely territories; it had acted as a court of appeal in contravention of the Golden Bull. Charles was accused of making audience difficult and costly; he had been rude in his rejection of petitions, had insulted the princes by stamping their arms upon the captured artillery which he had removed from Germany, had granted his *imprimatur* to the book of Luis de Avila, who, in his work upon the War of

Schmalkalde, had characterised the Germans as an ignoble and unmanly nation of barbarians. Albert Alcibiades, whom Avila had rightly accused of carelessness in allowing himself to be surprised at Rochlitz, had already thundered in his manifesto against the lying Spanish arch-knave.

In addition to these general grievances Maurice formulated his own demands. He asked for the bishopric of Münster for one of his Hessian brothers-in-law, and for himself the peaceful possession of the ecclesiastical territories and jurisdictions which he had occupied, or in other words the virtual secularisation of the Church in North Germany. His third demand was singularly characteristic of the movement for German liberty. Charles must pledge himself not to give full freedom to John Frederick. Yet the programme had been the liberation of German princes and full indemnity for all concerned in the past and present war! The one prince excepted should be the most honourable and disinterested of all the combatants, whom even Spaniards reverenced, whom the Emperor himself had learned to honour!

Maurice's demands were embodied in a treaty which the mediatory princes sent to Villach for the Emperor's signature. Charles took full advantage of his constitutional position to criticise the proposals clause by clause. The correspondence shows him in a new light as a dialectic fencer of no mean merit. He argued that religion was a matter of honour and conscience, and he could not of his absolute authority annul the decisions of recent diets; the common interest must be discussed in the common assembly; whatever the diet decided he would loyally accept, and meanwhile all judicial measures involving force should be suspended. In a

letter to Mary he stated his position on this subject very clearly, telling her that surprise was expressed at his refusing concessions which he had virtually granted at Regensburg and Speyer; but these, he rightly argued, were temporary measures, whereas the present demands entailed, possibly or probably, a permanent schism in the Church.

Charles had little trouble in proving that the liberty of entering foreign service was against the interests of all Germany, and even of all Christianity, for the service of France was virtually that of the Turk; it was a shameless claim that the princes should be authorised to serve even against their lord the Emperor. The constitutional questions were, he argued, for the diet's decision and not his own; any reform which the diet suggested he would carefully consider. He complained that those very princes who accused him of absolutism had been the first, in their own interest, to invoke his absolute authority: he had already promised an Aulic Council to be composed of Germans, and he would do his best to dispense with foreign troops, but to these foreign troops Maurice owed his electorate, and had besought the Emperor to send them to his aid: if the diets were unduly long, this was due to the princes' banquetings, which left them unfit for business: the aim of the Electors was to establish an oligarchy at the expense of both Emperor and the other Estates. Long before this Charles had deputed Arras to make apologies for Avila, a mere gentleman *de courte robe*, who, in relating his personal experiences of the war, had shown a passionate preference for his countrymen; after all, he had only done as every one else, as could be seen by what the Germans themselves and all other nations read in their own histories: Maurice had certainly no reason to

complain, for Don Luis had mentioned him in the most handsome terms.

Full as was the Emperor's reply of constitutional truth, of common sense, and even of cynical humour, it was not likely to find favour with the congress. Ferdinand, supported by the neutral princes and by Charles's own representatives, Rye and Seld, implored him to accept the treaty as it stood. But Charles stood by his amendments. Maurice, he wrote, was not the constitutional accuser and judge, while acceptance of the proposals would be dangerous for the Emperor and his successors,—"if the Imperial authority must be lost, I should not like the loss to be in my reign." Ferdinand was informed that, if he persisted, Charles would give him full powers to decide, but he would not himself be responsible, and would reserve his right to tear the disgraceful compromise in shreds. "I am resolved, rather than burden my conscience, to seek my foes with such forces as I can collect, and, if I cannot raise enough to fight them with any prospect of success, I would rather leave Germany for Italy and Flanders, and see if the mediatory powers could or would do better, for I will not bind myself to leave the religious question without a remedy for ever."

A Venetian envoy in these later years notices the increased obstinacy and the growing scruples of the Emperor. Charles had often, amid much temptation, clung to constitutional forms; and virtues, like vices, grow upon men in their declining health, especially when the virtue or the vice gives pretext for postponement. It is probable that he was in earnest when he protested that resolutions, solemnly passed in a diet, could only be revoked therein. But ethical and political considerations were undoubtedly intermingled. It must

be admitted that in a diet lay the Emperor's best chance. He might still in the main rely on the Catholic majority in the College of Princes, upon the conservatism of the Elector of Brandenburg; and what if he let loose the "born Elector" of Saxony, and so rallied to the Imperial standard the whole forces of orthodox Lutheranism against the Judas who had sold his Lord?

A diet implied time, and Charles still believed in the friendliness of time, for he was feverishly arming. Thus when Ferdinand personally went to Villach, and with streaming eyes implored his brother not to ruin the whole house of Habsburg, Charles stood firm. Against all expectation he had his way. Maurice was not personally much affected by the amendments on which the Emperor insisted, and he could now prove to the neutral powers that Charles was the main obstacle to peace. He returned to the camp of his allies with the amended articles. The confederates broke their strength against the walls of Frankfurt, losing George of Mecklenburg, the hero of the storm of Ehrenberg. They were then content to accept the treaty, which was thus concluded. Albert Alcibiades, indeed, pursued his independent course of rapine through Franconia to the Rhine, and thence into Lorraine, but Maurice, according to his promise, joined in Ferdinand's Hungarian campaign. Philip of Hesse was released, while John Frederick agreed to abide by the treaty of Wittenberg, and thus left Maurice in the enjoyment of his Electorate. The religious and constitutional settlement was left for the next diet, but this, owing to renewed disorders, was long in coming, and when it came, the Emperor took no part.

The flight from Innsbruck was so dramatic, the Emperor's personal humiliation so deep, as to create

an exaggerated impression of the completeness of his opponent's triumph. Charles, after all, had not been taken, nor yet driven into malcontent Italy. At Villach he was within easy reach of reinforcements, either from the hereditary provinces, or from Lombardy, where the close of the war of Parma placed his Italian forces at his disposal. Maurice's very triumph had freed the Emperor from the Council of Trent, which had long embarrassed him, but the closure of which he had hesitated to propose. In Germany his persistence in amending the treaty of Passau, combined with the strenuous defence of loyal Frankfurt, had left him with the honours both military and diplomatic. He had shown something of his old skill in dividing his Lutheran enemies. The Ernestine line of Saxony had first been won, and then the stout Protestant Hans of Cüstrin. The enforced moderation of Maurice had disgusted William of Hesse and John Albert of Mecklenburg, although their weakness compelled them to concur. Not only was Maurice induced to fight for the Habsburg cause in Hungary, but he was soon to be the declared enemy of his most dangerous ally, Albert Alcibiades. Above all, profound distrust divided the French king from his German confederates. Albert, to prove that a German could still be a faithful, honourable gentleman, forced the unfortunate cities of the Rhineland to recognise French suzerainty; but the French king was none too willing to provide a kennel for this hell-hound of war.

Although Charles had found little or no active support, no other German prince had openly befriended the original confederates. Christopher of Württemberg had, while professing loyalty, secretly sent a subsidy to the rebels, but this might be regarded as blackmail. It was much that both the Catholic and Protestant lines of

Bavaria had, despite great temptation, stood neutral in the hour of the Habsburgs' extremest need. This need moreover had reunited the Imperial family. Charles and Mary no longer doubted of Ferdinand's loyalty, though rubs there might still be in plenty. The concessions to which Charles had been forced were in truth considerable. It was, however, more gain than loss to be rid of his inconvenient Saxon and Hessian prisoners. Of these he had made the one his friend, while the other, with hair grey and spirit broken, was henceforth a votary of the quiet life. On no important question of principle had Charles committed himself. He had now made under compulsion engagements which he had more than once voluntarily conceded. He might now be finally convinced of the impossibility of his policy of comprehension, but he had once more shown no mean skill in the devices of division and suspension, and these expedients found their necessary complement in his faith and staying power.

The enforced exertion of the rapid flight from Innsbruck shook off the Emperor's languor, and restored his old energy and courage. He had really no wish for peace; all that he craved was time. He vigorously prepared for war, despatching urgent expresses to Philip to beg for men and money, vowing that he would drain Naples, Sicily and the Netherlands of their resources. Little reliance could be placed on German troops, but the Spanish and Italian forces in Lombardy were on the march. As regiments gathered round him, he became once more the active, enterprising soldier. No forgiveness for Maurice was intended, but the immediate enemy was France, the immediate aim the lost bulwark of Lorraine.

Everywhere the French had taken advantage of the

Emperor's misfortunes. Mary wrote in July 1552 that she had taken sufficient measures to protect Luxemburg and Hainault, but she doubted the loyalty of Liège: she could not put heart into officers or men: their defence was so weak that she could not feel sure of the strongest place, while not a single general was fit to lead the feeble forces which she possessed. The Regent concluded that it must be a divine punishment that her soldiers should serve so ill. She assured Charles that, if the absolutely necessary peace were not concluded, she should throw all her troops into two strong places, with herself in one and her few good officers in the other. Meanwhile Gonzaga could make no head against the French in Piedmont. Siena rose against the garrison of the new fortress, and the French were believed to have pulled the wires. The Turkish fleet ravaged the Neapolitan coasts, capturing several of Doria's galleys which were transporting troops. The Pope showed unfriendly indifference, while Cardinals spoke shamelessly of the Turkish squadron as "our fleet."

Charles had one more great moment. Marching through Tyrol in August 1552, he entered Augsburg, where he once again overthrew the democratic government although he allowed the Lutherans to continue preaching. If at Augsburg all was terror at the Emperor's approach, at loyal Ulm there was popular rejoicing. Charles was met by a procession outside the city, which he entered in high good humour, laughing heartily. He was presented with a cup containing a thousand gold gulden, with two waggon-loads of oats and fish, and six fat oxen "of those which the enemy had meant to carry off." The donors apologised for the destruction of all the game in the city territories. When Ulm was left, Alba and Albert Alcibiades raced

for Strassburg bridge, but the Spaniard was the nimbler. Charles entered the strongest and boldest town in Germany, and personally was well received. Tradesmen, however, refused to sell to Spanish soldiers, and Spaniard was a term of abuse applied indifferently to all the Emperor's South European followers.

At Ulm it had been decided to march for the Netherlands. There seems to have been some idea of first attacking Albert Alcibiades, who was now put to the ban, but the wild marauder had taken refuge in France, and thus the home and the foreign enemies were combined. From Strassburg the route lay by way of Hagenau to Landau, Charles marching in advance with 500 horse and a regiment of *lanzknechts*. At Landau a violent attack of gout caused a fatal delay of seventeen days. His health was not yet equal to his spirit. On leaving Carinthia he was described as looking thin and white; his eyes were deep set and his beard snow-white; he could not walk without the aid of a stick and a friendly arm. Now the gout was his master, and poverty was the ally of gout. Mary had sent him a remittance, but warned him to expect no more. She had advised her brother to suspend the campaign until the spring, and quarter his troops in Lorraine and Trier to punish the population for their French sympathies. Later, however, on hearing that there was a genuine desire for peace in France and great lack of money, she thought that immediate action might quicken negotiation. Under any circumstances Charles could not pay his troops throughout the winter, and thus, late as it was, he decided to besiege Metz, the key of Lorraine and Champagne.[1]

[1] See H. C. J. Griessdorf, *Der Zug Kaiser Karls V gegen Metz* (*Hallische Abhandl. zur neueren Ges.* xxvi. 1891); F.M. Chabert, *Journal du siège de Metz*

The objective was right, but the time was wrong. Not until October 13 did Charles join Alba in the neighbourhood of Metz, and then only to retire to Diedenhofen to nurse a fresh attack of gout. The siege did not really open until October 31. This delay had given the Duke of Guise two months and a half in which to complete his preparations. The town was by now strongly fortified and admirably provisioned. Some seven-eighths of the inhabitants had been sent away. All convents and other buildings without the walls, which might afford cover to the besiegers, had been demolished. The garrison numbered 10,000 men, and was cheered by the presence of numerous young nobles, full of fight and fun. In the field a large force was preparing to endanger the Emperor's communications.

To this relieving force Alba's attention was first directed, and with marked success. Albert Alcibiades, endangered by the Imperial advance, had offered his troops to France. His demands were exorbitant, and his troopers a terror to the country-side. The French mistrusted him, and were even preparing to disarm him by the seduction of his troops. At this moment Alba skilfully contrived an understanding with the arch-rebel, who, as he confessed, "would some day have to pay for all the broken crockery." The Hohenzollern, flouted by his late allies, secured retreat from his predicament by beating and capturing Aumale, their general, and brought him to the Imperial camp as an earnest of future service.

In making his peace with Albert Alcibiades Charles was dominated by military considerations, but it was a political mistake, which lost him such favour as he still possessed in Germany. He had secured a tolerable

en 1552, 1856, and *Bref discours du siège de Metz* (from the French side) in Cimber and Danjou's *Archives curieuses*, 1st series, vol. iii.

captain, and a valuable reinforcement of seasoned troops, but he sacrificed the support of the Catholic princes and the Protestant towns. He had quashed his own decision against the legality of the terms which Albert had extorted from the Bishops of Würzburg and Bamberg, and this was rightly thought disreputable. The Emperor was no longer the guardian of peace, but the aider and abettor of the most unscrupulous robber that recent German history had known. He felt his own shame acutely. "God knows," he wrote to Mary, "what I feel at seeing myself at such a pass as to treat with the said Marquis, as I am doing; but necessity knows no law."

Albert's 3000 horse and 15,000 foot enabled the Imperialists to complete the blockade of Metz. He was quartered on the left bank of the Mosel, while the main attack was directed from Magny on the south. The whole besieging force is said to have numbered 75,000 men. Nevertheless the siege made little progress. Discipline was undermined by dissension between the nations. Spaniards and Netherlanders already hated each other, while Germans and Bohemians were on ill terms with Spaniards and Italians. Charles had been warned against giving the command to Alba, whose dispositions Egmont and Hans of Cüstrin now criticised or set at naught. The arrival of Charles on November 20 gave some spirit to the camp. He was able to mount his Neapolitan horse, and rode round the lines speaking kindly to the men who had distinguished themselves, and even shaking Albert Alcibiades by the hand. After reconnoitring with Alba, he changed the direction of the main attack, which, however, cost precious time. The bombardment was very successful, but Guise met it by an inner line of earthworks.

There was nothing left but to storm the town, but the generals did not like the task. Charles afterwards gave as the excuse the depth of the trench and the earthworks behind it. Alba wrote to a friend that his master was very angry at the hesitation; when he was carried to see the breach he cried, "Why in the name of wonder won't the men storm the place? The breach is big enough and level with the trench; what more then, in God's name, do you want?" Alba replied that Guise was well known to have built an inner rampart lined with countless guns, which must deal destruction to any army. "But why the devil," rejoined the Emperor, "have you not made a try? I see very well that I have no real men left. I must take leave of the world and get me to a monastery, for I am betrayed, or at least as badly served as no other king can be. But, by God, before three years are out, I make myself a monk."

The French now were gathering in force and attacking convoys. Vieilleville, from Toul, fell upon Pont-à-Mousson, which caused another outburst from Charles against the careless, cowardly troops, who would not anticipate such attacks, and had no regard for his honour or his service. A feeble attempt at mining only gave occasion to Guise's sarcastic offer to lend the Emperor a thousand well-trained sappers. The weather had been cruelly cold and wet from October to December. Pay and food were falling short. The men were deserting, or dying of dysentery in the swamps of the Mosel; his very doctors were unable to heal themselves. The capable Italian general, Marignano, wrote early in December that failure was certain, but that all was done solely at the Emperor's instance, rather from a certain hardness of opinion, which might be called obstinacy, than from any hope of taking Metz. When Charles was

told that his men were starving and dying, he exclaimed passionately that he wanted the city and not advice: let his generals provide the supplies that were lacking and hire transport for the soldiers: before Metz he meant to stay until he had the town; he knew that there were difficulties, but without difficulty there was no victory.

Charles had shown all his old soldier-like indifference to danger and discomfort, but in vain. By Christmas his obstinacy began to yield. His own health could not stand a diet of two or three eggs a day, supplemented only by repeated draughts of beer. Maurice had suddenly returned from the Turkish campaign to Saxony. Henry II. was known to be tempting the German princes. In Italy there was trouble at Siena and danger for Naples. By the capture of Hesdin the Netherlands were laid bare to a French attack. Thus it was that on New Year's day the siege was raised. The besieging army had dwindled to nearly half its number, but at least the retreat was effected in good order, Albert Alcibiades covering the retirement of the guns, which were brought off without loss.

As to the responsibility for the great failure there was much mutual recrimination. Albert Alcibiades and the Germans blamed Alba and his wish to spare his Spaniards. Alba attacked the Netherland general of artillery. During the last stages of the siege the factions, which were raging among the Imperialist ministers in Italy, infected the camp; Alba and the Bishop of Arras renewed the quarrels of Toledo and Mendoza. But the chief responsibility must rest with Charles. He showed all the obstinacy of a man who had formed a resolve with infinite difficulty. It was madness to expose Spaniards and Italians to a siege begun only at the opening of winter. It was a repetition of the error

which caused the disaster before Algiers, but it had less justification. The Emperor's own excuse was that he could not disband the army raised at such cost without effecting something: sooner than this he preferred to trust to God and try his fortune. Fortune, in his own words, had proved a jade; she had deserted the old Emperor to smile on the young king.

When the excitement of the retreat from Metz was over, the Emperor's gout reappeared, and with it his languor and irritability. His dislike for business became so intense that he would drive his councillors from his room; at times he would not see his sister. It is said that he had to be carried through Brussels in an open litter to prove that he was not actually dead. All the ambassadors who were admitted to audience dwell on his pitiable condition. The English envoy Morosyne, at the end of January 1553, had never seen him so nigh gone, never so dead in his face, his hand never so lean, pale and wan; his eyes that were wont to be full of life, when all the rest had yielded to sickness, were then heavy and dull and as nigh death in their look as ever he saw any. Four months later there was little improvement. "He is so weak and pale as to seem a very unlike man to continue. He covets to sit up and to walk, and is sometimes led between two, with a staff also in his hand, but like as he desires to be thus afoot, so immediately after he has been a little up, he must be laid down again, and feels himself so cold, as by no means he can attain any heat." Morosyne did not think that Charles would want an ambassador much longer: few could oppose more energetic resistance to the blows of fortune, but the best nature had its limits.

Nevertheless the Emperor's fighting days were not quite over, and Fortune would still smile over her

shoulder at her once successful suitor. The war with France was now being fought to its finish on the Netherland frontiers. The capture of Térouenne, "one of the two pillows on which the king of France could sleep in peace," was a brilliant feat of arms. It was suddenly attacked in April 1553, and, in spite of its garrison of 3000 men and the neighbourhood of Vendôme with a large force, it capitulated in June, and with it the Constable Montmorenci's eldest son. The siege cost the life of de Rœulx, one of the Emperor's trustiest servants; the credit of its conclusion was due to Ponce de Lalaing, an admirable officer when he was not drunk. Throughout the Southern Netherlands there was loud rejoicing at the fall of the hated town, and louder yet when it was levelled to the ground.

In consequence of the jealousies of the Netherland nobility the command was now entrusted to the young Prince of Savoy, Emmanuel Philibert, who in July opened his splendid career by the capture and destruction of Hesdin, which had so many times changed hands. It was a pleasant moment for the sick Emperor, for one of his earliest enemies, Robert de la Marck, Duke of Bouillon, was taken, while Orazio Farnese, who had largely contributed to the decline of his fortunes, met his death. These reverses brought Henry II. into the field. He marched upon Cambrai, where, owing to the misconduct and mutiny of the Spanish troops, disaffection was known to be rife. The Netherlanders were grumbling at Charles's neglect, so in spite of health he left Brussels on August 30 to join the army, and was actually in sight of the French force near Mons, when the king retreated and both armies were disbanded for the winter.

Throughout 1554 peace was in the air, but the

Emperor's difficulties in Italy made the French terms impracticable. Their forces were now pushing their way down the valley of the Meuse, taking the new fortress of Marienbourg, and the two historic rivals Dinant and Bouvines. To meet this advance, Charlemont and Philippeville were built in the territory of Liège. Here it was that young William of Orange succeeded the fighting veteran Martin van Rossem in the command. The careers of the two men form a striking contrast. The latter had fought, and brilliantly fought, during long years for the independence of Guelders. When fortune turned against his province, he frankly accepted the situation, and commanded the Imperial forces against his old allies with equal energy and success. He was a mercenary leader of the best type, owing promotion to ability alone, and faithful as long as fidelity could serve his employer's interest. Orange, at no time a soldier of talent, owed his early advancement to a happy bequest, a lucrative marriage and the Emperor's personal affection; his future fidelity, capacity and fame were to be of quite a different type from those of the ubiquitous, hard-hitting Gueldrian, who would, perhaps, have made short work of Philip II.'s scanty forces.

For the last time in his life Charles was in the field. The French advanced against Namur, and the Emperor, setting all counsel and entreaty at defiance, led his army at great risk to cover this strategic point. Mason, writing from Brussels to Petre, augured ill of "this headiness which had often put Charles to great hindrance, specially at Metz, and another time at Algiers." Henry II., finding his progress blocked, retired to besiege Renti, but, after a battle or a skirmish in which both sides claimed the victory, decently retreated. The inde-

cisive, straggling war practically ended, with a devastating raid on Picardy, in which Charles was not personally engaged. Mason's criticism and foreboding had turned into panegyric on the Emperor's "unconquered courage and skilfulness in entering Namur, a town of no strength, but commodious for the letting of the enemy's purpose, against the advice and persuasion of all his captains." The accident of Metz has cast an ugly shadow over the close of Charles's military career. But he did not easily recognise defeat. The campaigns of the two succeeding years did him no discredit; they were the prelude to the victories of Saint-Quentin and Gravelines, the very news of which made the veteran's pulses beat again in the peace of distant Yuste.

CHAPTER XI

Negotiations for the marriage of Philip and Mary—The elements of opposition to the alliance—Its importance to the Netherlands—The last events of the reign in Italy—The belief of Charles in fortresses—His relations with Siena—Imprudent conduct of Diego de Mendoza—Troubles at Siena—Policy of Cosimo de' Medici—Disgrace of Mendoza and Ferrante Gonzaga—Revolt of Siena aided by France and Piero Strozzi—Events of the Sienese war—French attack on Corsica—Character of the Emperor's rule in Italy—Measure of his responsibility for Italian decadence—Results of the failure of the siege of Metz on Germany—Suspicions of an understanding between Charles and Albert Alcibiades of Culmbach—The defeat of Albert Alcibiades and death of Maurice at Sievershausen—The Emperor's instructions for the diet of Augsburg—His withdrawal from German politics—His failure in Germany.

THE political events of the years 1553 and 1554 will carry the memory back to those of the earliest period of the Emperor's reign. In 1521 Charles was fighting, somewhat against hope, for the defence of the Netherlands and the possession of Lombardy, when the immediate pressure was lightened by the sudden alliance of England. So also in 1553 an English alliance served to relax the tension at the moment when he was personally protecting his Netherland provinces, while his generals were striving to keep the French from Lombardy. In the first case his own projected marriage with Mary Tudor may be called a complimentary consequence of the treaty; in the second the alliance was to be the outcome of the marriage of the self-same princess to his son.

On the evening of July 6, 1553, the last male Tudor ceased to live. Charles saw his opportunity: like a true Habsburg he looked not only to arms but to wedlock for the defence of his territories, the widening of his influence. Almost before the breath had left the body of Edward VI., he determined that Philip should marry Mary.[1] He shook off his sloth and indifference, entering into the new project with all a lover's eagerness. It was, indeed, suggested that his own suit would best please his cousin. His enthusiasm for the English alliance did not reach as far as this, and he politely waived his privilege in favour of his son. "If we were of suitable age and health," he wrote on September 20, 1553, to Simon Renard, his ambassador in England, "and if we thought that it would redound to her advantage, there is no other alliance in the world that we should prefer to a marriage with the Queen. Our health is, however, such that, coupled with our age, it would seem a very poor compliment to offer our own person, nor do we see that it would be in any way of service to her interests. You know moreover the determination which we long ago formed, to remain in our present condition, and, even had we not formed it, our health would constrain us to it."

So eager was Charles for the English marriage that he risked the displeasure of Portugal, and sacrificed a fresh link with the sister Iberian state. Negotiations were at this moment far advanced for the marriage of Philip with Queen Eleanor's daughter Mary, whom she had left in Portugal. Though the Emperor would not force his son's matrimonial inclinations, he strongly pressed the substitution of the English Queen, for the

[1] Many documents relating to this marriage may be found in *Collection des voyages des souverains des Pays Bas*, by MM. Gachard and Piot, vol. iv. 1847.

Portuguese princess. Arras informed Renard that Philip had been instructed to congratulate the former upon her accession, and advised that the message should be "composed in fatter or thinner terms" in proportion to his liking for the marriage. The royal family of Portugal had become so attenuated that it was a real sacrifice to the ruler of Spain to abandon any marriage which might strengthen the monopoly of all possible routes to the long-coveted succession. Nor was this change of purpose the only slight to Portugal. The Infant Luis was himself a candidate for Mary Tudor's hand, but Charles deceitfully detained his envoy in the Netherlands until Philip's suit had been practically accepted. The Emperor gave his daughter Juana as a sop to soothe the disappointed suitor, who scarcely lived long enough to appreciate the full advantage of his disappointment. Sensitive Portugal did not forget the double slight, which created a sense of sympathy with France during the current and the future wars.

The attempt to supplant Mary in favour of the Protestant succession was brushed aside more easily than Charles had expected. He had, indeed, thought the proclamation of her accession, when she was a fugitive and her enemy in possession of the government, an act of perilous audacity. Nor did he consider the danger over with the fall of Northumberland. Nothing seemed more certain than that the nation would insist that Mary should choose an English husband, whether Courtenay or another. If the national wish were thwarted, Mary might once more find a rival in either her half-sister Elizabeth or in Mary Stuart, the one possessing a large share of English favour, the other backed by all the power of France and Scotland. Charles was well aware that there were three elements of opposition to the

Spanish marriage,—Protestantism, English insularity and French intrigue. It is true that the second and third seemed incompatible, but the first was often found in combination with the second, while the Protestant extremists in their passion for mastery threw patriotism to the winds. Hence it was Charles's constant aim to keep these three elements apart by respecting national sentiment and custom, by avoidance of irritation to religious nonconformity, by the representation that Imperial aid alone could save the distracted and bankrupt government from the two national enemies, France and Scotland.

As Northumberland had relied upon French assistance to set aside Mary's succession, it was natural enough that the Queen, even apart from her close relationship, should look for support to the enemy of France. Mary's inclinations were in this respect by no means shared by the majority of her people, to whose general sympathy she had owed her throne. Charles was well aware of this, and in treading the intricate path which led to his son's marriage he walked more warily than the Queen herself. The advice which he gave to her in the first months of her reign well illustrates the religious opportunism which he could adopt at times, while the respect for parliamentary institutions, almost inborn in him, was of peculiar value in dealing with the English people at this crisis. Northumberland, the ally of France, might force his will upon the nation by letters-patent of a dying king, not yet of age, framed in defiance of an Act of Parliament, and completed by the exercise of threats on protesting judges and reluctant councillors. The Emperor would have his cousin throw herself upon her people, lawfully represented in its Parliament full and free: her tolerance must give the lie to the Protestant

preachers, who in Northumberland's cause had thundered that the true religion was at stake. From the very first Charles counselled Mary to be above all "a good Englishwoman." He warned her not to hurry on religious changes, but to conform to the decision of her Parliament: without the advice of the chief men of her realm and of Parliament she should take no public measures, although, to avoid doing violence to her conscience and religion, she might hear mass privately in her room. He dissuaded her from her mad resolve to bury her brother with full Catholic rites, forbidden by the law of the land: for a heretic a heretic funeral were good enough. To Parliament Mary was urged to leave all its accustomed authority, and to summon a full house instead of a committee of selected deputies, which had been the recent practice of Northumberland.

In spite of all his pains Charles did not wholly succeed in keeping distinct the three elements of opposition. They were blended in Wyatt's rebellion, although the national dislike to the Spanish marriage was here predominant. This predominance turned, however, to the Emperor's advantage, for as it had mainly caused the rising, so Wyatt's failure quelled all open opposition to Philip's cause. Nevertheless Charles was still cautious, and especially on the score of religion. He impressed upon Renard in April 1554 that he should moderate the Chancellor's zeal for the Catholic faith, and that he should confine the operations of the coming Parliament to the marriage question, for if that of religion were once introduced, those who disliked the marriage, but did not dare openly oppose it, would strive to tack it to religion, and by this means court popular support. Even after Philip was wedded and bedded, Charles through Renard earnestly advised his son to check the

haste with which barbarous punishments were being inflicted on those whom time and kindness would convert. Mary's untimely zeal was causing Elizabeth to become the pivot of discontent. The Emperor would at once satisfy and secure the princess by settling the succession, and by marrying her out of England to the Duke of Savoy—by bringing, that is, Elizabeth also into the charmed circle of Habsburg wedlock.

The utmost had been done to reconcile English opinion to a foreign king. The order of succession was fixed in favour of England rather than of Spain. Solemn engagements were made that no foreigner should intervene in the English government. In the marriage treaty every suggestion made from England had been accepted. Stringent instructions were issued that the troops and sailors sent as a precaution against a French attack should not be allowed to land. While Mary was cajoled by the prospect that Philip's power would overawe internal discontent, Charles flattered English pride by showing that the Spanish and Netherland alliance would conduce to the recovery of Guyenne, perhaps even to that of the French Crown.

The English marriage was eminently a matter of Netherland interest. Charles, in pushing it in the Provinces, dwelt much less on the restoration of England to Catholicism than on the security of the Netherlands and England against France. His views were expressed in a paper prepared for his Council on November 25, 1553. It is noticeable that the scheme for the separation of the Netherlands from the Spanish connection once more reappears, but they were now to form not a Valois-Habsburg neutral state to propitiate France, but a Habsburg-Tudor combination to defy her. If Philip's marriage proved fruitful, Charles advised that the

Netherlands with England should form a common inheritance, whilst the Spanish and Italian possessions should be the lot of Philip's heirs by his first marriage. This would secure both England and the Netherlands from French attack, and exclude France from the Ocean, to the great advantage of the commerce on which the prosperity of the provinces was founded. The French had always felt the salutary effects of the union of Charles's forces with those of England: how much then could be hoped, if all were under the control of a single prince undistracted by that divergence of private interests to which confederates, however closely tied, were liable? If after all there should be no heir, the personal union would at least be valuable while it lasted, for Spain by means of England could supply the support which the Netherlands might need. The union would indeed be a curb on France, and this not only in self-defence, for active measures might even be devised for bringing her to reason.

Thus the reign ended, as it had begun, in the old Anglo-Burgundian-Spanish alliance, which the marriage of Catherine to Henry Tudor had been intended to cement. By the union of Mary Tudor to his son Charles made amends for his seeming neglect of the sorrows of his Spanish aunt, and furthered the connection of the Netherlands with a power less alien than either France or Spain.

Before Charles set forth for the siege of Metz, a fresh war broke out in Central Italy which was to outlast his reign. As the war of Parma closely connects itself with Maurice's rebellion, so is that of Siena intimately linked with the last conflict of the Emperor against the French. If Ferrante Gonzaga forced Ottavio Farnese into hostility, so did Diego de Mendoza provoke the rebellion of

Siena against Imperial rule. In neither case, however, was Charles blameless, and in the latter Mendoza was but clumsily carrying into execution a favourite principle of his master.

The value of fortresses had been in Italy a fruitful subject of discussion. Machiavelli had insisted that they were useless or dangerous to a ruler. Guicciardini controverted this view, and it is of interest to note that the practice of Charles corresponded with the maxims, not of the political thinker, but of the statesman. When Milan was restored to Francesco Sforza, its citadel and that of Como were at first retained. After the death of Alessandro de' Medici Charles reserved the fortresses of Florence, Pisa and Leghorn, only ceding them to Cosimo in 1543 in return for a subsidy for the campaign in Guelders. When the French had overrun the greater part of Piedmont, Charles took the remaining fortresses out of his brother-in-law's custody, and it was not, perhaps, entirely without reason that the Duke of Savoy rudely refused him admittance to the citadel of Nice in 1538. He was, again, sincerely anxious to build a fortress at Genoa, although he refused to deprive the city of her liberty. A little later Spanish garrisons are found at Piombino and in the Sienese port of Orbetello. Finally it was the erection of a fortress which was the immediate cause of the rebellion of Siena.

Machiavelli's objections had been urged against the use of fortresses as a means of curbing the ruler's subjects. Charles more often had an external than an internal foe in view. As a rule he was prepared to grant internal independence to the Italian states, while retaining some military control. This, if their weakness be considered, was not inexcusable. Yet a new fortress is a staring, uncompromising object which makes foreign

dominion disagreeably obvious. At Siena, moreover, the citadel was mainly intended to overawe the town, although it is true that this necessity was caused by the chronic civic factions which ceaselessly tempted foreign intervention.

After the compromise which Cosimo had effected in September 1547, the small Spanish garrison returned to Siena. In his instructions to Philip of January 1548 Charles spoke with confidence of the loyalty of Siena to the Empire of which she was a member: he believed that in the interest of her own liberty she would oppose any movements which might disturb the peace of Italy. Mendoza received a magnificent reception as the Emperor's representative, and had he there and then executed all his drastic measures, he might very possibly have succeeded. Instead of this, for nearly five years he kept renewing irritation. In 1548 he restored the nobles to their due share in the magistracy, and ordained that the Emperor's representative should nominate half the members of the Council of Forty. Next year he disarmed the people, and told them of the Emperor's intention to build a fortress, aggravating the popular anger by a faked petition in its favour. Exasperating as this policy was, it was not effective, for Mendoza was frequently absent, and the citadel made little progress; in the anxious autumn of 1551 Charles himself was urging speed. Cosimo was no friend to Mendoza; he feared the effects of the war of Parma and Sienese disaffection on Florentine exiles and malcontents; his natural desire for the investiture of Piombino, in return for his large expenditure on its guardianship, was thwarted by Mendoza's wish to marry the young lord Appiano to his own niece. His earnest warnings to Charles on impending danger

were ascribed to interested motives, and receive no due attention.

In the spring of 1552, at Chioggia near Venice, the plot for the rebellion of Siena was concocted. The French ambassador de Selve, the Cardinal of Ferrara, the Neapolitan prince Ferrante Sanseverino, Orazio Farnese, Niccolò Orsini of Pitigliano, the exiled Strozzi, were all included in the scheme; it was the supreme effort to which the old French party in Italy braced itself. The opportunity was good. Mendoza was absent from Siena; Naples was threatened by the Turks; Gonzaga was fully occupied in Piedmont. Maurice's success in Tyrol seemed to render success assured. On the night of July 17 a force of French and Italians under de Lansac and the Sienese nobleman Æneas Piccolomini surprised Siena from the south; the citizens fraternised to the cry of "France and Victory." Cosimo alone was on the alert. He had hurried up a handful of troops, but the Spanish garrison had no supplies and was forced to capitulate. Through Cosimo's mediation, it was agreed that Siena should be free under Imperial protection, and that no foreign forces should have entrance. De Lansac made over the citadel to the townspeople, who, with pick in hand and olive wreath on head, made short work of the walls that had been so long a-building. This festal scene was on August 5, 1552, three days later than the convention of Passau.

After the storm there was a long year's lull. Cosimo made a secret treaty of neutrality with the French, and did all in his power to reassure the Sienese. He was, however, in close relations with Charles V., and was probably acting as *agent provocateur* in Siena. French troops, recently engaged at Parma and Mirandola, were marched through Tuscany to Siena; the town was being

strongly fortified and garrisoned from every anti-Imperialist source; the Cardinal of Ferrara undertook the administration, virtually as French governor. The convention of August was broken beyond all repair. In January 1553 Garcia de Toledo marched his troops from Naples to Cortona on the Tuscan-Sienese borders, while the viceroy landed at Leghorn. But Cosimo, though he lent guns and forbade passage to French reinforcements, was still all for peace, and the Pope was working with him. The viceroy of Naples died at Florence; his son was recalled by a threatened attack at home. The peace policy seemed to have prevailed in Italy. Diego de Mendoza was recalled in disgrace, and though Gonzaga was more tenderly treated, his authority was at end. The proconsuls had ceased to prance, and Imperial interests were ambling along with Cosimo. He at length received his reward in the cession of Piombino and Elba under a deed of mortgage. Italy was dozing, with the exception of Siena, which never slept; the dreams of the high-living Cardinal of Ferrara were as troubled as those of all who for centuries past had failed to administer order in the madcap city.

About the close of October 1553 Cosimo awoke refreshed. He was fully conscious that the French had found him out, but he was aware that Siena was distracted, while the effects of the failure of Charles at Metz had now worn off. On November 25 he made a secret treaty with the Emperor for the recovery of Siena. Action was absolutely necessary for both, because Piero Strozzi, after a round through Europe, was concentrating his efforts against Charles and Cosimo in Central Italy, and was agitating for revolt in Florence. On January 7, Strozzi actually entered Siena; on the 18th he left to inspect the defences of the territory; on the night

of the 26th Florentine troops made the celebrated surprise of the Porta Camollia by the aid of Chinese lanterns.[1]

It is impossible here to follow the details of this war, though the stake was really very high, and the strategy of much more interest than usual. Siena held out for fifteen months, and resistance centred in the upland town of Montalcino for four years longer. The territory has never recovered the ravages of Spaniards, French, Germans, Swiss and Italians, who marched and countermarched over every mile of it. It was a desperate struggle between Imperialists and French, between monarchy and democracy, between Medici and Strozzi. Cosimo gave the command to the Marquis of Marignano, who had served with conspicuous skill in the war of Schmalkalde and in the siege of Metz. The fortunes of Siena depended upon Piero Strozzi, his opponent on both occasions. The extraordinary mobility of the ubiquitous exile was well matched against the skill of the professional artillery general, who favoured a war of positions. Strozzi burst through the besieging lines, marched into Florentine territory, crossed the Arno west of Florence and effected his junction with reinforcements from the north. The enemy were encircling him between Pisa and Pistoia, when he slipped through the ring, and headed south towards Piombino. Here his brother Leone, who with the French galleys had been fighting off the coast, had just been killed. Piero picked up his Gascon infantry, swept round to the south of Siena and marched into the beleaguered city with 17,000 men. Leaving the Frenchman Blaise de Monluc in command, he dashed north-eastwards upon Arezzo,

[1] An excellent contemporary account of the Sienese war is given by A. Sozzini in *Arch. Stor. It.* vol. ii. 1842.

threatening to march down the Arno upon Florence. Now, however, the more deliberate artilleryman proved his master. Want of supply and the chain of fortified townships along the Chiana valley checked Strozzi's mobility. Marignano pinned him to the valley, and totally defeated him at Marciano on August 2, 1554. Strozzi, as always, escaped, but henceforth his enemy could complete his cordon round Siena at leisure, and in the following April the brave city was starved into surrender.

Although the Sienese republic was transferred with its French defenders to the hill town of Montalcino, the capture of the capital really decided the long struggle for Italy against the French. It was of the greatest moment to the close of Charles's reign, for it cleared the way to peace with France, and rendered his abdication possible. Hence for this history its importance is greater than the more famous siege of Florence in 1530. The issue of the latter was never doubtful, though unexpectedly delayed, for foreign complications were entirely absent. Fortune at Siena was not absolutely certain until the last loaf was eaten.

Siena was not the Emperor's only Italian care in these last days of rule. The Franco-Turkish fleet which had threatened the Neapolitan coasts, compelling the return of Garcia de Toledo, then raided Sardinia, attacked Piombino, ravaged Elba, and finally landed the *condottiere*, Sampiero Corso, in Corsica. Aided by French troops and companies of the anti-Imperialist party in Italy, headed by Orsini and Sanseverini, Sampiero roused the natives to a general revolt against Genoese rule. The island was offered to the French, who eagerly accepted a position commanding the route from Spain to Northern Italy, and thus neutralising

Spain's virtual possession of Genoa. The French and nationalists met with easy success at first, but the Emperor sent Spanish and German troops to the aid of the Genoese government. Three distinguished leaders, Andrea Doria, Agostino Spinola and Chiappino Vitelli, starved out the Corsican fortresses one by one, and pushed the rebels and their auxiliaries back into the mountains. The war was not absolutely decided until the treaty of Cateau Cambrésis, and even then rebellion still smouldered; but before Charles's abdication fortune had turned in favour of his Genoese allies.

It was characteristic that Charles closed his reign in conflict with a Pope. The death of Julius III. was followed by the short pontificate of Marcellus, and then in 1555 was elected the Cardinal Caraffa as Paul IV. Belonging to an old Neapolitan house with Angevin sympathies, he hated the Spanish rule, and his hate was intensified by the Emperor's opposition to his election. He at once attacked the Imperialist house of Colonna, and made a league with France for the expulsion of Charles from Naples and Milan, and of Cosimo from Florence. Before the league took practical effect, Charles abdicated, and the history of the conflict, disastrous alike to Papal and French prestige, belongs to the reign of Philip.

The abdication of Charles was no finite date in Italian history. Mirandola was still a French protectorate; a remnant of the Sienese still held out in Montalcino; there could be no safety nor settlement as long as French garrisons occupied the greater part of Piedmont. Nevertheless the end was not far off. One year after the Emperor's death saw the final settlement of Italy, which lasted to the treaty of Utrecht, and, indeed, in part to the last half-century. The settlement, but for the

investiture of his son with Milan, was much upon his earlier lines. His chief creation, the state of the younger line of Medici, received from Philip with his sanction the grant of Siena as a Spanish fief—less, indeed, the Sienese seaports, which formed the curious little dependency named the Presidi under the direct control of Spain. Piombino and the greater part of Elba were restored to the Appiani, but Cosimo retained the valuable harbour of Porto Ferraio, which added greatly to the naval importance of his state. The houses of Farnese and Gonzaga, members of the Habsburg matrimonial ring, secured the southern and eastern fringes of Lombardy. Even that of Ferrara was detached from its long French alliance. The restoration of the house of Savoy by the treaty of Cateau Cambrésis once more covered Lombardy on the west. The few posts which the French continued to hold in Piedmont, and the Marquisate of Saluzzo, seized by Henry II. in 1548, were too distant and isolated to be a danger. Venice and Genoa were still, as Petrarch called them, the two eyes of Italy, watching the eastern and the western sea, although it may be that their lustre was somewhat dimmed, and that they were strained in Habsburg rather than in Italian service.

There is a strange mixture of violence and self-restraint in Charles's relations to the Italian powers. On the one side are found the murderous attack on Pierluigi and the arbitrary acts which goaded Siena to rebellion; on the other the large measure of independence granted to the rulers of Mantua and Florence. It may be placed to his credit that, in spite of much temptation and much persuasion, he honourably maintained the autonomy of Genoa. The territorial integrity of Venice and Ferrara was respected, though Venice

had filched from Ferdinand the Friulian port of Marano, though the French proclivities of Ferrara were undisguised, though both harboured the restless refugees who sought to overthrow the Imperial government in every Italian state. This two-sided policy is not altogether inconsistent with the Emperor's character, but it was mainly due to the choice of his agents, and to the free hand which he was forced to give to them. As time went on, the loss of Gattinara was keenly felt, for he alone of Charles's intimate councillors was genuinely interested in Italy; he alone had a thorough working knowledge of its conditions; he alone could have given some sort of unity to the rulers of Milan and Naples and the Imperialist Italian princes. As it was, each of these would strive to gain the ear of some one of Charles's ministers or advisers, either Granvelle or Cobos, de Soto or Alba, and such a councillor had no more thorough conversance with Italian politics than had Charles himself. Moreover, any difference of interests and opinion among the Imperialist rulers in Italy would needs find reflection in the Emperor's Council, and thus Charles himself was at times buffeted about between two policies.

From a purely political point of view the loose federation of viceroyalties and independent states, which was the result of Charles's reign, was to prove a conspicuous success. The system was but a modification of the conditions of recent Italian history. The presence of a controlling power which held the reins, but did not saw at the mouth, and sometimes even slumbered on the box, saved Italy from the ceaseless and aimless "fidgeting" which had exhausted and unnerved her. Under the polity introduced by Charles Italy slept, save when intermittently disturbed by French alarums,

and sleep—even a somewhat sodden sleep—was needed. She had been so much belaboured that she deserved to enjoy—to use the Emperor's favourite phrase—the benefit of time. Time was for her, as for him, the healer. The alternatives, after all, were not Spanish hegemony or independence, but the hegemony of Spain or France. French administration would have been unquestionably the more intelligent, but it would also have been to the Italian character infinitely more irritating than the Spanish; the result must have been the long-drawn agony of a chronic struggle for independence, or the burial of national aspirations past hope of resurrection.

It would be unjust to ascribe mainly to the polity of Charles, or even wholly to the later influence of Spain, the economic, social and intellectual decline of Italy. The bloom had been knocked off the garden of Northern Italy by French, Swiss and Germans, before Charles began to reign, or plundering Spaniards in any number had entered through the broken fence. Milan was a mere French viceroyalty before the days of Spanish rule; her gentry and her merchants were already impoverished by the loss of a court, her looms were silenced by protective tariffs against Venice. The prosperity of Naples, though never to reach a lofty standard, revived under Pedro de Toledo. Never again until the treaty of Utrecht, save in the fever-fit of Masaniello's revolution, was she to suffer a relapse into the maladies of the once independent kingdom, the incessant civil wars, the alternate oppression of an irresponsible nobility or a grinding despotism. Under continuous Spanish sway the condition of the northern duchy and the southern kingdom was bad enough, but it might have been, or had been, infinitely worse.

The fall of Italy had been most directly due to the

lack of manhood, to the decline of the military spirit. This failing at least was remedied under Charles. The Walhalla of his armies and those of his successor would boast many a monument of Italian strategy and valour. The fault was, indeed, that militarism became excessive —that the artificial revival of Ghibellinism galvanised the Italian gentry into a combative life at the expense of the trading classes. Henceforth there was too much gentility in Italy not only of the fighting but of the idling type. The baleful ideals of the Spanish aristocracy, for which, it must be confessed, Charles had little sympathy, exercised their strange attraction upon the Italian upper classes, even as they did upon the French. Exclusiveness, idleness, love-making and gambling, when welded together by a quarrelsome sensitiveness, form a combination of qualities which in a southern nation it requires much strength of character to resist.

There was then too much gentility and too little trade. But Italian trade after all had seen its better days since Europe had turned its face westwards, and the Turk had attacked its heels. The prosperity of Milan had for some centuries been dependent on the trade of Venice—enemy as she was, and Venice was declining from causes over which Charles had actually no control—although, had he been allowed his way, he would have done his uttermost to counteract the most immediate. It is noticeable that the two states which in the coming years showed the most marked economic decline were those which were most independent of Spanish influence—Rome and Venice. To the eighteenth century, on the other hand, Genoa, whose polity Charles had stereotyped, was still extremely rich, while Tuscany has never, perhaps, enjoyed material prosperity of such long continuance as under the dynasty which

Charles had introduced. The Frenchman Montesquieu, within twenty years of the treaty of Utrecht, confessed that the return to Spanish rule was the specific for the ill-ease of Italy.

Charles was not the "lofty Henry" of Dante's delusive dreams: but neither was he the German Albert who spurned Italy, nor yet the Sicilian Frederick of Aragon, nor the Neapolitan Charles of Anjou, "who would do well to fly low like swallows instead of soaring like hawks over the most unworthy quarry." Italy was, as Dante knew, a wild bad beast to ride, but Charles was a bold light-horseman and did not shirk the dangerous mount, nor too curiously examine the gift-horse that had been forced upon him.

Since the failure before Metz Charles became for Germany, in spite of his opponent's fears, almost a negligeable quantity. When he had set out from Innsbruck at the head of a powerful army, his earlier schemes had revived. Once more he canvassed the formation of a general German league, and his son's ultimate succession to the Empire. Had he won, the continued existence of Protestantism was, in his then temper, by no means secure. It was one of the stakes for which Charles and his enemy were playing, and Metz chanced to be the table. It is strange that the head of the house of Guise was perhaps the saviour of the German reformation.

Charles probably now realised that his cause in Germany was lost. He would write humbly at times to Ferdinand, confessing his ignorance and begging for information. The schemes for a German league sank to vain volitions for the renewal of the Suabian League, or for entry to that of Heidelberg, which the neutral party had concluded. All Germany, indeed, still believed that

Charles was intriguing for Philip's succession; the Elector of Brandenburg even seemed prepared to sell his support, if, at the expense of Maurice, he could secure the sees of Magdeburg and Halberstadt. But Charles was in his heart of hearts convinced of the impossibility of success, and Mary and the Bishop of Arras could not speak of the scheme with patience. Although Charles continued to play with fire, such serious intrigue as there was may be more directly attributed to Philip and Alba.

That which most damaged the Emperor's reputation was the belief that he was secretly supporting Albert Alcibiades, who, after the retreat from Metz, had resumed his plundering raids upon the bishops. The mediating party had drawn together in the defensive League of Heidelberg, to which the Emperor was refused admittance, although Ferdinand was accepted in his capacity of ruler of Tyrol and his West German territories.

Maurice and Ferdinand had now returned from Hungary, and entered a close offensive alliance for the suppression of disorder. This placed Charles and his brother almost in opposing camps. The Emperor had certain information of Maurice's intrigues with France, which recommenced before the treaty of Passau was pigeon-holed, and ceased only with his death. In the fear that Ferdinand might once again fall into his brother's plans, the Elector seems even to have listened to Turkish overtures for depriving his ally of Hungary and Bohemia. While Maurice lived, Charles supported Ernestine against Albertine interests. The honest resistance of John Frederick to the Interim seemed better than Maurice's fraudulent acceptance. He could not see, he told his brother, that Maurice was more religious than John Frederick. Orthodox Ferdinand

was forced to admit that not one of the Protestants was worth anything at all, and that he had only allied himself with Maurice to prevent his openly joining France.

Charles seems now to have sincerely wished for peace. He would reconcile Albert Alcibiades with his episcopal victims, and Maurice with John Frederick. He implored Ferdinand to make some reasonable compromise with Zapolya's widow, and to cease annoying the young Duke of Württemberg, who was related to all the princes of Germany, and could easily gain touch with France. Ferdinand's action might well cause trouble precisely in the quarter where Charles was desirous to establish a nucleus of loyalty by friendly relations with Württemberg, the Palatinate, and the Suabian and Franconian towns and knights. The Emperor had now less interest in the territorial aggrandisement of the Austrian Habsburgs. He had given Ferdinand, he angrily wrote, a goodly heritage apart from Württemberg: if his brother had lost the duchy, it was not his business to recover it for him. This protection of Christopher was all the more remarkable, as he was beginning to adopt a strongly anti-Catholic line of policy.

There remained the question of Albert Alcibiades. To him Charles was genuinely grateful, because in the retreat from Metz he, and he alone, had saved the guns. Moreover, he owed him money, which, though not scrupulous in this respect, he felt under the circumstances obliged to pay. He apologetically explained that if he published the ban against Albert, he had no power to execute it,—that Albert would divert his attentions from the bishops to the Netherlands, or would combine with Maurice and the French against the Habsburgs. Moreover, as Charles constantly repeated,

the wild raider's enemies had never raised a finger to help the Emperor either against French or rebels: he had sacrificed his patrimony, and received no aid from the Empire. The mediatory princes had, perhaps, really saved Charles from the worst consequences of the rebellion, but he naturally ascribed his salvation to his own increasing forces, and the failures and divisions of the enemy.

In June 1553 Albert Alcibiades gave respite to the Franconian bishops and "pepper-bags," and suddenly turned upon a worthier foe—Duke Henry of Brunswick. Among the Protestant towns and gentry of North Germany there was strong sympathy with the scourge of priests. From hostility to Maurice the influence of Ernestine Saxony and of orthodox Lutheranism was on the Hohenzollern's side. Ghosts long laid were raised, and it was even feared that his appearance would cause the seeds of peasant disaffection to germinate afresh. Thus it was that not only Ferdinand and Maurice, but Catholic Bavaria and Brunswick, ultra-Lutheran Württemberg and Hesse, South German towns and bishops, were all eager to stem his progress. Nevertheless all Germany believed that the official champion of order and Catholicism was supplying the Protestant anarchist with men and money. When, in the wild, whirling fight of Sievershausen on July 9, Maurice and Henry of Brunswick, aided by Ferdinand, fell upon Albert's forces, it was said, though probably in error, that Burgundian colours floated above his ranks. It was the fiercest battle that Germany had witnessed for many a long year. Albert was beaten, but Maurice received his death-wound.[1] It is a curious illustration of the tangles

[1] For Maurice's last years see S. Issleib, *Von Passau bis Sievershausen, 1552-53* (*N. Arch. Sächs.* viii. 1887).

of religious-political history that Maurice's death was the subject of public rejoicing at both Wittenberg and Brussels. Orthodox Lutherans and orthodox Catholics shook hands over the fall of indifferentism and compromise.

Maurice's death had the effect of lessening Charles's interest in German politics. His successor Augustus was a ruler of a different type, conservative and conciliatory. Charles had now no personal injury to avenge. He had hated Maurice as he had once hated Philip of Hesse, but this stimulant for action was now removed. There were now no longer the same reasons for supporting or condoning Albert Alcibiades, and the ban against him was at length issued, though Charles took no part in its execution.

The death of Edward VI., closely following that of Maurice, turned the Emperor's attention in a new direction. Though Philip and Alba might still cherish the idea of Imperial succession, Charles now let it drop. Ferdinand had well-nigh been beforehand with his brother in the English marriage; he had made overtures on behalf of his son the Archduke Ferdinand, who would have more experience than Philip in governing a people divided in religion. Charles once more had reason to complain that his impulsive brother first acted, and afterwards asked advice. But, having won, he could afford to be generous. Some feared that this addition to his power would increase the danger of Philip's succession. Charles, however, frankly told his brother that the feeling of its impossibility had been his chief motive for seeking in England compensation for his disappointment in the Empire.

Ferdinand now directed German politics, and Ferdinand took his stand on the new alliance of Catholic

Habsburg Austria and Lutheran Albertine Saxony. It was of little interest and no benefit to Charles that his old ally, Henry of Brunswick, covered the Catholic arms with glory, for he alone dared to follow up and crush Albert Alcibiades, that "ill dog to bite," on his last foray against the Franconian bishops. If Germany was at length at peace, this was none of the Emperor's making, and in the diet which was to perpetuate this peace he took no active part.

Only by slow degrees did Charles arrive at the resolve to hold aloof from the diet of Augsburg. Health apparently first prompted him at the close of 1553 to beg Ferdinand to represent him. Yet in 1554 he chose three influential commissaries who were intended to be anything but cyphers. The Emperor's instructions and Vice-Chancellor Seld's memorial thereon comprise at once a programme, an *apologia* and an indictment. These documents marvellously illustrate Charles's mingled opportunism and idealism, his practical sense in shelving impossibilities, his sentiment in clinging to what he believed to be permanent essentials. Never would he surrender the unity of the Church, and yet no Lutheran could more frankly handle the defects of the Papacy and of the Catholic German clergy. It was recognised that since 1548 circumstances had altered cases, that Lutheranism was likely to expand, that the Catholic princes, having lost confidence in Imperial authority, and caring less for their religious than for their material interests, were seeking to secure their states by alliance with other powers of whatever creed. The Emperor, it was admitted, could now do nothing against the will of the Estates: he could only temporise in the hope of better days; he must not employ force; he must not "pound water in a mortar," and so

increase hatred; nor yet on the other hand must his commissioners explicitly sanction any act to the prejudice of his conscience or of religion. Of the remedies for religious strife a General Council was confessedly the best, but the carelessness or opposition of the Pope and the indifference of European powers rendered this inoperative for the present: Rome would not seriously press the welfare of the Church, and no Council could have general authority while the war with France continued. The idea of a National Council or Synod was waived as being beyond the range of practical politics: the precedents were few and unfortunate: if the bishops alone had votes, it would not satisfy the laity, while the admission of the latter was uncanonical: if the Pope refused consent the bishops would not sit, or, if they did, a schism would result. It was further argued that the ecclesiastical circumference of the so-called German nation included Danes, Swedes, Bohemians and Hungarians; to summon these would be a fruitful source of difficulty, while the limitation to Germans and the admission of the laity would be a mere reproduction of a diet. Nevertheless to such a National Council the Emperor was willing to consent if the Estates insisted, although he must determine its objects and procedure. A settlement by diet merely involved postponement from one diet to another; but in this also, if the Estates could devise no better remedy, the Imperial commissaries might acquiesce.

After this depressing survey of unpromising possibilities Charles returned to his old nostrum for the ravages of dissent—a religious conference. Conferences, he wrote, had after all not been unfruitful, for the recent works of Bucer and Melanchthon were far more moderate than those of twenty years ago. All heresies had been

conquered, not by Councils, nor by arms, nor by courts of law, but by time and reasoning: so it had been with Arianism, so with Hussism, for Huss had been milder than Wyclif, Rokyczana than Huss, while modern Utraquists differed only in two points from Catholics. At all events a conference would gain time, but no conference must prejudice the authority of a future Council. Here then was the old mixed method of comprehension and suspension.

In Seld's commentary upon the Emperor's instructions the Interim and the Imperial reform of the clergy were abandoned as impracticable, and on the true grounds; there is, indeed, no better summary of the causes of their failure. So also it was plainly admitted that the formation of an Imperial treasury and the revival or extension of the Suabian League were improbable. The whole field of German grievances against Charles was once more surveyed, and it is interesting to find that the stamping of captured cannon with the German princes' arms is ascribed to Alba's folly and severely censured.

Charles, not content with answering the grievances of others head by head, unburdened himself of his own. He wrote that it were only fair that his complaints should receive discussion as full as those of others, but old as he was and ill, it was not his wish to bring charges against any. He asked only that princes should render to himself and his successors the obedience which they expected from their subjects: let them not oppress their people, but rule them with the same consideration which they claimed at the Emperor's hands: let them not use religion as a cloak to conceal selfish ambition: let them apply Church property, not to their personal use, but to the objects for which it had been intended.

Every true German, Charles continued, would watch the frontiers of the Empire, would resist the Turk, would not look idly on while his neighbour's house was burning: if an Estate had a complaint against the Emperor, it should not be redressed by arms, and if one prince quarrelled with another, a settlement should be sought by speedy arbitration, and not by a never-ending legal process: it was the nation's duty to look to the safety of her roads, that it might not seem that Germany, almost alone among Christian countries, protected robbers: if the princes would loyally combine with himself, he would devote all his strength to furthering their objects; if not, he would carry to the grave the credit of having solemnly warned them of their duty.

These were the last formal words of Charles to Germany. The ideal of national health was beyond his own powers and beyond the princes' wishes, but at least his warnings sounded the depths of German sins and sufferings, the anarchy, the hypocrisy, the fist-law of the princes, their oppression of the peasant, their want of patriotism, which laid Germany bare to French and Turk, the self-seeking which exulted in a neighbour's ruin, the stifling of trade by highway robbery.

As the diet drew nearer the Emperor's dislike of his task increased. He was conscious of personal failure. The ideals were still there, but he felt that his own course was nearly run,—that they must be left for others to realise. Increasing infirmity had rendered his Catholicism more sensitive, while intensifying his constitutional indolence, which now he could only shake off under pressure of strong excitement. Thus ultimately he laid upon Ferdinand's shoulders the sole responsibility for the coming settlement, even as though

he himself were dead or absent from Germany. He told him plainly that conscience forbade him to make the concessions to the Lutherans which Ferdinand knew to be inevitable. This avoidance of responsibility was not now prompted by desire for a free hand, should fortune ever smile again; it was rather the renunciation of Imperial power. Though technical abdication was delayed, the relations of Charles with his German subjects ceased in 1555.

In Germany the Emperor's failure had been almost confessedly complete. Far from enlarging the boundaries of the Empire he left three of its western bulwarks in French hands. His own action alienated for ever the Teutonic territories of his Burgundian inheritance, to which, moreover, he had added the see of Utrecht and the Duchy of Guelders, thus filching them from Germany. Elsewhere even the Habsburg territories had suffered shrinkage. The acquisition of Constance was poor compensation for the loss of Württemberg, and Charles had been unable to oust the Crescent and its Transylvanian satellite from Hungary, the kingdom which his grandfather and great-grandfather had schemed to secure for their posterity.

For the Empire's losses Charles was of course less to blame than the unpatriotic or traitorous princes. Lutheran and Catholic, Saxon and Hessian, Bavarian and Brandenburger, had all in turn, for what they were pleased to call conscience' sake, sold their country to Frenchman, Pole, or Turk. Only at moments had the Estates given their Emperor honest support in his endeavours for the national cause. Yet for this indifference or hostility Charles himself supplied some pretext. His mistake was that of all earlier Emperors; he had confused Imperial and territorial, official and hereditary

interests. On this ground the princes and towns, while mustering their forces for the defence of Austria, had declined to attack the Turk in Hungary. They had given little or no aid at Metz, because it was rumoured that Charles, if the town were conquered, intended to annex it to the Netherlands. The Estates probably were unaware how much Charles had really done from time to time to correct his earlier errors. They did not know that he warmly advised Ferdinand to make concessions to Zapolya, that he insisted on his brother's abandonment of his claims on Württemberg, that with extreme reluctance he yielded to the absorption of Constance in the Habsburg aggregate. Even in the Netherlands he had safeguarded the Empire's feudatory rights, and had contrived that they should bear their share of Germany's financial burdens.

In spite of thirty years of patience and prudence Charles never really gained a hold on Germany. Because he never lived there, he never really understood her problem nor her people. Migrating from the Netherlands to Spain, he learned to understand the Spanish problem, and, though he was never quite popular in Spain, he realised her true interests, or at least her character. Without any exercise of violence he left her in his heir's hands an instrument upon which he could play at will, for how different is the Spain of the first years of Philip from that of the opening of Charles's reign! Ferdinand, transferred much against his will from Spain to Germany, after a long and unfortunate apprenticeship, learned her needs and humours, and was among the wisest Emperors of whom Germany can boast, never surrendering personal honour or convictions, yet always allowing the nation to follow its natural bent.

Charles never had been an absolutist. However great his success, he was always willing to grant a liberal measure of territorial independence in Germany as in Italy. The rule of Austria and the Netherlands corresponded to that of Naples and Milan: all he asked of the intermediate princes was to give a general support to his foreign policy. Instead of supporting they had thwarted him at every turn. The Emperor had signally failed to assert any Imperial authority over the territorial princes; they had even added to their independence, and this in a direction than which none could be more unwelcome—that of sectarian dissidence. They had placed themselves beyond the reach of the two swords of Church and Empire; they were outside the sphere of the sun and moon which had once given light to the European world. The dream of the Holy Roman Empire had vanished; Charles's successor must be content with making Austria the chief among many territorial powers. The modern Habsburg-Austrian Empire, with its exclusive territorial interests, its administrative experiments, its intricacies of religion and of race, really begins with Ferdinand.

It is true that the reign of Charles closed with the Peace of Augsburg, which restored to Germany a certain degree of prosperity and peace, that for more than sixty years she suffered from no appreciable civil strife, that she lost nothing to France and little to the Turk, that the religious question ceased to absorb her whole energies, that the house of Austria became, if not the dominant power in Germany, at least the most considerable. Yet this result, which was in fact far more satisfactory than is often thought, was in no respect due to Charles, who expressly repudiated the responsibility of surrender. It was the work of Ferdinand, who had learned the

painful lesson over which the elder Habsburg still was stumbling, and of Augustus of Saxony, whose brother Maurice had proved the ruin of Charles's fortunes.

The Emperor's attitude towards the Peace of Augsburg proved the strength of his religious convictions and the weakness of his political insight. This peace granted to the Lutherans not much more than Charles had conceded in his several compromises. There was, however, this essential difference, that the peace between the princes of the two confessions was recognised as permanent, although many still believed in the future possibility of religious union. Charles had proved once and again that he could be opportunist in practice, but he was too Catholic in sentiment, too obstinate in character, to admit the principle of dissent. Charles might have granted as much as Ferdinand, but the grant would have been conditioned by a time limit. Ferdinand, with a surer grasp of German politics, realised that permanence was the essential—that he could limit the concessions to Lutheranism, perhaps in space, but not in time.

The provisions of the diet of Augsburg would alone suffice to prove how entirely Charles had failed. It established peace between the contending creeds, and peace had ever been the Emperor's aim. But he would have a peace founded upon union, while this was one which only bridged division. It officially recognised dualism in creed as well as in political authority; it set the Imperial seal upon territorial autonomy. Peace, again, in Germany had for Charles the end of utilising her vast military resources against the French. The Peace of Augsburg passed over in silence the French thefts from the Empire, and turned the vision of Germany inwards rather than outwards. Germany should be at peace abroad as at home: religious parity

and non-intervention were the two planks in the new platform upon which the Austrian-Saxon Alliance took its stand. How impossible was a stage so narrow for one with the Emperor's religious and political aspirations!

CHAPTER XII

Rule of Charles in the Netherlands—Charles as territorial prince in his Burgundian inheritance—Acquisition of Friesland—The see of Utrecht and its secularisation—Conflict with Charles of Guelders—Acquisition of Groningen by Charles—Death of Charles of Guelders—Election of William of Cleves in Guelders—Absorption of Guelders and Zutphen in the Burgundian state—Results of annexation on the five new northern provinces—Conquest of Tournai—Military occupation of Cambrai—Relation of Charles to the bishopric of Liège—Views of Charles upon Lorraine—Ideas of an independent Burgundian kingdom—Treaty between the Netherlands and the Empire in 1548—Sense of unity in the Netherlands under Charles—Centralisation of administration—The Court of Malines—Charles and the Netherland nobility—Powers of the Estates-General—Military strength of the Netherlands—Difficulties of central government—Provincial peculiarities—Survival of local independence—Charles's policy towards the municipalities—The Church in the Netherlands—Charles's scheme for a national episcopate—Friction between temporal and ecclesiastical judicature—Persecution in the Netherlands—The danger of Anabaptism—Secular character of the Inquisition—General features of Charles's administration; its merits and demerits.

In the Netherlands Charles had opened his career, and there he closed it. Of all his subjects the Netherlanders, with the momentary exception of his mother city, had been the most unswervingly loyal. Yet they had suffered most from the long French wars in which their interest had been the slightest. Artois, Hainault and Luxemburg had time after time been ravaged, while every province had paid unheard-of subsidies,—and all that the Spanish hold on Italy might be retained. It

will be remembered that the Low Countries had no quarrel with their neighbour France, that the policy of Charles's father and of his own first minister had been steadily directed towards peace, and that the assumption of the Spanish crowns was the cause, and that of the Imperial title the occasion, of the personal wrangle between Charles and Francis. War implied the closing of their best market to the fisheries of the Northern provinces, while all must forego their main supply of wine, of which nobles and citizens made only too liberal a use. Occasionally, indeed, the strain on Netherland loyalty was felt to be excessive, and each regent, Margaret and Mary, deemed it wise to make a separate truce to give her subjects breathing space.

On the other hand Charles must be credited with the increased rate of progress in the prosperity of Antwerp and Amsterdam, which was in great measure due to the personal union of the Netherlands with Spain, for very much of the colonial trade fell indirectly into the hands of the merchants of the Scheldt and the shippers of the Y. The Netherlanders were grateful to Charles for his good intentions, even when they failed; they knew that he would gladly have put them on a level with his Spanish subjects in the trade with the Indies. Antwerp had, indeed, for some little time replaced Bruges as the real commercial capital. Since the year after Philip's death she had become the distributing centre of the Portuguese spice trade. But it was under Charles that she became the greatest trading city of the world. If all roads once led to Rome, all waterways now converged on Antwerp, down the rivers which drained Central and Southern Germany, from the Baltic through the Sound, from Spain and her Indies, from Portugal and her African and Asiatic factories. But above all

Charles gave to the Netherlands their internal peace and administrative order, and with these such spirit of unity and patriotism as they possessed. He fashioned their final external form, completing the stately hull of which his Burgundian forefathers had sketched the plans and laid the lines.

In Germany Charles, as the representative of central authority, was the natural enemy of territorial particularism; in the Netherlands he was himself the territorial prince. Here his aims were identical with those of the rulers of Saxony, Brandenburg or Bavaria. He would round off his territories by convenient acquisitions, and level the inequalities caused by noble, clerical or municipal privilege, which broke the uniformity of their surface; he would, as far as possible, exclude the jurisdiction of any foreign authority, whether bishop, Pope, king of France—nay, even of Roman Emperor. Charles would in fact, like any other prince, convert his territory, or group of territories, into a nation, self-sufficient and exclusive. Thus it might come about that Charles as ruler of the Netherlands might be opposed to Charles as Emperor. If this peculiar situation is constantly borne in mind, it will give more unity and more interest to the multifarious aspects of his rule in the provinces of his Burgundian inheritance.

The very year in which Charles was declared of age was signalised by a notable step in the process of territorial expansion. In 1515 the Habsburg government purchased of Duke George of Saxony his rights on Friesland. It will be remembered that this province had long been harried by the factions of Schieringers and Vetkoopers, a division all the more incurable because it was the result not of definite principles or interests, but of local and family traditions. This feud

had been aggravated by a standing struggle between Groningen and the surrounding district, which ended temporarily in the commercial and political supremacy of the town over the neighbouring Ommelande. The house of Saxony might have re-established order but for the stubborn resistance of Groningen. The Bishop of Utrecht had tried in vain to recover his rights over the unruly province, while the powerful town retaliated by stimulating the disaffection of the episcopal vassals in Overyssel. The Count of Friesland, with somewhat more success, sought his advantage in the general confusion. In 1514 the inevitable Charles of Guelders joined in the fray, invited by the trade guilds of Groningen, who despaired of holding the town against the Saxon leaguer. He was already more powerful in Utrecht than its nominal lord the bishop. Thus foreign and civil war in Friesland and the bishopric became involved in the old dynastic conflict between the houses of Egmont and Burgundy in Guelders.

The action of the duke determined that of the Habsburg government, which had long eagerly watched, if it had not stirred, the cauldron of Frisian disorder. It could not suffer its ubiquitous enemy to hold the entrance to the Zuyder Zee. On the other hand the advent of the fresh foe meant ruin for Duke George, who had already exhausted the resources of Saxony in the attempt to introduce strong government among a people who lived by anarchy. Hence it was that George sold back to Charles the rights which Maximilian had alienated. For the moment, however, there was so little active interference that the Duke of Guelders could even accompany Francis I. to Italy, and substantially contribute to the French victory of Marignano.

Charles of Egmont ruined his cause in Friesland by the oppression of his soldiery, who proved worse than the Saxon mercenaries from whom he had come to free the province. For Charles V. the Imperial election was a Frisian as well as a European victory. Egmont had flung himself on the side of Francis, for his very existence seemed to depend upon his success: a French Emperor would give a definite decision in favour of his title to Guelders and to the protectorate of Friesland. On the other hand the election gave Charles a new point of vantage; the Frisians were still Germans, and Charles was now their natural lord and peacemaker. The towns one by one admitted Habsburg garrisons, and by the close of 1523 the Estates took the oath to the Emperor Charles and to his heirs hereafter. Thus the realisation of the shadowy Imperial sovereignty over Friesland was coincident with the recovery of the long-lost hold on Lombardy. The two victories of Charles were two defeats for France. The Burgundians who garrisoned Friesland, and the Spanish-Italian-German force which held Milan were but divisions of the self-same army.

Even more important to the consolidation and security of the Netherlands than Friesland were the ecclesiastical states, such as Utrecht, which skirted the inner shores of the Zuyder Zee, and Liège, Cambrai and Tournai, which lay enclosed within the boundaries of the southern provinces. The acquisition of these was all the more desirable because in their bishops' dioceses were included a large portion of the Burgundian territories, in which, therefore, the ecclesiastical power was wielded by prelates who might be, and sometimes had been, rival territorial lords. With regard to these bishoprics Charles's predecessors had followed two lines of policy—the one practical, the other ideal. The former

consisted in securing the election, especially in Utrecht and Liège, of near relations or close allies. The bishops were constantly at variance with their subjects, democratic as in Liège or aristocratic as in Guelders, and must perforce purchase Burgundian aid by conferring upon their ally the right of military occupation or even of virtual administration. Thus it was that two bastards of Philip the Good ruled with a short interval the see of Utrecht, whereas that of Liège had been secured for members of the nearly allied house of Bourbon. But the dukes had higher aims than this. In the schemes of Philip the Good and Charles the Bold for a Burgundian kingdom the actual secularisation of these states for administrative purposes had been an essential feature. Philip would have also included Osnabrück and Münster, while Charles the Bold nearly won Cologne; and had his occupation of Lorraine proved permanent, the three Imperial bishoprics, Metz, Toul and Verdun, must have become mere territorial sees.

The submission of Friesland made the control over Utrecht all the more invaluable to Charles, for without this the new province had no connection with the older ones except by sea, and the claims of the bishops on Frisian territories might easily prove a source of danger. Moreover if Charles did not secure the mastery of Utrecht, it was certain that his rival Egmont would; indeed ever since 1516 the conflict between Burgundy and Guelders had centred in Utrecht. Charles, following ancestral traditions, had here supported the bishop Philip, a Burgundian bastard, whilst Egmont was the darling of the Chapter and the Estates. Philip died in 1524, and neither Charles nor Egmont succeeded in influencing the election. The latter, however, drove the new bishop from his capital and conquered Overyssel,

thus planting himself on the flank of Friesland. This forced Charles to abandon the temporising policy of bolstering up the sick man of Utrecht. The result of Egmont's success was one of the most brilliant strokes of Charles's reign, for the bishop in despair was induced to surrender the temporal sovereignty of the see to Charles, as Count of Holland and Duke of Brabant (November 1527). In spite of Egmont's obstinate defence and the bold offensive of his general, Martin van Rossem, who surprised the Hague, Utrecht in 1528 fell to the Burgundian troops. The See and the Upper See, or Overyssel, were added as two distinct provinces to the Netherland possessions of the Habsburgs. Friesland and Holland were geographically united, and the Frisian claims of the bishops of Utrecht went to strengthen the *de facto* sovereignty of the house.

It was next the turn of Guelders, but here Charles was prepared to compromise. By the treaty of Gorkum in October 1528 it was stipulated that Egmont should retain the duchy of Guelders and county of Zutphen for life, with the sovereignty of Groningen and the districts of the Ommelande, Drenthe and Coeverden, but with reversion to Charles, as Duke of Brabant, in the event of the failure of male issue. This treaty seemed to secure the possession of Utrecht and Friesland, and the peace of Holland and Brabant. As the acquisition of Friesland had coincided with Charles's early victory in Lombardy, so these successes were closely linked with the capture of Rome, the capitulation of the Pope and the failure of the French before Naples. The capitulation at Aversa really determined Egmont to abandon the French cause and make his peace with Charles. The secularisation of Utrecht would never have received the Papal sanction

but for the treaty of Barcelona. Contarini, writing from Rome on August 21, states that in a Consistory five cardinals voted in favour of the bishop's resignation of temporal jurisdiction and four against, while the Pope was opposed to it, although he dared not say so. The secularisation of Utrecht made a deep and abiding impression; it was thought to be but the first-fruits of the harvest to which the Emperor meant to lay the sickle throughout the rich fields of ecclesiastical Germany. There is little question that now and hereafter the episcopal princes were nervous on the subject of this secularising policy.

Meanwhile no treaty could bind Charles of Egmont, ever on the watch to seize his opportunity against the Habsburgs. Even before the Franco-Imperial war of 1535 had broken out, he had secretly placed his lands under French protection and promised the reversion to the French Crown. In 1536 the Count Palatine Frederick, now married to Charles's Danish niece, was with Dutch aid defending Copenhagen against the elected Danish king, Christian III. Egmont professed to arm in favour of the latter, but threw himself upon the city of Groningen, which resented his suzerainty, as it had that of the Saxon dukes. Egmont had hitherto relied upon the majority of the populace, represented by the trade guilds. These, however, in their need for a strong government had veered round towards the Burgundian cause, and the town now placed itself under the Emperor's protection. After a defeat of the Danish-Gueldrian troops at Heiligerlee, Egmont was forced to sell his rights to Groningen and the neighbouring districts, and thus a fourth province was added to the Netherlands.

Egmont was still irrepressible. Failing in a fresh

attack upon North Holland, and beaten at every point, he revived his desperate resolution of leaving his inheritance to France: the French king should thus wield the power of a large state with the best fighting population of the Low Countries in the heart of Charles's Netherland possessions. France, Egmont told his Estates, was the only lord who could protect them against Charles, and he would sooner the land were drowned than left in Burgundian hands. But he overreached himself: the Estates declared against the bequest: Nimwegen and Zutphen garrisoned their own citadels. In vain Egmont proposed to transfer the inheritance from France to one of his own nephews, princes of Lorraine. The Estates chose William, heir to the Duke of Cleves, thus recognising the title to Guelders, which the house of Juliers had long claimed. Anger broke the old soldier's heart, and he died full of years and bitterness on June 30, 1538. Of all the Emperor's enemies Charles of Egmont had been the most persistent and not the least dangerous.

It is surprising, perhaps, that Charles did not follow up his success at Ghent by establishing his effective sovereignty to Guelders, which had now by the treaty of Gorkum devolved to him. But the outlook towards France was clouding over, and the roar of cannon might have brought down the storm. He was really anxious for religious peace in Germany, whereas an attack on the house of Juliers would probably provoke a rupture. He was full of schemes for action on the Mediterranean against the Turk, and this the Low Country war must have delayed. Thus Charles, as usual, waited—although in this case the waiting was perilous enough. The old Duke of Cleves died in February 1539. To Juliers and Berg he had added in 1521 Cleves and Mark, and his

heir now increased this aggregate by Guelders. William's sister Sibyl was married to the Elector of Saxony; his sister Anne was in the summer of 1539 engaged to Henry VIII. He was hand in glove with France; he was seeking admission to the League of Schmalkalde. His states, fortified by such alliances, formed a power fully equal to the Burgundian possessions, and more dangerous than the older combination of Guelders, Utrecht and Groningen.

Mary on the death of Charles of Egmont had pressed her brother at once to occupy Guelders, for its abandonment would entail a grievous loss of reputation. The Emperor replied that the season was too far advanced for war in Germany, but that he would take the matter in hand next year, if the Turks left him leisure: meanwhile Mary must temporise by means of diplomatic representations. This answer seemed so strange to the regent that she dared not communicate it even to her ministers, for fear of driving her subjects to despair. She pointed out that negotiation would be ascribed to powerlessness, and that this would give a fresh impulse to the revolt of Ghent: it was surely more important to come and establish order in the Netherlands than to go to Constantinople to fight the Mussulmans.

Charles did, indeed, personally re-establish order within the Netherlands in 1540, but he left the Duke of Cleves undisturbed in Guelders. This was due to his extreme desire to propitiate the German Protestants. While the Emperor pressed his claims by legal arguments, the young duke relied rather on the arms of France and Denmark. His momentary triumph and complete defeat in 1543 have already been described. By the treaty of Venloo, Guelders and Zutphen became

a Netherlandish state, completing the roll of the Seventeen Provinces. Much of the credit of the annexations was due to the two capable lady regents. Yet they would scarcely have succeeded but for the Imperial victories on a wider field, and Charles in person struck the final blow. The present Orangist kingdom of Holland owes more than half its area to the sovereign whose son the favoured heir of Charles's favourite general was so shortly to supplant.

Traces necessarily remained of the independence of these new northern provinces. Friesland, Groningen, Overyssel and Guelders, claimed the right of independent taxation, and of exclusion from the general assessment made by the States-General. In the coming revolution the Gueldrian gentry were foremost in combating the long-hated house of Burgundy-Habsburg. Groningen was, on the other hand, a centre for some years of loyalty and Catholicism. The other provinces were with difficulty persuaded to cast in their lot with Holland and Zealand; even then the antagonism, sometimes latent, sometimes patent, played its part in the failure of Leicester and the tragedies of Barneveldt and De Witt. Viglius, the trusted minister of Charles, who gained in the Netherlands so evil a reputation under Philip, was reckoned as a foreigner in Flanders. His alleged rascality was ascribed to his Frisian origin, for were not the Frisians nearly as great rogues as the English, who were their lineal descendants?

There are those who will sentimentally regret the loss of the kite-and-crow freedom of these "rough-and-tumble" Low German peoples. It was a freedom which sentimentalists would be the last to wish to share. There was no freedom to plough or to trade, or even to prattle and to dream. There was plenty of freedom

for meaningless factions to cut throats in never-ending feuds, for the strong man armed to harry his neighbour's peaceful cornlands, for a corrupt commercial ring to enforce monopolies upon the labouring classes, for a military aristocracy to overawe a weak civil government. There was more than abundant freedom for every one who had a horse and weapon to oppress him who had never possessed either, or from whom he had stolen both. In spite of their virtues, and they are many, the dwellers on the North Sea lacked that of governance. Therefore it is that their debt is large to their French and South German rulers, and to the crossed Franco-German dynasty of Orange-Nassau, which, in succeeding to its predecessors' difficulties, inherited also much of their absolutist tradition and their administrative talent.

For convenience' sake the annexation of the five northern provinces has been treated first; but the Emperor's earliest and latest definite acquisitions were in the south. The town and bishopric of Tournai, which formed a French protectorate, were captured in December 1521. It was a brilliant feat on the part of the Netherland investing force, consisting mainly of militia. The city had been strongly fortified by Henry VIII. on the newest model; it was, perhaps, the earliest of his very numerous defensive works. The Netherland government had done its utmost to thwart the sale to France, or at least to secure its dismantlement. The walls were defended by powerful artillery and manned by a French garrison of 1000 men, while every citizen was a soldier. The French relieving army, under the king in person, had driven in the covering force of Nassau. But Francis exhausted his energies in a witticism on the "day of heels," and left the beleaguered

city to its fate. Wolsey had implored Charles not to waste his strength upon a hopeless task, but he had secretly supplied powder and diverted French attention by the smoke of mediation. Tournai and the surrounding territory became a Burgundian province. Although it was reckoned among the Seventeen, it was, for administrative and financial purposes, linked to Flanders.

The campaign of Charles in the Netherlands in 1543 was signalised by the military occupation of Cambrai. This Imperial town owed its fate to the French intrigues of its bishop, a member of the house of Croy, who had made the neutral *enclave* in Hainault a source of imminent danger to the province. Charles built a fortress, at once to overawe the town and to form part of his western scheme of defence. Cambrai, however, did not become a separate province; it was rather a somewhat apologetic garrison, making a parade of its expediency. Charles, however, was more obstinate than Louis XI., who withdrew the hand which he once laid upon it, saying that the citizens might pretend that the Imperial cock had flown away, and had come back to roost. It is noticeable that Tournai and Cambrai had been included in the recurring Burgundian schemes for the absorption of episcopal territories.

Far more extensive than Tournai and Cambrai was the great bishopric of Liège. Over this from the first Charles succeeded in obtaining a control which became more and more complete. In spite of the active hostility of his brother Robert, the bishop Erard de la Marck became Charles's friend and counsellor, winning through him the Cardinal's hat, which was one of the minor causes of the first French war. While Cambrai refused the Emperor admittance, Liège furnished him with troops and guns. This friendship continued until Erard

took his fatal dish of oysters in 1538. Corneille de Berghes, a devoted Netherlander, was then, much against his will, pushed into the see, of which he was already coadjutor, but soon resigned in favour of the Emperor Maximilian's bastard, George of Austria. Thus Liège, in exact accordance with the precedents set by Philip the Good, was brought within the family circle.

The long alliance with Erard de la Marck was the more remarkable, as there were frequent rubs on the subject of his ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Netherland provinces. Moreover, the dispute between Liège and Brabant as to their respective prerogatives in Maestricht, the all-important passage of the Meuse, now after several centuries reached its climax. Maestricht, an old Imperial city, had in past ages been granted as a fief to Brabant for the defence of the frontier, but the bishops of Liège claimed many of the Imperial rights. In 1530 Charles virtually detached the city from the Empire, and incorporated it with Brabant. This arbitrary act on the part of the territorial prince produced violent agitation in the town, which was fomented by the bishop, and was not appeased by the Emperor's personal visit. The city appealed to the diet of Regensburg, where it found much sympathy. Charles, however, had his way, first by blocking its avenues of commerce, and then by granting ample privileges to the citizens in 1546. It was impossible, however, to please all parties, and at the very close of the reign the Council of Brabant quashed the compromise as being too favourable to Liège.

It was none too easy to retain control of the bishopric, for the people had long had French sympathies and were sorely tempted by France and Guelders in 1542 and 1543. The Meuse was, moreover, one of the chief highways for French invasion. To check this Charles, under

a convention with the bishop, built the fortress of Marienbourg in 1546, and in his last campaign commanded the river by the erection of Charlemont and Philippeville. As these positions were to the extreme west of the bishopric, they fenced the gap between the southern frontier of Hainault and the north-west of Luxemburg, and so for military purposes enclosed Liège within the Burgundian provinces.

From Luxemburg the eyes of the Emperor, as of Charles the Bold, wandered southwards to Lorraine. If he could also command this province, he could secure communication with Franche Comté, which lay dangerously "in the air," and totally unconnected with the other Burgundian territories. With this view he married his niece Christina, widow of Francesco Sforza, to the heir of Duke Anthony, after the negotiations for her marriage with Henry VIII. had fallen through (1540). Christina did, indeed, become regent for her young son, and was strongly Imperialist.

The hopes of Charles were dashed by the French capture of the Three Bishoprics in 1552. The regent's sympathies caused her removal from the government, and her separation from her son. Metz was defended against the Emperor by a cadet of the house of Lorraine, in the person of the Duke of Guise, and the dynasty was once more drawn within the radius of French influence. Charles had failed only in the outlying fragments of his general scheme. He had in vain hoped to cover his northernmost possessions by the Danish marriage, and the southernmost by the connection with Lorraine. Apart from this, he had succeeded beyond all expectation. Six provinces had been added to those which he inherited; the dreams of the Burgundian rulers had almost been fulfilled, as far as the Netherlands were

concerned; the compact group of states was now well worthy to become a separate kingdom.

The creation of such a kingdom was frequently present to the Emperor's mind. It formed, as has been seen, a feature in all the more recent negotiations with France. It may be urged that these proposals were not made in earnest, or at least were forced upon Charles by foreign complications. But the will made in February 1535 proves the reality of the project. By this he left his Burgundian provinces to his second son, should God give him one, and, in default, to his eldest daughter, or if she died, to his second. Four years later he told Philip that he and the Empress had come to this decision from their experience that the provinces required to be ruled by a separate sovereign, for which indeed they had frequently petitioned: the absence of their prince made them irritable and discontented: foreign intrigues, combined with the spread of revolutionary ideas of civil and religious liberty, might well lead to the alienation of the Netherlands from the house of Habsburg and from the Catholic faith. In November 1539, when he left Spain for the Netherlands, and when the death of the Empress had deprived him of all hope of a second son, he added a codicil to his will, to the effect that its provisions in favour of his daughters should be understood by Philip in the form of counsel and advice, leaving it to judgment and good-will to follow them, if it seemed good to him, but not otherwise. He dwelt on the loyalty of the Netherlands and their sacrifices on his own behalf, and expressed his confidence that Philip would always prefer their advantage to his own. Throughout the long instructions given to his son at this moment the Emperor's inclination evidently leans towards the creation of a separate Burgundian state, linked by marriage either to France or Austria.

Flanders and Artois had already been released from French suzerainty by the treaties of Madrid and Cambrai. It remained to loosen the connection with the Empire, which, indeed, in some respects had been drawn tighter by the new Imperial Constitution, which had followed Charles's election. The Walloon provinces repudiated any dependence upon the Empire, but the newly annexed northern states were admittedly members of the Westphalian circle; the remainder, constituting the majority, were in a somewhat anomalous position. Germany called for a closer tie with the wealthy Burgundian territories; Margaret and Mary, representing Netherland opinion, were the champions of their territorial independence. Charles at first seems to have hesitated between his Imperial and territorial interests, but afterwards resisted the connection on particularist grounds. His victory over the Protestants in 1547 seemed to Mary a golden opportunity for deciding the question on terms favourable to the Netherlands, and she visited the diet of Augsburg with this object. The provinces were in July 1548 declared free and sovereign principalities, not subject to the laws or recesses of the Empire. The new northern states were removed from the circle of Westphalia, and the whole of the territories were incorporated in the so-called Burgundian circle. It was agreed that this should contribute to Imperial taxation in the proportion of two Electorates, or in the case of a Turkish war, of three. In return the Empire took the provinces under its protection. Those states which were of old Imperial fiefs still retained their feudal connection with the Empire.[1]

[1] For this treaty see F. Rachfall, *Die Trennung der Niederländer vom deutscher Reiche* (*Westdeutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kunst*, xix. pt. 2, 1900).

This compromise was not wholly acceptable to either party. Several of the provincial Estates were opposed to the contribution to Imperial taxation, moderate as it was. Germans with more reason disliked the obligation to protect provinces dangerously exposed to French attack, and which were not subject to German jurisdiction. As soon as the Emperor's fortunes declined, German discontent became vocal, and early in Philip's reign the convention became a dead letter, for neither was the contribution paid nor the protection accorded. Thus within a very few years the result of this important measure was the total disconnection of the Netherlands from the Empire, save for the nominal feudal tie in the case of some of the provinces. From the convention of Augsburg of 1548 the existence of the Netherlands as an independent nation has been dated by some writers, rather than from the peace of Westphalia just a century thereafter.

The consolidation of the provinces of very various origin under a single circle necessarily contributed to the growing feeling of unity, and this was increased in the same year by the Pragmatic Sanction, which was designed to remedy the confusion arising from the varying provincial customs relating to the law of succession. This law was now declared to be one and the same in every Netherland territory. This was for the territorial prince a matter of the highest moment, but his subjects also recognised the gain. Charles was aided by the Court of Malines and the Council of Brabant, and the ordinance was issued without opposition.

The Netherlands were now, indeed, fitted to become a separate nation. But it was at this unlucky moment that Charles had decided to leave the Burgundian inheritance to Philip, and the prince was summoned

from Spain to be recognised as heir. It is to be remembered that at this time also Charles intended his son to succeed Ferdinand on the Imperial throne, and had he succeeded in this, the Netherlands would not have been placed in their very peculiar relation to the Spanish king. It is difficult to determine with precision the Emperor's motives. He may already have been jealous of the popularity of his son-in-law Maximilian, who coveted the succession for his wife; he was, perhaps, influenced by pressure from Alba, who to the end of the reign pushed Philip's interests. It seems certain that he believed that the union, as far as possible, of all Habsburg territories in a single hand would conduce to the defence of Catholicism and to resistance to the power of the Porte and of France. He was, moreover, so strong at this moment that he found himself able to gratify desires, which he may possibly have long cherished, but from fear of French or Protestant jealousy concealed.

If the Netherlands were to be more than a bundle of fagots fortuitously collected and bound by any personal tie that happened to be handy, they must submit to some uniform system of legislation and administration, of justice and finance; they must gain consciousness of common political and diplomatic aims; they must be animated by military *esprit de corps*. These were the gifts of Charles. They were not wholly of his own invention and creation, but rather heirlooms; he had inherited them as rough stones or broken jewellery; in presenting them he gave them fresh facets and new setting.

The Burgundian dukes had long toiled to establish central judicial and financial control. The latter, however, was never effective, while on the death of Charles

the Bold the High Court of Malines, organised on the model of the Parliament of Paris, was the first victim of reaction at once separatist and Teutonic. His professional army, partly national but mainly mercenary, was discredited and disorganised by successive defeats. The nobles of the southern provinces were divided by French, Flemish, Burgundian and Habsburg sympathies. During the short rule of Philip there had been a measure of reconstruction. The Court of Malines was revived, though shorn of much of its importance. On the other hand the Estates-General, purely inchoate in former reigns, were frequently summoned. This was due to pressing financial necessities rather than to any definite national programme, and the full significance of these inter-provincial meetings was probably not realised. The growth of Philip's reign, moreover, was either checked or cut by the rough weather of Maximilian's second regency. Political parties had been modified, and the rude blows of Albert of Saxony in Maximilian's service had, during the first regency, temporarily suppressed particularist, democratic tendencies. Nevertheless there was still a French, a Burgundian and a Habsburg policy, although it would be impossible to define the relations of the middle term to the two extremes. There was at all events plenty of scope for the constructive power of Charles and his successive regents, his aunt Margaret and his sister Mary.

The essence of territorialism is not necessarily identical with that of absolutism. Its principle is uniformity; it would place all the inhabitants of the area affected in approximately the same relation to the ruler, but this by no means need be one of complete subjection. The break up of local authority, and the resulting union of groups hitherto isolated, was not unlikely to prove a

check upon the prince's power. In Germany the growth of territorialism was often accompanied by that of parliamentary control; the history of the territorialising prince marched *pari passu* with that of the territorial Estates. In England representative government ripened quickly and strongly, because local autonomy had early weakened. France never developed a parliamentary system because provincial and municipal institutions were so strong. It is no paradox to state that the excess of local liberty favours that of central absolutism within the limits which are left to it.

Nevertheless a central court and council is for territorialism the first essential, and to their creation therefore Charles and his ministers first addressed themselves. In the Netherlands, as in Spain, the reign was marked by the further evolution of the Royal Council. The title of Privy Council was retained by a purely professional body which acted as a ministry of justice and police. From this was separated the Council of State, which, again, contained two distinct elements, the four regular Councillors and the array of Knights of the Golden Fleece and high officials, who were summoned to give advice, though not to debate. As early as 1517 a Council of Finance had been organised, and was later more highly developed, acting not only as a court of receipt and audit, but as a court of record and a depository of the national archives. The Court of Malines, although remodelled in 1531, was never a complete success; it was never recognised as the central court of appeal by all the provinces, and the more indigenous Court of Brabant remained a dangerous rival. Nevertheless the court which tries the most important personages will itself become the most important, and before that of Malines were brought

the suits of the Knights of the Golden Fleece, the provincial governors, the royal officials and the foreign merchants.

Notwithstanding this elaboration of the administrative machinery, the tendency of Charles's government was much less bureaucratic in the Netherlands than in Spain. Charles showed no jealousy or fear of the nobility. He allowed them to criticise his character and conduct in the chapters of the Golden Fleece; he encouraged the maintenance of large estates by the growing custom of primogeniture; he gave higher titles to the upper members of the nobility, creating for instance the duchy of Aerschot for a member of the house of Croy. Upon the magnates were bestowed the twelve stattholderships, the great court offices, and the higher commands in the national *gendarmerie*. These great nobles formed a strong tie between the Crown and the provinces, of which they held the government, and in which they enjoyed much patronage civil and ecclesiastical. Here too it was their duty to summon the provincial Estates, and to superintend the collection of the taxes therein voted. In the long-established presence of the court at Brussels, and in the existence of the Golden Fleece Charles possessed advantages which in Spain were lacking. With this constant attraction towards the centre there was no chance that the great nobles would harden off into provincial satraps, whilst, owing so much to court favour, it was at least improbable that they should form a clique for the conversion of the central monarchy into a central oligarchy.

A government that was in spirit bureaucratic would never, in spite of its necessities, have encouraged the growth of national, representative sentiment in the form of the Estates-General. These in the course of Charles's

reign met more than fifty times—a striking contrast to the far older French assembly, which never once met in the long reign of Francis. Although the motive of the Crown was selfish in the main—although the members were but delegates of the provincial Estates with no powers apart from those conferred by these bodies—yet nothing could have been better calculated to foster a feeling of national unity, and at the same time to moderate the growth of absolutism. The petition for supply was necessarily answered by the presentation of grievances, and sooner or later supply would surely be dependent upon redress. Had Charles lived longer, or had his principles prevailed under his successor, taxation would soon have led to a share in legislation. Even as it was, the Estates were frequently consulted on questions of commerce, coinage and the maintenance of dykes, while their petitions against abuses often led to remedial legislation.

The Estates-General by no means always met the wishes of the Crown. They steadily resisted any proposal for a permanent tax, which, as in France, would have placed financial control beyond their reach. Thus in 1536 they refused a duty on wine, beer and textiles, and again a proposal for a poll-tax. After the outbreak of the French war of 1542 there was a prolonged struggle over an export duty of one per cent. Mary professed that her brother's sovereignty was at stake, and that she intended the duty to be permanent. Nevertheless the Estates won the day, the nobles supporting the towns in their resistance. Technically no province, not even a town or village, was bound but by its own vote, but insensibly the idea of the will of the majority prevailed; the proportion of the subsidy to be paid by each province was more or less fixed by

custom, and the refusal of any province to pay its quota, by disturbing the whole financial scheme to which the Estates had virtually consented, created a prejudice against the recalcitrant member. The Estates-General, meeting almost annually, made the Netherland aggregate of heterogeneous provinces more of a nation than was Spain with her five independent Cortes.

The remodelling of the "companies of ordinance," the regular cavalry formed on the French model by Charles the Bold, also served to stimulate patriotism. These companies were exclusively national, and were commanded by national nobles. They met on equal terms the professional French horse, regarded as the best in Europe. Though the infantry added to this cavalry might be mainly mercenary and partly German, yet it was under the direction of Netherland generals. In the recurrent war on the French frontier, the Netherland troops had none the worst of the exchanges. Tournai was conquered, Cambrai occupied, Térouenne razed to the ground. France had no corresponding gains on Netherland soil to boast. The skilful march of the Count of Buren across the breadth of Germany had really turned the fortunes of the day against the League of Schmalkalde. The Netherland nobles might and did drink and dice and swear, but they had once more become a martial race with military pride; they had redeemed the defeats of Charles the Bold.

This general process of consolidation and centralisation may seem infinitely simple and desirable, but it was, in point of fact, often difficult and unpopular. Even the Estates-General did not embrace the whole of the seventeen provinces. On ceremonial occasions, indeed, they all sent their representatives, but the newly annexed northern territories, with the exception

of Utrecht, which was linked with Holland, maintained their independence of the ordinary financial sessions. In the south Luxemburg enjoyed a similar privilege. During Margaret's regency, as later during Philip II.'s reign, the Estates of Brabant frequently assumed an attitude of criticism and opposition, all the more troublesome from their immediate contact with the court. Brabant, indeed, regarded its judicature and its Estates as rather collateral with than subordinate to the wider national institutions. This feeling was encouraged by the fact that it had no stattholder, but was under the direct authority of the regent. Charles, careful and conservative as he was, desired the Pope in 1530 to absolve him from the customary oath of the *joyeuse entrée*, because he found it a constant bar to the execution of his principles of government.

The difference in the blending of classes in the various provinces was a constant source of embarrassment. Some had long been subject to their princes, others had claimed even a right of session without summons. In the southern provinces the nobles were numerous and influential, in the north they usually had little weight. In one state the classes debated without distinction, in another they were severely separate. The clergy of Brabant, headed by the wealthy abbots, were a controlling power, whereas in the Estates of Zealand only one cleric had a seat, and in Holland and the north they were excluded from the ordinary assemblies. Utrecht, again, retained its ecclesiastical character, and the representatives of the five chapters preserved their pride of place long after the reign of Charles, when floods of rebellion and dissent had swept the bishopric from end to end. In the Estates of Guelders the knights banneret of Zutphen

formed an order distinct from the other three; while in Flanders the main division was one, not of class, but of locality, the four "members" being the three great cities, Ghent, Ypres and Bruges, and the district named the Franc of Bruges. All these distinctions infinitely complicated the adjustment of interests in the common assembly. Charles and his regents had to cope with a reality which many modern and stout-hearted Imperial federationists would regard as an impossible ideal.

The difficulties of Charles were, after all, less in the matter of common taxation and of general policy involved in this, than in the more everyday questions of legislation, administration and judicature, which more nearly touched the individual and the lesser corporate bodies. It was inevitable that central and local interests should clash. The governmental aim was to establish certain general principles of civil and criminal law, of administration and police. For this purpose not only was the supreme Court of Malines reorganised, but the powers of the several provincial courts were increased. This led of itself to conflicts of authority in which the supreme tribunal was usually, though not invariably, victorious, except in its conflict with the Court of Brabant. But in the Netherlands the smaller the area of local independence, the greater was its intensity. The provincial courts themselves had been the creation of territorial lords, whose aims and interests had been substantially those of Charles; the change was rather of masters than of principles. The municipal courts, however, represented popular and local privilege, and hence the resistance to monarchical and common principles was the more obstinate. The larger towns possessed by charter immunity from the intervention of higher courts until it came to a question of appeal. They had also wide

powers of legislation by means of by-laws. The towns clung desperately to their judicial rights, which acquired added importance from the activity of the superior courts in matters of heresy. So also the very brisk legislation of Charles's reign brought his regents and governors into frequent collision with municipal authorities. The so-called Placards contained a body of ordinances covering the whole area of social and economic life. They were at least drafted by trained jurists and based upon the principles of Roman law. The prince had an unquestionable right to publish his edicts in the municipalities, but they were frequently in flat contradiction to the by-laws. This led to conflict on the authority and interpretation of the charters themselves. At the very outset of his reign Charles had interpreted the charter of Ghent, the celebrated "Calfskin," in favour of the Crown. He would frequently call upon towns to produce their charters for inspection by the Court of Malines, in order that any provisions contrary to good sense and justice might be altered. The Crown insisted that the diversity of law was prejudicial to the country and made its government more difficult; that from a fusion of the various provincial and municipal customs a common law could be evolved for all. But the towns knew well that such a common law would be twisted to fit Charles's high conception of his sovereignty; they resisted, therefore, especially in Holland, the inspection of their charters, or sent copies in place of the originals.

The success of Charles in the conflict with the municipalities was by no means complete. Several circumstances were, however, in his favour. In most towns patrician aristocracies had, with Burgundian aid, replaced

the turbulent government of the guilds; they could not safely dispense with the Crown's support. Again the Government, through the provincial stattholders, had retained a very real hold upon the nomination of municipal councillors. The growing influence of the permanent municipal secretaries or "pensionaries" was also in favour of the Crown, for they were trained in Roman law, and their tendency was to assimilate local custom to the uniform principles of the Burgundian jurists; it was at all events difficult for lawyers with such a training to withstand the pretensions of the prince.

That the contest between central and local government only on one occasion became acute was due in part to Charles's own moderation. One of the chief obstacles to national consolidation was the limitation of provincial offices to natives of the province. To the Hollander a Fleming or a Frisian was a foreigner, and could have no claim to office. Thus the provincial officials of the Crown must necessarily be men with whom local interests and traditions naturally stood first. Charles frequently neglected these provisions, but he was saved from tyranny by his legal mind. The law was clear, and when his attention was seriously directed to the breach of provincial privilege he usually gave way. This he did also on an important financial grievance which agitated the city of Amsterdam, now the centre of the grain trade in Northern Europe. His father had forbidden the export of grain except under license, and this license threatened to become a perpetual source of indirect taxation. This the Estates of Holland resisted as being against the privileges of the province. Charles allowed a case to be stated before the Court of Malines, and loyally accepted an adverse decision. To this wise

compromise between central and local interests there was but one very notable exception. Ghent had flaunted her independence, and Charles hardened his heart to the city of his birth.

The Emperor's territorial aims are peculiarly prominent in his dealings with the Church, which stood in a most anomalous relation towards prince and people. His intention to recast the ecclesiastical framework of the Netherlands was prompted primarily by national and administrative considerations. At the beginning of the reign Arras was the only territorial see. The greater part of the provinces fell within the dioceses of Utrecht, Cambrai, Tournai, Térouenne and Liège, all of which lay outside the area of Charles's government, and were peculiarly subject to the financial extortions of Rome and the political pressure of neighbouring princes. The Frisian states were subject not only to the see of Utrecht, which became national, but to the independent German sees of Münster, Minden, Osnabrück and Paderborn. The metropolitan archbishopric of Cologne claimed part of Guelders and part of Luxemburg, where confusion was worse confounded by further parcelling between Triers, Rheims, Liège, Metz and Verdun. There was throughout a most unusual lack of coincidence between the civil and ecclesiastical boundaries of the provinces.

The Netherland Church was thus being drained for the benefit of Rome, while ecclesiastical jurisdiction was exercised by princes who might at any moment become hostile territorial powers. For this alien control Charles wished to substitute national sees, which would not be sufficiently powerful to cause anxiety to the prince, and the nomination to which should be within his competence. It was no novel idea, for both John and Charles

of Burgundy had sought to establish a bishopric in Brabant. Margaret and Mary were equally keen with Charles for this reform. Margaret assured her nephew that in nominating learned men he would derive more service from them, whereas from a small number of rich and powerful bishops there was nothing but disservice and opposition. Mary in her turn inveighed against the fresh usurpations of the wealthy independent prelates. From the very beginning to the very end of the reign the subject was pressed upon the Curia.

The confessor Glapion drew up a scheme for Leo X., and Adrian VI. was at once called upon to give his sanction. Manuel, Lannoy and Sessa all brought their diplomatic armoury to bear. Margaret urged Charles to take advantage of the treaty of Madrid, and after that of Barcelona his demands rose to six national sees for Leyden, Middelburg, Brussels, Ghent, Ypres and Bruges. He was prepared to respect vested life interests, but would at once organise the Cathedral staffs. The Curia, however, was an expert in obstruction and evasion. Even the modest attempts, made in 1551, to transfer to a bishopric of Ypres the parts of Flanders and Artois comprised in that of Térouenne met with no response. This same bishopric was of all the alien sees the most obnoxious, and the Emperor, when on the point of abdication, had his revenge. This was due rather to fire and sword than to the Chancery. Together with the levelled city the bishopric disappeared from what once was Térouenne, to find a new home at Saint Omer.

Intimately connected with the reorganisation of the bishoprics—in fact its most urgent cause—was the daily conflict between civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Violent beyond all bounds, wrote Margaret, were the clergy in usurping and enfeebling the prince's authority.

Unless the diocesans' pretensions were reduced, echoed the royal ministers, Charles would have no more power in Brabant than a village mayor. Unless the abuses were remedied, Adrian VI. was officially informed, territorial jurisdiction would become a cypher: he was urged to restrain ecclesiastical judges by decrees such as had been obtained by the kings of France and England. In 1525 so many towns were under ecclesiastical sentence that Charles seized the temporalties belonging to the diocese of Liège within his territories. By 1540 the conflict became so acute that an edict forbade the issue of ecclesiastical censures against civil authorities. This was followed by a Concordat with the Bishop of Liège, fixing the respective limits of temporal and spiritual jurisdiction; and this was apparently accepted as common law throughout the several states.

If the general relations of Charles to the Papacy be remembered, it is not surprising that the old law forbidding the publication of Bulls without the prince's license was reinforced. It was decreed that no benefices should be conferred upon foreigners, and in 1526 Margaret wished to make the most of the treaty of Madrid by getting rid of the foreign provincials and visitors of the religious orders, through whom dangerous information had been conveyed to the enemy. In all such measures public opinion was strongly on the side of the government. When, however, it was a question not of national but of purely ecclesiastical interest, the regents came into collision with the great abbots of Brabant, who occupied a leading position in the provincial Estates. Mary constantly insisted on the necessity of bridling these fractious ecclesiastics, who in days to come were to test all the skill and strength of Philip's government.

Charles was doing in the Netherlands what every territorial prince, Catholic or Lutheran, was attempting in Germany. The bishoprics and abbeys should be territorial sees dependent on the prince; nomination and visitation should be in princely hands; uniformity of jurisdiction and taxation should no longer be broken by ecclesiastical encroachment or privilege. It is not necessary to assume that the government was always acting on the defensive, or that it was always in the right, but it had the irresistible force of modernity behind it. It is very possible that Charles was consciously applying the principles prevalent in the Spanish Church to the ecclesiastical system of the Netherlands, which sorely needed reorganisation and reform. If it is lawful to ante-date and pervert a Calvinist nickname he would have made the territorial Catholic Church Arminian. "Of all princes who have reigned in the Netherlands," wrote the historian Henne, who is no friend of Charles, "none has reformed more ecclesiastical abuses, none more closely restricted the prerogatives of the clergy, than the champion of the Roman Church against reform."

The Emperor's failure to remodel the bishoprics cost both his successor and the Papacy very dear. Owing to the obstruction of the Curia the scheme was deferred until the most inopportune moment. In the early years of Philip II. the measure, which was originally intended to be above all things national, assumed an anti-national complexion. The Church, had it been reformed under Charles V., would have been more popular, and probably more pure, for demoralisation and consequent dissent were often in Europe found to bear a direct relation to the unwieldiness of the diocese. Bound by a national tie the Church, the army and the

Estates-General might have withstood the forces of disruption, and the Netherlands have remained a nation either with or without the personal rule of a Spanish king.

The severity of persecution in the Netherlands was a natural consequence of Charles's ecclesiastical and territorial policy.[1] He was no ferocious bigot. In Spain throughout his reign there was a lull in the activity of the Inquisition; in Germany his moderation excited the anger of Catholics. The Burgundian government was distinctly Erasmian in its principles; Mary had in Hungary shown decided Lutheran tendencies. But Charles was convinced, as many of his letters prove, that the spread of heresy in the provinces would be fatal alike to his authority and to the unity which he was endeavouring to create. The future history of the Netherlands, and the vain efforts of William of Orange to establish authority and unity on a basis of toleration prove that the Emperor's judgment was correct. In the provinces Charles had the advantage, which he lacked in Germany, of being at once suzerain and territorial lord. Resistance could only come from those who were his immediate subjects, and this in Protestant as well as in Catholic states was regarded as high treason. No Protestant prince tolerated diversity of worship; and there was this much to be urged on the Emperor's behalf, that whereas the Lutheran princes were attacking vested interests, he was himself protecting them.

The difference between Charles's attitude towards

[1] P. Fredericq's monumental work *Corpus documentorum inquisitionis hæreticæ pravitatis Neerlandicæ*, at present unfortunately only extends to 1525. The same author has written an interesting monograph on the intellectual and religious condition of the Netherlands under Charles V., *De Nederlanden onder Keizer Karel.*

heresy in Germany and the Netherlands was marked from the moment when he refused to condemn Luther unheard, while he burnt his books in obedience to Papal instructions within his own territories. From this moment the edicts became increasingly severe until the celebrated placard of 1550. It is true that the number of victims has been grossly exaggerated. Heretics not too ostentatious could still run the risk of remaining in their homes, for otherwise the vast exodus to English shores which followed Philip's accession could scarcely be explained. This moderation was, however, not due to Charles's own temper, but to the reluctance of the local magistrates, high and low, to inflict the extreme penalties of the law. Mary herself believed that the later placards went too far, if only for the interests of trade. She personally persuaded Charles to interpret them in favour of toleration to foreign merchants, for the prosperity of Antwerp was at stake.

Heresy in the Netherlands early assumed its least manageable form. All schismatics were at first called Lutherans, but Lutheranism proper was perhaps confined to the north-eastern provinces, to the German colony at Antwerp, and to some of the Augustinian monasteries. Indigenous heresy was rather of the Zwinglian type, but it would be impossible in the provinces to draw exact lines between Erasmian, Lutheran and Zwinglian tendencies. The success of the government in crushing the milder forms recoiled upon itself, for it left the masses without the leaders who in Lutheran or Zwinglian states retained respect for constituted authority, and who would have educated their followers on more moderate lines.

The Southern provinces had in recent reigns been agitated by earlier forms of heresy which had been

roughly classed as Waldensian, but which here, as elsewhere in the Rhineland, were probably influenced by the more advanced type of Hussitism. If there were no actual survival of this above ground, the seed lay at very short distance below the surface. Floating, indefinite forms of heresy are apt to be attracted towards extremist doctrines. This was the danger when the Peasant revolt broke out in Germany, and when Anabaptism became for a time the prevailing religion among the lower classes. The social-religious outbreak, which was in Germany mainly rural, threatened to become in the Netherlands mainly urban; it was said that if the peasants had moved towards the Low Countries 25,000 men would have joined them from Antwerp alone. The urban revolt culminated finally, as has been seen, at Münster, but it was a mere accident that it did not explode at Amsterdam, where, indeed, a party of sectaries did for a moment seize the town-hall and hold it desperately against the municipal forces. The Anabaptists in Holland may not have advocated polygamy and community of goods, but had they captured any important town it is probable that they would have pushed their doctrines to their more extreme conclusions. Whenever they momentarily gained the upper hand, they applied the practical methods of modern Anarchism or Nihilism to the professed principles of Communism. It is small wonder, therefore, if the governments burnt them or drowned them, regarding them as mad dogs to whom no mercy should be meted out. In the teeming industrial centres where the distinction between rich and poor was very sharp, and where a temporary commercial crisis involved disturbance in the labour market, Anabaptism was a grave danger. Mary was neither a bigot nor a coward, and had much reason for the severe

view which she took of the situation. William of Orange himself, in Philip's reign, while advocating tolerance for Lutherans and Calvinists, favoured the suppression of Anabaptists, on the grounds, firstly, that it was possible, and secondly, that they were socially dangerous.

Towards the end of the reign persecution of so-called Lutherans had almost ceased. The tragedy at Münster had doubtless caused a reaction against extremists, especially as the Burgomaster who was killed in the attack on the Amsterdam fanatics was himself a Lutheran. Reformation principles were, indeed, still rife among the middle and even upper classes, but in the absence of definite congregational organisation, and the presence of governmental espionage, the more moderate learnt to conceal their heterodoxy. Already, however, more highly educated ministers from France, Geneva and Southern Germany were beginning to fit the somewhat formless dissent of the Netherlands into a Calvinistic framework, although in the earlier troubles under Philip it was not always easy to draw a hard-and-fast line between Calvinism and Anabaptism.

The methods of Charles in dealing with heresy were thoroughly characteristic. The Inquisition was even more governmental than it was in Spain. The Emperor told the bishops plainly that heresy was due to the shortcomings of the clergy, to their insufficient education and their gross lives, to careless appointments, to the neglect of preaching and of insistence upon mass and confession. The reforming movement was indeed headed by the more spiritual among the clergy, and reinforced by the humanistic revolt against the obscurantism of monks and friars. With good reason Charles

did not place his remedy in the hands of the faculty which had produced the disease. But there were other motives. The powers of examination and confiscation vested in the Inquisition would have increased the jurisdiction and wealth of the clergy, which he already regarded as excessive. Thus, pending the reorganisation of the episcopate, the Inquisition was made a purely secular institution. This would probably have been in accordance with public feeling, but for the singularly bad choice of the first Inquisitor. Van der Hulst was admitted to be a clever lawyer, but was accused of being a bigamist and a murderer, and these alleged failings were aggravated by an unquestionable want of tact. He not only came into violent collision with the powerful Court of Holland, but with the regent, whom his unconstitutional defiance of local privilege had compromised. He was, indeed, deprived, but he had already discredited the Inquisition. Charles issued edict upon edict, each more severe than its predecessor. But resistance had been aroused among the clergy, who resented interference with their prerogatives and profits, and among the municipal governments, themselves tainted, and among the provincial courts, which saw their traditional privilege *de non evocando* perpetually evaded on the plea of heresy. Even more than questions of finance the punishment of heretics threatened to become the cause of conflict between local and central authority. Charles knew this, and more than once, in spite of his personal opinions, was induced to modify the execution of his edicts.

The rule of Charles in the Netherlands is the brightest feature in his troubled reign, and that in spite of persecution and frequent local disturbances caused by recurrent taxation and the chronic pressure of modern centralisa-

tion. He at all events left them a nation, or nearly a nation. They were in the closest relation to England, and measures were already taken for peace with France. The country was at the height of its prosperity, notwithstanding enormous financial sacrifices and occasional commercial crises. There was no distress that a few years of peace would not remedy. When the provinces first resisted Philip, they appealed to the institutions of his father; they claimed due influence for the Council of State which was his crêation; they pressed the summons of the Estates-General which owed their maturity to him, and which under him had become the recognised expression of popular desires. If they demanded the withdrawal of Philip's foreign soldiery, they could rely for their defence on the *gendarmerie* which he had organised; the victors of Saint Quentin and Gravelines had been trained in his armies. The very noble who was to lead the national revolt was he whom above all others Charles had delighted to honour; the keenest intellectual spirit of the rebellion, Marnix S^te^ Aldegonde, was by origin a Savoyard, by education a Habsburg minister. That the Netherlands were as united as they were in opposing Philip was due to the growth of national feeling fostered, not by provincial or municipal particularism, but by royal consolidation. The very town which played the least creditable part in the great rebellion, which provoked the secession of the southern from the northern provinces, was the only city which had shown violent resistance to the authority of Charles.

In the Netherlands, as elsewhere, Charles showed no great originality of design. His masters were his Burgundian forefathers, but he copied with a free hand, improving in depth and breadth upon his originals. The

lines, moreover, on which he consistently acted were those of his own free will; his policy was not forced upon him, as it was in Germany, in Italy, even in Spain. It is true that much of the success was due to his two capable regents. The appointment of Margaret was scarcely a matter of choice, but that of his sister Mary, in spite of her undeniable youth and suspected heterodoxy, was a proof of his sound judgment. It is at the crisis that the master's own presence is needed, and at four of these, in 1522, 1540, 1543 and 1553, Charles was in the Netherlands.

There was of course a darker side to Charles's rule. It might be shown that all—or almost all—the elements of disorder under Philip already existed in his father's time. Granvelle was the minister whom Charles had specifically destined for the Netherlands. Margaret's absolutism had more than once excited the hostility of the nobles. More than once taxation had nearly driven provinces to revolt. In the Netherlands, as everywhere, the Spanish soldiery were already hated. Philip could urge with truth that his edicts upon heresy were merely a re-issue of his father's. There were faults also on the other side which perhaps really rendered success chimerical. When Charles implored Mary to continue her regency after his abdication, she replied that it was impossible for a woman to rule the Netherlands in peace, much more in war: she could not keep on tolerable terms alike with the nobles and the communes, the nation being neither an absolute monarchy, nor an oligarchy, nor yet a real republic: the morals of the younger generation, the enfeeblement of respect towards God and kingdom, the absence of devotion, the anarchy,—all this so irritated and afflicted her that she would not live, even as a private person, among such people, and

as for ruling them, she would rather work for her daily bread.

As matters fell out, it proved most unfortunate that Charles left the Burgundian inheritance to his heir. More than once, as has been seen, he had contemplated the formation of a middle kingdom between France and Germany, under a separate government — the very measure to which Philip half-heartedly resorted when the remedy was too late. But, apart from some great international compact with this view, it was difficult to set aside the natural order of inheritance. Nor is it probable that the country would then have welcomed the change, for commercial motives predominated, and its commerce was now dependent mainly upon Spain—a connection which would have been broken had it not remained under the Spanish Crown. To this it must be added that the new king of Spain was also king of England. The Spanish-Burgundian-English alliance of Ferdinand had ripened into a personal union of the three nations. It was, perhaps, rather personality than policy that was at fault. Had Philip been Charles, or Mary been Elizabeth, or Margaret of Parma Mary of Hungary, history might have been very different. It was not Charles and Mary, but Philip and Alba, who, even before the Emperor's abdication, proposed to import the *alcabala* into the Netherlands, and permanently establish a Spanish garrison. The religious edicts of Philip might be identical with those of Charles, but in the reign of the latter religious parity had not yet been recognised by the peace of Augsburg, nor had the legislation of the early years of Charles IX. in France made at least the idea of toleration a commonplace. Nevertheless, when all is said, the feeling must remain that a great opportunity was lost—that Charles, after realising

to the full the ideal of a territorial prince, after converting his heterogeneous group of territories into a compact and self-sufficient state, smothered alike the growing sense of nationality, and the ripening authority of the central power, by subjecting the new people to an alien and absent ruler.

CHAPTER XIII

The abdication of the Netherlands by Charles—His farewell to Ferrante Gonzaga—His interview with Coligny and the truce of Vaucelles—Reasons for the Emperor's delay in the Netherlands—Hostility of Paul IV. to Charles and Philip—The last voyage to Spain—Retirement at Yuste—The interest of Charles in political events—His resignation of the Empire—His death.

In the Netherlands alone Charles ceremoniously abdicated his sovereignty. However clear his conscience might be as to the fulfilment of the toilsome duty of his reign, here only could he expect a friendly sympathy for his efforts or intentions. The day which he had long desired had come at length. On the morning of October 25, 1555 he rode into Brussels from his little house in the park. His mount was a small mule, for he could no longer sit his charger. At 4 P.M. he entered the great hall hung with the tapestry named after Gideon or the Fleece. His right hand rested on the shoulder of the Prince of Orange, his left pressed hard upon his stick. On the west side of the hall was a dais approached by six or seven steps, and hereon were three chairs for Charles, his sister, and his son. On a bench to the right sat the members of the Golden Fleece, on the left were gathered the other greater nobles. In front were ranged the deputies of all the provinces. Row behind row they sat; the tale was said to reach a thousand.

When the Emperor was seated, Philibert of Brussels,

Councillor of State and Privy Councillor, made the formal address to the Estates, detailing the reasons for his master's abdication. Then there was a solemn silence as Charles put on his glasses and opened a little memorandum, glancing at which he spoke. The Councillor, he told the assembly, had given the motives which had dictated his abdication, but he wished to add a few others which had yet more weight. Forty years ago, in the self-same place and almost at the self-same hour, on the eve of the Epiphany, the Emperor Maximilian had released him from his minority at the age of fifteen. In the following year died the Catholic king, and this had compelled him to repair to Spain to aid his mother in her infirmity. When it pleased God to call the Emperor to Himself, he became a candidate for the Empire, not from ambition to amass more lordships, but for the service of several of his dominions, and more especially of the Netherlands. Since then, in the interests of his people, he had journeyed nine times to Germany, six to Spain, seven to Italy, ten to the Netherlands, four to France either in peace or war, two to England, and two to Africa, in all some forty journeys, without counting numberless visits within his other kingdoms, countries and islands, nor yet laying stress on his journey across France to remedy the troubles in the Netherlands, which was not the least of his exertions. Eight times had he crossed the Mediterranean, three times the ocean. Thus often had he been forced to abandon his Netherland dominions, but he had left in his absence his dear sister, who, as he was well assured, and he would have no better witnesses than those who heard him, had faithfully done her duty for the government and defence of the provinces.

Having thus touched upon his merely physical exer-

tions, Charles then approached the real anxieties of his reign. "I have had to bear the burden of many wars, and that, as I can testify, against my will. Never have I undertaken them except under compulsion and with regret. Even to-day I grieve that I cannot on my departure leave you in peace and quiet. . . . Now it may easily be imagined that I have not undergone all this without feeling the burden and the tire. It is easy to judge of these by the condition to which I am reduced. Also I would beg of you not to think me so ignorant as not to recognise my incapacity for bearing these burdens. I should not have hesitated to lay down a charge above my strength, if my mother's infirmity and my son's youth had not been obstacles, for it would have seemed to me inhuman not to do all in my power to meet such a moment of necessity. At all events, before last leaving Germany I had intended to resign, but affairs were then in such a critical and troubled state that, as I did not feel as ill as I do to-day, I did not wish to throw upon another the task of reducing them to order."

In a few words the events of the last three years were then dismissed. In spite of pain and miserable weather Charles had striven, if in vain, to restore Metz to the Empire. Térouenne and Hesdin had been captured, and the Emperor had marched to meet the French king; in the following year he had in person forced him to raise the siege of Renti. "I have done what I could," he concluded, "and am sorry that I could not do better. I have always recognised my insufficiency and incapacity, . . . and in my present state feeling this to have become yet greater, I have been obliged to adopt this resolution which has been communicated to you. Moreover, the obstacles to it no longer exist. The queen, my mother, is dead; my

son has arrived at man's estate. I trust that God will grant him the talents and the strength to fulfil, better than I have done, the obligations imposed upon a king. I pray you not to read in this my resignation any thought of withdrawing myself from the eventualities of trouble, danger and toil. Believe me, I have no other motive than the inconvenience attached to my powerless and crippled condition. I leave my son in my place, and commend him to you. Render to him the love and obedience which you have always shown towards me; preserve zealously that union among yourselves which you have never abandoned; sustain and maintain justice. Above all, do not permit the heresies which surround you to penetrate these lands, and if any such there are let them be rooted out. I know well that I have in my day committed many faults, as much from youth as from ignorance and carelessness or other causes. But I can truly testify that I have never done violence, wrong or injustice wittingly to any of my subjects; if any I have done, it has not been to my knowledge, but in ignorance; I am sorry for it, and I ask pardon for it."

Such was the substance of this far-famed speech. The tears rolled down the old Emperor's cheeks, and throughout the hall deputies sobbed in honest sorrow. Sir Thomas Gresham, who was present, has described the scene.—"And here he broke into a weeping whereunto, besides the dolefulness of the matter, I think he was much provoked by seeing the whole company to doo the lyke before; beyng in myne opinion not one man in the whole assemblie, stranger or other, that during the tyme of a good piece of his oracion poured not abundantly teares, some more, some less."[1]

[1] See M. J. W. Burgon, *The Life and Times of Sir Thomas Gresham*, vol. i. p. 175.

When the Pensionary of Antwerp had replied on behalf of the Estates, Philip knelt before his father to receive investiture. Charles caught him in his arms and said to him in Spanish, "My son, I give, yield and make over to you my countries here, even as I possess them, with all revenues, profits and emoluments which depend thereon. I commend to you the religion of the Holy Church, good police and justice, and I beg all the Estates to remain in close union." Philip replied, "You lay a heavy charge upon me. Nevertheless in constant submission to your Majesty, I will continue to conform to your wishes by accepting these countries. I pray you to give them your aid and to take them under your protection." Then Charles, with voice shaken by emotion, turned to the Estates.—"Gentlemen, you must not be astonished if, old and feeble as I am in all my members, and also from the love I bear you, I shed some tears." The Bishop of Arras addressed the assembly on behalf of Philip, whose knowledge of French was insufficient. Mary in a short speech announced the resignation which her brother had at last permitted, dwelling modestly on her own shortcomings, and giving warm expression to the love she bore towards the people whom she had so long governed. Charles tenderly thanked her for her services, and then with an official panegyric of her rule from the lips of the Pensionary the long meeting closed.

The year 1555 was indeed for Charles a year of farewells. One that deeply moved him was his last interview with Ferrante Gonzaga in the spring. The ambitious Mantuan had retired from his governorship of Milan under a cloud which was lined with silver. He had lately coveted the office of Grand Chamberlain to Philip, but this had been refused either by the

influence of Alba, or, as some thought, by that of the Bishop of Arras. Under this sense of wrong he came to take leave of the master whom he had really loved, and whom, as he said, owing to their common infirmities he should never see again. Ferrante knelt by the Emperor's bedside and craved permission to kiss his hand. Charles put his arm round his neck, saying in words choked by a rush of tears that he too thought that they should never see each other more by reason of their age and ailments, which gave both cause to be weary of the world. With this he showed Ferrante his crippled hands, telling him that he now had before him the worst share of life. He assured his friend that he thought himself so well served by him that he could not but greatly commend him for his loyalty, courage, intelligence and advice; but he would tell him frankly that, what with his long illness and his constant occupations of late, he had been prevented from examining his affairs as closely as was his wont: thus it had come about that he had conceived some doubt of Ferrante, but this was now entirely dissipated, and he knew that the cause of his son's rejection of the prince's suit was the influence of Philip's favourite ministers, who did not tell their master of his worth. Thus apologising greatly for his son, and putting the blame upon his ministers, he laid his hand upon his heart and swore on the word of a true gentleman that he would severely punish Ferrante's calumniators.

Such is the Venetian envoy Badoer's account of Charles's last interview with one who ranked among his dearest personal friends. The Emperor's sun was setting, and other constellations were on the rise. Thus Ferrante never received his coveted reward, nor were his calumniators chastised. Charles did, however, settle

upon him a pension with every possible security. The ex-proconsul died a year before his Emperor, and it is among the legends of Charles's life that Ferrante was the only man for whom he ever shed a tear. The story of the farewell is at least good evidence of the Emperor's genuine warmth of heart, his appreciation of faithful service, his keen sense of justice, his willingness to confess himself to have been mistaken.

Charles was still Emperor and King of Spain, but he was longing to be free of all responsibility. On January 16, 1556 he resigned, in the presence of their deputations, his Spanish kingdoms and that of Sicily. To add to his son's authority, and to retain the hold upon Italy, which had been the most ostensible triumph of his reign, he secretly created Philip and his successors Vicars perpetual of the Empire in Italy—an unconstitutional act which scandalised even the not too scrupulous Bishop of Arras. As Emperor he took part in the negotiations which led on February 5 to the truce of Vaucelles. The last stage of these is of peculiar interest, because it brought together in friendly intercourse the forces of the past and of the future in the persons of Charles and Coligny. The French Admiral found the Emperor seated at his table, the cloth, the curtains, the chair-covering being all of black, for Charles was still in mourning for his mother. His formal presentation of the French king's letter was followed by a cheerful interview, of which some short account will be elsewhere given. The scene is, perhaps, the last personal picture that we possess of the Emperor before his retirement in Spain.

The truce of Vaucelles enabled Charles to resign Franche Comté to his son. During the wars with France the Duchy and County of Burgundy had

enjoyed mutual neutrality under the guarantee of the Swiss. The arrangement, however, had taken the form of a personal pledge to Charles, and the abdication of the County during hostilities might therefore have left it exposed to French attack. The title of Emperor was now the sole dignity which remained to him.

It proved easier to resign the government of Spain than to find retirement there. The causes which delayed the Emperor's last voyage were several. For long he could not raise sufficient money to pay his debts in the Netherlands. He was then very anxious to see his daughter and her husband Maximilian before he sailed. In July they stayed a fortnight with him—a visit, as he wrote to Ferdinand, most welcome but all too short. The visit was not entirely without its political object. Charles, craving for release from all responsibility, longed to abdicate the Empire. Ferdinand through Maximilian implored him to delay, representing that it was doubtful if he could resign without the consent of the Estates, and that in the present state of feeling his own succession would be far from certain. Charles therefore contented himself with investing his brother with all his authority as Emperor, and the formal resignation did not take place until shortly before his death.

Meanwhile the violence of the new Pope, Paul IV., seemed likely to plunge Europe into fresh confusion. The Florentine envoy Ricasoli besought Charles in August to delay his departure, from which Europe would surely suffer. "Ambassador," he replied, "my departure is indispensable. Rest assured that what my son will not do to remedy the disorders of the world, I could not do myself, were I to stay. The Pope, who is the cause of trouble, is old; he will not live long."

Paul IV. outlived Charles, and old as he was, he was abusive to the last. His diatribes threw a new light upon the estimation in which Charles's Catholicism was held in Ultramontane circles. The Pope would declare that he knew Charles when the prince was thirteen, and had afterwards accompanied him to Spain: he had even then discovered his faults—"the flower of the fruit which had since been savoured"—his lust for Empire, his insufferable pride, his contempt for religion. What other Emperor, he cried, but Charles would have held Councils and diets in which Lutherans and heretics took their place? God had punished the Emperor by making him die while he yet lived, for he was a lunatic and possessed of a devil, as his mother and his sisters were. Even Philip, future champion of Catholicism, found no mercy. The Emperor's ill-begotten son, cried the vituperative old man, was following in his accursed father's steps, living in Lutheran fashion, making no distinction of diet on feasts and fasts. Truly he was an accursed sapling, son of an abandoned father, who was the most pernicious plague from which the world, and especially Italy, had ever suffered.

The straitest Protestant may have a kindly thought for Charles, since no underbred Lutheran or Zwinglian preacher abused him more roundly than the noble Neapolitan who wore the triple crown in Babylon. Hard words break no bones, but Paul's suggestions to the court of France might and did prove dangerous. In the selfsame letter in which Philip was condemned as an accursed sapling, Catherine de' Medici was canonised as a little saint, and Paul proposed that her two younger sons should be educated in Italy—one as a future king of Naples, and the other of Milan and Piedmont. At this moment after all it was more

probable that Henry of Valois should be King of Lombardy than that he should win, as he ultimately did, the crown of Poland.

At length on September 17 Charles sailed from Flushing on the last of his many voyages. His ship was the *Espiritu Santo*, a Biscayan of 565 tons, called the *Bertendona* after her captain's name. The two queens, Mary and Eleanor, followed their brother on the *Faucon*. Eleanor had lately received permission to withdraw from France, where she was not liked, and to join the Emperor in withdrawing from the stage of public life. Spanish and Netherlandish squadrons escorted the three crowned heads to Spain. As the first voyage of Charles from the Netherlands was financed by an English loan, so the last was honoured by the English flag. Near Portland the *Bertendona* was joined by an English fleet which sailed in company till off the coast of Brittany. Hence without adventure Charles made the port of Laredo, and from there set out for the retreat which he had chosen at the Jeromite convent of Yuste in Estremadura. In spite of his wish to make his journey as private as possible he could not avoid the concourse of nobles who flocked to see him at Burgos and Valladolid. At the latter city he dined in state, and this may be called his last appearance before the world. As his bearers struggled with his litter to the summit of the rough pass of Puerto Nuevo, whence he could look down on the secluded scene which his retirement was to make famous, he is said to have exclaimed, "This is the last pass which I shall cross in life."

It is not our task to describe the last two years of Charles's life at Yuste. No period of his career has been treated with such wealth of detail, or is so familiar

to general readers.[1] But his part as a statesman was really played when he made his exit from the Netherlands. Henceforth the narrative is largely one of appetite and of concomitant variations of health, of gifts of game and fruit, of sausages and olives, eels and anchovies. Religious exercises and interchange of civilities with the brethren of the convent are a recurring feature of the tale. To the confessor Juan de Regla, and to Torriani, maker of clocks and mechanical toys, was allotted a portion of every day. It is true that the little four-roomed palace annexed to the Jeromite Church was no hermit's cell, for it was neither ascetic nor secluded from the world. Charles had his visitors, his two sisters for example, his close friend Francisco Borja the Jesuit, the historians Luis de Avila and Sepulveda, Carranza the new Archbishop of Toledo. Couriers bustled to and fro between the Netherlands or the Mediterranean and Estremadura. No convulsion happened in the outer world without seismic disturbance being marked at Yuste. All the Emperor's endeavours for peace on his son's behalf had been frustrated by the renewal of war — war not only against France, but against the new Pope, Paul IV. He was feverishly excited by the news of the victory of Saint Quentin, and he could scarcely conceal his disappointment that Philip was not himself engaged. Twice did outbursts of indignation greet the intelligence of the too favour-

[1] The most complete authority for the life of Charles V. at Yuste is L. P. Gachard's *Retraite et Mort de Charles Quint au Monastère de Yuste*, 1854-55. English readers need scarcely be referred to Sir W. Stirling Maxwell's delightful book, *The Cloister Life of the Emperor Charles V.*, 4 editions, from 1852. The subject may also be studied in A. Pichot's *Charles Quint; chronique de sa vie intérieure et de sa vie politique, de son abdication et de sa retraite dans le cloître de Juste*, 1854, and in F. A. M. Mignet's *Charles Quint son abdication son séjour et sa mort au monastère de Juste*, 1854. W. H. Prescott has utilised these sources for his edition of Robertson's *History of Charles V.*, 1857.

able conditions granted by Alba to the Pope. There was even a suggestion that he should put himself at the head of an army, and create a diversion by the invasion of Navarre. Once he gave Philip advice on the conduct of a campaign, but this was so delicately worded that it could not assume the form of a command. The loss of Calais cut the old soldier to the heart, not only on account of its effect upon the English alliance, but because it endangered Brussels. Joy for the later victory of Gravelines was balanced by distress at the loss of Thionville and the Turkish success in Minorca in the last year of his life. Charles took a keen interest in measures for the defence of Oran, but was fortunately too ill to learn the defeat and death of the Count of Alcaudete, the veteran African governor.

Occasionally the Emperor's intervention in affairs of state went farther than mere interest. This was especially the case with the thorny negotiations between the closely allied but sensitively jealous crowns of Spain and Portugal. Here he, perhaps, regarded himself as having in his capacity as chief of the family his hands less tied. He gave new instructions to an envoy despatched to Portugal by Philip, and deliberately altered those of his daughter Juana, regent of Spain. On the death of John III. he concerned himself with the question of the regency, while he even opened confidential negotiations through the medium of Francisco Borja for the succession of Don Carlos, in case Sebastian, the boy-king of Portugal, should not survive his childhood.

In another subject Charles busied himself at intervals until shortly before his death. There seems little doubt that his conscience was troubled as to the righteousness of his grandfather's conquest of Navarre. This had

been apparent in the instructions to Philip of 1548, and in the will of 1554. In the former he had advised his son, if the project for a French marriage fell through as seemed probable, to marry the heiress of Navarre: in the latter he requested him to make close examination into the claims of the house of Albret, and, if these were substantiated, to restore the kingdom or grant compensation. Henri d'Albret, convinced of the hopelessness of French aid, had offered to join the Emperor against France in return for due compensation for Navarre. After his death this offer was renewed by the consort of his heiress, Anthony of Vendôme, and a treaty was absolutely drafted for the exchange of Milan and Navarre. The project was only abandoned when Charles came to the conclusion in January 1558 that Vendôme was acting collusively with the King of France.

Charles was not without his influence in Spain, although he refused to intervene in ordinary administrative matters. His action was mainly confined to the supply of troops and money for his son. Thus he aided Juana in inducing Cortes to grant a liberal subsidy; he gave vent to unseemly indignation against the officials of the *Casa de Contratacion* at Seville, for failing to reserve the whole of the precious metals from the Indies for royal use; he forced the Archbishop of Seville and the Bishop of Cordoba to disgorge a portion of their revenues for the necessities of the Netherland war; he would eagerly proffer his advice on measures for the defence of Spain and the islands against the squadrons of the Turk.

More celebrated and perhaps more effective were his letters to Philip and Juana on the discovery that Spain was permeated by the poison of heresy. It is possible that these were the immediate cause of the systematic

persecution of reformed doctrines in Spain, although the character of the Inquisitor-General was sufficient to account for the new direction given to the activity of the Holy Office. Charles professed to regret that he had kept faith with Luther when this origin of all evil was in his power at Worms. He had, however, been singularly blind to the lightly-sitting Catholicism of his principal ministers, which must have contributed to make his own court—nay, his very chapel—a focus of unorthodoxy.

In spite of the Emperor's keen interest in affairs military, politic and ecclesiastical, he had no regrets at his retirement, no longing to reassume command. The recurrent despatches did but give zest to his loiterings among his flowers and animal pets. When the news came on May 3, 1558 that his resignation of the Empire had been accepted, that he was no longer Cæsar even in name, he was genuinely delighted. He ordered that his name should be omitted from the prayers, that new seals should be made for his use without crown, eagle, fleece or other token of his sovereignty. When the villagers sent him a basket of carnations, he refused to accept the gift until the wicker crown which adorned the basket had been removed. He resented being addressed by his ancient and sonorous style:—"The name of Charles is enough for me, for henceforth I am nothing." Four months of freedom were all that were vouchsafed to the late Emperor on earth. On the last day of August 1558 he was seized with an attack of fever, and was carried from the open gallery, where he loved to sit, to his bed. Here for three weeks he lay between life and death. In the early hours of September 21 the end had clearly come. The chaplain Villalba spoke of the blessedness of dying on the feast of St.

Matthew, who for Christ's sake had forsaken wealth, even as Charles had forsaken Empire. The dying man interrupted the preacher with the words, "Now is the time." The Archbishop of Toledo gave him the consecrated candle from the Virgin's shrine at Montserrat, and the crucifix which the Empress had grasped in death. Upon the latter Charles earnestly gazed, then clasped it to his breast: his fingers could not retain their hold, the archbishop took the crucifix and held it before his eyes. It had just struck two, when with a loud cry of *Ay, Jesus!* the great Emperor was gone, "the chief of men," in the words of Luis de Quijada, who had watched beside him, "that had ever been or would ever be."

The death of the last great Roman Emperor made less sensation in Europe than his abdication, on which enemies might gloat as a confession of failure, while friends applauded the noble self-abnegation. Popular imagination was entranced by the soft, still evening of the grand, stormy life: it became the theme of preacher, philosopher and essayist. Montaigne has made immortal the impression, which for him was young and fresh. To English-speaking people his translator Florio has bequeathed the thought in a setting almost as beautiful: "The worthiest action that ever the Emperor Charles the Fifth performed was this, in imitation of some ancients of his quality, that he had the discretion to know, that reason commanded us to strip or shift ourselves when our cloathes trouble and are too heavy for us, and that it is high time to go to bed when our legs faile us. He resigned his meanes, his greatnesse and kingdome to his Sonne, at what time he found his former undaunted resolution to decay, and force to conduct his affaires to droope in himselfe, together with the glory he had thereby acquired."

Of the two sisters who had followed Charles to Spain Eleanor had died almost suddenly on February 18, while Mary only survived her brother by some five weeks. The last political act of Charles had been to persuade the reluctant queen to pay at least a visit to the Netherlands, that she might aid Philip in the difficulties which were already gathering round him. Faithful and brave as ever, she was preparing to make her last sacrifice to her brother's wish when, on October 28, she died of a relapse of smallpox on her journey to the coast. Ferdinand and Catherine alone now lived of the sons and daughters of Philip the Handsome and Crazy Jane. Charles left but three legitimate children, Philip II., Mary, who was married to her cousin Maximilian, and Juana the widow of the late Prince of Brazil. The grandsons as yet born were doomed to trouble. Of Don Carlos his grandfather had already received a bad impression. Portents had accompanied the birth of Don Sebastian. Rudolf and Matthias, Mary's sons, had little of the talent or the fortune of their two grandsires. Charles was happier in his illegitimate posterity. Don John has at least made a great name, perhaps too great a name, in history. The Emperor's grandson, Alexander of Parma, joint product of the two hostile houses of Habsburg and Farnese, was a soldier and statesman of whom the last true Emperor might have been proud indeed.

CONCLUSION

THE CHARACTER OF CHARLES V.

VIEWED from a distance, or with listless eyes, Charles V. may seem a mere lay figure, or at most a perfunctory king in an historical play. Even as the plot of this play develops and is more closely followed, the king's personality is still elusive, or is set down as a cold abstraction devoid of dramatic vitality. But this is mainly due to the huge size of the stage, the over-elaborate setting, the crowd of characters and super-numeraries who pass and re-pass the hero, cramping his exits and his entrances, diverting due service of eye and ear. Charles, perhaps, was not dramatic in the sense of being a fit theme for tragedy or melodrama, yet his was a very human character, and that, too, of a not very uncommon type. His essential characteristics were honesty of purpose, warped by self-interest to the extent that he could persuade himself at times that his own way was the right way; industry, interrupted by fits of indolence, or rather, perhaps, natural indolence thrust backwards by a sense of duty occasionally intermittent; self-control ruffled, though rarely, by sudden squalls of passion; irresolution relieved by quick resolves, which chose sometimes the right moment, sometimes the wrong, both a little at haphazard; obstinacy, which is so strange and yet so frequent a yoke-fellow to irresolution.

Among these qualities it was the combination of obstinacy and irresolution which most closely and constantly affected the political and religious issues of the reign. The one revealed itself rather in the ends, the other in the choice of means. Charles V.'s eye was fixed steadily on his aim, but there was no exact correspondence of eye and limb. Like other irresolute men, he had a clinging to ideas which he had professedly abandoned. Hence, when he has adopted a line, even a right line, he is found harking back to an older and falser policy, searching a decent pretext for evading later obligations. This is especially noticeable during the failing health of his last years of rule. He seems then to have had neither the physical nor moral force to loose his hold on the fatal project for his son's succession to the Empire, nor yet to attach himself to the saving scheme of mutual toleration which Catholic and Protestant princes alike were fashioning.

Margaret of Burgundy, who knew Charles from infancy, once said that no one could hope to move him when once he had made up his mind. This was very early in his reign, before he was popularly supposed to have a will at all. This obstinacy, however, was not absolute, for Charles could slowly absorb the views of others, adopting them long after he had appeared decisively to reject them. He was no less open to the force of circumstances than to the weight of argument: his strong common sense, except at periods of extreme ill-health, usually saved him from attempting the impossible. The whole history of his relations to the Lutherans from the diet of Worms in 1521 to that of Speyer in 1544, or even perhaps to the Interim of Augsburg, will furnish illustrations of this adaptability. The fits of irresolution were exasperating to his advisers,

and must have been torture to himself. Striking instances of these preceded the war of Schmalkalde, and the Emperor's flight on the advance of Maurice. When once he was forced to action, indolence and irresolution knew him no more; he put forth all his long-gathered reserve of energy. With success, however, the tension was immediately relaxed, and thus he seldom reaped the full harvest of his opportunities.

Subject to the deduction which has been mentioned, the Emperor's standard of honour was higher than that of most contemporary rulers:—"In no event and for nothing in the world will I act against duty and conscience," he cried in the last troubled days, when a twist to his conscience would have brought him peace. Critical contemporaries sometimes said that Charles was singularly just save when political interests were concerned, but that in such cases he acted under the advice of his confessor, who taught that, as the greatness of the Emperor was serviceable to Christianity, everything that was of service to him was honourable and just, and everything which might injure him dishonourable and unjust. Charles keenly felt reflections on his honour. His severity towards Philip of Hesse was mainly caused by his righteous wrath at the insinuation that he had trapped the landgrave, whereas his utterances on the conditions of capitulation had been absolutely unequivocal. He was acutely conscious of his lapse from rectitude in accepting the services of the wild Lutheran firebrand, Albert of Hohenzollern, during the disastrous siege of Metz. "God knows," he wrote to his sister Mary, "what I feel at seeing myself at such a pass as to treat with the Marquis, as I am doing; but necessity knows no law." So throughout Charles's life necessity, the omnipresent anarchist, was

ever struggling against the code of honour, but more often than not the victory lay with justice.

Charles had not the quickness of sympathy or the geniality of his brother, Ferdinand, and his nephew, Maximilian, or, if he had them, these qualities were reserved for his family and more intimate circle. Alvise Mocenigo states, indeed, that he was formerly talkative and familiar with all, like Ferdinand, but that Cobos warned him to be dignified and severe with Spaniards, because in their excessive pride they would abuse his familiarity, and pretend to be his fellows; hence it was that from custom he became reserved with all, and scarcely spoke even to his household. Another Venetian, however, credits him with versatility in this respect, writing that he was able to win Flemings and Burgundians by familiarity, Italians by the good sense of his conversation, and Spaniards by dignified gravity. All admit his courtesy and patience in giving audience. Though he disliked long speeches, he would hear every one, except an occasional Papal nuncio, to the end. His replies were short, but well weighed and complete. He would answer the address head by head, and seemed always eager to convince. His personal sympathies were probably not wide nor easily excited, but he was a faithful, if not a lavish friend, to those in whom he had once placed trust. Unlike his son Philip, he never let an old servant fall into disgrace; his smile was not as Philip's the prelude to the dagger. Even when he had ceased to trust, he could not find it in his heart to punish; if removal were necessary, it was delicately veiled with honourable pretexts, and occasionally graced by apology and regret. Cruelty, in the sense of blood-thirstiness, was unknown to Charles, but he could be unforgiving towards those for whom he had conceived

strong personal or political dislike. On this subject it is difficult to establish any guiding principle. His vindictiveness towards Philip of Hesse, Pierluigi Farnese, or even the leaders of the Castilian communes, contrasts strangely with his generosity towards Francesco Sforza, who betrayed him, the Duke of Cleves, who defied him, and the Elector of Saxony, who did his utmost to depose him. Mocenigo writes that he was always kind and merciful in peace, but cruel in time of war. As an example of cruelty, he cites the punishment of Ghent, but even here the spilling of blood was trifling in comparison with the provocation. He has been frequently execrated even by contemporaries for the terrible sack of Rome, but it would be equally unjust to ascribe the actual horrors of Badajoz to the Regent. He confessed himself that he was "hard to weep," but that wept he had at the tale of the atrocities inflicted by the German troops on those whom they were professedly defending against the Turks. This finds its parallel in his distress at the fate of Duren in the Clevish war, and in his indignation against the plundering Papal troops in his campaign upon the Danube.

It would appear that Charles was naturally timid. A mouse or a spider could produce effects denied to the Grand Turk or the French King. He sometimes had trembling fits; for instance, in his bed at Ingolstadt, when the approach of the Lutheran army was announced. Yet here it was that, pinned against the town wall, and plied by more than a hundred guns, he proved, as in the terrible retreat from Algiers, the fine temper of his courage. Duty and dignity were no mean substitutes for professional experience and physical insensibility. Example is a truly royal virtue. Outside the Danube fortress Charles steadied his troops by rallies on the

innocuous noise of heavy guns;—"We were short of hands," he afterwards apologised; "I could not set a bad example." On retiring across the sands to Metafuz his affected calmness stayed the threatened panic. When food fell short and the cavalry horses must be killed, he expressed approval of his slice from the liver of a fine white charger, to set, says a casual eye-witness, a good example to his men. In the Clevish War of 1543 Mary entreated him not to endanger his person. He twitted her in reply with her somewhat masculine courage, promising to do no more than she would, were she in his place. It was often noticed that when once the drums beat the Emperor's health and spirits revived. But he was a soldier rather than a conqueror. The pleasure of war was purely physical, a reaction against the natural indolence which prompted him to go all lengths to avoid it. "Not greedy of territory," wrote Marcantonio Contarini in 1536, "but most greedy of peace and quiet." The wars of Charles were, in fact, all defensive. Had there been no Francis I. or Solyman, no Philip of Hesse or Barbarossa, his would have been a reign of peace, perhaps of sloth. Universal Empire was indeed the dream of certain of his ministers, the nightmare of his enemies, the repetition lesson of many of his historians. But he himself laughed at the idea, truly asserting late in life that it had never entered his conception, however possible it might have been. Charles was no Don Quixote, though Alberoni, of all men, has so christened him.

It is seldom that a king's personal morality is without effect upon his public career. The case of Charles V. was in his own age certainly exceptional. His private life was not so absolutely stainless as his brother's, but at least he did not drag his royal dignity through the

mire; he did not outrage public opinion as did Francis I., or Henry VIII., or Philip of Hesse. If ever he sported with Amaryllis, it was in the shade. No nation and no creed was at the mercy of the mistress of the moment. Of the two illegitimate children whom the Emperor left, Margaret was born before his marriage, and Don John after his wife's death. Previous to 1526 there are traces of two others unknown to fame. It is noticeable that, while recognising Margaret, as was the universal custom, Charles maintained strict secrecy with regard to his parentage of Don John. Just before his death he had his last little store of ducats most privily conveyed to the boy's mother, Barbara Blomberg. He would seem to have had scruples of conscience as to this his last amour, as a wrong to the Empress whose memory he so lovingly cherished. A Venetian envoy could write in 1548 that Charles was by nature sensuous, but was then a mirror of propriety, nor had he ever been guilty of a violent or dishonourable act. Eighteen years before Melanchthon had told a Protestant friend that Cæsar's private life was a model of continence and temperance —that domestic discipline, of yore so rigorous among German princes, was now only preserved in the Emperor's household. On leaving Philip as regent in Spain, Charles gravely impressed upon him the ruinous consequences of matrimonial infidelity.

The Emperor's domestic affections were strong, if limited. To his wife he was tenderly attached. He refused all suggestions for a second marriage, although she left only a weakly heir to continue the succession. He pathetically told Philip that he had but one son, and wished to have no more. Each morning began with a mass for the soul of the dead Empress. On his death-bed he called for her picture; in his last half-hour of

life he pressed her crucifix to his breast until he could no longer hold it. This was his tribute to the wife whom he had married for money and convenience. His brother Ferdinand's rapidity of thought and action frequently annoyed him, and in later years there were causes for rancour and suspicion; nevertheless, the brotherly affection was retained. From his nephew and son-in-law, Maximilian, Charles parted on affectionate terms, though he must have attributed to him the great disappointment of his life—his failure to secure for Philip the succession to the Empire. The pleasure of his daughter's and son-in-law's last visit was, he wrote to Ferdinand, only far too short. The correspondence with his sister Mary proves how thoroughly they loved each other. Mary, perhaps the most capable and autocratic member of her family, never shrank from speaking her mind strongly and decisively. Charles rarely answered with a sharp word, and, if he did, the letter which followed contained the salve.

The correspondence of Philip II., published by Gachard, threw a new light upon one who had passed for an ogre, turning our eyes from the monastic barrack of the Escurial to the daffodils and singing birds of Aranjuez. These tastes were hereditary, for Philip's father loved pet birds and beasts, including a parrot and two Indian cats. To him, too, our gardens owe the Indian pink, which he sent home to Spain from the shores of Tunis. When a basket of carnations was given to him at Yuste, he thanked God for making so beautiful a flower. Charles also had his soft side for children. The reader may remember his kissing the pretty little Piccolomini child, as he rode into Siena in 1536. His letter on the death of his little Danish nephew, "the prettiest little fellow for his age that it was possible to

see," was drawn straight from the wellspring of the heart. There is, too, a touch of humour in his grief,— "without offence to God, I could wish that his father (the disreputable Christian II.) was in his stead welcomed to the kingdom of heaven." The condolences conclude, "I am writing to my little nieces to console them . . . there is no other cure but to find them two husbands." In the case of Christina the cure was worse than the disease, for Charles insisted on her marriage with a very poor creature, the sickly Duke of Milan. The sacrifice of this young girl and of his favourite sister Eleanor are blots upon his life. The treatment of Queen Juana has been considered heartless, but Charles as a child had never known his mother; from earliest youth he had been taught to believe her a danger to his country's welfare and his own. Insanity was in Spain regarded as a Divine punishment for sin, and the anti-religious form which Juana's mania took may well have given colour to this belief. Charles visited her regularly, and in a nature so reserved it is difficult to sound the depths of feeling. Juana lived to the very eve of her son's abdication. His letter describing her death to Ferdinand showed heartfelt joy that at the end the cloud had lifted from the darkened mind, and that with her last breath she had called upon her Saviour.

A powerful ruler has seldom been so modest, so willing to confess his faults and foibles. Charles accepted in all humility the frank criticisms of the Chapter of the Golden Fleece upon his character and methods of government, upon his slowness, his lack of sufficient counsellors, and the consequent waste of personal energy on unnecessary detail.[1] His late confessor, Loaysa, could be outspoken in his references to the

[1] See Baron de Reiffenberg, *Histoire de l'Ordre de la Toison d'Or*, 1830.

perpetual struggle between glory and indolence. Writing in 1530 he prayed that by God's mercy the love of honour might in future overcome with less difficulty the Emperor's natural enemy, the inclination to enjoy himself and waste the greater part of his time without purpose. Charles himself had no shame in confessing to his son the weaknesses for which he had been blamed. He was as conscious of his obstinacy as of his irresolution. "I am by nature," he said to Contarini, "obstinate in sticking to my opinions." "To hold fast to good opinions," replied the Cardinal, "is not obstinacy, sire, but firmness." "Ah! but I sometimes stick to bad ones," honestly rejoined the Emperor. Nevertheless, though substantially modest, he had no mean idea of his own abilities. He was peculiarly sensitive as to the opinion which had outlived his earliest days of rule—that he was governed by his ministers. In his interview with Coligny after his abdication he frankly classed himself with Alba and Montmorenci as being the three best generals living, politely adding that Coligny and the Duke of Guise would rise to eminence if they took sufficient pains.

The champion of Catholicism was no theologian. It is doubtful if he ever really understood the doctrinal points at issue, and not without reason the Papal nuncios might regard this as a danger in the formal religious conferences. Of his chief ministers Gattinara was a professed Erasmian, the elder Granvelle an Erasmian or indifferentist. Alonso Valdés was an official pamphleteer against the Papacy. Carranza, Archbishop of Toledo, who ministered to Charles upon his deathbed, was very shortly the victim of the Inquisition. The Holy Office never authorised and finally condemned the book on Christian doctrine by Constantino Fuentes, which was

dedicated to Charles and was one of his favourites at Yuste. Yet no one doubted Charles's personal piety, unless it were a Pope drunk with passion, or heated with full-bodied Neapolitan wine. His religion was of the heart rather than of the head, and he had the sense to realise that without adequate exercise the heart ceases to perform its function. He heard two masses every day, and confessed and communicated six times a year. Long hours of prayer preceded each dangerous enterprise. Bucer might scoff at the grovelling superstition fit only for old women, at the knees bent before the Virgin, at the hands busy with the beads. But when the Emperor arose from prayer it was the would-be Lutheran Duke of Cleves who was brought to his knees to mumble penitence. As Charles was about to cross the Elbe at Mühlberg he saw a crucifix with the arms of Christ sacrilegiously broken. "God grant," he cried, "that I may avenge Thy wrongs!" and with a vengeance did he indeed avenge them. In his view of Christianity there was doubtless less of reason than of manhood. He may at least claim to have set a high standard in religion as in morals, and to have made strenuous if not always successful efforts to attain to it.

Dalla messa alla mensa—from mass to mess! This was the summary of the Emperor's life current in Italy. The transit was short, but the downward gradient very steep. Charles, was, indeed, wholly free from the drunkenness which, as he complained, made German noblemen unfit for business. Yet this was, perhaps, due to strength of head rather than of character. Ascham describes him as emptying five times during dinner a flagon containing nearly a quart of Rhine wine. Other authorities quote a lower score, but, however this may be, his self-indulgence at table marks a curious

contradiction in his character. His general power of self-control was from the first notorious, yet over his appetite he had no more command than has a greedy child. To this he deliberately sacrificed his life. When tortured by gout he would obey his doctors, and do everything to get well. When once recovered, he lived as though he could never be ill again; returning to the highly-spiced dishes, the disgusting sausages, the forbidden fish, the early morning draughts of ale which had been placed outside the window for the frosty night to cool. The five o'clock beer was followed by a bowl of chicken broth, improved by milk, sugar, and spices. At midday he ate a heavy dinner—roast mutton, for instance, succeeding large slices of beef, followed in turn by braised hare, and that by chicken—all, as writes a Venetian envoy, being bolted, for he could not chew. After Vespers he would take a hasty snack, while midnight closed upon a substantial supper. When an Italian doctor warned him that he must give up beer, he flatly answered that he would not. Against this gluttony his affectionate confessor Loaysa remonstrated when Charles was little more than thirty. His faithful attendant, Guillaume van Male, made regretful references to it in his private letters during the last years in Germany; it is the theme of those who recounted the closing scene at Yuste. "Surely," sighed Luis de Quijada, on seeing his disobedient master devour oysters, "kings must think that their stomachs are not made like other men's."

Spaniards blamed Charles for introducing the elaborate extravagance of the Burgundian Court. His personal tastes, however, wrote Navagero in 1546, were simple; his clothes, his table, his kennel and his stables were those of a modest prince rather than of a mighty

emperor. He would spend lavishly on great objects, but grudged a ducat for superfluities. There is a good deal of evidence as to his economy in dress. In 1541 he is described as coming into Italy in a bad hat and threadbare clothes. Yet he was careful with his head-gear, for when it came on to rain at Naumburg he sent into the town for an old cap and put his new one under his arm. Mocenigo wrote in 1548 that he was most economical in his person, thinking it folly to give more than 200 crowns for a fur; he often had his clothes mended, knew every detail, and missed a straying shirt or handkerchief. It was, however, said that Charles took this line or purpose to counteract the insensate passion for dress among the gentry. He would wear, for instance, in Germany a fustian cap and a woollen costume not worth a crown, all of one colour, and so all the great lords did likewise. At this same time his court and table were very cheaply run; his household was often without pay for a year, and his pages so rarely had new liveries that they were in rags. Indifference as to dress, as with other men, probably grew upon the Emperor after marriage, for the costumes of earlier days might be envied by modern German royalty. During twenty months of 1519 and 1520 he ordered fifty-three pairs of stockings and one hundred and sixty-three pairs of shoes and slippers—a handsome allowance even for a newly-elected Cæsar.

Impolite ambassadors reported that the Emperor ate too much and took too little exercise. His midnight supper was not provocative of early rising. Cold and moist elements, it was scientifically stated, prevailed in his constitution. He, therefore, loved warmth, riding in full sun in summer, and hugging the stove in winter. He was a fine horseman, and in his youth played a more

than creditable part in tournaments. He had hunted bear and wolf in the mountains of Granada and Castile, and had faced the boar of his native forests. Bad health early robbed him of the passion or the ability for hunting, which tempted so many contemporary princes into restless, useless lives. His delight was to ramble, gun in hand, by himself or with a few companions, and this rather for the pleasure of seeing wild animal life than of shooting a bird or two. Within a year of his death the pigeons in the woods at Yuste would courteously pretend to be frightened at his shots.

Like many grave men, Charles took pleasure in others' jests, or even in his own. His major-domo was a noted humorist, while the Spanish buffoon Perico enjoyed a sometimes dangerous license. From Coligny's suite during the Embassy of 1556 the Emperor singled out the French jester, Brusquet, and laughingly admitted that in the exchange of banter the amateur had come off second best. During this same interview he gave proof of a humour both playful and pathetic. When with great difficulty his distorted fingers broke the seal of the French king's letter, he said to Coligny, "What think you of me, Sir Admiral? Am I not a fine knight to charge and break a lance, I who can only open a letter after so much trouble?" Then, hearing that Henry II. had already some few grey hairs, he told how on his return from Tunis he was anxious to please the notoriously pretty Neapolitan ladies, for, after all, he was a man, so he called his barber to dress his hair. "Take all those out, and don't leave one," he cried, as he saw two or three grey hairs. But some time after, on looking in his glass, he found that for each white hair removed three more had grown. "If," concluded Charles, "I had made the barber take these out also, in

less than no time I should have been white as a swan." Another jest he used to make at the expense of his own plain features and the portrait painter's art. He was, he said, by nature ugly, but as the artists usually painted him uglier than he really was, he agreeably disappointed those who expected to find a plainer man.

Although, or perhaps because, badly educated, Charles became, in Van Male's words, an insatiable reader. Originally his bent was for romances of chivalry and chronicles. Monstrelet's history was an early companion, as befitted the lord of Burgundy, and it is said that he called the Memoirs of Commines his breviary. In the troubled years from 1550 onwards his reading was more theological. With Van Male's help he made some progress in the Vulgate, and was devoted to Maccabees, Esdras, Daniel and any prophecies about the end of the world. He would tell his reader to write for copies of Philo and Josephus. It was one of Van Male's duties to try and read his master to sleep, for he suffered terribly from insomnia, while sometimes his asthma would keep him sitting upright at his table the whole night through. To these years belong his literary labours. In his boat on the Rhine he composed his *Commentaries*, which Van Male prepared to translate into the Latin of Livy, Cæsar, Suetonius and Tacitus combined. Now also he translated his favourite book, the *Chevalier délibéré* of Olivier de la Marche, into Spanish, and wished Fernando d'Acuña to versify it, and Van Male to undertake the publication of 2000 copies, much to the latter's alarm, for he saw more straw than harvest in the costly if flattering task. The selection of some thirty volumes which were taken to Yuste comprised Cæsar's Commentaries in Italian, the war in Germany, by Luis de Avila, the *Chevalier délibéré*, Boethius in French, Italian

and Spanish, part of the MS. of Ocampo, the court historian, and several books of meditation and commentaries on the Psalms.

Apart from his love of reading, Charles was what would now be called eminently intelligent, especially in commercial matters and mechanical inventions. He was a firm believer in the future of the American trade, and wished to give it far more freedom than his Spanish subjects would allow. He strongly advised Philip to grant no permanent concessions, for though they might then be of trifling value, they might reach untold proportions. Cardinal Contarini was in 1541 astonished at his conversance with cartography, and his wonderful knowledge of geography. About the same time, a member of his household wrote to his sister Mary on his great pleasure in maps, and maps were among his few treasured possessions at Yuste. Heine once found his breakfast of smoked herrings (*Bückinge*) made the pleasanter by the thought that the Emperor after his abdication had travelled from Middelburg to Bievlied in Zealand merely to see the grave of William Bücking, to whom commerce and gastronomy owed so much. Every one has read of the mania of Charles for the mechanism of clocks, and the very most recent periodical on submarine navigation reminds us that he is said to have taken an interest in the experiments made with a diving apparatus at Toledo in 1538.

A fine taste for art seemed inborn in Charles. Before he ever set foot in Italy he had summoned Italian architects and sculptors to build the splendid renaissance palace at Granada, which was destined to remain unfinished. On his first Italian visit he is found spending his time in the churches and monasteries of Mantua to see the pictures. Here he interviewed Frà

Damiano, the artist in *intarsia*, and Parmigianino. He thoroughly examined the Gonzaga galleries, and after seeing a portrait of Federigo Gonzaga, with unerring instinct selected Titian as the Court painter of the future. His close relations with the great master lasted for twenty years; but he in vain pressed Titian to accompany him to Tunis, and was forced to be content with the services of Vermeyer. When Charles retired to Yuste, he could not be parted from his masterpieces, and, indeed, the *Trinity* was ordered in 1550 with an express view to his withdrawal from the world. Music was a passion from boyhood. The Emperor's choir was the best in Europe. To his choristers he was most generous, for when their voices broke he would educate them for three years, and afterwards, if they recovered voice, he would give them the preference for places in his chapel. Wherever the Emperor went, even were it to Tunis, his choir and its organs accompanied him; he could find no better present to give to his Aunt Margaret than a portfolio of Mass music. As he could detect a false note among the singing friars at Yuste, so he could point out the plagiarisms in the Mass composed for him by Guerrero. The Emperor's reflections on the parentage alike of the eclectic composer and the discordant choirman would scarcely bear the publicity of print. In secular music Charles's taste was sentimental, if it may be judged from his favourite song, *Mille regrets*, which has been preserved.

If any one would know the Emperor's outer man, he must have recourse to Titian's glorious portraits. Although Charles was undeniably plain, and of no great stature, although his under jaw protruded and his complexion was colourless, yet he never failed to strike a

strange ambassador with a sense of his royal dignity. So it was, as several eye-witnesses could prove, when he received the news of the victory of Pavia, and so it was when he put himself at the head of his troops for the campaign of 1544. It is not given to every man when old and ill and sore of lip to stamp an impression such as Sir Richard Morosyne bore away from his interview in the autumn of 1552. Charles had no adventitious trappings to give him presence. He was sitting at a bare table without carpet or anything else upon it save his cloak, his brush, his spectacles and his picktooth. He could only speak with difficulty, for his lower lip was broken in two places, and at his tongue's end he had a green leaf, a remedy, as Morosyne took it, "against such his dryness, as in his talk did increase upon it." The envoy was received with many gentle words, the Emperor concluding with the phrase that old amities, which had been long tried and found good, were to be made of. "And this," reported Morosyne, "he spake a little louder than he did the rest, as tho' he would indeed have me think that he did earnestly mean that he said: and yet hath he a face unwont to disclose any hid affection of his heart, as any face that ever I met with in all my life; for where all white colours, which, in changing themselves, are wont in others to bring a man certain word how his errand is liked or misliked, have no place in his countenance, his eyes only do betray as much as can be picked out of him. He maketh me oft think of Solomon's saying,—'Heaven is high; the earth is deep; a king's heart is unsearchable.' There is in him almost nothing that speaks beside his tongue; and that at this time, by reason of his leaf and soreness of his lip, and his accustomed softness in speaking, did but so-so utter things to be well understood, without great care

to be given to his words: and yet he did so use his eyes, so move his head, and order his countenance, as I might well perceive his great desire was that I should think all a good deal better meant than he could speak it."[1]

Charles was very ill and anxious at this time, for the fateful siege of Metz was just beginning. Yet in Morosyne's description may be seen something of the gentle courtesy, the eagerness to convince, the brightness of eye, and the immobility of the facial lines which were the theme of so many an envoy in younger and less careworn days. No reasonable being ever said that the Imperial dignity did not befit the Emperor.

Such a man, then, was Charles V.; if not a highly dramatic personality, yet by no means a lay figure, nor even the inevitable stage king. He was not quite a great man, nor quite a good man, but, all deductions made, an honourable Christian gentleman, striving, in spite of physical defects, moral temptations and political impossibilities, to do his duty in that state of life to which an unkind Providence had called him. It was not his fault if,—to alter a single word of Morosyne's conclusion,—"all was a good deal better meant than he could do it."

[1] *England under the Reigns of Edward VI and Mary.* By P. F. Tytler, vol. ii. pp. 135-137.

APPENDIX

NOTE TO VOL. I. chap. viii. p. 193. — The publication of the correspondence of the Prince of Orange by M. Robert is unfortunately not yet quite complete; the February number of the Boletín concluding with Charles V.'s important letter of October 9, 1529. The Emperor's letters and instructions are printed from the originals, most of which are at Vienna, whereas those published by A. Bardi, relating to the siege of Florence, are derived from the copies or very full abstracts preserved at Brussels. The correspondence of the Prince is of first-rate value on all questions connected with the settlement of Italy at this critical period. With regard to Florence it is made clear that Charles wished at once to be loyal to his engagements to the Pope, and to come to an amicable arrangement with the city. He was prepared even to negotiate privily with the Florentines behind the Pope's back for a preliminary understanding, and instructed Orange to delay his march. It must not be assumed that Charles was acting from humanitarian motives. The important instructions given to Vaury on October of 1529, and the letter to the Prince of the same date, prove that the Emperor was mainly actuated by the westward advance of the Sultan. He said plainly that the Pope's obstinacy with regard to Florence and the Duke of Ferrara would hinder the settlement of Italy, and imperil the orthodoxy and the very existence of Christendom; he was prepared even to compensate the Pope by slices of Milanese territory. Charles, in fact, needed Orange's army and the largest sum which could be extracted from Florence for the defence of the Austrian frontier. It is noticeable that in this question, as in Charles's eagerness to hurry on his coronation at Bologna, the subject of German heresy is merely touched; the real issue is resistance to the Turk. The Emperor's desire for compromise at this moment and his later desire to mitigate the vengeance of the Pope go far to prove that Florence

owed her misfortunes not to the alien and hybrid house of Habsburg, which restored prosperity with a legitimate line of Medici, but to an amalgamation of bastards or extremely dubious scions of that family.

NOTE TO VOL. I. chap. xiii.—W. Friedensburg uses important unpublished reports by Granvelle in his article, *Zur Geschichte des Wormser Konvents*, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 1900-1901.

NOTE TO VOL. II. chap. i. pp. 17-23.—While this volume was passing through the press, I enjoyed the privilege of reading the proof-sheets, relating to my subject, of Mr. R. B. Merriman's forthcoming book, *Thomas Cromwell: His Life and Letters*. The foreign policy of the English minister and his master is here fully and lucidly set forth.

I have omitted, by an unfortunate accident, to acknowledge my obligations to P. Friedmann's well-known work, *Anne Boleyn, a Chapter of English History, 1527-36*, 1884.

NOTE TO VOL. II. chap. iv. pp. 109-113.—Some mention should certainly have been made of the mission of Ruy Lopez de Villalobos to the Philippines, since it had a peculiarly governmental character. The expedition was originally projected by Pedro de Alvarado, governor of Guatemala, but on his death it was despatched from Mexico in 1542 by Antonio de Mendoza under detailed instructions from the Crown. Villalobos it was who first gave the name Filipina to the island of Leyte, while he christened Mindanao Cesarea Caroli. In defiance of his instructions Villalobos wintered in the Moluccas, and even began the construction of a fort, calling down upon himself the remonstrances and then the active hostility of the Portuguese governor. The Portuguese, indeed, even claimed the island of Mindanao as being a complement rather of the Moluccas than of the Philippines. Abortive as the expedition proved, it is interesting as showing Charles's deliberate intention to occupy the Philippines and adjoining groups, and as illustrating the governmental instructions for such missions. Villalobos was ordered to take precautions that the Indians were not in any way maltreated, nor their pigs or other domestic animals killed, nor their houses entered for fear of trouble about their women; he must not, however, put faith in native friendliness, and his captains should avoid, as far as possible, native banquets where there was drinking. The morals of the crews, consisting of nearly 400 men, were, as usual, watched over by

Friars. The penalties for blasphemy were particularly severe, rising from imprisonment on half rations to two years in the galleys or marooning on a desert island.

The Hakluyt Society has published in No. 52, *The First Voyage round the World by Magellan, translated from the Accounts of Pigafetta and other Contemporary Writers*, 1874. Reference may also be made to the interesting volume of F. H. H. Guillemard, *The Life of Ferdinand Magellan* in the series, The World's Great Explorers, 1890.

NOTE TO VOL. II. chap. vii. pp. 177-180.—An interesting monograph on Pierluigi Farnese has been written by F. de Navenne, in the *Revue Historique*, Nov.-Dec. 1901 and Jan.-Feb. 1902. The writer has a bad opinion of the Papal *nipote*, but disbelieves in the tradition that amours were the immediate cause of the conspiracy of his nobles. The subject is throughout treated with much good sense and sobriety.

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